The mystery of the two ivntos Presbyterian and independent. Or, The serpent in the bosome vnfolded.

The Mysterie of the two Iuntos, Presbyterian and Independent.

THe Kingdome being overgrowne with Preroga∣tive, [unspec 1] Corruption, and Superstition (the fruits of a long and lazie peace) by a long discontinu∣ance of Parliaments; At last by Providence his Majestie was necessitated to call a Parliament the onely Colledge of Physitians to purge the much distempered body of the Common-wealth.

In this Parliament a contest betweene the Kings Prerogative and the peoples lawes and liberties begat a warre. [unspec 2] The Divines on both sides out of their pulpits sounding Alarme thereto: and not only Sermons; but Declarations of Parliament, and the Nationall Covenant, (holding forth to the people the defence of Religion, Laws, Liberties, and properties) inflamed the people to the rage of battle, as the Elephant is inraged at the sight of Red. This warre occasioned extraordinary Taxes and leavies of mo∣ney, such as was never heard of by our Ancestours, and were Ir∣ritamenta malorum, the nurse of our Corruptions.

This incentive working upon the humane frailty of the speak∣ing and leading members of the Houses,* 1.1 caused them first to in∣terweave their particular interests and ambitions with the pub∣lique, and lastly to preferre them before the publique.

Wherefore the said Leading men or Grandees (for that is now Parliament language.* 1.2) First divided themselves into two factions or Junto's: Presbyterians, and Independents: seeming to look only upon the Church, but (Religion having the strongest operation upon the spirit of man) involved the interests of the Common∣wealth.

The Common people of the two houses following (with an implicite faith and blind obedience) the example of their leaders, [unspec 5] divided themselves also into the said Dichotomy; which they did with more seriousnesse then their leaders, as not perceiving any thing of designe therein: But according to the diversity of their judgements, or rather fancyes and confidings (for to resigne a

mans judgement to the opinion of another man is but a silly trust and confidence) studied the to holding of their parties with ear∣nestnesse; whilst the Grandees of each party in private close toge∣ther for their owne advancement, serving one anothers turn.

[unspec 6] The Grandees (in all publique debates) seeme as reall in their reciprocall oppositions, as those silly ones who are in earnest, whereby they cherish the zeal of their respective partyes, keepe them still divided, (Divide & impera is the devils rule) and so amuse them, and take them off from looking after other interests, in which (were they conjoyned) they might share with the Gran∣dees themselves: and for the better contentment of such their Confidents as look too intentively after their own gain, the Grandees of each Junto conferre something of advantage upon those that are subservient to them, as five pounds a week, or some petty imployment.

[unspec 7] The seeds of these factions spread themselves into the Com∣mon-wealth and Armies: as Rheume distils from the Head into all the body.

* 1.3Thus the leading men or Bell-wethers have seemingly divided themselves, and having really divided the Houses: and captivated their respective parties judgement, teaching them by an Implicite faith Jurare in verba Magistri, to pinne their opinions upon their sleeves; They begin to advance their Projects of Monopolizing the profits, preferments and Power of the Kingdome in them∣selves. To which purpose, though the leaders of each party seem to maintain a hot opposition, yet when any profit or preferment is to be reached at; It is observed that a powerfull Independent especially moves for a Presbyterian: or a leading Presbiterian for an Independent: and seldome doth one oppose or speak against another (in such cases) unlesse something of particular spleen or Competition come between, which causeth them to break the common Rule. By this meanes the Grandees of each faction sel∣dome misse their mark, since an Independent moving for a Pres∣byterian, his reputation carries the businesse cleare with the Inde∣pendent party: and the Presbyterians will not oppose a leading man of their own side. By this artifice the Grandees of each side share the Common wealth between them: And are now be∣come proud, domineering Rehoboams (even over the rest of their

follow members▪ contrary to the liberty of Parl. which consists in an equality) that were formerly fawning ambitious Absoloms.

