The logicians school-master: or, A comment upon Ramus logick.: By Mr. Alexander Richardson, sometime of Queenes Colledge in Cambridge. Whereunto are added, his prelections on Ramus his grammer; Taleus his rhetorick; also his notes on physicks, ethicks, astronomy, medicine, and opticks. Never before published.

GRAMMATICAL NOTES.

THis we are to know, That God made all things for man, and at the beginning for one man, for there was but one: but since the Fall, because all things cannot come under one man's eye, immediately, therefore God hath provid∣ded Speech, to be an Hobson, or Carrier, between man and man; that thereby he might see all things, and that so Gods Ordinance, of making all things for one man, might still con∣tinue. Logick doth act and bring the thing to my understanding & afterwards Speech is the carrier of

it, therfore, it is necessary that there should be a con∣stant rule of speech, that one man might understand another; but whereas these things, being uttered by Speech, are therefore hard to be received, because they are inartificial Arguments: therefore God hath provided Two arts of Speech, one of propriety of Speech, and another of the decking and sweetning of it. So that the Lord doth here, even as Physitians use to do with their Patients, to wit, when they have a bitter Potion to give, they use to sugar the top of the Pot wherein it is. So that Grammer may be compared to a plain Garment wtithout welt or gard, or it is like a grave Citizen. Rhetorick may be com∣pared to the lace, or jags on the garment, and is like a fine Courtier: Poetry may be compared to some fine cut, and is a Courtier—going on his feet: so that according to the double use of Speech it is di∣vided into two parts: the first wherof is Grammer.

The name Grammatica is a Greek word, which therefore we see was first named of the Grecians, and is derived of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a letter, of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a line of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 which signifieth, (1) to engrave seu insculpo, and hence cometh our English word, ingrave: (2) 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifieth to write, because, the first writ∣ing was by Hieroglyphicks, for at the first they used Hieroglyphicks, making the images of Birds or Beasts, as an Horse for swiftness, a Bear or Lion for strength: a Lions head and a Ring in it they use still over mens doors, signifying thereby watch∣fulness. For in Philosophy, we find that a Lion sleepeth with open eyes, and this was the first kind of writing: The second was in wax Tables, or Tables laid over with wax, where they have a stile made of steele, (and our English word steel cometh of stilus)

and hence also stilus signifieth a pen; Now they wrote in these, by lifting up the wax, and so was the letter made: hence came exarare to signifie to write, i e. to plow up, as they did the wax, and so shut up the Tables; and these, as Tully speaketh, had every one his letter-carrier to his Friend, and hence came let∣ter-carriers, or tabellarii, and the Friend had keyes to open the ••ables, and so read the letters: The next kind of writing was in the rind of the bark of a Beech, and there thy wrote with ink, and rolled them up. Now this rind was like unto parchment, and thence came liber, (which is properly that rind) to signifie a Book; and our English word Book co∣meth of that word Beech, Buck, and to this day most of that which we call Beech, is called Buckmast. Now concerning the invention of ink, which was here first used, we read not of it; only this, that some call it atramentum sutorium, and therefore it seems they learned to make it by Coblers and Dyers. The next kind of writing was in Parchment made of Sheep skins and Goat skins, which was invented in Phrygia, at Pergamus in Troy, and thence came Per∣gamena, to signifie Parchment. The last kind of writing was in Papyr, which was first invented in Egypt which was made of a rush, called Papyros, hence came it to be named Papyrus, and Papyr in English: hence is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of biblos that rush.

Printing was invented a great while after any of these, not past some 300 years ago; it was invented at Gaud in Picardy, where there was a Knight that had his Seal fell into his ink as he was writing a let∣ter, and he taking it up something nimbly for foiling his fingers let it fall in again, and afterwards lying on the papyr, there it left the print of the letters, and

