Rome ruin'd by VVhite Hall, or, The papall crown demolisht

CHAP. XIII. Treateth of the Popish distinction of Mortall and veniall Sins.

SECT. 1.

Objection. THough concupisence be a corruption of our nature, yet it is but a veniall sinne, or at the most partly mortall, and partly veniall; for when our desires are without reason, then it is a mortall sinne, but when they are reasonably required, it is but a veniall sinne?

Ans. The distinction of Mortall and veniall Sinnes being un¦derstood in their sence, that some sinnes (in the condition and qualities thereof) are mortall, and some veniall, is contrary to Scripture, which maketh death the wages of sinne, Rom. 6. 23. that is, of all. But to the faithfull (tis true, through Gods grace)* 1.1 all sinnes are veniall, and shall never be laid to their charge, (and so no concupisence is mortall;) otherwise, there can be no rea∣sonable coviting of any other mans things; for reason ••s groun∣ded upon the Law of Nature, against which is all concupisence: therefore the coveting of any thing which is our neighbours

(being a transgression of the Morall precept) is in its owne nature mortall.

SECT. 2. No worthinesse to be attributed to our selves from any gift of Nature.

ANd if we rightly understand our selves, it is contrary to the nature of a true Christian to justifie, or vindicate himself in any thing that may tend to his owne glory and praise, by ascribing any worthinesse to himself from any gifts of Nature that is resident in him, or to endeavour to lessen, or mittigate a sinne, but rather to acknowledge himself to be altogether sinfull and un∣cleane, which was the qualities of all the holy men of God, as the Scriptures doth plentifully expresse; for if we did but truly con∣ceive what sinne is, there is none which we ought to esteeme little or veniall, unlesse it be comparatively, seeing there is none so small but that without repentance is able to sink the soule to eter∣nall* 1.2 damnation, who will think that a slight wound which giveth a sudden in-let to death; but should we grant this errour, of all other sinnes they are most dangerous, both for their frequency and security, the one increasing them to a large heap, and the other so covering them that we see not how they wrong us; so as we see the raine that falls in smallest drops moystens the earth, and makes it more slimy and dirty then a shower which descends vio∣lently, which washeth away but sinketh not in. And as the smallest letters are more hartfull to the sight, then they that are written with a text pen; so those sinnes which are esteemed as small and veniall, and we take no notice of, may soonest prove our fatall overthrow.

And for the better progresse in this question, we will observe* 1.3 the degrees which are to be considered in the nature of sinne, which are three, viz. Appetitus, assentio, & actio. The appetite, or first desire. 2. The perfect assent. 3. The action.

Now the very appetite is restrained in the Morall precept, al∣though it doth not yeeld to the desire, if it doe but tickle us with a delight, it is sufficient to make us guilty; for our Saviour saith

that, He that looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart, Mat. 28. where if we ob∣serve, our Saviour meaneth not in these words, he that looketh, and lusteth, but he that looketh (to) lust; that is, he that look∣eth upon a woman as an object to kindle, or set an edge to his lust, or to give way unto it in the least degree; which instance suiteth with the first degree of sinne, which is the appetite, and not with∣in* 1.4 the bounds of consent, or action. By which it is evident, that all concupisence is forbidden, yea that which hath the least incli∣nation of the will though no consent be given.

SECT. 3. Concupisence of two sorts, good and bad.

Obi. ARe those thoughts which are in the minde without any con∣sent of the will to be counted as sin before God?

Ans. We are to distinguish betwixt concupisence and desire,* 1.5 which is either good concupisence, or bad; the good is of two sorts, either perfectly good, or imperfectly good, such as is now in man, mixed with many infirmities and imperfections, which is either naturall in man, as the coveting and desiring of meat and drink, and other things necessary for the use of man, or superna∣turally wrought in man by grace, as is the love and desire of ver∣tue; or it is mixed, partly naturall, and partly supernaturall; as Matrimoniall concupisence for procreation, which hath both a naturall cause or being, and is likewise guided by grace unto a right end, and none of these kinds of good and commendable con∣cupisence is sinne.

Evill concupisence is of three sorts; 1. As Idle, roving, and* 1.6 impertinent thoughts, which the mind may easily reject. 2. Vio∣lent cogitations, which sticketh more closely and nearely, as the immoderate desire of meat and drink, and such things as belong to the necessity of nature, as sumptuous apparrell, and the like. 3. There are filthy and uncleane cogitations, as lasciviousnesse, envie, vain-glory, and the like.