There hath been lately given away to members openly (be∣sides innumerable and inestimable private cheates mutually con∣nived at) at least 300000 l. in money; besides rich offices, [unspec 9] Im∣ployments in money Committees, Sequestrations, and other ad∣vantages. And those members who have so well served them∣selves under colour of serving the publique, are (for the most part) old Canvasers of Factions who have sate idly and safely in the house watching their advantages to confound businesses, and shuffle the cardes to make their owne game, when others that have ventured their persons abroad, labour'd in the publick work like Isaelites under these Egyptian task-masters, and lost their estates, are left to sterve, untill they can find reliefe in that empty bag, called by fooles fides publica, by wise men fides punica. And are now looked upon in the House superciliously, like unwel∣come guests (for it is known how malignantly and how jugling∣ly writs for new elections were granted and executed) and called younger brothers, and like younger brothers they are used: their elder brothers having slipped into the world before them, and anticipated the inheritance; They have broken first into the com∣mon field, and shut the dore to prevent after commers even from gleaning after their full harvest. For the better effecting whereof they have now morgaged (in effect) all the meanes they have to raise money, unto the City. And being themselves fat and full with the publike Treasure (to expresse rather their scorne then care.) Ther are making an Ordinance that no more money shall be given to their members: And yet to shew how carefull they are of all such as have cheated the Common-wealth under them (I will not say for them) They have taken advantage of the petition of the Army: wherein they desired Indempnity for all acts done in relation to the warre. And have passed an Ordinance of In∣dempnity for all such, as have acted by authority, and for the ser∣vice of the Parliament, wherein (under great penalties, & with an app••ale at last from the Judges of the Law, to a Comittee of Par∣liament) such as have gone beyond the authority given by Par∣liament, and sequestred men unjustly and so withheld their goods under pretence thereof, and such as have leavied taxes three or

four times over, are quit from private actions: and the benefite of Law and Justice taken from the Oppressed, to secure countrey Committees, Sequestrators, and others, (not Prerogative, but Legislative) Theeves; contrary to Magna Charta, which saies,, nulli negabimus, nulli differemus justitiam, aut rectum; We will deny, or deferre justice and right to no man. Oh prodigious acts! and of greater tyranny then any King ever durst adventure upon. What is become of our Nationall Cov. and the Parliament many Declarations for defence of Lawes and Liberty? Or have we fought our libertie into slavery? By these devises the honest middle men of the House (whose consciences will not let them joyn in any faction to rend the Common-wealth in sunder) are out of all possibility of repaire, and made contemptible as well by their own want, as the pride of the Grandees: and in the end, their poverty will inforce them to leave the sole possession of the house to these thriving Junto men, who do beleaguer them therin, ma∣king them (for farther addition to their losses) pay all taxes from which the thriving men go free: so that the poorer part of the house payes tribute to the richer. Nay it is further whispered, that at last the Junto men will quit the Parliament Priviledge of not being sued, purposely to leave these younger Brothers to the mer∣cy of their Creditors, and disable them to sit in their House.

An other ambitious ayme of those Junto men is their devise of referring all businesses of moment to Committees.* 1.4 For the active speaking men by mutuall agreement, naming one another of eve∣ry Committee (or at least their confident Ministers) doe thereby fore-stall and intercept the businesses of the house, and under co∣lour of examining and preparing matters, they report them to the house with what glosses, additions, detractions, and advanta∣ges they please; whereby the House (judging according to their report) oftentimes mis-judgeth, and if it be a business they are willing to smoother, the Committees have infinite artificiall de∣layes to put it off, and keep it from a hearing, or at least from reporting. By this meanes the remaining part of the House are but cyphers to value, and Suffragans to ratifie what is fore-judged by the said Committees. This usurpation of theirs is much helped by keeping the doors of their Committee roomes shut, and dis∣patching all affaires privately and in the darke. Whereas Justice

delights in the light, and ought to be as publique as the common aire, it being against its nature to be chambred up and kept from the observation of eye, and eare witnesses.

Parts of this project wee may well call the Multiplicity of money Committees, as Goldsmiths hall, Haberdashers hall,* 1.5 the Committee of the Kings revenues, Committee of the Army, &c. Where every mans profit and power is according to his cunning and conscience. Hereby they draw a generall dependency after them, for he that commands the money, commands the men: These Committee-men are so powerfull that they over-awe and over-power their fellow members, contrary to the nature of a free Parliament: wherein the equallity of the members must main∣taine the freedome and integrity thereof, and suppresse fa∣ctions.

The like may be said of such members as (in scorne of the self-denying Ordinances) hold offices by gift or connivence of the Par∣liament: either openly in their own name,* 1.6 or Secretly in the name of some friend. Their offices inabling them to do courtesies and discourtises. And although there hath bin a Committee appoin∣ted to certifie all pensions, Sequestrations, offices, imployments of advantage and profits conferred by the Parliament upon any their members, in which Committee M. Sands holdeth the chair; yet is this meerly a formallitie to blind the eyes of the world, and foole the expectation of some losing members, who were then resolute to know who had already received satisfaction for their losses, and how farre they had outrunne their fellow-members therein. Yet this Committee is now let fall, no reports deman∣ded of M. Sand: and when any is to be made; they are not un∣provided of a meanes to make it fruitlesse, by putting every par∣ticular to debate: well knowing that no man will be willing to argue against the particular persons and merits of his fellow-members, and thereby heape envie upon his own head; besides the delay of a particular debate.

