Reflexions upon ancient and modern philosophy, moral and natural. Treating of the Aegyptians, Arabians, Gretians, Romans, &c. philosophers; as Thales, Zeno, Socrates, Plato, Pythagoras, Aristotle, Epicurus, &c. Also of the English, Germans, French, Spanish, Italian, &c. As Bacon, Boyle, Descartes, Hobbes, Vanhelmont, Gassendus, Galilens, Harvey, Paracelsus, Marsennus, Digby, &c. Together with the use that is to be made thereof. Licensed, Octob. 4. 1677. Ro. L' Estrange.

Reflexions ON PHILOSOPHY in General.

THE Name of Philoso∣pher, how simple and modest soever it be, seemed heretofore so glorious and lovely to the Learned of ancient Times, that they preferr'd it to the most splendid and lofty Titles. That love of Wisdom and study of Vertue, whereof they made Profession, raised them to such Authority over the minds of men, that their Example served for instruction, and their Maxims were re∣ceived

as Oracles by the publick. Great men asked them Counsel in the Af∣fairs of weightiest importance: Cities and Provinces submitted to their con∣duct; and Kings themselves reckoned it their glory to be their Disciples. It is true Philosophy taught Pythago∣ras the integrity of manners and au∣sterity of life, which gained him so many Followers. It was Philosophy that made Empedocles refuse a Crown, and prefer a private and quiet life to all the magnificence of Grandeur. By Philosophy Democritus was raised to the contemplation of Nature, and re∣nounced bodily pleasures, that he might more peaceably enjoy the de∣lights of the Soul. Philosophy taught Socrates to dye without haughtiness or weakness: and though in the death of Cato, who affected too much the Philo∣sopher, there appeared less modesty and tranquillity; yet therein are also to be seen the lineaments of a greatness of mind, which made him despise life. So that there being hardly any action of constancy and stedfastness in Paganism,

which was not animated by Philoso∣phy: It may be said, that it was in some manner the principle and source of the purest vertue of Heathens.

II.

The Egyptians, who were the first Philosophers in the world, gave so my∣sterious a garb to their Philosophy, that they made it pass with the People for a part of their Religion: Nor did any thing advance it more in authority with the publick, or give it greater credit among the Learned. But their Priests had no other end in shrowding their Observations of Nature, under the Veil of their Hieroglyphicks, but to keep them from the knowledge of the people, and thereby to distinguish themselves from the vulgar. As they propagated their Philosophy only by Tradition, and did not willingly com∣municate their knowledge to other people; so (as Strabo observes) there is but little known of their true Doctrine. The truth is, all that is said of Philo∣sophy, before it became to be known in Greece, hath so little foundation;

and all the discourses that are found of it in the Fragments of Sotion, Hermippus and Hermodorus, whereof Diogenes Laertius makes mention, aswell as in the Dialogue of Lucian's Fugitives, are so fabulous, that I intend only, as to what concerns the beginning thereof, to adhere to that which is to be found in History, that I may give a more cer∣tain account of the same. Besides, that mysterious Philosophy of the E∣gyptians, is so little different from that of Pythagoras, that the method and principles of both are almost the same; as appears by what Plutarch tells us in several of his works, Jamblicus in the life of Pythagoras, Selden, and some others who have treated on that sub∣ject.

III.

The Grecians, who shewed greater passion for the discovery of truth, than other Nations, gave themselves so ear∣nestly to the observation of Nature, that from Thales to Plato there were more Truths concerning Natural Phi∣losophy discovered, than in the Ages

following. It must be acknowledged likewise, that Philosophy in its infan∣cy began to produce so great wits, and that it shewed so much reason in its primitive famblings, that its first rudiments served for principles, and even for models to the following Ages. By long and constant study men ob∣served the motion of the Heavens, di∣stinguished their revolutions, framed the first Ideas of a Coelestial Systeme, discovered the obliquity of the Zodi∣ack, unfolded the most hidden things of Nature, and drew that Curtain wherewith Providence had hid the greatest part of its secrets, to present them to men as a matter of meditati∣on and enquiry. And amongst those that laboured in the search of these Ve∣rities, Thales, Anaximander, Anaxa∣goras, Heraclitus, Hippocrates, Demo∣critus, Empedocles, and Archelaus, ob∣tained the greatest reputation. Plu∣tarch, who in the second Tome of his Works gives the History of their Opi∣nions, does indeed show the contradicti∣ons and absurdities whereinto for most

part they fell: Nevertheless they still deserve the praise to have been the first that ventured upon that so difficult an attempt, and by unknown Paths traced the way to those that followed them, rendring themselves conside∣rable to Posterity, by the founda∣tion they laid to Sciences. Justin in his History observes, that whilst study and meditation made Philosophers in Greece, Nature alone without any as∣sistance made the like amongst the Bar∣barians in the middle of Scythia; as appears in Abaris and Anacarsis, of whom Apuleius speaks, who without precepts and discipline attained to Wisdom.

IV.

To speak then properly, Thales and Pythagoras were the two Founders of the ancient Philosophy; the one in Greece, and the other in Italy. There appeared in the School of Pythagoras somewhat more regular and better established, than in that of Thales and his Successors. As in the Do∣ctrine of Pythagoras every thing was

made mysterious; so submission was its principal Character: that religious silence which with so much rigour he made his Disciples observe, was an art to procure himself a more respect∣ful attention. The life of that Philo∣sopher, as well as his Doctrine, is at this day still a great subject of contro∣versie: he was indeed a man of a deep reach, a quick and penetrating appre∣hension, and of indefatigable industry and application. His usual way of teaching, was by Geometry and Num∣bers: he explained material and sensi∣ble things by Geometry, and intelle∣ctual by Musick and Numbers. He was of too solid a judgment, to imagine any reality in Numbers, which are but only intentional Beings, as Aristotle proves in his Metaphysicks. It is true he found so great a facility in explaining the perfection of every thing by har∣mony and proportion, after the man∣ner of the Egyptians, that he expressed himself no other way: and that he made use of Numbers as of Symbols and Signs to teach with: and all that

Science of Numbers, which was so fa∣miliar to Pythagoras, is to this day still a kind of mystery, whereof the secret is not very well known. Jamblicus in the life of that Philosopher says, that he invented a musick proper for the cure and quieting of the Passions. In his Moral Philosophy there is nothing regular; only fair Maxims without Principles: his Natural Philosophy is the same almost with that of the Pla∣tonists. His Doctrine of two Princi∣ples, the one of good and the other of evil, on which the Manichees built their belief, is false; for of real Beings there is but one real Principle. Pytha∣goras in Plutarch boasts, that the great∣est fruit which he had reaped from Phi∣losophy was, not to wonder at any thing: because that Philosophy disco∣vered to him the cause of every thing, as Horace expresses it to Numicius,

Nil admirari prope res est una Numici.

In fine, Pythagoras had so extraordi∣nary a genius for Philosophy, that all

the other Philosophers have gloried to stick to his sentiments: Socrates and Plato have hardly any thing that is good but from him. And if we con∣sider more narrowly, we shall even find, that amongst all other Sects almost, there is somewhat of the Spirit of Py∣thagoras that bears rule.

V. SOCRATES.

Socrates was the first that began to reduce into method the confused Ideas of those that went before him, by ranking the Observations which he had made of Nature, in a more regular order, that he might shape them into Arts and Sciences. Though he had all the charms of wit, which flow from a pregnant genius and happy dispositi∣on, yet he wanted not depth, and all imaginable solidity. And that height of knowledge and understanding was accompanied with the true simplicity of a Child: When he applyed himself to every thing, he seemed not employ∣ed in any thing: He handled obscurest

matters in a pleasing strain; and his most serious meditations deprived him not of his good humour. As he ne∣ver affected to talk like a wit, but as a vertuous man, so his ordinary jests were noble. He was capable of every thing, and proud of nothing. His no∣tices, that gave instruction to others, and made them of Scholars become learned men, served only to puzle and entangle himself, by the doubts and uncertainties which they raised in him: And for all he was so rational, yet he too much distrusted his Reason. The fertility of his wit so choaked his discerning, that his different views led him into irresolution. By his ingenui∣ty in declaring on all occasions, that he knew nothing, he rendred the other Philosophers of his time ridiculous, who brag'd that they knew every thing: And the ignorance he made profession of, acquired him greater re∣putation than all his knowledge. He suffered those that disputed with him to take all the advantage over him they pleased, that he might refute

them with so much the more authority, as he took the less. He procured an abso∣lute power over their sentiments, by the deference that he yielded to them: it was only by hiding his Opinion, that he forced others to follow it: And the Empire that he exercised over mens minds, was but an effect of the skill he had not to usurp any, by the indif∣ferency which he made appear for his own sentiments: as Cicero says, Socra∣tes ipse sibi detrahens, in disputatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. But as he was the head of all the Sects that followed him; so was he also in some manner the Founder of all the doubts that arose amongst them. For his Reasonings tended commonly to the baffling of Reason: And as he esta∣blished Sciences, so he left occasion to overthrow them; because he taught his Scholars not so much to know, as to doubt of things. Not, but that for all this he much contributed to give Philosophy the Form it hath taken since: For he it was that drew the first draught of Logick and Moral Philo∣sophy,

and gave Principles to Natu∣ral Philosophy: But by prying into this, according to the quality of his wit, with too much quaintness, he re∣fined every thing so much, that he handled these matters with less solidity than his Successors. Not, but that his judgment is also of great authority, when he affirms any thing; but his Sentiments are rather Principles than Decisions: and all things rightly con∣sidered, his Philosophy is more proper to overthrow than establish. He had moreover with his simplicity a great Soul; for Lysias having read to him in his Prison a Discourse that he had made in his defence, he chose rather to dye than make use of it; because it de∣fended him not with dignity enough: and so he dyed sedately and in cold blood, which amazed his Judges.

