Rome ruin'd by VVhite Hall, or, The papall crown demolisht

CHAP. XV. Treateth of the Popes dispensing with the Morall Law.

SECT. 1.

ANother of the Popish Tenents is, That the Morall Law, or any precept thereof may be by humane au∣thority dispensed withall, to which purpose the Popes Cannonists doe give to their Terreine god, an infinite and unreasonable power, these being their conclusions, viz. Papa potest dispensare contra jus divinum. The Pope may dispence against the Law of God. 2. Contra jus Naturae, Against the Law of Nature. 3. Contra novum Testamentum, Against the New Testament. 4. Contra Apostolum, Against the Apostles. 5. Papa potest dispensare de omnibus preceptis veteris & novi Testamenti. The Pope may dis∣pence with all the precepts of the Old and New Testament, and that for these reasons following, each of which shall receive its answer; their first reason being this, viz.

SECT. 2.

Obi. AS amongst men, the Law-giver may dispence with his Law, so God that gave the Morall Law, is therefore above the Law, and may dispence with it. And if God may dispence, then the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the Church may certainly dispence, because they are in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••ead.

Ans. 1. As to that concerning humane Lawes, which tend to* 1.1 the common good, the preservation of the Publique State, the maintenance of peace and justice, the Law-givers cannot so dis∣pence as to over-throw the end of those Lawes, (as it shall be lawfull to disturbe the publique State, or the like;) for this were to evert the very scope and end of the Law. But yet in particular cases they may dispence, as that where an order is that every one shall watch, which is intended for the good of a City, yet some may be dispenced withall, and exempted from watching, who may more necessarily be imployed for the common good; for here, al∣though the letter of the Law be not precisely kept, yet the inten∣tion of the Law-makers is observed, which is to seeke, and pro∣cure the common good. So likewise universally, the Lord neither will, nor can dispence against his Law, as to make it lawfull to have other gods, to take Gods name in vaine, and the like; for this were for God to deny himself to be just, 2 Tim. 2. 13. and to make it lawfull in generall to violate the precepts of the first and second Table, were to deny his owne Justice, and so consequently to deny himself, for God is most true, yea Justice it self, and the Law is a perfect rule of justice, yet in the particular determina∣tions* 1.2 of the Law, the Lord doth dispence; as with Abraham sa∣crificing of his Son, Gen. 2. 2. the Israelites in robbing of the Aegyptians, the fornication of Hosea the Prophet, Hosea 1. 2.

For the Will of God which is most just, and the right (which he hath in the lives, bodies, and goods of men) maketh these things lawfull, (being done by the Commandement of God) which other∣wise would be unlawfull; for a man may use his Oxe, or his Asse at his pleasure (because they are ordained for his use) so likewise may the Lord doe with men, take away their lives at his pleasure, and that by a double right; both because man by his sin hath deserved to dye. 2. As he is his Creator, and may use the creature at his pleasure, or as may best serve to his glory. And as man may use his owne goods, and that which is lent unto him precario, freely and frankly, during the pleasure of the lender: (which when he will he may require againe) so the earth being the Lords, and the fulnesse thereof, which he (as it were) lend∣••th to man so long as it pleaseth him. He may justly at his plea∣sure, transfer things from one to another, and like as Matrimony

maketh carnall copulation lawfull, so the Lord may by his Com∣mandement bring, and supply the like bond as Matrimony is, as in the instance of the Prophet afore mentioned, when the Lord bid him take unto him a Wife of fornication, the Commandement of God made that lawfull, which otherwise was unlawfull, and so in the other examples.

But albeit, God can make that which seemes unjust to be law∣full and just, yet can he not make a just, and a good act, to be evill and wicked, as that he which worshippeth God aright doth evill, or such like; and the reason is, because God by this meanes, should be contrary to himself, in commanding one so to worship him, and yet counting him for so worshipping him to doe evill. A∣gain, it is impossible for God to doe that which he cannot will; now the Lord willeth no evill to be done, therefore he cannot make that which is good to be evill, because he cannot deny himself, who is only good.

SECT. 3. A difference betwixt the precepts of the first and second Table.