How frequently the countrey Committees act contrary to the Laws of the Land:* 1.7 how they trample Magna Charta under their feet, how boldly and avowedly they transgresse all orders and Ordinances of Parliament, and break our solemne League and Covenant, how they ordinarily turne well affected men out of

their free-holds and goods, imprison and beat their Persons with∣out any known charge, accuser, or witnesse against them. How fre∣quently they leavie one taxe three or four times over & continue their leavyes after the Ordinances expire. How cruelly they raise the twentieth and fifth part upon the well affected; exercising, an Illegall arbitrary tyrannicall power over their fellow subjects farre higher then ever Strafford or Canterbury durst advise the King to. How ignorantly and unjustly they exercise a power to hear and determine (or rather to determine without hearing, or heare without understanding) private controversies of Meum▪ & Tuum, for debts, trespasses, nay title and possession of lands without either formality or knowledge of the Law, not having wit, man∣ners nor breeding enough (as being chosen for the greatest part, out o•• the basest of the people for base ends) to satisfy men with an outside, or Complement of justice: Insomuch that nothing is now more Common, then an accusation without an Accuser, a sentence without a Judge, and a condemnation without a hear∣ing. If any man, I say, be so deaf as not to heare the loud univer∣sall outcrying of the people; so great a stranger in our Israel as not to know this truth, let him peruse M. Edward Kings discovery of the arbitrarie actions of the Com. of Lincolne printed 1647. where he may see these things briesty Epitomised: but to historise them at large would require a volume as big as the book of Mar∣tyrs. These Committees are excellent spunges to suck money from the people, and to serve not onely their owne, but also the Covetous, Malicious, Ambitious ends of those that raked them out of the dunghill for that imployment, and doe defend them in their oppressions. Who is so blind as not to see that these men have theïr protectors? Their Daemones to whom they offer up part of their rapins; to whom they sacrifice.

Occulta spolia, & plures de pace Triumphos.

If there be any intention to restore our lawes and liberties, and free us from arbitrary Government: it is fit these Committees and all associations be laid downe, having no enemy to associate against, and that the old forme of Government by Sheriffes, Ju∣stices of the Peace &c. be re-established; and the Militia in each County setled as before, in Lieutenants, and Deputy-Lieutenants, or in Commissioners.

Nor is it a small artifice to raise mony by so many severall and confused Taxes. Whereas one or two wayes orderly used and well husbanded, would have done the work. 1. Royall Subsidie of 400000 l. 2. Pole-mony. 3 the free Loans and contributions upon the publick Faith amounted to a vast incredible summe, in mony, Plate, horse, Armes, &c. 4. The Irish adventure for sale of Lands the first and second time. 5. The Weekly Meale. 6. the City Loane after the rate of 50 Subsidies. 7. The Assessement for bringing in the Scots. 8. the 5. and 20 part, 9. The Weekly assessement for my L. Gene∣ralls Army. 10. The weekly (or Monthly Assessement for Sir Tho. Fairfax Army. 11. The weekly Assessement for the Scottish Army. 12. The weekly Assessement for the british Army in Ireland. 13 The Weekly Assessement for my L. of Manchesters Army. 14. Free∣quarter (at least) connived at by the State, because the Souldiers ha∣ving for a time subsistence that way, are the lesse craving for their pay: whereby their arrears growing stale, will at last either be fru∣strated by a tedious Committee of Accounts, or forgotten. In the mean time, the grand Committee of accounts discount it out of the Commanders arrears, whereby the State saves it. 15. The Kings Re∣venue. 16. Sequestrations and plunder by Committee••, which if well answered to the State would have carried on the work: which thus I demonstrate, One half of all the goods and chattells, and at least one half of all the Lands, Rents, and Revenues of the Kingdom have been sequestred. And who can imagine that one half of the pro∣fits and goods of the Land will not maintain any Forces that can be kept and fed in England, for the defence thereof? 17. Excise upon all things. This alone if well mannaged would maintain the Warre. The Low-countries make it almost their onely support. 18. Fortification money, &c. By these severall wayes and Taxes about 40 millions in money and money worth have been milked from the People: and the Parliament as (the Pope did once) may call England, Puteum inexhaustum; yet is now almost drawn day. A vast Treasury, and so excessive, as nothing but a long peace could import: and nothing but much fraud and many follies could dissipate. And we ought not to wonder if it be accounted ••nter ar∣cana

novissimi imperii to be alwayes making, yet never finishing an account thereof.