VI. PLATO.

Plato has the smoothest tongue of Antiquity, and takes pleasure to make men hear him attentively, though

he is not much concerned whether they believe him or not: he is always florid, but not always solid. The false relish that was then in vogue, through the credit of the Sophists, obliged him to that flourish of expression which he used. He is witty, quick, and elegant, and as ingenious as man can be; and with little coherence and method, he observes in his discourse a secret oeco∣nomy which fails not to hit the mark. And seeing he teaches only by way of Dialogue, that he may follow a free and disengaged stile, which has the air of Conversation; he is rich in Prefa∣ces, and magnificent in his entry on Discourses; but he decides but little, no more than Socrates, and establishes almost nothing at all. However what he says is so naturally exprest, that no∣thing can be imagined more taking. The slight matters which he mingles with great in his discourses, and the trifles wherewith he circumstantiates what is essential and weighty in the subjects he treats of, render him allu∣ring; and it is by that way alone that he

amuses. But through the great desire he hath to be pleasing, he is too much for telling of wonders: most part of his discourses are nothing else but Fa∣bles, Metaphors, and continual Alle∣gories; he affects often to be mysterious in what he says, that he may keep him∣self the more within the verge of his Character; and it is commonly by ly∣ing that he undertakes to perswade truth. Rhodiginus pretends that his sense is more to be minded than his words, which are often allegorical. Moreover he was too much a Politici∣an for a Philosopher: For in one of his Letters to Dionysius of Siracusa he ac∣knowledges, that he published none of his Maxims, but under the name of Socrates, that he might not be account∣able for his own Doctrine, in a time when the nicety of the People of Athens was offended at every thing. The condemnation of Socrates made him so cautious, that to be in good terms with the Publick, and to dispos∣sess the People of the opinion, that he was addicted to the Sentiments of his

Master, he turned Pythagorean. Though he was a man of vast capacity, (for, what did he not know, says Quinti∣lian?) and had a wonderful Ge∣nius for Sciences, whereof he speaks always better than others did; yet it must be acknowledged, that he gave greater reputation to Philosophy, by the conduct of his Life and Vertue, than by his Doctrine: For he it was that first taught, that true Philosophy consisted more in Fidelity, Constancy, Justice, Sincerity, and in the love of ones Duty, than in a great Capacity. After his death his Disciples so altered his Doctrine, and filled his School with such rigid Opinions, that scarcely could there be known amongst them the least print of the true Doctrine of Plato: which was divided into so ma∣ny Sects, as there started up Philoso∣phers in the Ages following.

VII. ARISTOTLE.

Aristotle is a Wit so far above others, that few know him: For by an unpa∣rallel'd

reach of understanding he soars above the highest: He is an Eagle that mounts so high, that men easily lose sight of him; and there is so much force in his thoughts, so great eleva∣tion in his sentiments, that he cannot be followed. He it was who first col∣lected the several parts of Philosophy, that he might unite them into one bo∣dy, and reduce them to a compleat Sy∣steme. No man had ever so great a discerning of truth and falshood, as that Philosopher; for he not only di∣ved into Reason, that he might disco∣ver it, under what cloud soever it hid it self; but upon discovery thereof, had the art to make it even perceptible to others in all its force, and intelligi∣ble in its full extent: so happy and pe∣netrating was his genius. By that qua∣lity of mind he became so exact an ob∣server of the Works of Nature, that Plato called him, the Genius of Nature, as if Nature had made use of his Spi∣rit as an instrument to discover her Se∣crets. In all his sentiments there spar∣kles a sage and judicious Character,

which always satisfies the mind; so regular and solid he is: and there is hardly ever any thing said reasonably in Philosophy, which bears not some signature and impression of the spirit of Aristotle. So that all the Judg∣ments that have been made on his Do∣ctrine in succeeding Ages, have only differed according to the greatness and mediocrity of light and knowledge, that have swayed them: For in a word, none have given greater weight to hu∣mane Reason, nor carried it farther than Aristotle. His method is more so∣lid than that of all others, because his principles are better founded on Rea∣son, and his Reason more grounded on Experience. But when he speaks, one cannot tell whether it be to hide his doubts, or to make himself reve∣renced, that he is obscure. It seems he writes only that he may not be un∣derstood; and that his Works are not so much to instruct his own Age, as to give exercise to the following: There∣fore it is, that Diogenes Laertius com∣pares him to that Fish that troubles the

Water for fear of being taken. But there is some Justice due to Aristotle, as to that reproach which is cast up∣on him: His obscurity is not so much the defect of his understanding, as of his subject matter; and in the manner how he fathoms things, it is not very easie to pierce the darkest clouds of Nature, to unfold her most hidden se∣crets, to dig into nothing but abysses, to walk only on precipices, not to pur∣sue truth but by ways unknown to all other heads, and to be intelligible to all men: And that is the reason that the discourses of Aristotle have always more politeness and force than perspi∣cuity; because he confines himself to a short and concise stile, the constraint whereof will not allow but a perplex∣ed elocution: And that is also the rea∣son that he writes in a manner more apt to amaze than perswade his Rea∣ders. One must have heard him, says Psellus, to be able to comprehend his Doctrine. He masked sometimes with an affected obscurity, what Pythagor as disguised under Symbols, and Plato

under Allegories. But in fine, there is so great a depth of judgment to be found in all that Aristotle said, when one can penetrate into it, that he is not to be found fault with, if he have not always the art to make himself be understood. It is in vain therefore, that a brood of stinted spirits have let flye against the reputation of that great man, under the conduct of Telesius, Patricius, Bacon, Campanella, and some others, to discredit his Doctrine in these last Ages; who by censuring Aristotle have pretended to be wiser than all the Ages and Nations that have esteem∣ed him.

VIII.

Philosophy did shortly after degene∣rate from the Nobility of its Extracti∣on, there being none in the following Ages that came near the knowledge of those great men who were its Foun∣ders; and that purity which it preser∣ved in its beginning, was quickly sul∣lied by the multitude of Sects that sprang up since. Then began Philoso∣phy to put on all the shapes and figures

which the passions of men gave it, ac∣cording to the different inclinations and various interests that prevailed in succeeding Ages. For besides that the School of Zeno was full of counterfeit Vertues, and that of Epicurus stuffed with real Vices, Philosophy became impious under Diagoras, impudent un∣der Diogenes, selfish under Demochares, censorious under Lyco, voluptuous un∣der Metrodorus, fantastical under Cra∣tes, licentious under Pyrrho, litigious under Cleantes, turbulent under Arce∣silas, and took the humour of a Buf∣foon under Menippus, and spirit of contradiction under Lacydes: In a word, it was abandoned to all the ramblings that the mind of man is capable of. The Philosophers themselves became jealous, envious, fickle, rash, unjust, passionate, and subject to the infirmi∣ties of the rest of Mankind. Then be∣gan men only to reason with reference to their humours, ambition, and in∣trigues: and in a short time, there was no foppery nor extravagancy, says Cicero, which had not some Philoso∣pher

for Author and Patron. Men fol∣lowed no more Reason but Passion; and made it their business more to maintain their Opinions with heats, than to defend the Truth with sinceri∣ty. The different interests of Sects who at that time laboured to over∣throw one another, by the opposition that was amongst their Ring-leaders, did not a little contribute to that dis∣order. The ancient School of Plato degenerated by the Sentiments of the new, into the Sect of Scepticks and Pyrrhonists, who doubted of every thing. And after the death of Theo∣phrastus, the School of the Peripate∣ticks remitted much of their applica∣tion to Natural Philosophy, that they might study Eloquence. And this was the revolution in Philosophy, which followed that of Greece: for since that it lost its liberty, under the Successors of Alexander, there arose but a few heads fit for the study of Nature, un∣der the Reign of the Ptolomies, who called the Learned to Alexandria, and obliged them to leave Greece. Nei∣ther

was there almost any other Philo∣sopher of note in any other part of the world, except some followers of Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, and Epicurus, who were in some vogue at Athens. The Learn∣ed that got greatest name elsewhere, were Athenodorus Keeper of the Libra∣ry of the Kings of Pergamus, who cor∣rected the Books of Zeno; Strato the Preceptor of Ptolomy Philadelphus; Ari∣steas that was sent by Ptolomy the Son of Lagus to Eleazar High Priest of Je∣rusalem; Zoilus, who made himself fa∣mous by his Criticismes on the Poems of Homer; Nicander the Physician of young Attalus, whose capacity Quin∣tilian admires; Eratosthenes, whose Fragments are cited by Plutarch, Athe∣naeus, Diogenes Laertius, and Clement of Alexandria; Apollonius of Rhodes, Li∣brary-Keeper to Ptolomy Evergetes; Ze∣nodotus who flourished under Ptolomy Soter, and some others. The jealousie it self which arose between the Kings of Alexandria and Pergamus, upon the fansie they took of raising Libraries, served only to discredit the Philosophy

of Aristotle; for the foolish emulation that these Princes had to make great Collections of Books, made them with∣out distinction give considerable re∣wards to all who brought them in the Books of Aristotle, as Galen assures us; and upon that account, such was the industry of Booksellers, that forty Vo∣lumes of Analyticks bearing the name of Aristotle were collected, though he never composed but four: And that confusion was the cause that the inter∣preters of that Philosopher were so puzled about the true distinction of his Books.

IX.

Philosophy was not known at Rome, till Civility had polished it. The three first Ages of that state were spent in the Conquest of Italy. Philosophy was then lookt upon as the Mother of lazi∣ness, which became odious in a Re∣publick where every one was usefully employed, as appears in a Fragment of Pacuvius. The love of Letters came to Rome by the Commerce which they had with the Grecians. Then it was

that the Romans became the Scholars of those whose Masters they were. For the Study of Philosophy was revived again even in Greece, by the persecu∣tion of one of the Ptolomy's, who ba∣nished from Alexandria the Philoso∣phers whom his Predeccssors had call∣ed thither: The greatest part of whom returned to Athens, where the con∣course of the Learned gave new heat to Studies by a flight of Wits that there signalized their Capacitie: Amongst whom the chief were Panetius the Tu∣tor of Lelius and Scipio, Polybius, Car∣neades, Clitomachus, Apollonius Molo Preceptor to Julius Caesar and Cicero, who by the noise of their fame drew to Athens the most flourishing Youth of Rome, for the study of Philosophy; and they occasioned even emulation among the Romans, who began to ap∣ply themselves thereto with earnest∣ness. Lucretius was the first that wrote there of Philosophy, as he himself af∣firms. Quintilian makes mention of one Varro of Gallia Narbonensis, that wrote on that subject. Terentius Varro,

whom Salust calls the learnedest of the Romans, was a great Philosopher. Vir∣gil was also one of the first that was delighted with the study of the works of Nature. But no man in that time exprest so great love for Philosophy as Cicero; for he wrote several Treatises thereon, he explained to Terentius Var∣ro the Doctrine of Plato and other Phi∣losophers in his Academicks: he wrote of the Moral Philosophy of the Stoicks and Epicureans to Brutus: he made a Discourse to Hortensius to excite him to the love of Philosophy, whereof St. Augustine makes mention. He wrote to Trebatius the Book of Topicks, which is a kind of Logick. In fine, the troubles of the Republick encrea∣sing daily, and Tyranny beginning to take rooting there, he retired into the Country, where he applyed himself so strenuously to the study of Philosophy, that in the opinion of Plutarch, he was prouder of being a Philosopher, than an Orator. Brutus likewise in imitation of Cicero wrote some Trea∣tises of Philosophy, which are lost:

And in this state was Philosophy at that time in Rome.