THere is also a difference to be made betwixt the precepts of the first and second Table. God doth dispence with the se∣cond, which he referred to the good of our neighbour, (when he seeth it more to make for his owne glory, which is the true end and scope of the first and second Table;) as when God command∣eth to dishonour Parents, rather then to dishonour him; and bid∣deth them kill; and so in the rest. But with the precepts of the first Table he dispenceth not, because they are immediatly refer∣red to his owne glory, for otherwise it were to consent to disho∣nour himself; and thus much for the answer of the first part of the Argument.

2. It followeth not (if God can dispence) that therefore the* 1.3 Prelates and the Church may. 1. Because the dispensation a∣gainst a Law, must be by as great authority as the Law was first made by. But the Moral Law (grounded upon the Law of Nature,) was founded by the Author and Creator of Nature, and there∣fore by him only, and not by any else may it be dispenced with.

2. As in naturall effect•• ordinarily there must goe before an ex∣traordinary cause, a naturall cause; as a thing cannot be made hot, unlesse fire or some other efficient cause of heat be put unto it; so that the Pope himself cannot command a thing to be ho••, but by such efficient cause of heat. Yet the Lord without such ••ediate and ••rdinary mean••s, can make a thing hot by his infinite power, supplying that cause himself.

So likewise in Spirituall actions, the Lord may supply that which maketh the thing lawfull, which man cannot doe without some externall cause, or circumstance doe concurre in making the act lawfull. As to kill is an unlawfull act in it self, neither can the Pope, or any other man make it lawfull to kill, unlesse there be some cause that maketh it lawfull to kill; as when the party commanded to be slaine deserveth to dye. But God (to whom all men are debtors, and who is the Lord of every mans life, may command to kill without any injustice, although there be no such apparant cause or circumstance, which should make that act lawfull.

SECT. 4.

Obj. BƲt they further object thus: To restore that which is committed to a mans trust is a naturall duty; yet this is dispensed with, when as a man refuseth to restore to a Mad-man his sword or weapon, which he gave one to keep; so the Magistrat•• ordinarily dispenceth with that precept, Thou shalt not kill, when he commandeth Malefactors to be slaine: So also the Maccabees dispenced with the Sabbath, when they resolved to fight with their enemies on the Sabbath day, 1 Mac. ••. Chap. As these precepts then were dispenced withall by men, so may the rest.

Ans. For the first instance, there is in that particular case, no dispensation against the Law of Nature, for then by such dispensa∣tions it would be made lawfull, not to restore that which is com∣mitted to trust, which cannot be made lawfull by any dispensation; for this were to crosse and over-throw the Law of Nature, but not to restore a sword to a furious man, is but a particular inter∣pretation of that generall Law of Nature, wherein the in••ent of

that Law is kept, for it is agreeable to the Law of Nature, to ren∣der whatsoever belongeth unto another; and the reason thereof is, because it is just. So it is lawfull by the same Law, (notwith∣standing) not to give unto a Mad-man his owne sword, because it is just. Also the meaning and reason of the Law is kept, because the furious man would doe some hurt with his weapon, and there∣fore to administer occasion and instrument unto his rage, were unjust.

In the other two particulars, there is no dispensation, but an interpretation rather, or declaration of the Law; as that it is no Murther when one is justly slaine. And in the other, that it is no breach of the Sabbath, when necessity compelleth to breake the rest thereof; but thus to dispence were a dispensation to make it lawfull to kill where one cannot justly be put to death, and to worke upon the Sabbath where there is no necessity. 2. Thus to dispence were to make it lawfull afterward, which was not before such a dispensation; but it was alwayes lawfull for the Magistrate to put to death, and upon like necessity to intermit and suspend the rest of the Sabbath. 3. Besides these interpretations and de∣clarations of these Lawes, they are not devised by man, but war∣ranted in Scripture by the Lord himself, the Maker and Au∣thor of the Law, and therefore they are not to be interposed by any humane authority.

Notes

• * 1.1

  The Law▪giver cannot dis∣pence in hu∣man Lawes as to over▪ throw them.
• * 1.2

  Exod. 3. 22. & 22. 35, 36.
• * 1.3

  Though God can dispence the Prelates cann••••▪