Light in the way to Paradise with other occasionals / by Dvdley the 2d late Ld. North.

CHAP. XI. Of the supposed decree of Reprobation of Prescience and Free-will.

NOW to prosecute the Subject of our Discourse, the next thing should be to set forth the places (or at least the most con∣siderable of them) to be passed in this holy and righteous way, but it will be necessary first to take into consideration a Paradox, which if true, may prevent the occasion of endeavouring to journey at all. This Para∣dox is the opinion of fatal necessity in all things that come to pass, as well in the way of Salvation as otherwise. If this necessity be true, (as a decree of Saving or Damning all particular persons, makes it in the main point) many will be apt to say, let us use this Worlds delights, while we may, for Judgment is al∣ready pass'd, and the Argument were not ir∣rational. Now since there are learned Di∣vines, who assert Free-will in opposition to this opinion, I shall take for granted, that there are very many texts of Scripture, which may fitly be produced for each side; and therefore not being able to sound the Abissus of this con∣troversie as a Divine, I shall only express how my own reason is governed in it. I first lay

for a ground, that God is just, and in such away just, as is consonant to that which he hath in∣fused into the heart of man concerning the principles of Justice, whereof one undeniable maxim is this, That no man is to be condem∣ned, but he who hath wilfully offended, upon which ground very young children and mad∣men are to be exempted from such condemna∣tion; from this it must follow, that every per∣son capable of being so sentenced, must have freedom of will, and not be bound up by any necessity to perpetrate the evil which he com∣mitteth. And how can this stand with a de∣cree of reprobation? The maintainers of this decree accuse the asserters of Free-will, as inju∣rious to God, for taking away by that means his fore-knowledge, which (as they say) must be grounded upon some certainty, and comes not any ways so sure, as by a decree. And further they affirm, that it argues imperfecti∣on in God, if he fore-knew not both what is to be elected by the will, and all other things; for otherwise something must come to pass, which is new to him, and not consistent with his All-sufficiency. For my part I will never either say, or conclude in my thoughts, that God hath not a perfect Prescience, because there may be grounds of his fore-knowledge out of the reach of my imperfect understand∣ing; but I must freely confess, I cannot see, how the determinations of our will should be fore-known at all. To me it seems altogether

as derogatory to the attribute of God's pow∣er, to say, that by no means he can establish a contingency, which contingency cannot, as I conceive, consist with fore-knowledge, whereunto necessity is always attendant. And as to the above-mention'd Objection of No∣velty to God, it must be so however, for when any fore-known thing comes to pass, the existence of it is new to him that fore∣knew it; as for example, The Prophet Elisha fore-knew and fore-told the plenty in Samaria, 2 King. 7. yet when the plenty came by means of the Syrians flight, the being of it was new to him, as well as to others; for the first existence of every thing is actually new, notwithstanding any former Idea, as a house newly built is new to the Architect, and for the Deity to receive it otherwise than it is, were certainly an imperfection. And that the election of the will be new, gives no impe∣diment to God's providence in governing the World, for it concerneth only the divine Ju∣stice, as to rewarding or punishing the good or evil election, all action whatsoever being only in the power of God, and not subject to any man's will. Besides this, why should it be greater imperfection not to fore-know a thing, to which God hath given the nature of not being fore-knowable, than to want ability of making a thing not to be, then when it is? I must therefore conclude, that every man hath freedom of Will, to elect

what he shall doe, or else there can be no ground either for sin, or for punishment.