* 1.8And as they have artificially confounded the accompts by laying on multiplicity of Taxes; so (so for the same reason) they let the money run in so many muddy, obscure channells, through so many Committees and Officers fingers, both for collecting, receiving, issu∣ing and paying it forth, that it is impossible to make or ballance any publick account thereof: and at the least one half thereof is known to be devoured by Committees and officers and those that for lucre protect them. By these means as they make many men partners with them in the publick spoils, so they much strengthen and increase their party, whereby multitude peccantium tollit paenam.

* 1.9If these things were not purposely done, 1. our Taxes would be fewer in number, and more in effect. 2. They would be put to run in one chanell, under the fingering of fewer Harpies, and perspi∣cuous and true Entries made of all receipts and disbursements which would be publick to common view and examination. The Exche∣quer way of Accompts is the exactest, ancientest, and best known way of account of England, and most free from deceit, which is al∣most confessed de facto, when (to make the Kings Revenue more ob∣noxious to their desires) they took it out of the exchequer way (con∣trary to the fundamentall Lawes of the Land; for both the higher & lower Exchequer are as ancient and fundamentall as any Court in England) and put it under, a Committee which (as all other Commit∣tees do) wil render an account of their stewardship at the latter day. In the mean time divers of that Committee buy in old sleeping Pen∣sions which thee pay themselves from the first of their arrears: yet other men that have disbursed money out of their purses for the Kings Service, can receive no pay for any money laid forth before Michaelmas Terme, 1643. because (forfooth) then the Committee first took charge of the Revenue. In the mean time the Kings Tenants and debtours are deprived of the benefit of the Lawes and Liberties of the Subject which before they enjoyed: all Debts and Monies being now raised by the terrour of the Pur∣fuivants and Messengers, whose Commissions are onely to distrain

and levy, &c. whereas formerly the Exchequer sent out legall Process, and the Tenant or Debtor had liberty to plead to it in his owne defence, if he thought himselfe wronged; but now New Lords, new Lawes,, and to countenance their doings, the Com∣mittee have gotten an addition of some Lords to them. 3. If there were faire play above board, so many Members of both Houses would not be ambitious of the trouble and clamour that attends Task-Masters, Publicans, and such sinners as fit at the re∣ceipt of Custome, being no part of the businesse for which the write summons, or the people choose or trust them and whereby they are diverted from the businesse of the House: but would leave that imployment to other men, who not having the chara∣cter and priviledge of Parliament upon them, will be lesse able to protect themselves and their agents from giving pub••ike accounts of their receips and disbursements, and from putting affronts & delayes upon the Committee of Accompts as (it is well known) some of them have done. Lastly it is scandalous that the same men should be continued so long in their money imployments because Diuturnitas & solitudo corrumpunt Imperia; and by long continu∣ance and experience they grow so hardned, so cunning in their way, and so backward with dependencies, that it is almost impossi∣ble to trace them. And although (when we look upon the many persons imployed) we cannot say there is solitudo personarum; yet when we consider that by a long partnership in their imploy∣ments they are allyed together in one common interest; they are to be esteemed but as one man, for a Corporation of men is but many men joyned together as one man, and with one mind pur∣suing one and the same end or interest.

And though we have a generall Committee of Accompts,* 1.10 yet they were nominated by those Members that ought to give Ac∣compts: and it must needs be suspitious for an Accomptant to choose those persons before whom he shall accompt. And we see (after so long a time of their sitting) no fruit thereof. Whereas the people did hope, that after so much money spent, and such great debts and arreares left to pay, (whereby they are threatned with continuance of their Taxes) That a full and exact generall accompt of all Receipts and Disbursements would have been pub∣lished

in Print, for their satisfaction, as is usually done in the Low Countries, and as was once done by this Parliament, Anno 1642. by a Declaration of the accounts of the Kingdome.