X.

Furthermore the Romans, who made appear great solidity of wit in what they undertook, adhered to the Philo∣sophy of the Grecians, and attempted not the invention of any new one; probably also, because their genius inclined them to Eloquence. How∣ever it be no partiality divided their minds into different Opinions: Gravity, which was the Character of their Nation, allowed not the weaknes∣ses which spring from dispute and pas∣sion. Old Cato who naturally despised every thing that was not truly Roman, could not endure that they should learn any thing from the Grecians: That made him give his vote, that with all possible diligence the three Grecian Phi∣losophers, Carneades, Diogenes, and Critolaus, deputed from Greece to the Senate, should be sent back again, for fear that the Roman Wits might be in∣fected with their Opinions. And it is to this also, that the Oracle in the sixth

Book of the Aeneides has a reference; which says, that the Grecians were to be greater Orators and Philosophers than the Romans:

Orabunt causas melius, coeli{que} meatus Describent radio, & surgentia sidera dicent.

As if Philosophy had not been altoge∣ther worthy of the Majesty of the Em∣pire. This also Horace insinuates after his manner, by the biting raillery which he jeers all the Sects with in his Satyrs: And by the Character of Offellus, in whom he represents the mark of a Ro∣man Philosopher, by praising in his person that grave, austere, and solid wisdom, which was perfected without any dependence on the Rules and Pre∣cepts which the Grecians so much e∣steemed.

Offellus abnormis sapiens crassa{que} mi∣nerva.

The Grecians were indeed more polish∣ed

and formal in all their ways of car∣riage than the Romans: but their man∣ners were not altogether so pure. This is the Idea that Quintilian formed of both. Cicero who understood the Opi∣nions of all the Philosophers, addict∣ed not himself to any. Young Cato was a Stoick meerly by Constitution. Caesar was a great Dialectician, eager in the pursuit of the knowledge of Nature, as he is represented by Lucan; but Epicurean as to his Morals, aswell as Pomponius Atticus. Horace was one of the Libertines in Philosophy, who agreed with all Sects, and was of none, That was commonly his Sect which suted best with his Affairs: For he changed and altered them as men change their humour: And so much he professed himself.

XI.

That smack of Philosophy, which common sense and sound judgment that then reigned seasoned Rome with, continued still under Augustus, a Prince of an even and solid wit. He had able Masters, as Suetonius saith; and by

his Philosophy he reigned with tran∣quillity enough, considering the vio∣lent Revolution that the Empire suf∣fered at that time. There was hatch∣ed at Rome during his Reign a new Sect of Philosophers, whereof Potamon of Alexandria was the Founder. That Phi∣losopher picked out all that was ratio∣nal in the Doctrine of the other Philo∣sophers, that he might compile it in∣to a Systeme; and therefore he called his Sect, the Sect of Eclecticks. It had scarcely any followers but amongst the Christians, as Clemens Alexandri∣nus assures us. The Tyranny that un∣der Tiberius and his Successors, began to domineer even over the minds and sentiments of men, changed the coun∣tenance of Philosophy, aswell as of the Government and Affairs. Most part of the persons of Quality became Stoicks, that they might have a Cha∣racter of stedfastness against the vio∣lences of Tiberius. So that bad for∣tune and disgrace made more Philoso∣phers, than the School or Closet; and men by being unfortunate became wise.

Caligula, Nero, and Domitian banish∣ed the Philosophers from Rome: and Nero by a fantastical appetite to Philo∣sophy, sent for Magician Philosophers from Arabia, to refine what he had learnt from Seneca. Seneca himself was a better Courtier than Philoso∣pher; his Morality was severe, but his Doctrine not very exact, as Quintilian observes. The truth is, Philosophy was in no great esteem in that time, wherein all things went by favour and complaisance; mens care was only how to please and flatter the Empe∣rours, and true merit being shut up in secret and in silence stirred not a∣broad. Philosophers were not now distinguished by Vertue and Doctrine, but by Habit and Grimaces; which were made use of to impose on the Publick, by disguising their real Con∣duct. In fine, men became Philoso∣phers by the Beard, when they left off to be so by Manners. As it appears by the accident that some time after hap∣pened to Herodes Atticus; A thing like a man wrapped up in a Cloak, with a

long Beard, presented it self to him: What ar't, said he? A Philosopher, re∣ply'd arrogantly the Fellow. I see, (said Herodes) the Cloak and Beard of a Phi∣losopher; but the Philosopher I see not yet.

XII.

The Study of Philosophy, which was grown contemptible under the first Emperours, through intrigue and policy which the Revolution of the State, and the weakness of new Go∣vernment produced, began to reflou∣rish under the Emperour Adrian, and his Successors, in such a manner, that these Princes themselves were proud of being Philosophers; and were pleased when they were flattered to be com∣plemented with that new Title. As it happened to Marcus Aurelius and Com∣modus, when Athenagoras and St. Ju∣stin, who were deputed by the Grecian Churches, to inform them of the Chri∣stian Religion, made their Harangues to them. Trajan who by his wit and inclination was already become favou∣rable to Learning; the Natural History

of Pliny, which was published in the time of Vespasian, and the Discourses of Dion Chrisostom, who composed Treatises of Moral and Natural Philo∣sophy, contributed to the reviving of that Spirit; which Plutarch, one of the wisest and most judicious Philosophers that ever was, inspired into the Em∣perour Adrian, whose Preceptor he was, as he had before done to Trajan; and his Works which were at the same time so favourably received of the pub∣lick, renewed in men a relish of Phi∣losophy: Wherein he was well second∣ed by Favorinus, Secretary to the Em∣perour, who by his Writings gave his Master jealousie; of whom Diogenes Laertius speaks so often, with an ho∣nourable Character. That love of Phi∣losophy which Adrian re-established at Alexandria, by the Learned whom he sent thither, continued under his Suc∣cessors, by the cares of Epictetus; who having withdrawn from Rome, for the horrour which he conceived of Domi∣tian's Reign, returned again in the time of Antonine, to whom he was Pre∣ceptor;

by the Writings of Arrianus his Scholar, Preceptor to Antoninus Pius; by the Works of Galen, Physi∣cian to the Emperours, and the finest Wit of those times; by those of Dio∣genes Laertius, Herodes Atticus the Di∣sciple of Favorinus, Pausanias, Aulus Gellius, Ptolomy that famous Astrono∣mer, Maximus of Tyre, one of the Preceptors of Marcus Aurelius, and of many other Learned men that followed them; as of Taurus of Berytus, Athe∣naeus, Alexander Aphrodiseus, Philostra∣tus, Plotinus, Apuleius and Porphyrius; who being encouraged by the Exam∣ple of Emperours, in these and the fol∣lowing Ages, revived the love of Phi∣losophy by their learned Works. In fine, it seems that the study of Truth began to be more valuable in a time, when the Oracles themselves began to lye. And Philosophy was so much in fashion in the time of Lucian, that he undertook in several parts of his Works to render Philosophers ridiculous, and chiefly in the Dialogues of the Battel of the Lapithes, the Sycophant —,

Icaromenippus, the Cynick and Fugi∣tives; the nipping Jests that he puts upon them on all occasions in imitation of Cratinus and Aristophanes, who play upon Pythagoras and Socrates, do suf∣ficiently evidence, that the opinion wherein they were held at that time, gave ground to raillery. The truth is, there was so counterfeit an outside in that Profession, and the name of Phi∣losopher was so horribly abused, that that Author who set up for the publick Censurer of the Manners of his time, had reason to make it one of the prin∣cipal subjects of his Satyr.

XIII.

But that Divine Philosophy which descended from Heaven, by the birth of JESUS CHRIST, being spread abroad in the world by the Doctrine and exemplary life of Christians, Pa∣gan Philosophy began to appear to men very frivolous; especially when they came to understand what was that Supreme Good, about which men had for so many Ages disputed in vain: and after that all-coelestial Mora∣lity

of the Gospel, wherein all the Wis∣dom of God appeared to be com∣prised, had been published in the world, it filled the minds of the Pagans with jealousie. For S. Paul having been desirous to speak before the Areopage of the Immortality of the Soul, and the resurrection of the Body, as of an indubitable truth, he was treated there with scorn and contempt, by the Philosophers who were then at Athens, who endeavoured to make him pass for a Babler. The spirit of Vani∣ty and Pride, which reigned most in the Heathen Philosophy, obliged that A∣postle to discredit it, by the advice he gave the Colossians, to take heed lest they should be misled by the vain rea∣sonings of Philosophers. Emulation encreased still more in succeeding times: For S. Austin, Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, and Eusebius employed all the force of their Eloquence, and all the ardour of their Zeal, to decry the foolish wisdom of Paganism: As the Heathens on the other hand began to declaim against our Religion, whereof

Lucian had the impudence to call the Author a Sophist, and Christians ig∣norant People; and Octavian in Mi∣nutius Felix reproached them for being wholly destitute of Learning. S. Au∣gustine in one of his Works refutes these Calumnies with all the vehe∣mence he could. But because at that time the Miracles wrought by Christi∣ans did much authorise their Doctrine, the Pagans had their recourse to Ma∣gick and Enchantments, to keep up their credit by such wicked Practices, when the usual ways failed them. That abominable fancy to Magick, had be∣fore that its beginning in those who made profession of Philosophy, under the first Emperours, by means of Anaxilaus and Nigidius Figulus, both Pythagoreans, whom Augustus banish∣ed, and of the Magician Philosophers whom Nero sent for from Arabia. It redoubled under Domitian by the im∣postures of Apollonius Thyanaeus, of whom Hierocles composed a Book, comparing his Miracles to the Miracles of JESUS CHRIST; and whose

Life Philostratus wrote on the same de∣sign; as Eunapius wrote the Lives of the Sophists, who were almost all Ma∣gicians, that he might oppose them to the life of Christians; because they gained the admiration of people, by their Vertue and Miracles which they wrought. The fancy to so detestable a Philosophy was encreased by the Do∣ctrine of Pythagoras, which was at that time in fashion, and whereof the followers became Necromancers, as appears by the reproach that Lucian casts on them in one of his Dialogues. But nothing gave so great a current to so idle a Philosophy, as the freakishness of the Emperour Julian, who giving his mind to all the horrid absurdities which the extravagance of his curiosi∣ty suggested to him, made an execra∣ble mixture of what was holy in our Religion with the impieties of Paga∣nism, that he might shape to himself an abominable Philosophy. And most part of the Philosophers of that time were Magicians, to please the Empe∣rour: Which appeared since in Apu∣leius

a Platonick Philosopher, who be∣ing accused of Magick by the Magi∣strates, defended himself no otherwise, than by a pretended connexion, which he alledged, of Philosophy with natural Magick. That abomination, which continued in the study of Philosophy until the time of Boetius, and whereof he purges himself, gave ground to the first beginnings of Cabalistick Philo∣sophy and Chymistry, as Delrio as∣sures us.