he seeing that, did by that means invent Printing: and thus much for 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. From that cometh 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 a line, and before Moses we know there was no wri∣ting but only by Hierogliphicks, so that lines are not so ancient as hieroglyphicks, except we mean such lines as we write from one side of the papyr to the other: Now for writing by letters, Moses was the first, or rather God, as we may well think, see∣ing he hath brought all sounds to so few letters; though Josephus makes mention of two pillars that were before Moses, wherein were written the prin∣ciples of the Mathematicks, and that he saw one of them, yet I think he was either deceived, or they were after Moses, and hactenus of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Now followeth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 litera, for every letter hath lines except one, which hath only one, and that is (jod) which signifieth a space because it leaves out a space: And hence is Grammatica a Greek word, understand 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and it will be a literal art, or the art of letters, because their language which they were to learn being natural unto them, they needed not to go any further than to learn their letters and to spell them, so they called it Grammatica literaria: as if the whole art of Grammer consisted only in the knowledge of letters. So that this name is as much too strait for the thing, as a Childs shoo is for Her∣cules foot; but yet we knowing the meaning of the name, may still keep it, knowing that was the errour of them which gave it, not of those who shall after∣wards hold it. Grammatica is too strait, for the let∣ters are the least part of Etymologie; and truly, if we look at the names of all Arts, we shall find that they were named before they were perfected, as Dialectiea, coloquor: an adjunct. Rhetorica, a fluent Speech,

Now this Art of Grammer is but one in nature, for at the beginning there was but one Speech, (as but one man) till an hundred years after the floud. Again, Speech is but one, in regard of the faculty, and also in regard of man; so that all the languages in the world are but as so many idioms of the same Gram∣mer, and not divers Grammers; for one definition of Grammer, and one distribution; one definition of vox, and one distribution of vox, numeri & sive numero serveth to them all: And as in Greek those several Dialects do not mak several Grammers, but only divers idioms; so do all languages whatsoever make several idioms, not several Grammers. Now this variety of languages came by the building of Ba∣bel, for whereas they built a Tower, both that might be famous for memory, and understanding that God would destroy the World either by Fire, or Water, therefore thus in their foolish conceits, they went a∣bout to prevent the power of God; first laying brick, and using slime for morter to prevent fire, and a—of Reed and Palm-tree leaves, which are very broad and like a target, which are there to be seen until this day, that they might swim upon the—made of this Reed: And Herodotus wri∣teth that there were eight Ascents in it, and the two lowermost were Furlonges high, so that if the rest were so, it was a mile high; and on the top (he saith) there was a Temple built, which was dedicated to Ju∣piter Belus, Son of Nimrod: This Tower they built, being loth to disperse themselves abroad over the face of the earth, as they were commanded Genesis the first, to replenish the earth: therefore it pleased God to work that Confusion of Tongues among them to sever them, and so make diversity of Countries; for

according to their Tongues commonly Countries are severed. Of these Tongues were first the Mo∣ther Tongue, then the deducts from it; the mother Tongue is Hebrew, first, in respect of its self, for it is most natural, for there is not any natural notion, but it hath its natural word. Again, in Hebrew are the fewest words and yet signifie the most things. A∣gain, it is plain by the Scriptures, for the History, in Genesis sheweth, that the words are Hebrew words, as Adam HEvah: But objection, Why might not God have given them from the Du••ch's? No, for there is no Dutch name so effectual as the Hebrew names be; so the Lord called the Heavens Shammajim, and there is no name in the world that signifieth so; and the Sea Jam, there is no tongue that doth term it so from the same reason, and until the building of Babylon, their names were Hebrew names, and the Towns which they built before Babylon, had also Hebrew names; therefore, that Speech was the first.

We have heard the reason of this name Grammati∣ca, which is the definitum, now followeth the defini∣tion of it: i. e. Ars generalis in sermone, and so Gram∣mer is Ars benè loquendi. First, he calleth it Ars, for that which is, and is for an end, must have a constant rule to guide man to that end. From this genus many questions may arise; as, How can Speech be eternal, seeing it is proper to man? Here we are to know that Speech is a Creature of God, and there∣fore 'twas in his eternal decree, as all other things: and though it be true that there was but one Tongue from the beginning of the World till the destruction of Babel, yet in Gods decree all the rest are eternal, and so is the rule of Speech, and they were in the e∣ternal notion of God. Again, their words do vary

continually, therefore they were not eternal; for if one that died 500 years ago were now alive, and should speak, we could not understand him. Answ. Though it be true that words by reason of many sounds do daily change, yet the rule is eternal; though they be not spoken from eternal, yet the va∣riety of Speech doth not change the rule of Gram∣mer. as in reason, this axiome homo est animal was true before homo was, and will be for ever: So in Grammer is the rule eternal, as likewise is the rule of generation and corruption eternal, and ever true and the same, though men daily be generated and corrupted; so is Grammers rule external, though, &c. and 'tis because God would shew his mighty power and wisdom, that there are as many several Grammers, as there are several ages, and more too; and there is nothing more wonderful under heaven then to consider the great variety o•• ••••ands and co∣lours, and complexions of things, which all are from their contrary forms.