* 1.11By these exorbitant courses, though they have drayned 40. Mil∣lions from the people, yet (as Philip of Macedon was said to be Inter quotidianus rapinas semper inops) they are falne to such ridi∣culous want and beggerie, that they have lately pawned almost all the security they have for 200000.l. to disband the Armie, and enter upon the Irish imployment. They have slit Goldsmiths Hall in sunder, and given one side thereof to the Citie, and kept the other halfe thereof to themselves, and that already charged with 200000.l. at least. So that if any sudden occasion happen, they have put their purse into the hands of the uncircumcised Jews of the City, and cannot raise one peny but by new taxes up∣on the people. It was worth observing to see how officiously some of the old Stagers took leave of the Publique purse, before it came into Hucksters hands. Alderman Pennington had a debt of 3000. l. he owed to Sir Iohn Pennington forgiven him, (he never asked forgivenesse of his sins so heartily) and 3000.l. more given him out of Goldsmiths Hall in course. The reason of this bounty was forked or two-fold:

1. Because he had got enough before.

2. To comfort his heart, for being left out of the City Militia. But the most observable thing was, to see this old Parlia∣ment like a young Prodigall, take up money upon difficult termes, and intangle all they had for a security.

1. They gave way to the City to hedge in an old debt, being a loane of money after the rate of Subsidyes: and other old debts.

2. Whereas 200000. l. only was the summe to be borrowed; the City injoyned them to take up 230000. l. whereof the the odde 30000. l. to be bestowed for reliefe of decayed occupiers of the City: So, that (upon the matter) the Parliament payes 30000. l. Broakage.

3. That the City may not trust the greatest unthrifts of Christen∣dome, with laying out their owne money; they put upon them two Treasurers of the City to retaine and disburse it for the ser∣vice

for which it was borrowed. So ye see they have now neither credit, money, nor a purse to put it in.

So that the modest Members who have beene more forward to helpe their Country then themselves,* 1.12 are left in the lurch for their losses, and exposed to the laughter of their elder brothers, the old Junto men, and factious leaders of the house; all being now morgaged to the Lombards of the City. The thriving Mem∣bers hope their younger brothers will continue as modest, as they have beene, and digest all with patience. But others (and those neither fools nor knaves) hope all the modest and middle men of the houses (such as are ingaged in no faction) will be provoked here∣by to draw into a third party or Junto to moderate the excesses of the other two, when any thing prejudicial to the Common-wealth is agitated: and to call the old Junto men those land Pyrates to ac∣count, making them cast up what they have swallowed, and bring it to a common dividend. Nor let them be discouraged with the supposed difficulty hereof, since 20. or 30. men holding together, & observing the crosse debates, and different sway of each party, may easily make themselves moderators of their differences, & turn the scales for the best advantage of the common, which way they please to cast in their votes, since it is very rare to have any que∣stion carried by more then eight or tenne voyces.

Most of these Grandees have for their retreat,* 1.13 houses in the Low Countryes richly furnished with sequestred Plate, Linnen and Stuffe: and great store of money in bank for their shelter, against such stormes as their Rapine, Tyrannie and Ignorance may happi∣ly raise here amongst us. In those their retirements, these Authors of our miseries will injoy their sinnes, and our spoiles in security, attending an opportunity to purchase their peace at last, and betray our Safeties and Liberties to the inraged Prince and Peo∣ple. This is called robbing the Aegyptians. And truly these am∣bitious state-Mountebanks have brought us into a darknesse, worse then Aegyptian. The text faith, the Aegyptians rose not from their places in three dayes: They yet knew where they were: which is more then we doe, every man being out of his place and ranck. The Servant in place of his Master, the Begger in place of the King, the Foole in place of the Councellour, the Theife

in place of the Judge, the Cheater in place of the Treasurer, the Clowne in place of the Gentleman; none but God alone can play Daedalus part, and give us a Clue to lead us out of this labyrinth, into which these unpolitique Hocas Pocasses have brought us: These unskilfull workmen that have built up Babel, and pulled downe Sion. Others are said to prepare Forraigne Plantations for Re∣treat; To people which, children are ravished from their parents armes, and Shipped away; an abomination not knowne in Eng∣land before, and therefore no competent Law made against it; no more then in ancient Rome against Parricides.