XIV.

By how much the Heathen Philoso∣phy fell into extravagancy, by all these excesses; so much that of Christians continued to advance to perfection in the search of Truth, aswell by the pu∣rity of its Doctrine, as the integrity of their Manners. It is reported, that Solon travelling in Egypt found there a Philosopher of the Country, who told him with a certain air of Authority, The Grecians, Solon, are but Children. Which happened to be but too true, in regard of the Heathens, when Chri∣stian Philosophy began to spread abroad

its light into the world: because hu∣mane Reason appeared in all its weak∣ness, before the beams of that divine brightness of Faith. But they who brought Philosophy in greatest vogue among the Christians, whether by their works, or the publick profession they made thereof, were Aristides, one of the most learned of those that flourish∣ed at Alexandria under the Emperour Adrian, Justin Martyr, Tatian, Athe∣nagoras, Bardesanes, Athenogenes, Apol∣linaris Bishop of Hieropolis, Melito Bi∣shop of Sardis, S. Irenaeus whom Ter∣tullian calls a man versed in all Sciences; Tertullian himself, who was obliged to study Philosophy to de∣fend Religion, which in the minds of the Pagans passed for a Sect of Philo∣sophy; Panthenus, who explained the Catechism to Christians in the School of Alexandria; Clement his Scholar, who having, through Greece and Egypt, in vain sought the wisdom of this world, learnt the wisdom of Heaven, in the School of blessed Panthenus; to whose place he succeeded in that fa∣mous

Chair of the Christian Schools; Origen, who succeeded to Clement, and who, that he might refute the Philoso∣pher Celsus, learned all the Opinions that were taught at that time; Lactan∣tius, who was ignorant of nothing of all the Sects of Philosophers; Arno∣bius, who with so great judgment wrote against the Gentiles; S. Gregory Nazi∣anzen, of whom Eusebius speaks with so many Elogies; Ammonius, who was esteemed by the Pagan Philosophers, and who was the first that taught Christians the Philosophy of Aristotle. To these great men, may be added S. Basil, who was the greatest Dialecti∣cian of his time, in the opinion of Gre∣gory Thaumaturgus; S. Chrysostom, who became as great a Philosopher as he was an Orator; S. Augustine, who, be∣sides the three Books he wrote against the Platonicks, made a Treatise of Dia∣lectick, which is to be found in the first Volume of his Works. I could name a great many more, who adorn∣ed that time with the lustre of their knowledge, authorising the Religion

which they preached by the purity of their lives; and making the dryest Thorns of Philosophy fructifie by the sacred streams of their Doctrine.

XV.

From this Sun-shine of Philosophy which at that time appeared, by the emulation of the Christians and Pa∣gans, men fell since into a gross air of barbarity and ignorance, which can∣not be sufficiently lamented. It was in those wretched times, when the Huns, Vandals, Goths, and Longobards broke in upon Italy. That disorder began by the burning of the Biblio∣theck of the Emperours, which hap∣pened at Constantinople, under the Em∣pire of Zeno; wherein Philosophy and the other Sciences were much concern∣ed, by the loss of more than sixscore thousand Volumes. The Arabians ha∣ving rendred themselves Masters of the world, by their Conquests in the fol∣lowing Ages, made a kind of revolu∣tion in Learning aswell as in the Em∣pire. The nature of their genius, which was subtil, plodding, and profound,

and tied them too literally to the Text of Aristotle, made them follow a kind of abstract reasoning, which did somewhat deviate from the solidity of the Greeks and Latines; and though there ap∣peared much subtilty in that way, yet it must be acknowledged, that that new strain of Reason seemed false, by the mistakes whereinto Avicenna, Al∣kindus, Algazel, Averroes, Alpharabius, Albohasen, and some others fell, of whom Possevin in the third Book of his Bibliotheck relates the Errours to an enormous number. Ludovicus Vives speaking of the Metaphysicks of Avi∣cenna, and the Philosophy of Aver∣roes, pretends that both look like the raveries of a wandring imagination, and the Visions of the Alcoran. And Thomas Aquinas in one of his Opuscles says, that Averroes was not so much a follower of Aristotle, which he pro∣fesses, as a corrupter of his Doctrine. But besides that, under the Arabians Philosophy became nice and full of quirks, by these precisions and ab∣stracted Notions which it introduced

into the Schools: It became also whol∣ly barbarous in its expressions; Rea∣son, if I may so say, having unlearned to shew it self under rational terms. It must be granted however, that the Arabians, by the quality of their geni∣us, and through the leisure which the prosperity of their Arms and Plenty afforded them, did so apply themselves to the study of the Mathematicks and Philosophy, that they became in that time the learnedest men in the world. And Averroes by the depth of his plodding genius, and the study of A∣ristotle, deserved to be called his Com∣mentator, and founded a Sect of Phi∣losophers under his own name; who opposed themselves to Aphrodiseus, Philoponus, and the rest of the Greci∣ans. Nevertheless as Averroes under∣stood not Aristotle but by a Translation not very exact, he fell himself into so horrible perversions of his sense, that Bagolinus a Philosopher of Verona, Zi∣mara, and Mantinus in vain assayed to correct him. For Vives sayes, that he read only a base Latin Translation of

the Text of Aristotle, whereof he made another into Arabick still worse. The truth is, that besides the unfaithful Co∣pies, which the Arabians had of Aristo∣tle's Text, as Vives and Possevin assures us; it is thought, that the Genius of the Arabian Language is so different from the Greek Tongue, that the one can hardly exhaust the sense of the other, to make a Faithful Translation: for with some proportion it may be said of all the rest of the Arabians, what Caelius Rhodiginus sayes of Avicenna, Avicenna linguae graecae ignarus cum li∣bros Aristotelis mutilos perversos{que} lege∣ret, autorem eminentissimum minus con∣sequi potuit. Picus Mirandula sayes, that Averroes stuck to the study of A∣ristotle, and Avicenna to Plato, which ocasioned the Opposition of Opini∣ons that are to be found betwixt them. After all, they were both great Men, and of extraordinary esteem amongst the Learned.

XVI.

The School-men, who all addicted themselves to the Doctrine of Aristotle,

and formed their minds by the study of the Arabiaus, from whom they took that subtile and nice Spirit, which since slipt into the Schools, made the last Sect of Philosophers, which hath been in any reputation. Thomas A∣quinas is pretended to have been the founder of that Sect, for having read Aristotle in a Translation of Averroes made by a Spaniard, he took from it the Method, which Lanfranc Arch∣bishop of Canterbury, Gilbert Porre∣tain Bishop of Poictiers, Abelard, and Peter Lombard, had already rough∣hewn upon the Idea that Damascenus had framed thereof: and whereof Peter Comestor composed the first Ele∣ments, for they were great Dialectici∣ans. Danaeus in his Prolegomena upon the first of the Sentences, hath written the beginnings of the Scholastick Phi∣losophy, which may be said to have had three different periods, as is report∣ed of the School of Plato; the an∣cient, the middle and the new Scho∣lastick. The first, which had it's be∣ginning under the Archbishop of Can∣terbury,

or to say better, under Pet•…•… Lombard, lasted almost two hundre•…•… years, and ended under Albertus Mag•…•… nus. Lombard soiled much the purity〈…〉〈…〉 Theology, by many unprofitable que∣stions, wherewith he perplexed it Alexander Alesius was the most consi∣derable of these first School-men. Th•…•… second began with Albertus Magnus Bishop of Ratisbonne, the vastest Geni•…•… of these Ages, in the Judgment o•…•… Trithemus, and continued until Du∣randus: and during that space of a∣bout an hundred years, the Doctrine of Aristotle was raised to the highest pitch of its reputation, by the vogue that Thomas Aquinas and John Duns a Scotish-man gave it. These were the two Spirits of greatest capacity for Phi∣losophy in these last Ages. No Man ever reasonned with more justness and exactness than Thomas Aquinas: Soli∣dity was his chief character, as sub∣tility that of Scotus. They both made themselves so famous by their learning, that they became the heads of two the most celebrated Sects that ever were;

and had it not been for the misery of their times, wherein barbarity reigned, they would have been comparable to the greatest Philosophers of Antiqui∣ty. The third Age of School-Philoso∣phy began with Durandus, who to get reputation, did rise against Thomas A∣quinas, but with little success, and lasted till Gabriel Biel a German, the compiler of other Philosophers, who expressed ill, what he conceived indiffe∣rently well; for there is a dulness in his expression, that renders him dry and harsh. Then did the Wits subti∣lize more and more by an emulation of being Nominalists or Realists. Ocham was the chief of the Nominalists, who taught that Beings Universal were but words, and Scotus leader of the Rea∣lists, who taught that the same Uni∣versal beings were real things. And as that age was infected with that naughty air which corrupted the Schools; so the animosity of these two Sects hurried mens minds into such ex∣tremities, as cannot be paralell'd in an∣tiquity; for in Germany they waged

such War together, as broke some∣times out into extravagancy an•…•… rage. It was no more disputing in th•…•… Universities, but downright fighting and opinions were only defended by violence. Then it was that Philo∣sophy was wholly taken up about th•…•… operations of the mind, conceptions and precisions: the wits drained thei•…•… reasons with frivolous questions: Me•…•… fell into heats for bare and pure forma∣lities, raised to themselves Phantasms, and Disputations; Reason became li∣tigious and trickish to maintain it self, and truth was almost nothing else but the price of the dispute. This was called Wit, but was it so? In this me∣thod were composed heaps of idle Books and Opinions, which stifled all that remained of a good relish for Let∣ters. Nevertheless, that Scholastick Air, how dry soever it was, appeared most solid and proper to overthrow falshood: error and imposture could not endure its splendour; and the sharpness, animositie, and passion, which was then to be found in disputes,

was not so much the fault of the Schools, as of those that abused them.