The first of these may be compared to thin Clay that sticketh or cleaveth not; the second to tough Clay, that sticketh fast;

and the third to uncleane and stinking Myre and Mud: (other∣wise) the first motion is not voluntary, (as a certaine preparation of the affection;) the second is with the will, (but the same not obstinate,) as when it commeth to ones minde to revenge himself when he is hurt; but the third kinde is so outragious that it will not be ruled by reason, as when a man is carried to revenge him∣self without measure. The first of these can be no more ruled by reason, then such things as hapneth to the body; as when one yauneth when he seeth another yaune, or suddenly winketh, when one putteth their finger towards anothers eye, &c.

SECT. 4.

Obj. ARe these idle wandrings (being without respect to any certaine object) sin, and so forbidden in the Morall pre∣cept, seeing the Morall precept aymeth at a certaine object, as thou shalt not covet thy neighbours house, &c.

Ans. If we doe reject these thoughts at the very first moving of them; and yet if so, they carry some staine and guilt in them, in regard children which have no such evill thoughts, yet are not cleane before God, being conceived and borne in sin, as in Psal. 51. 5. and which is also most evidently confirmed by the death of Infants, (as I have formerly shewed,) sin being the cause of death.

Therefore the best solution is, that those cogitations (which doe vanish before the minde be affected;) be not comprehended in the precept as actuall sins, untill the will of man in some degree give consent, till then sinne is only in the conception, but not in the birth, as the Apostle James saith, When lust hath conceived it bringeth forth sin, Jam. 1. 15. but as it is the first fruit of origi∣nall sinne, together with that native corruption, they are con∣trary to the precept, for the Morall Law being grounded upon the Law of Nature, which was perfect in man by creation before his fall, and from which perfection originall sinne being a de∣fect. It may well be concluded, that though they doe not come to reckoning before God, if they presently vanish (before the will and affection be inclined unto them) yet doe they shew the corruption of our nature; and although they breake not into a

a flame, yet they are sparkes that flye upward; but if those sparks doe not break into a flame, they shall never burn us, nor be laid unto our judgement: for if the will assent not, concupiscence shall never hurt. But this is through Gods meere mercy, for otherwise* 1.7 this very originall corruption is enough to condemne us. And thus I have shewed the distinction of sinnes veniall, and yet not veniall in their proper nature, in respect of their greatnesse and smalnesse, but not to be permitted, for these reasons.

SECT. 5. Why originall corruption is not to be permitted.

1 IN respect of the nature of sinne, which of it selfe deserveth death, Rom. 6. 23. The wages of sinne is death, as also in that it is a transgression of the Law, 1 John 3. 4. and every transgres∣sion of the Law is under the Curse, Gal. 3. 10. 2. In respect of the infinite Maiesty of God, who to offend can be no veniall sinne of it selfe, considering his perfect and absolute righteousnesse, which cannot abide the least blemish and imperfection. Therefore in regard of the perfect righteousnesse, and infinite Maiesty of God, no sinne against him can be veniall, as in the sudden motion and passion of anger, even when it is sudden and unadvised; yea, though there be no further purpose or intendment of hurt, is notwithstanding guilty of judgement, Matth. 5. 22.

So then we admit of a distinction of mortall and veniall sinnes,* 1.8 if it be understood not of the nature of sinne, but of the quali∣ties of the persons: for unto them that believe, all sinnes are ve∣niall and pardonable, through the mercy of God, Rom. 8. 1. There is no condemnation to them that are in Christ Jesus; but to the wic∣ked and unbelievers, all their sinnes are mortall, Rom. 6. 23. to them the stipend and wages of sin is death.

Now if we trace this originall and spaune of sinne unto the birth, we shall find it in action, which action proceedeth from the conception of the will, to enioy the thing desired, as the Apo∣stle James saith, When lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sinne, Jam. 1. 15.

SECT. 6. Five things to be considered in every sinfull act.

ANd in every sinfull act there are five things to be considered, as Actus, Peccati, Culpa, Macula, Reatus, Poena. 1. The ve∣ry act of sin. 2. the fault. 3. the blot. 4. the guilt. and 5. the punishment.

1. The act of sin, as it is an act, is not alwayes evill: for, there* 1.9 is the same act in substance, in sin, as in doing that which is honest, as in adultery, there is the like externall act, as in lawfull Matri∣mony; so that onely the fault, which is in respect of the circum∣stances (which are not observed) make the difference.