* 1.14By what hath been already said, you see what the severall, and what the conjoyned interests of these two Juntos or Factions Pres∣byterian and Independent are. Let us now consider where their severall strength lyes. The Independent groundeth his strength upon the Army, which if he can keepe up, he hopes to give the Law to all; and to produce that great Chymaera, Liberty of Conscience: not considering that the confusion and licentiousnesse of such a liberty will destroy it selfe, Libertas Libertate perit. The Presby∣terians have three pillars to support them. 1. The City is their chiefe foundation, with which they keepe a strict correspondencie, and dayly communication of Councells. Upon this considerati∣on they have lately put the Parliament Purse into the Cities Poc∣ket as aforesaid; setled and inlarged the City Militia. Where∣as all the Countrys of England (being more obnoxious to injuries then the Citie) suffer much for want of setling their Militia; the Parliament not trusting them with armes, so much as for their owne defence: An evident signe, there is a farther designe then disbanding this Army. And because the City Militia, can only keepe in awe the adjacent South and East Counties of the King∣dome; therefore to suppresse the remoter parts, and inforce them to obedience, they keepe up some in-land Garrisons, and have Generall Poyntz supernumerarie forces for the North. And in the West (under colour of sending men for Ireland) they keepe upon free quarter and pay of the country many supernumerarie Re∣giments and Troops most Cavaliers; at least five times as many as they really intend to transport. These are alwayes going, but ne∣ver gone: Like Saint George, alwayes in his saddle, never on his

way. Something ever is and shall be wanting untill Sir Thomas Fayrfax's Army be disbanded; and then (it is thought) the dis∣guise will fall off; and these supernumeraries shall appeare a new modelled Army under Presbyterian Commanders, you may bee sure: and such whose consciences shall not befoole their wits where any matter of gaine appeareth. If this be not their ayme, Why did they not disband these lewd Supernumeraries before last winter, since they might have raised as many men the spring following for halfe the charge their very free quarters cost? And most of these sweare they will not goe for Ireland, vowing they will cut the throats of the Round-heads.

The Countrey is amazed, fearing these Cavaliers are kept on free-quarter by a Cavaleerish party for some Cavaleerish Designe. Secondly, why did they not rather divide Sir Thomas Fayrfax Army into two parts, one to goe for Ireland, the other to stay in England; being already modelled, excellently disciplined, and ha∣ving the visible marks of Gods favour upon their actions? But to take a few for Ireland, a few for England, and leave a Coare in the middle to be plucked forth and disbanded, was the way to discontent them, and put them into mutiny: and thereby necessi∣tate the Parliament to disband them all, and give an opportuni∣tie to them that seek it, to new modell another army out of the aforesaid Supernumeraries, more plyable to the desires of the Presbyterian Iuncto: Adde hereunto the causelesse exasperating Speeches and aspersions cast upon most of the army purposely, as moderate men think, to discontent them. Thirdly, If they have no intent to keep up an Army upon the people, why have they con∣tinued the military charge for another yeare; and inlarge it from 52000 l. to 60000 l. a moneth?

Thus the City, Inland Garrisons,* 1.15 and Supernumerarie forces new modelled are like to prove the three stringed whips wherewith the Presbyterian Phaetons will drive their triumphant Chariot if they prevaile; To which may be added the Presbytors themselves, who by over-awing mens Consciences with their Doctrine, will subdue and worke mens mindes like wax to receive any impressi∣on of bondage that tyranny and oppression can set upon them, as they do in Scotland: The Clergy in all times and places have ever

held with the mightyt as the Jacco hunts still with the Lion to partake of his prey.

* 1.16The premises considered, I shall propound these ensuing Quae∣ries to those that are of better Judgement then my selfe.

1 Quere, Why the Title and punishment of Malignants is tran∣slated from the Cavaliers, who fought for Regall Tyranny against the Parl. and laid upon those that fought against Regall Tyranny for the Parliament? Is it not because those Cavaliers that have fought for one Tyrannie, will not be scrupulous to fight for ano∣ther? and such well affected as have opposed Tyranny in one kinde, will not admit of it in another? Why is it now accounted a note of malignity and disaffection to endeavour the putting down of Arbitrary Government, and re-establishing our lawes, liberties and properties; whereto the Parliament by their many Declara∣tions and their Nationall Covenant are bound? Lay this to heart and consider whether they have not changed these their first prin∣ciples, and consequently whether they are not desirous to change their old friends who resolutely adhere to the said principles.