XVII.

There were notwithstanding in these Ages three Philosophers, who by a spirit of novelty took their flight out of the Schools, and devised a method quite different from what was in use: these were Reymund Lully, Cardan, and Paracelsus, who with very different Notions were all three of a Character not much different. Reymund Lully by the commerce which he entertained with the Arabians, became very skil∣ful in Medicine, Natural Philosophy and Astronomy: And of these three Sciences he made a fourth, the Art of Chymistry, whereof in Spain and Italy he was the Restorer. He endeavoured to overturn the order established in the Schools, by reducing Philosophy and other Sciences to a method, that has nothing of solidity, and which is so far from making men learned, that it could never make one reasonable. Car∣dan is a vast and irregular head that offers at all without distinction; and

fixes on nothing: What he says him∣self of his familiar spirit, which he be∣lieves to be made up of Saturn and Mercury is so foolish, that one cannot read him in cold blood without laugh∣ter: And what he adds elsewhere, that that spirit did not communicate it self to him but in dreams, is still more ex∣travagant. It is he who hath in these last Ages revived all that secret Philo∣sophy of the Cabal and Cabalists which fills the world with spirits, to which he pretends that men may be∣come like, purifying themselves by Philosophy. But Paracelsus who had the air more of an Operator than Phi∣losopher, is the most extravagant of all: For he fancied to himself to make a new Philosophy, a new art of Medi∣cine, and a new Religion; of his own head making himself, by a ridiculous neutrality, the Mediator between the Pope and Luther, that he might bring them both to his Maxims. Gohory was his first Follower in France, a very su∣perficial Naturalist, but a great Distil∣ler. Paracelsus had a deep wit, a dull

and obscure expression; all his words were Riddles, and his discourses Myste∣ries. Rullandus a German Physician made a Dictionary of his terms, with which one cannot yet understand him. Paracelsus re-established Chymistry in Germany: The Emperour Charles the Fifth heard him; but upon the propo∣sition that he made to enrich him by Chymistry, called him an Enthusiast. To these three Philosophers may be ad∣ded Cornelius Agrippa, Arnoldus de villa nova, Peter of Apono, Bacon, and some other Cabalists, of whom Agrip∣pa himself speaks in his Epistle to the Abbot Trithemius. But all that Philo∣sophy can serve for no other end, but to lead men into extravagancy and il∣lusion; because it seems to disguise un∣der the veil of Natural Knowledge, what is most black and horrid in Ma∣gick. About that time Reuchlin en∣deavoured to revive in Germany the Philosophy of Pythagoras, as Marcil∣ius Ficinus had in Italy re-established the Doctrine of Plato. These were the Distempers of those Ages: Of

which the different tasts for Philoso∣phy, the diversity of sentiments, and the instability of spirits that is to be seen at that time, shews sufficiently the weakness.

XVIII.

In fine, seeing the love of Learning, and especially of Philosophy, became confined to Europe, the different Nati∣ons thereof applyed themselves vari∣ously to it, according to the diversity of their genius's and inclinations. The Spaniards according to the Character of their Wits, cut out for Dialectick and Reflexions, became subtle in their Reasonings, Formalists and Metaphy∣sicians. The Italians took a more a∣greeable air, they grew for most part curious in lovely Ideas; the Works of Triphus one of the learned of the last Ages, inspired into them love for the Philosophy of Aristotle; and the Books of Cardinal Bessarion and Marcilius Fi∣cinus gave them an inclination for the Philosophy of Plato, to which they accommodated themselves better than other Nations, by the quality of their

fine genius, naturally quick but lazie. The French, who found themselves ca∣pable of all Sciences, embraced all; and by that Character of Capacity and Curiosity, copied what they found good amongst other Nations, and suc∣ceeded in every thing. The English, by that depth of Wit which is com∣mon to their Nation, loved the Me∣thods that were profound, abstruse, and far-sought; and by a head-strong application to labour, set themselves to the observation of Nature more than other Nations: as appears by the Works which they have published. The Germans, by the necessity which the Climat imposed upon them to keep themselves by the fire, and by the conveniency of their Stoves, addicted themselves to Chymistry; as did other Northern people: So that the Southern Countries contributed to make Philo∣sophy profound and subtle, and the Northern to render it labourious and mechanical. And of all the modern Philosophers, those that have made greatest noise, are Galilaeus an Italian,

Bacon, Hobbes, and Boile English, Gas∣sendus and Descartes French, and Van∣helmont Dutch-man. Galileus seems to be the most ingenious of all; and he I think may be called the Father of Modern Philosophy. His Method re∣sembles much that of the Platonists, his Stile is pleasant; and by his man∣ner of Writing he conceals many de∣fects: though he hath copied many things from the Primitive Philosophers, yet all seems to be his own, and he is taken for the original in several places, where he is but the transcriber. Bacon has a ranging wit which dives not deep into any thing; his too great reach hinders him from being exact, the most part of his sentiments are ra∣ther Overtures for meditation, than Maxims to be followed: His Opinions are somewhat subtile and sparkling; and if they be rightly considered, they resemble more sparks of fire, than an entire and natural light. Hobbes is ob∣scure without delight, singular in his Notions, learned, but not very solid, and inconstant in his Doctrine; for

he is sometimes Epicurean, sometimes Peripatetick. Boile is exact in his Ob∣servations; no man in Europe hath en∣riched Philosophy with so many Expe∣riments as he; he reasons upon his Ex∣periments with indifferent good con∣sequence, which after all are not al∣ways unquestionable; because his prin∣ciples are not always certain: he is in a word, an able Philosopher and great Naturalist. Gassendus, who desired on∣ly to pass for the Restorer of the Phi∣losophy of Democritus and Epicurus, speaks little of his own head; there is nothing almost in him but the beauty of stile, that may give him the credit of an admirable Author: To refute his Natural Philosophy there needs no more but the Arguments of Aristotle against Democritus and his Disciples. Descartes is one of the most extraordi∣nary genius's that hath appeared in these last times; one of a fertile wit and profound meditation: the conca∣tenation of his Doctrine reaches his point, the order of it is well devised according to his principles; and his

Systeme, though made up of the an∣cient and modern, is well digested. The truth is, he teaches men too much to doubt, and that is no good model for spirits naturally incredulous: but in fine, he is more original than o∣thers. Vanhelmont, through the know∣ledge which he had of Nature after hi•…•… way, performed such prodigious things by his Remedies, that he was put in∣to the Inquisition, upon suspicion that what he did was above the power o•…•… Nature. In a word, Galileus is the most agreeable of the Moderns, Bacon the most subtle, Gassendus the most learned, Hobbes the most plodding and thoughtful, Boile the most curious, Descartes the most ingenious, and Van∣helmont the greatest Naturalist, but too much wedded to Paracelsus. The most universal method of his Philo∣sophy, is the sympathy and antipathy of Simples and mixt Bodies, which he well understood.

XIX.

Upon the retail of all these notions of Ancient and Modern Philosophy, and

upon the different character of both, this comparison may be made. The Ancient Philosophy is more founded on authority, and the Modern on expe∣rience; the Ancient is simple and na∣tural, the Modern artificial and elabo∣rate; the former is more modest and grave, the latter more imperious and pedantick. The ancient is peaceable and calm; for it was so far from dis∣puting, that it would have the minds of Youth prepared by the Mathema∣ticks, that they might be accustomed to submit to demonstration without hesitation: the modern is of a strain of disputing of every thing, and of train∣ing up Youth to noise and the tumult of the School. The Ancient inquires only into truth out of a sincere desire to find it: the Modern takes pleasure to dispute it, even when it is discover∣ed. The one advances more securely in its method, because it hath alwayes the Metaphysicks for a guide: the o∣ther is unsure in its steps when it is once deprived of that conduct. Con∣stancy, Fidelity, sound Judgment, and

Stedfastness, was that which men called Philosophy in the dayes of Plato. And the dislike of business, peevishness, the renouncing of pleasures when the use of them is lost through the extinction of passions, I know not what Autho∣rity that is derived from the Gray∣beard, counterfeit audacity, phleg∣matick sullenness, moderation, and all that Wisdom which springs from the weakness of Age and Constitution, is the Philosophy of a great many now-a-dayes. The Ancient is universally more learned, it aims at all: and the Modern confines it self to the sole con∣sideration of nature, resting satisfied to be a mere Naturalist. In fine, the Ancient is more addicted to study, more laborious and indefatigable in what it undertakes; for the Primitive Philosophers spent their lives in study: the Modern is less constant in its ap∣plication, more superficial in its pains, and more precipitate in its studies. And this precipitation accustomes it by little and little to ground too easily, reason∣ings not very exact, upon uncertain

rumours, testimonies of little credit, and upon experiments not well agreed upon. It pronounces boldly upon doubts and uncertainties, to satisfie in some manner the eagerness that it some∣times hath to vent its imaginations, and to give vogue to novelties: so that to make a decision between both, I am of the Opinion of that intelligent Philosopher of these last Ages, who all things being well considered was of the mind to stick to the Ancients, and leave the Moderns to themselves: for the plain common sense of the Primi∣tive Philosophers, is preferable to all the art and quaintness of the new. But let us conclude without prejudice, that as from what Cloud soever the day breaks out, it should be accounted pleasant; so from what part soever truth comes, it ought to be esteemed. Let us no more distinguish ancient rea∣son from new, because on what side soever we behold it, and what colour soever we give it, it is alwayes the same. And let us make this reflexion, that if there be some Opinions better received

by the publick than others, it is b•…•… sometimes because their Cabals hav•…•… been more powerful, or their Stars mor•…•… favourable.

XX.