Ars.

In Latin some think the word comes from artus a s••new, others of arx a tower, ab arcendo; and both w••ll well agree to our purpose, for artus a sinew, we know the strength of those things that have sinews li••th in them, yet they are stronger then the bones, for the bones by reason of their hardness will break, w••ereas sinews will rather give back, and bend, and are more tough: So the rules of art are most strong an•• sinewy. If we derive the word from arx a tower, it my be very well so, for as there is both great stre••gth and much beauty, both in the matter and

form, so the rules of Grammer are most strong, and make a most sweet harmony.

Generalis.

Because though it be not everywhere, as Logick is, yet it may be; now Logick is everywhere, because every thing was made for man; therefore he must have an eye to see every thing, for otherwise he could not use them aright. But Grammer, because when I see a thing by Logick, I may keep it to my self, therefore it is general only 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 secundùm quid, therefore it is taught after Logick. Again, wheresoever there is Grammer, there is also Logick; where there is Logick, there is not alwayes Grammer, for Logick may be only in mente, therefore it is more general.

Orationis.

This general art of Speech is twofold, both Gram∣mer and Rhetorick; but the difference is this, that Grammer carrieth the matter in a budget neither too big nor too little, like one of these Irishmen with Breeches without pockets. Rhetorica carrieth it in a fine bag full of laces, yet not altogether full, for there are more words then matter; therefore both Grammer, Rhetorick, and Poetry are all e∣qually general for subject, but not for use. For Gram∣mers use is before the use of them, and may be with∣out them even as a garment may be without a lace or jag. But here by the way, because these are general Arts, therefore they have no proper subject, but their use may be everywhere, and therefore Kecker∣man, whilst he maketh Rhetorick a special art, telleth me he never knew the right distribution of the arts,

for it is the art of Speech, and that may be every∣where, therefore Rhetorick is general and may be used in any thing; therefore Tropes upon due consi∣deration may be used in any art. Now if it be de∣manded, whether it be better to use Grammer, or Rhetorick in teaching of Children? I Answ. Gram∣mer is better, 1. Because it is more general than Rhetorick: 2. Because it keeps us more close to the matter, which is a very good thing in teaching; yet not withstanding sometime Rhetorick is better, be∣cause it delivers the proper word together with some sweetness, for Tropes do arise from some arguments in Logick; so that we cannot condemne Rhetorick, neither is it possible we should alwayes use Gram∣mer, seeing there be many more things then proper names; for God making all things, and Man being to name them, and had not names sufficient for them: therefore for want of words, gave the same name to divers things by Tropes; and therefore Talaeus saith necessitas tropum genuit: Yet at the beginning one thing had but one name, but afterwards the same word came to signifie many things, as we see in He∣brew, where one word signifieth twenty things, and but one properly and Grammatically, and all the rest Tropically. And I find that words are used impro∣perly these wayes: First, in respect of the Trope: Secondly, when we deliver the same things, in di∣vers languages, there they use divers phrases, which must be compared together, as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is good in Greek, in Latin it is to make Children, which is not usual. Now if you will know whether is better, bring them to Logick, and there see which phrase is more special, that is to be prefer'd: to make it ge∣neral to the efficient cause in general, to beget or

procreate Children is proper to the first modus of the efficient, therefore it is the better phrase. So vac∣cas agere in English is to drive Kine, though they say in some parts, do the Kine into the field: And there is another kind of Trope, which is caused by reason of the phrase; therefore one that teacheth young Scholars must have a special care, That first his Scholar knwo the nature of the thing, and then the name of it, which stands by this rule, v••x est no∣ta quâ unumquodque vocatur, and by this means we shall teach them, first what every word signifieth in propriety, and then the thing as it is named in other tongues, and then the phrase, and then compare one phrase with another, and thus by the way we shall estimate which phrase in every language standeth with best reason. As that of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and in English to beget Children, where to beget is peculiar to nature, and belongeth to those things which have only a vegetative life, and therefore our English phrase is better: So 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is to put to the hand, and in Latin is agreed, to put to the foot, or to go to, which is more general, therefore the Greek phrase is better: So in English we say to go to, and to go in hand with, which phrase neither the Greeks nor the Latins have. It is a Metaphor fetched from the mo∣tion of the hand, which is the chief organ of motion, & is as much as I should say, put our hands to, & this is more special; so that bring them to Logick and ••here you shall be able to judge which phrase in e∣very language is best; and so consequently which Tongue is best. And this way I can prove our Eng∣lish best, except the Hebrew: For those that inven∣ted the Greek Tongue, were great Scholars, and were very good Rhetoricians, and so made their

Speech more eloquent, whereas our inventors of English were not so.