2. If the King grant the Propositions; or if he deny them, and the predominant Juncto (for both Juncto's joyned in one (for this is probable) to drive on one common interest) establish the mi∣litary and civill power without him, according to their desires, and in order to their aymes. Quaere whether the said leading men set∣led in their postures with their confident Guards about them, may not draw after them so many of their party, as upon an implicite faith will follow them, and lick up the crums of the publicke spoyles under their Tables: expelling or disabling (as aforesaid) the dis-ingaged members, and by this policy make themselves per∣petuall Dictators, incorporating and ingrossing to themselves both the Consultive, Directive and Ministeriall power of the Kingdome in all causes Civil and Military, setting up an Oligarchy or popular Tyranny in stead of a Regall: As the thirty Tyrants of Athens did. In order whereto they already declare, 1. That an Ordinance of Parliament without the Kings Royall assent is equall to an Act of Parliament. 2. That an Ordinance is above a Law by vertue of their Legislative power: upon which presuming in their Ordinance of Indempnity they have granted an Appeale from the Judges of the Law to a Committee of Parliament. See the Ordinance May 21. 1647. 3. That they are the Irre∣vocable

Trustees of the peoples lawes, liberties and properties, without account: with other principles preparative to Tyranny.

3. Quaere, Why Arbitrary and Barbarous Government by Cōmittees and other Illegall proceedings (which in time of war were used upon Reall or pretended necessitie, & were then only excusable, because necessitas tollit Legem) are still continued upon us now in time of peace, no enemies troubling our quiet, and without any further pretence of necessitie, Contrary to their Na∣tionall Covenant, and all their Declarations? Is it not, to inure the People to servitude, and ever use their patience?

4. Quaere, Whether the Prodigious oppressions of Committees, Sequestrators, &c. and of free Quarter be not purposely counte∣nanced to necessitate the people to rise in tumults, that thence occasion may be taken to keepe in-land Garrisons and Armies?

5. Quaere, Whether our lawes, liberties, and properties are not now as lyable to an Invasion from the Legis-lative power, as formerly, from the Prerogative? Considering that those who like ambitious Absolom courted and wooed the people in the begin∣ning of troubles, now like haughtie Rehoboams, care not though the people complaine: Their little finger is heavier then the loynes of the King, the controversie betweene the two Juncto's being no more, then whose slaves wee shall be.

If the middle and dis-ingaged men in the House do not speedily unite themselves into a party or Juncto, as the Factious have done,* 1.17 and communicate their counsels; they will be arena sine calce, loose sand dissipated by every breath: and neither serviceable for them∣selves nor their Countrey. Whereas if they unite, twentie or thir∣ty may become Moderators and Umpeers between both parties; (as hath beene already said) Let the moderate men but consider how sad and dishonourable a thing it is to see nothing almost of great and publique concernment come into the House, but what hath bin before hand contrived, debated, and digested in one or both of the two Juncto's at their private meetings: and put into so resol∣ved and prejudicate a way and method of dispatch, that every man is appointed his part or Cue before-hand: One man to move it, and set it on foot, another to second him: One man to speake to one part of the argument, another to another part: another to keepe himselfe to the last for a reserve, and speake to the que∣stion, which he is provided to qualifie with a distinction, or vary

it, if he find it difficult to passe. Thus all publique businesses are measured by private respects; wherby it appears, that as frequent Parl. are good physick: so continuall Parl. are bad food; & the peo∣ple may complain, that, qui medice vivit, misere vivit. Parliaments are Bona peritura; they cannot keepe long without Corruption. Their perpetuitie emboldens the members, by taking from them all feare of being called to account: Especially if they get their sonnes into the House as well as themselves (as many have done this Parliament: and more endeavour to do) whereby they have an estate in their places for two or three lives: Moreover by long sitting they become so familiar with one anothers persons and designes, as to serve one anothers turnes, to joyn interest, and to draw into Factions, Hodie mihi, cras tibi. If you and your partie will helpe me to day, I and my friend will helpe you to mor∣row.

* 1.18Miserima Resp. ubi majestas Imperii, & salus populi discordi∣bus conflictantur studiis. What shall we say?

En quo discordia tetra—perduxit miseros?

Shall we complaine to God? God hath a controversie with us. Of whom shall we complaine? of our selves? we must first reforme our selves: we that take upon us to reforme Church and Common-wealth. Shall we complaine of our sinnes? aske the grace of repentance first; and so aske that we may obtaine. Shall we complaine of our punishments? let us first repent, and amend our sins that caused them. Let us first pluck off the maske of hy∣pocrisie, God will see through such a fantasticall garment of Fig∣leaves. Let us no longer make Religion a stalking-horse; God who is all Wisedome, and all Truth, will not be deceived. If we talke like Christians, and live like Turks, Christ will not owne us. To fast for a day, and hang our heads like bulrushes, will not reconcile us. We must fast from publique spoiles, rapines and op∣pression, and not drink the teares of the poore and needy. Shall we complaine with the Prophet, That our Princes are become Theeves? that was heretofore our complaint, now we must in∣vert it, and cry, That our Theeves (meane and base people) are become Princes. We are sick, very sick, intemperately sick; and God hath given us a Physitian in his wrath, a Leper as white as