There are therefore two extremities to be avoided, in the course that is to to be held between the Ancient and Modern Philosophers. The first is o•…•… those who out of a good Opinion which they have of themselves, find nothing comparable to their own Age: the Zeal which they have to free themselves from the Tyranny, which the Authority of the Ancients have u∣surped over mens minds, is a false Zeal: that is the way to impose new Laws on Reason, under pretext of giv∣ing it liberty. And all these fair pre∣cepts which men give us to shake off the prejudices of Education, Custome, Authority, and to cure our selves of po∣pular anticipations, are but Snares laid for our credulity: they speak to us only of liberty, to impose upon us a new Yoke. It is only to give to the Moderns, what Men would take

from the Ancients; and to destroy the credit of Aristotle to set up the reputa∣tion of Descartes: but is it just to de∣spise those whom all antiquity have re∣spected? Tradition alone and the U∣niversal Consent of all people, might oblige us to do Justice to those great Men, who have been the Founders of Sciences; for the World is a great As∣sembly, wherein every Age has its Vote; and to know who is preferable in the Judgment we pass on men, we must look on those who have deser∣ved from the Publick the most Univer∣versal Approbation. None but super∣ficial minds can be pleased with Novel∣ties. He that is solidly wise, is not surprised at the lustre of Noveltie; he adheres only to what is established by the suffrage of the Ancients, as the Prophet hath it. Is it possible that so many Ages, so many Great-Wits, so much Application, and so many Works, have been able to produce no∣thing that is tolerable, saith Cicero? So that if we compare our selves with the great men of the first Ages, let us

not decide rashly in our own favour we are partial Judges, it is the part posterity to give their verdict there•…•… Let us but cast our eyes on the ag•…•… past, and that will teach us modest These great Men, besides the extraor•…•…∣nary genius they had for Sciences, spe•…•… their lives in continual pains, with〈…〉〈…〉 docility of Spirit without exampl•…•… Pythagoras was a Schollar fifty yea•…•… under the greatest Masters of the world Eusebius sayes that Democritus studie•…•… fourscore years. Parmenides hid him∣self eighteen years in a Cave, there t•…•… meditate on Logick. Plato was th•…•… Disciple of Socrates, Archytas and Eurytus, above forty years. Aristotle studied under Plato more than twenty years. And shall we, forsooth, after two years slight study, under very ordinary Masters, pretend to compare with these great men!

XXI.

The other extremity to be avoided is the pertinacious adhering to the An∣tients sometimes without Reason: Men make an Idol of their Authority by a

blind prejudicated perswasion of their merit. Such was the head-strongness of george of Trabisond, who made a Book to prove the conformity of A∣ristotle with the holy Scriptures: and of Marcilius Ficinus who pretends that Plato knew the mystery of the Trinity. For which Medina a Spanish Divine condemns him of boldness in∣jurious to the purity of our Religion, which contains nothing but what is su∣pernatural. Hermolaus Barbarus was yet more whimsical in his cleaving to the Doctrine of Aristotle: that learned man by an horrible Catastrophe of his Wits raised the Devil, that he might learn the true sense of Aristotle, about a Term which that Philosopher used, and whereof the signification seemed to him ambiguous. But the most fan∣tastical of all, was the Emperour Ju∣lian; who, as Ammianus Marcellinus saith, debased the Grandeur of his Vertues, by playing the Philosopher: he was chaste, sober, just and vigi∣lant; but by a ridiculous devotion to the Authority of the Ancient Philoso∣phers,

he preferred the Doctrine of Plato to that which St. Paul taught the Athenians; and by a fearful rambling, he gave himself over to all the curiosi∣ties of an unsettled mind. The haugh∣ty wisdom of Paganism hindred him from submitting his reason to the wise follie of the Mistery of the Cross, which appeared to be beneath that Philosophy wherein he gloried: and because he made that Philosophy his Religion, so soon as he was Master of his Opinions, by becoming Master of the World, he renounced the Doctrine of JESUS CHRIST, that he might embrace that of Pythagoras and Socrates, whereby he laboured to gain an extra∣vagant reputation among the Philoso∣phers of his time; and by an abomina∣ble vanity, would acknowledge no Gods, but such as owed their Divini∣ty to his grant: so much was his mind debauched by his stubborn adherence to the Ancients. There is therefore a mean to be observed between the An∣cients and Moderns; these are to be respected without vilifying of those.

So let us endeavour to discover new Truths, and not neglect the Ancient. Let us not overthrow things establish∣ed, to establish things that are uncer∣tain: let us preserve our liberty, and let us not lose the use of our reason, by a blind adoration of the sentiments either of the Ancients or Moderns: let us do Justice to both; and let us value merit wherever it be, without minding whether it be old or new.

XXII.

But though a man may have his mind sufficiently armed against the prejudices which arise from the Au∣thority of the Ancients, and the incli∣nation which he may have to the Mo∣dern, yet hath he hardly ever the pow∣er to strip himself wholly of the natu∣ral love which he hath for his own o∣pinions. That is one of the great in∣firmities of the mind of man; because self-love believes nothing to be so much its own as its Opinion: men look upon that as a Creature of their own, and renounce all other interests to maintain this. Men are even some∣times

so opinionative and obstinate in defending their own conceits, that they run upon strange extremities. The Disciples of Plato gave themselves to be burnt for the Doctrine of their Ma∣ster; and the Followers of Hegesias suf∣fered themselves to dye of hunger, by sticking too closely to the Maxims of their School. Socrates, for all his wis∣dom, in cold blood gave his life to preserve his Opinion. And even in these last Ages there have been men so foolish, as to become the Martyrs of their Doctrine: For Errour hath its Votaries, stricter than those that Truth it self hath. Men have even some∣times a secret vanity to authorise by their suffrage, what is not warranted by Reason; and blindly embrace Prin∣ciples which they understand not, and whereof they are only fond, because they are hard to be understood. These are the most common illusions of self-love, which how ridiculous soever it be in its other passions, yet is never so much, as in its obstinacy to maintain its Notions. And as nothing is more

unreasonable than what it wills; so nothing is less maintainable than what it thinks. But the worst of extrava∣gancies is, to be obdured against the torrent of publickly-received Opini∣ons; and to admit of no other senti∣ments upon the subjects that are in hand, but a mans own private opinion: such men take pity to see others contra∣ry to themselves in judgment, because they abound so much in their own sense, that they ackowledge no other: this is the Character of stinted minds. For in fine, the more merit there is stedfastly to maintain true Reason, when once it is known; the more there is of Vertue to forsake the wrong, when men are perswaded of its fals∣hood. That is a magnanimous inge∣nuity, saith Aristotle: And it is a great∣ness of Soul to retain its full liberty, by maintaining of truth and renoun∣cing falshood, according to the diffe∣rent views that one hath of both. Thus did Hippocrates acknowledge that he had been by false Principles sometime mistaken in his Reasonings. So great

modesty could not proceed but from a great capacity: and it is always a mark of judgment, to doubt of its own suf∣ficiency.

XXIII.

It is great knowledge to judge of things, according to the different degrees of certainty that they may have, to clear the truth of appearan∣ces; to take that for Opinion, which is only but Opinion, and so to distin∣guish Judgments as one may give sound Judgment of every thing. For the disorders which slip into the mind, by the various sentiments that pass in publick, spring from this confusion of discerning. For example, Copernicus shuts himself up in his Closet, that he may frame a new Systeme of the World: he revives the Opinion of that Nicetas of Syracusa, who taught that there was nothing in nature at rest, but the Sun. He beats his brains to frame a new Opinion according to his fancy, and there is nothing better de∣vised than that Hypothesis: however, would it be reasonable to make the O∣pinion

of that great man pass for a de∣monstration? and without consulting the Universal consent of so many Ages, who have gone before us, and who are of a contrary Opinion. Would it be just to oblige all the World to be go∣verned according to the imagination of Copernicus, and to make a private mans sentiment a Law to all the rest of man∣kind? Descartes erects a new natural Philosophy, upon principles that are not altogether new. He calls his own Systeme himself a Chimera; for in that manner he discoursed with his con∣fidents, naming his Philosophy a Ro∣mance: and men would have me es∣pouse the Opinions, that he laughs at; is that reasonable? I confess, I admire his Ideas, but am not so submissive as to think them unquestionable: and so I return to my principle, which ought to be the rule of all the reasonings in Philosophy, that one must be frugal of his belief, that he may employ it, ac∣cording to the different degrees of cer∣tainty which he finds in the matters he examines; to the end that he may take nothing for a truth but what is true,

and think that only probable which is probable. In that consists all the pru∣dence of the Wise-man, saith Epicurus in Cicero: and it is a bad Character to act in an other manner; for things are often otherwayes than they appear, by the Opinion and Notion that men frame of them.

XXIV.

They are but false measures and de∣ceitful notices, that make men deviate from the common ways of Philosophy, to search out extraordinary paths: and it is always a sign of a depraved taste in Sciences not to love what is com∣monly received by all the World: one is subject to wander, when he follows by-ways. It is even convenient in the conduct of life, to adhere only to com∣mon Opinions: otherways a man ex∣poses himself to great absurdities. A∣lexander for all his valour, having fail∣ed in this principle, became worthy of contempt: He wept, says Plutarch, because following the Opinion of De∣mocritus, who made many Worlds, he had not as yet conquered the half of

one. That greatness of soul which he makes appear by so noble a sentiment becomes ridiculous, saith Elianus; for it is grounded on a false Foundation. So would a Magistrate, whose Life ought to serve as a Model in a well-or∣ordered State, be of little Judgment in the mind of Cicero, if in his conduct he followed the Opinion of Epicurus: and if instead of being severe, he made appear easiness in his sentiments; for all the Counsels of a publick person ought to be austere, to hold every one to his duty. To what purpose is it to prescribe rules to others to live in or∣der, if he himself be irregular? If we did follow, sayes that Orator, in our O∣rations these singular Opinions of the Stoicks, who eye Glory and Ignominy after another manner than other people doe; because they are not affected with either of the two: and if we would pro∣pose to the publick the opinion which the Porch teacheth of Vertue and Vice, Good and Evil, no body would listen to us. And there is nothing more absurd, than the way that Cicero brings in Tor∣quatus

speaking in the Senate, upon the principles of Epicurus, whose Do∣ctrine he followed. There is in that di∣scourse some quaint and delicate touch∣es of Raillery: that Orator seems de∣lighted to declame against all other Phi∣losophies, but that which was in use, judging nothing more opposite than that to true eloquence. It was that likewise which hindred Demosthenes from embrace any Party, amidst the ma∣ny Sects which in his time sprung up at Athens; that he might not wander from the usual sentiments and common ways, which are fittest to perswade. And for all that Julius Caesar was so ambitious to be a great Philosopher, yet he made it his only business to be∣come popular, that he might the bet∣ter gain upon the minds of the people. In fine, what-ever men say, one can hardly retain the Character of a wise∣man, in deviating from the common opinions, nor of a publick spirit by embracing private sentiments. And to extend this to all Professions, how should a Poet be laughed at, who, fol∣lowing the opinion of Copernicus,

would make the Earth turn round the Sun: or who, according to the System of Descartes, should never speak of Stars or Constellations, without speaking of whirlings and of subtile matter? how ridiculous should one be, what wit so∣ever he might have, with so dainty principles!