2. The second thing to be considered is, Culpa, the faultinesse of the action, which is committed by the not due observing of the Circumstances, which are these, First, Quid, what it is that hee* 1.10 doth, whether it be lawfull, or not lawfull, honest or not honest. 2. quantum, the quantity must be considered; as one may steale much or little, or raile sparingly, or with a full mouth. 3. quoties, how often; for he that committeth the same sinne often, is more blameable then he that doth it seldome. 4. qualiter, after what manner, whether willingly or unwillingly, whether he be quicke or slow in doing of it. 5. Cum quo, with what instrument; as he that smiteth with a switch, is not equall with him that striketh with a sword. 6. Cum quem, with whom the sinne is committed; as fornication betwixt them that are married, is more hey∣nous then betwixt single persons. 7. Ʋbi, where, in what place it is committed; for it is more heynous to steale in a Church, or Con∣gregation of Gods people, then in another place. 8. quando, when, for it is more heynous to steale in time of Divine worship, then at other times. 9. Ad quid, to what end; for the end maketh a thing of it self lawfull or unlawfull.

Now to make an action lawfull or good, all these things must concurre; but it is enough to make it evill, if it faile in any of them; and this faultinesse of the action, passeth with the action it selfe, which is the subiect thereof, and remaineth not.

3. There is left behind a macula, a certain stain or blot in the Soule, whereby the Image of God is deformed.

4. Besides this stain, there is a guiltinesse of punishment.

5. The punishment it selfe, which is Hell Fire, without true repentance.

SECT. 7.

Object. VVHether doe we sinne of necessity, or of a voluntary disposition: for if it be of necessity, it ceaseth to be sin, and if it be voluntary, it may be avoïded.

Answ. Sinne is both of necessity and voluntary: First, it is of* 1.11 necessity in respect of Adams fall, by which we became Bond∣slaves to sin and Satan. Secondly, in that we have originally a seed of that defect in us procured by him, and so can will nothing but that which is evill; that as the Apostle saith, We are not suffici∣ent of our selves to think any thing of our selves, as of our selves, 2 Cor. 3. 5. it being proper to God alone to work in us both to will and to doe of his good pleasure.

Object. The Apostle saith, he would that which was good, though he could not accomplish it, Rom. 7. 15. Therefore man of himselfe can will that which is good.

Ans. The Apostle in that place speaketh not of the Naturall man, but of the regenerate; for he addeth, I am delighted in the* 1.12 Law according to the inward man; but (saith he) I see another law in my members, resisting the law of my minde, Rom. 7. 22. And it will fully appeare that we are corrupt in both parts, viz. in soule and body: For that which is born of the flesh is flesh, John 3. 6. And, to be carnally minded i•• death, Rom. 8. 6. And therefore in vain doe we seek in man either integrity, understanding, or the feare of God: For the will is so fast bound by the slavery of sinne, that it cannot move it selfe to that which is good, and much lesse apply it selfe thereunto. For such a motion is onely a beginning of turning unto God, which is wholly attributed to the grace of God in Scripture; as in Jer. 31. 18. where Ephraim is said to desire of God, to turn him that he might be turned. And the Spouse in the Canticles, Draw me, and I will run after thee, with divers other* 1.13 places of Scripture which doth testifie the same. It is therefore proper to Nature to will that which is evill, and to Grace that

which is good, whereupon it followeth that men are drawn unto evill by necessity of will, and yet they are not constrained to com∣mit it. Again, on the other side it commeth to passe through the the infinite goodnesse of God, that godly men cannot doe evill through any forceable compulsion; for otherwise the minde of man in its owne nature is voyd of all grace, for which cause it is said that he that hath begun a good worke in us will also finish it, Phil. 1. 6. & 2. 13. as also, It is God that worketh in us both to will and to doe of his good pleasure. The Lord also speaking by his Prophet, saith, that he will give his people a new heart, and take from them their stony heart, and also put his Spirit in the middest of them, and make them walke in his Commandements, Ezec. 35. 26. by which it appeares, that all the inclinations to goodnesse pro∣ceed only from Gods Spirit moving us thereunto, secretly say∣ing, This is the way, follow it.

Grace then goeth before every good work, it doth not follow after, but so that will, and desire doth accompany it, not lead it; For the will doth worke by grace, the Lord preventing him that is unwilling that he may be more willing, and that he may not will in vaine, so that there can no will be found which is incli∣ning to good save in the elect, but the cause of election must be sought without men; whereby it is proved, that man of himself hath not a right will, but that it floweth from the same good* 1.14 pleasure whereby he was elected before the Creation of the world; as also that the beginning of willing, and doing well, proceedeth from faith, and faith is the gift of God; it must needs then follow, that it is of meere grace, when we begin to will that which is good, being inclined and bent naturally to evill. As also by the instance of David, who desired the Lord, to create in him a new heart, Psal. 51. 12. yea we are as prone thereunto, as the sparkes to fly upward.