snow, fitter to infect then cure us. What Physick doth hee pre∣scribe? Poyson. What dyet? Stones instead of bread, Scorpions instead of fishes, hard fare for them that formerly fed so daintily. Before I conclude, let me give you the pedegree of our Miseries, and of their Remedies. A long peace begat Plenty, Plenty be∣gat Pride, and her sister Riot; Pride begot Ambition, Ambition be∣got Faction, Faction begot Civill War: And (if our eviils be not incurable, if we be not falne in id temporis quo nec vitia nostra, nec corum remedia ferre possumus) our War will beget Poverty, Po∣verty Humility, Humility Peace againe, Sic rerum revertentibus vicibus annulus vertitur Politicus. The declining spoake of the Wheele will rise againe. But we are not yet sufficiently Humb∣led; we have not repented with Nineveh. We weare Silkes and Velvets instead of sack-cloath and ashes (even the meanest up∣start hath his thefts writ upon his back by his Taylor in proud Characters of Gold-lace) we have not watered our Couch with our Teares, but with adulterous sweat. Look to it therefore ye state Incubi, that by an incestuous copulation have begot plenty upon Warre, and filled your houses with the spoyle and plunder of your deare Countrey; an inundation of bloud, and of the tears of the oppressed will wash away the foundation of your houses: And peace will be farre from you in this world, but especially that peace which the world cannot give: And because Salaman∣der-like you delight in the fire of contention; an unquenchable fire will be your lot hereafter. And though you escape all ac∣counts here, yet upon the great day of account when you shall receive your sentence of condemnation, those your children for whose preferment you fell your soules, your God for gold, shall not shew so much thankfulnesse or pitty towards you, as to say, alas our father! But your hearts are hardned with Pharaoh, I leave you therefore to Pharaoh's destiny, to be drowned in your owne Red Sea, as he was in his.

Thus farre I adventured to vindicate our Religion, Lawes,* 1.19 and Liberties with my pen; in discharge of my Conscience, and pur∣suance of our Nationall Covenant which obligeth us to defend them against whosoever to our power; neither knowing nor ca∣ring whether in so wicked an age (wherein vice is honoured, and

vertue contemned) I may be thought worthy of punishment for being more righteous then my superiors. I know an honest man is wondred at like a monster, and the innocency of his life and conversation suspected as a Libell against the State, yet if I perish I perish; & pereundum in licitis. Nor am I lesse provided of a safe retreat then our Grandees. My grave is open for me, and one foot in it already. Contempsit omnes ille qui mortem prius. He that contemnes death, scornes both Hope and Feare; which are the only affections that make Knaves, Fooles and Cowards of all the world. The world is a goodly Theater, we the Actors, God is both Poet and chiefe spectator. We must not choose our owne parts, that is at Gods appointment. One man he appoints to play the King, another the Begger, one a Comick, another a Tragick part: Whatsoever part God hath appointed for me in this remainder of my life, I will have a care to personate it in∣genuously and aptly: Not doubting but my Exit shall be ac∣compained with an applause into my tyring Roome, my Tomb; nor will I refuse the meanest part that may draw a plaudit from so excellent a spectator, but will prepare my selfe for the worst of evills, in this worst of times; and pray to God to reforme our Reformers. Amen.

THE END.

Notes

• * 1.1

  3. Grandees.
• * 1.2

  4. Factions.
• * 1.3

  8 Monopoli∣zing Profits and prefer∣ments,
• * 1.4

  10. Commit∣tees of the Houses.
• * 1.5

  11. Money Committees.
• * 1.6

  12. Members holding offi∣ces, &c.
• * 1.7

  13. Countrey Committees.
• * 1.8

  15. Accounts.
• * 1.9

  Accounts a∣gain.
• * 1.10

  16. Committee of Accounts.
• * 1.11

  17. Wants of the Parl. and how occasio∣ned.
• * 1.12

  18. Modest and middle members.
• * 1.13

  19. Grandees provision to save them∣selves.
• * 1.14

  20. Grandees their several intrests and designes and strengths.
• * 1.15

  21. Presbytersi
• * 1.16

  23. Quaeries up∣on the pre∣mises.
• * 1.17

  23. Middle and Moderate members a∣gaine.
• * 1.18

  24. Conclusion with some complaints.
• * 1.19

  25. Resolution and scope o•• the Author.