XXV.

Nevertheless there is nothing now∣adays more in use with Philosophers, and nothing bears greater rule than that kind of humour: For men seek only to set off their parts by new and extraordinary sentiments, and leave the way of common sense because it is too much beaten. When one has got a more working brain than others, he falls on a fansie of speaking that which other men never said. This whimsi∣calness, as Cicero says, made Arcesilas be taken for a seditious person, who overthrew the old Academy, to erect a new one. And Ramus, by that humour in these last Ages, was like to have de∣stroyed the University of Paris: For, that he might confute the false Peripa∣teticks,

he attacked the true; and to restore the Schools to peace, he be∣came their disturber: He was a learn∣ed man, bold to decide; but natural∣ly troublesome: he only imitated Lau∣rentius Valla and Ludovicus Vives, two great Criticks in the former Age, that he might set up for an Innovator. In fine, men often dispute thus, only that by a fansie of innovation they may o∣verthrow what is best established. When men have not the power to make new Opinions, they find a way to give a new garb to the ancient; and that they may pass for Authors at any rate, begin the change of senti∣ments by the change of language: Men give new names, as Zeno did heretofore, to Opinions which are not new: and what do they not to speak in a different strain from others, and to gain reputation at any rate whatso∣ever? But seeing the libertinage of sen∣timents proceeds from the licentious∣ness of manners, the mind stands in need of barriers to keep it within bounds. Religion, Laws, Custom,

Education, Punishments and Rewards, ought to serve it for a Bridle when it begins to ramble; yet sometimes it re∣volts against all these: and when it hath once cast off the yoke, and runs out beyond the common Opinions, there is no kind of extravagancy that comes amiss to it. This makes Laws necessary: For Civil Authority ought to have a hand in regulating the senti∣ments of men whose minds are natu∣rally extravagant.

XXVI.

There are some minds naturally free in their sentiments, and others born slaves: The one sway the others by an ascendant of birth, and the others suf∣fer themselves to be governed through a weakness of wit; they are so depen∣dent through the quality of their ge∣nius, that they are only fit to receive the impressions that are given them, and to follow the motions that others inspire into them. From this defect and weakness have sprung the different Sects of Philosophers: For as there are some so bold as to raise themselves a∣bove

others, there are likewise ma•…•… so timorous and dependent, as to su•…•… |mit to them, and to entertain no op•…•… |nion nor sentiment, but with a depe•…•… |dance on their Masters. There are a•…•… so some minds so light and credulou•…•… and who so freely resign themselves that the raveries of other men guid•…•… their reason and conduct: the spirit〈…〉〈…〉 bondage extends it self even to the•…•… hearts and thoughts, because they ar•…•… too weak to retain the liberty of chus∣ing sentiments of their own. But what is more strange, there are some∣times obscure and sullen spirits, whose notions are naturally perplexed and confused, and yet are listened to like Oracles; and who gain a kind of Em∣pire over mens minds, and no body can tell wherefore; unless it be that they are bolder and more positive in their decisions than others: and such blades procure authority only by pre∣sumption and boldness. This was the way that Paracelsus got into vogue in the last Age: his affected obscurity made him considerable: his credit was

built particularly on this, that he spake not like other men, and that no body understood him: his confidence in playing the Master without Reason, won him disciples, and by that means his Doctrine received a mysterious air, which raised him Followers. It is partly by that way also that Descartes has got reputation: the entangled an∣swers which he makes to the difficul∣ties that he forms to himself, are al∣ways new difficulties which busie the Reader: men take pleasure to see them∣selves led from obscurity to obscurity, without knowing whither they are go∣ing. Yet that Author does please by that art, because it is thereby that he seems oraculous. His Interpreter that endeavoured to render him more intelligible, by a new explication of his Natural Philosophy which he publish∣ed lately, hath robbed it of part of its beauty, by putting it in a plainer dress. Nothing seems to give so great satis∣faction in that admirable piece, as the trouble there is to understand it. That obscure stile has somewhat more my∣sterious:

the quality of being inco•…•… prehensible is a great charm to his D•…•… |sciples, who admire him more for that than for any thing besides. And tha•…•… obscurity is an art which some me•…•… employ, and wherewith our blockis•…•… |ness is satisfied.

XXVII.

Subtile and quick wits are not al∣ways fittest for Philosophy. It were better to condense the imagination by something that is gross, than to suffer it to evaporate in too quaint speculati∣ons. The plain common sense of So∣crates triumphed over all the arts and quirks of the Sophists. Philosophy be∣comes only abstracted, when it leaves off to be solid: men addict themselves to formalities, when they have nothing that is real to say; and never think of betaking themselves to subtilty, but when they are out of hopes to make Reason prevail by simplicity. That same Protagoras who was the first that devised captious Reasonings, took that subtle way, because his mind was stuf∣fed with nothing but false Notions.

He was no true Philosopher, sayes Aulus Gellius, because having rendered himself redoubtable by his arguments he became the greatest jangler of the Sophists. All was spoilt, saith Seneca, by striving too much to refine every thing. For to make a vain ostentation of wit men left the essential part of Sciences, began to weaken the truth of things by the artifice of words, and made use of Sophisms when they wanted solid reasons. By this new art Nausiphanes and Parmenides turned all things topsie turvie. By this, Cle∣antes, Chrysippus, and the rest of the Stoicks made their wise King an Effigy, whom they furnished with Titles of Nobility and Treasures, that consisted only in fair words and magnificent ex∣pressions, as Cicero pleasantly upbraides them. So the Simplicity of reason was corrupted by the artifice of dis∣course: and men played with truth in∣stead of using it with respect. This was the fault of the Spaniards of the last age: they did with Philosophy, as with policy, by the quality of their

Spirits born to reflexions, they drew them both out into unconceivable sub∣tilities; and there was not any Scho∣lar who did not refine his Master. From whence happened a disorder like to that whereof Seneca complained heretofore: disputation became all the fruit of Philosophy, and it was more made use of to try the wit than to cure the mind. Let us be satisfied with the common wisdom that is in use, and with the reason that we find in the Commerce of the World, with∣out keeping such a stir and making so much ado: one runs a hazard of turn∣ing Fool, when he would be otherwise; and there is nothing more unprofitable in the common conduct of life, than those two exquisite Opinions which are made use of to subtilize in Scien∣ces.

XXVIII.

Philosophy taken the wrong way hath spoiled a great many men, and that study of wisdom ill understood hath made a good many fools. Empe∣docles had a lofty and high genius;

Lucretius compares him to the greatest of the Ancients; but the vapours of Melancholy meeting with an over∣strained Application, and a too head∣strong study, so sullied his imagination and altered his brain, that he became mad; and in the fit of his rage threw himself into Mount Aetna, where he was devoured by flames. Horace pre∣tends that he endeavoured to render himself immortal by such a fair piece of boldness. Henry Cornelius Agrippa in these last Ages so weakened his Spi∣rit by reading of Plato, and by the Doctrine of the Platonists, that he fell into extravagancy, as he himself con∣fesses. Peter D'Apono a Physician of Padua, who flourished under Clement the Seventh, so marred his imaginati∣on by reading of the Arabian Philoso∣phers, and by too frequent meditation on the Astrology of Alfraganus, that he was put into the Inquisition, as having been suspected of Magick. Pom∣ponatius and Cremoninus, the one Pro∣fessor of Philosophy at Padua, and the other at Bolonia, became impious by

too immoderate study of Philosophy, and left to posterity the marks of their Extravagancy. They were Philoso∣phers who did injury to reason, by by making so bad an use of it. It may be said also, that Libertinage was the most usual effect which Philosophy produced in most part of the Wits of that Age, and which rendred it odious. For by the wicked use that men made of it, they spoiled their Judgment, endeavouring to improve their reason. But to be short, if the most regular wis∣dom of man is subject to straying, what is to be expected from the false glimpses of an inordinate Philosophy, joyned to the weakness and extravagances of a brain-sick head?

XXIX.

It is no small progress in Philosophy, to have learnt how much obscurity and uncertainty is mingled with our exact∣est knowledge, and to be satisfied to be ignorant of that which cannot be known. That is it which makes the knowing man speak with trembling; his great capacity makes him the more

timorous, because the light of his un∣derstanding discovers to him more of the darkness of his mind: the greater his penetration is, the more it lets him see his own weakness, and obliges him to distrust his strength. That made Aristotle say, that old men are more jealous and incredulous than others; because the experience which they have of the uncertainty of things, ren∣ders them more cautious and circum∣spect. Socrates could not conceive why the Oracle had called him the wisest of men: he examined himself, and found nothing worthy of that elogy; unless perhaps that he was wise, because he did not believe him∣self to be so: his knowledge served to make him the better understand his ignorance, which he frankly confes∣sed. Epicurus was naturally wise, for he was a Philosopher even in his pleasures: He was so sharp-sighted, that his Brother Niocles says, in Plu∣tarch, that Nature had assembled all the Atoms of knowledge and wisdom, to compose his person; whilst he him∣self

says that he knows nothing. His Friends stun him with acclamations and praises, and he minds them not. But besides that modesty which is the vertue of great men, there is a sage and discreet ignorance, that in the con∣duct of life can doubt of things, whereof no certainty can be had, and is willing not to know such things, whereof no knowledge is to be attain∣ed, unless men would dive into that which is inscrutable. For Nature ha∣ving reserved to her self some certain secrets that are above our reach, it is great wisdom to shut our eyes, and not to pry into such Mysteries. There is no truth but may appear false, nor falshood which may not seem true: and on this uncertainty is grounded the doubtfulness which the learned man shows in his judgments. It is also to be acknowledged, that this circum∣spection is one of the great fruits that may be reaped from Philosophy. So that the opinion of those Philosophers is to be esteemed, who place the su∣preme knowledge of man and his true

reason, in acknowledging the weak∣ness of his wit, and the uncertainty of his judgment: but when they deprive the senses of all credit, because they may may be deceived, and doubt of every thing, because they have ground to doubt of some things, they are not to be listned to. These are extremi∣ties far contrary to true Philosophy, which only enjoyns moderation.

