Justice vindicated from the false fucus [i.e. focus] put upon it, by [brace] Thomas White gent., Mr. Thomas Hobbs, and Hugo Grotius as also elements of power & subjection, wherein is demonstrated the cause of all humane, Christian, and legal society : and as a previous introduction to these, is shewed, the method by which men must necessarily attain arts & sciences / by Roger Coke.

The Sixth GROUND.

In what consists Right or Due.

Author. HEre our Author says, The next Consideration may appear too Meta∣physical a Nicety for a Moral Treatise: Yet he armed Cap-a-pe in compleat Ignorance, valiantly attempts it, and will tell you of I know not what, of Reason, which takes nothing to be good, but what is good for a mans self; and makes it the rule of his actions, to do what is fitting for him, or conformable to his, that is, to a Rational nature. But this is a rule by which he treats Horses, Dogs, Trees, and Stones, &c. and runs through all his actions.

Observ. Well: But since the men of this world were never more unreason∣able, and every man so pretending to Reason, and yet no man almost can

tell what he means by Reason, let us see what Ratio, Reason is; and what Reasoning is; and why Man is onely said to be a reasonable creature. Reason is properly that power of the soul, by which a Man is discerned from other living creatures, and by which he does excell and command them: By Horace it is put for the reasoning and discoursing of the soul, for finding out what is true; Ratio ponitur pro ratiocinatione & discursu animi, ad investigandum verum. Cicero lib. 2. ad Heren. Ratio est causa quae demonstrat verum esse id, quod intendimus brevi subjectione; Reason is the cause which shews that thing to be true, which we intend in a short view: And Reason is many times equivocally used for Counsel, as Cicero in Verr. Mea quidem ratio, cum in praeteritis rebus est cognita, tum in reliquis explorata & provisa est; My counsel is as well known in things past, as throughly tried and provided in other things. Sometime for Respect; Habenda est ratio honoris, Men ought to respect their honor. Sometime for Care; Habenda est ratio rei familiaris, Men must look after their houshold-affairs. Sometime for Business; Rationem habet cum terra, quae nunquam recusat imperium, He busieth himself with his land which never disobeys him. Thus far Calapine. Sometime it is taken for Account, Lu. 16. 2. Redde rationem villicationis tuae, Give an account of thy Stewardship. Ratio, in the third Definition of the fifth Book of Euclide, est duarum magnitudinum ejusdem generis, mutua quaedam secundum quantitatem, habitudo: Reason is a certain mutual habit, of two magnitudes of the same kind after their quantity: As when two Quantities of the same kind, two Numbers, two Lines, two Superficies, two Solids, &c. are compared one to another, ac∣cording to their quantity, that is, accordingly as one is greater, less, or equal to another; this comparison or mutual habit of one to another, was by Geometricians called Ratio. But now, I know not by what habit or custom, Proportio, (which definition 4^o lib. 5. Euclid. is, Rationum simili∣tudo; And definition 5, consists in three terms at least, for indeed it must consist in four; for where it is in three, the medium is iterated twice, as what proportion four hath to six, six hath to nine, &c.) hath eaten the former quite up, and is only used.

Or take Reason thus: Reason is that by which men from given Prin∣ciples, do rightly infer and deduce Conclusions. And Reasoning is two∣fold, either à priori, or à posteriori: A priori, from the cause, nature, and mat∣ter of necessary truths, to shew what effects follow from thence; and such Propositions are called demonstrative or scientifical, shewn and known from the Causes; such are all Propositions in Geometry and Mathema∣tiques: Or when the Effect is certain, and the Cause probable; and these are but probable Conclusions, such as those in Philosophy and Physick. As I would know the reason why Summer is hotter then Winter, for so I find it to be; why, thus I reason: It cannot be from the propinquity of the Sun to the Earth, in Summer more then in Winter, for the Earth is but a Point in proportion to the Universe; besides, the Sun is nearer to the Earth in Winter then in Summer, for the Orbis magnus is not Spherical or Circular, but Eccentrical and Elliptical, which is plain, because the revo∣lution of the Earth, or the Suns motion, is finished in less time from the Autumnal Equinox to the Vernal, then from the Vernal to the Autumnal, and therefore nearer to the Earth in Winter then in Summer. It is not then from the Suns nearness to the Earth, which makes the Summer hotter

then the Winter; I find, that the higher the Sun rises in our Horizon, that is, the nearer it comes to our Zenith when at the Meridian, the hotter it is: I therefore probably conclude, that the heat in Summer is caused from the reflexion of the Sun; and the nearer the radii are reflected to right angles, the hotter it is; and the more obliquely they are reflected, the colder it is. Or as when a Physitian from the symptoms of his indisposed Patient, en∣deavors to find out the causes of his distemper, &c. this is reasoning à po∣steriori, from the effect to find out the cause: And men may reason from uncertain and false Principles, as well as true, but then always the Conclusi∣ons are so. And therefore all Clavius his Demonstrations in his Practical Geometry, and at the end of the sixth Book of Euclid, of the Quadrature of a Circle, though the Demonstrations be truly deduced, are uncertain, because it does not certainly appear, That from the imaginary motion of the two right lines he there speaks of, the Quadratrix line does cut the Base so, that the side of the Quadratrix is a mean proportional between the Base and the Arch of the Quadrant. And the Inferences and Conclusions which have caused so much confusion and distraction in these times, are drawn from feigned and false Principles. But in all true Propositions what∣soever, no reason can be given for the first grounds and principles of them, but only the will of the great Creator of all things, who therefore so made them, because it so seemed good unto him.

Of all the creatures upon earth, Man only is reasonable, for Man only contemplates God, and looks up to heaven, as thence expecting his be∣atitude. Ovid. Metam.—

Pronaque cum spectant anamalia caetera terram, Os homini sublime dedit, coelumque tueri Jussit, & erectos ad sydera tollere vultus.

And a little after,

Sanctius his animal, mentisque capacius altae Deerat adhuc, & quod dominari in caetera possit, Natus homo est—

Only Man, from universal causes, can by Reasoning (the faculty of his understanding and memory) rightly infer and conclude from them; only Man has freedom in his will of doing, or not doing, and may (if it be not his own fault) in all his actions, let his Will be informed by his Under∣standing and Reason: whereas other Creatures do all things spontaneously, that is, by an impulse of Nature, as they are moved by their objects or fears. Therefore only Man does well, and only Man does ill; and only Man is happy, and only Man is miserable.

Author. But our Author goes on and tells you of a Tailor and a Mariner, and I know not what indeed, and concludes, That now not the nature of two men, but their words and what follows out of them, ground their being active and passive: This power of activity is in Latine called Jus or Justum; in English, Right or Due. Our Author says before, He that makes a promise to another man, puts himself and his Promissary into a rank of agencie and patiencie, upon a new score, to wit that of Fidelity and Negotiating.

Observ. Did ever man huddle up so much insignificant bumbast as here is, or who in this world did from hence ever claim any Right or Property in any

thing? Well, let us see then what we understand by Right or Due. Right or Due, is what any Man or company of Men claim to be his or theirs, ex∣cluding all their fellow-Subjects. And this Right, Due, or Property, we no where find to be given by God immediately to any Man or Men, but only the Land of Promise to the Children of Israel, the Portion of whose Inheritance fell to them by Lot. And by nature no Man has any property in any thing, more then another, if it be true as Cicero saies, Privata nulla natura. And Horace,

Non propriae telluris herum natura nec illum Nec me, nec quenquam statuit.

What then gives it but the Law or Supreme Power of the Nation? for Martial, Hoc lege quod possis dicere, jure meum est.