SECT. 8. The Pelagians two-fold question answered.

THe will therefore is the Patient, and not the Agent, and there∣fore to resolve the Pelagians two-fold doubt, viz. whether we

sin willingly being made bond-slaves to Satan; and whether in evill workes we ought to attribute any thing unto God; we thus answer.

As touching the first we answer, that mens wills may be com∣pared to an Horse that waiteth his Masters pleasure, and God and the Devill may be compared to Hors••-men, or Riders, but if the Devill possesse it he carrieth it head-long unto death, as it were an Hunter over hedge and ditch; as we may instance in that example of Job, upon whom it was the Lords pleasure to exercise by calamity the patience of his servant, but contrariwise Satan endeavoureth to drive him into dispaire. Again, the Caldeans study contrary unto equity, to get gaine by that which was ano∣ther mans, in which passage one and the same act may be ascribed unto God, Satan, and Man, but the variety in the manner and end maketh the justice of God appeare without any fault; and in the other the wickednesse of Satan and Man is discovered, to their perpetuall shame and reproach.

Obi. If it be not in the power of a Sinner to obey, exhortations should be made in vaine, admonitions should be superfluous, and reprehensions rediculous.

Ans. Our Saviour saith, that without him we can doe nothing, Joh. 15. 5. and yet notwithstanding he doth neverthelesse re∣prove those that did evill without him; as we may see in his re∣proofes which he uttered against Corazin and Bethsaida, Mat. 11. 21. as also to the Scribes and Pharisees, and others of the Jewes, ver. 23. terming them Vipers, Mat. 12. 34. children of the De∣vill, Joh. 8. 44. by reason of their uncleane thoughts, and ungodly actions, and yet these sinned not of absolute necessity, as we may instance in Phara••h, Exod. 7. 22. where it is said, that Pha∣raoh did not hearken to Moses as the Lord had said.

From which instance we may collect, that it was necessary that Pharaoh should not have harkened to Moses, because the Lord had fore-told so much, who cannot be deceived, but Pharaoh was not forced or compelled thereunto.

SECT. 9. Two sorts of necessity.

THere are two sorts of necessity, viz. a violent necessity which forceth and compelleth, and there is a conditionall necessity, when a thing is said to be necessary, another thing presupposed. So Pharaohs disobedience and obstinacy was the second way neces∣sary upon the proposall of Gods presience, but the first way it was not necessary.

The first of these is coactive, the second is voluntary; the first neither justifieth a man if he doe well, being forced thereunto, nor condemneth him if he doe evill, but the second hath place in both; for by it the righteous have praise (whose obedience in respect of Gods ordinance is necessary, and infallable;) and con∣trariwise the wicked are condemned, who sinne willingly, not∣withstanding (Gods presience considered) in some sort, it is also necessary. As our Saviour said concerning Judas, It is ne∣cessary that offences should come, but woe be to him by whom they come, Mat. 18. 7. It was necessary that Christ should suffer, be∣ing the determinate counsell and fore-knowledge of God, Act. 2. 23. but Judas did not know that he was appointed to be the man that should act that treason, but he did it voluntarily, out of his covetous affection to money, as doth evidently appeare by his owne expressions, What will ye give me and I will betray him un∣to you, Mat. 26. 14.

Again, it was necessary that the Prophets and Wise men should be killed, crucified, scurged, and persecuted by the Jewes, as Christ had foretold, Mat. 23. 34. but neverthelesse the Jewes did it out of a voluntary hatred they had to Christ, and his Gos∣pel, as plainly appeareth in Scripture.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Ho•• sin•• are veniall and no••
• * 1.2

  The danger of the smallest sin
• * 1.3

  Three degrees in the nature of sinne.
• * 1.4

  All concupi∣sence forbid∣den.
• * 1.5

  Good concu∣pisence of two sorts.
• * 1.6

  Evill concupi∣sence of three sorts.
• * 1.7

  Original sinne enough to condemne us.
• * 1.8

  The distinct••ō of mortall and veniall sinnes.
• * 1.9

  Sin as it is an act, is not al∣wayes evill.
• * 1.10

  Nine things to bee considered in the faulti∣nesse of an action.
• * 1.11

  Sin is both of necessity and voluntary.
• * 1.12

  M••n corrupt both in soule and body.
• * 1.13

  The effects of Nature and Grace.
• * 1.14

  Man of him∣self hath not a right will.