XXX.

But how much there is of folly to doubt of nothing, and to doubt of e∣very thing: so much there is of im∣prudence to approve all, and to ap∣prove nothing. To preserve the en∣tire liberty of ones judgment, with∣out being prepossessed with false Rea∣son, or pretended authority, is a strength of mind whereof few are ca∣pable. The proud man approves of nothing, for fear he submit himself by approving of somewhat; the light and superficial person approves every thing, that he may spare himself the pains of examining what is proposed to him. To close with every thing,

and to close with nothing, are other extremities to be avoided by a wise man. The design of that Proconful of Greece, who called together to his house all the Philosophers of different Sects that were then in vogue at A∣thens, that he might bring them to a∣greement, appeared ridiculous to Pom∣ponius Atticus: but the design of that Arabian Philosopher, who undertook to refute the opinions of all the other Philosophers, and to overthrow their Doctrine, by a Book written to that purpose, which he called The Destru∣ction of Philosophy, seems to me more ridiculous. Averroes wrote a Confu∣tation of that Book, which he calls, The Destruction of the Destruction, and which is one of the best of his pieces. For I look upon it to be the utmost point of extravagancy, considering the way that men live in the world, for one to suspend his judgment amongst so many truths, and so many falshoods universally acknowledged, and to ap∣ply himself to no side. There is like∣wise weakness to follow only the sen∣timents

of others, and to become a slave to all their opinions: but it is a far more dangerous condition, to be hardened by a spirit of pride, against that inclination which man naturally hath to be perswaded by reason and truth, so as to believe nothing, and to doubt of every thing. I like not that blind submission of the Disci∣ples of Pythagoras, who reasoned no more after that he had spoken: his au∣thority served them for reason. Those imperious ways, which force men to yield, are fitter to overturn the mind, than to instruct it. For, if we speak properly, all the liberty that man hath, is his right to judge of things as he pleases; and there is nothing that de∣pends on himself but the use which he makes of his opinion. All these ex∣cesses are blame-worthy in a Philoso∣pher, who ought to mind nothing, but to hear reason, and find out truth. It is true there are some spirits, who stand in need of exercise and nourish∣ment that they may be employed: all goes well with them, even false Noti∣ons,

empty Imaginations, chimerical Designs, and rather than have nothing to think on, they amuse themselves with the Visions of others, their own heads having nothing to present them with for entertainment. From this Character men stumble on another more pernicious, which is a levity in believing every thing. Let us avoid these extremities; let us examine what is doubtful, but let us give our assent to what is true: let us never be impo∣sed upon by conjectures, but let us not resist evidence; and let us above all things consult reason and common sense, which are the surest means to attain to the knowledge of the truth.

XXXI.

When we seriously examine the mo∣tives that incline most part of Philoso∣phers to espouse a Party in the Opini∣ons which are publickly professed, we find in their conduct nothing less than Philosophy: For it is often without deliberation, without choice, before maturity of age, by chance, and even sometimes without thinking on it, that

they cleave to an Opinion. As it com∣monly happens to those who come to be of a Sentiment, by the Cloaths they wear, by the Country they belong to, by the company they keep, by the in∣terest of the course of life they follow, by the Cabal that wheadles them, by the Croud that draws them along, by the Torrent that hurries them, and al∣ways by any other Consideration than that of Reason and Prudence. Where∣in they are like those Philosophers, of whom Cicero speaks drollingly; ad quamcun{que} disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tanquam ad saxum ad∣haerescunt: who stick to an Opinion, as men tossed in a storm cleave to the Rock on which the tempest has cast them. By this means men submit themselves to the tyranny of prepos∣session, because they want strength of discerning to set them above preju∣dices: they forsake their own judg∣ment, to be led by the fancies of ano∣ther: they defend with heat, what they have undertaken without Rea∣son; and maintain rashly what they

have embraced inconsiderately. And when one is prepossessed by a senti∣ment, he makes it a senseless point of honour to maintain a foolish opinion. It happens even sometimes, that the animosity of Parties puts a spirit into those that have none; and that many times they have no other talent, nor other reason, but the bitterness where∣by they are animated. To conclude, these rash and fortuitous embracings of the sentiments of others, look so ridiculously, that it were far better not at all to be a Philosopher, than to be one of that stamp. The choice that is to be made in these occasions, is to make none at all. For a Philosophy so little founded on reason is but a mere debauchery of Wit, and real weak∣ness.

XXXII.

Truth is now-a-dayes so persecuted by all the disguises of the Age, that men have not ingenuity enough to speak candidly, or courage to be sincere. He must be resolute that would be a Philo∣sopher in good earnest. It is a great∣ness

of soul to speak as one thinks, and think as one speaks; as that Roman did, of whom Quintilian speaks, Scias eum sentire quae dicit; You may be assured he speaks what he thinks. A Moral Philosophy from the hand of so candid a man would have been of great force, and the loss of the Trea∣tise of Vertue which he composed is great: for never man spake with great∣er freedom than he. He imitated that strain of Socrates, who could not dis∣guise his sentiments. Men are never subject to speak against their Conscien∣ces but when they are weak: interest, passion, head-strongness, prejudice, the torrent of custome, dependance, are the most usual obstacles to sincerity, and the purity of our judgments. Such kinds of weaknesses only make men forsake their own sentiments, to em∣brace the Opinions of others: And it is but a lowness of Spirit, and a base complaisance that make men square their Opinions, by the judgment of those they depend on, and whom they desire to please. The truth is the most

lovely of all Philosophies, is to know how to live; that is, to accommodate ones self to persons, affairs, and sea∣sons, as reason requires it: Yet that is to be done freely and without constraint; that we may not imitate those weak souls, whose sentiments on every thing are borrowed, and who a∣base themselves to condescend to Opi∣nions, to which they can hardly submit, because they want courage to retain their entire liberty. So servile a kind of Philosophy is but a counterfeit wisdom. Such was that of the Senators, who lived under Tiberius and Nero, of whom Tacitus speaks; who having prostituted themselves to the most in∣famous kind of flattery, put on the Mask of Philosophy to save them from persecution, wanting courage to be true Philosophers, and truly to speak their Judgments in the Senate.

XXXIII.

Disputation is an Art set in vogue by the Schooles to rouse Youth, and to exercise their Wits: it serves to incul∣cate reason to these that understand it

not, and to impose silence on bablers; but it serves likewise to feed animosity, to give a fair colour to all sorts of passi∣on, and to maintain opinionativeness, in despight of Truth and sound Judg∣ment. There is no Philosopher who becomes not by this fine Art, a man for progress, and clearing of doubts. For every disputant may undertake to perswade others of his Opinion by noise, when Reason fails him. In fine, disputation, as all things else, has its good and evil: so that without pre∣tending to condemn it, let us imploy it to those uses wherein it may do good. But let us open the eyes of rational men, that we may not abuse them; for most-times men only dispute, because they understand not one another. Thales has vacuity in horrour, De∣mocritus bogles not at it; let them but mutually explain themselves, and they are good friends. Epicurus believes his senses too much, Empedocles be∣lieves them not at all: they shall dis∣pute no more, when they have once agreed upon it what the errour is,

which hinders the belief that should be given them. Let us make a Cartesia•…•… understand, what sense and sensation is, and he shall easily allow that a Horse is a Beast, though now he be∣lieves it not. Men have disputed al∣most three hundred years about Liber∣ty, because as yet they are not agreed what it is: Let us make appear to Phi∣losophers and Divines, who have spo∣ken of it so differently, wherein it con∣sists, and they shall speak in the same Language. For in fine, when men have reason, and are agreed about principles, there is no more disputing. That great Diversity of Opinions which reign in the World, proceeds only from the different manner that Men think and speak of them. This made Aristotle say, that when two ra∣tional men are of a different sentiment, it is commonly because they speak dif∣ferently; and all disputation is more a∣bout words than things.

XXXIV.

Though the Philosophy which is taught in the Schools at present, with

that method of disputation introduced there, hath been much censured by Ramus, a Professor of the University of Paris, about the end of the last Age, by Gassendus in the beginning of the present, and generally by all the mo∣dern Natural Philosophers of any repu∣tation; because it hath suffered much of the purity of the Doctrine of Aristotle to be corrupted by its Professors, who profess themselves to be his greatest Followers: yet for all that I still think it the most convenient, in regard of the way that men live in at present, yea and the most proper for Youth, at the age that they apply themselves to it; because that after all that hath been said, it stamps on the mind an impres∣sion of order, to make men speak ex∣actly, and with method of every thing: it teaches us to reduce unto certain principles the matters we treat of, that we may methodically deliver our opi∣nions: it exercises the spirits of youth by the subtleties of Logick and Meta∣physick, in the only way that they are capable of: it gives them but an

abridgment of Moral Philosophy, whilst their understanding is not ripe enough to support a long deduction of Con∣clusions, which are entertainments too serious and calm for the heat and edge of youth; which is an age of too lit∣tle experience, to delight in the con∣templation of the Works of Nature by a serious study of Natural Philosophy, and of too narrow a capacity to compre∣hend the vast extent of humane Affairs. It were however to be wished, that that part of Philosophy were handled more methodically in the Schools, and that the most important Experiments and Observations of Nature were more par∣ticularly discussed: But it often comes to pass that Masters affect to teach use∣less things, to make it be thought that they will not forget the necessary. However, the method that is at pre∣sent in use, might be brought to grea∣ter perfection: but that perfection is only to be expected from the genius and candour of the Professors, who can wave things indifferent, and in∣sist on what is essential, according to

the measure of knowledge that expe∣rience may furnish them with. For matters being in the state they are, there is no great reason to expect as to that a well-adjusted Reformation. To conclude, it is probable that the Laws, which suffer no innovation in the use of things universally established, will not countenance any other method, but what is now at present followed in the Universities; that they may not allow too great a freedom to the passi∣on that men have naturally for new Opinions, the tendency whereof is of dangerous consequence in a well-order∣ed state; especially considering that Philosophy is one of the instruments whereof Religion makes use in explain∣ing its decisions, as we shall see at the end of this Treatise. These are the Re∣flexions which we have made on Philo∣sophy in general: Let us now proceed to these which are to be made on the parts of Philosophy severally.

The end of the first Part.