Bene

Is here an adverb joyned to the verb to shew his signification, and is not another word from loqui, and the reason of it is this, a man may loqui, but not bene loqui, as bonus vinum was as good as their Wine, but not good Grammer; as a man may dispute so∣phistically or ignorantly, and so break the rule of Logick: so likewise he may malè loqui and break the rule of Grammer. Again, since the Fall of man as there is a bona and a mala ratio, so there is a bene and malè loqui, and Grammer gives not precepts of that malè loqui which was attracted by sin, but only of that bene loqui which is a Creature of God. Object. But many have thought that this bene is no∣thing but that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the definition of art in general, and therefore should not be repeated in e∣very special art. Answ. But they are to know, since the Fall, as we said before, there is a bene and malè lo∣qui, and art gives precept only to the bene loqui, and therefore bene must be added for distinction sake: Again, they confess themselves, That bene in the de∣finition of ars, is the same that expeditè and that is an habit in man, whereas this bene is essential unto Grammer as it is an art: Again, here bene is joyned with the form not with the genus, and therefore is another genus which is more special, over and above that which was before; for so we are to understand that the species contain more in them than the genus doth: Now for those who to avoid bene will put more words into the definition, let them know that into how many words they divide the form, into so

many parts they cut it; which ought not to be, be∣cause the form is but one Argument. Now it is a great question among many Scholars which language was the first (and that was indeed the Hebrew) Goropius would have the Dutch to be the first, and he argueth for it subtily, and hath many notations of words, as fast backwards is staf, because when we have a staff, we stand fast: so litera is of let and er which signifieth to wander, because when we write we let our Pen wander about.

Benè loquendi.

Here because the form is not easily found out, and when it is found out, we have not one word to ex∣press it in, therefore we are to imagine the form to be included in this Gerund in di: for because we have not a word to deliver the form in, hence we are fain to take the next argument to forma, which is finis and include it in that: and we are to know that in very deed every precept is a member of that Art whereof it is a precept, so that every precept hath a certain vigour, or life, or soul as it were, which soul taken up from all the precept, is the form of the Art. And again, howsoever it may be objected that Grammer is not in every thing (for many things have no names) and so is not a general Art, yet the work of Grammer is in every thing: So also though man only can speak, yet Grammers work is general, and so we are to understand it, to answer in proportion to Logick, for as I see every thing with my eye of reason, so it is requisite that after I have received it, I should carry every thing to ano∣ther, and that I must do by Grammer: and Gram∣mer hath a double reference, one in regard of him

that speaks, and another in regard of the thing he speaks of, or the matter in hand. i e. We that here are to look out at the thing he speaks, and his mean∣ing: and in very deed ens à primo is Gods creature, and hath every Art in it: so that though Grammer, that is speech, is proper to man, yet Grammers work is in every thing: the reason is this, Every thing in nature is distinct, and I apprehend them so with my Logick; and they being so, must needs have distinct names, otherwise I cannot carry them to others di∣stinctly and as they are. So that Grammer is general, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, for so Adam by seeing into the nature of every Creature, could see their names, though we cannot do it: so he named the fire Esh, because of the noise it makes in green wood: so wa∣ter maiim which signifieth quid, that is the essence, for so Thales thought that every thing was made of water: and in the second verse of the first Chapter of Genesis, it is said, The Spirit of God moved upon the waters, where water is put for the first matter: so we call it in Latin aqua quasi à quâ the efficient cause: so he called darkness lajil which signifieth rest, because it is the time of rest: So God called the day jam because of the jumbling noise that is made in it: so the earth erets from rashat tero to ware: and there is no name but it hath a reason of it, and that Logick tels me when it handled notatio, for ens à primo hath that in it which is in every ge∣neral Art.

Loquendi

Loqui and dicere signifie the same thing, but come to be distinguished thus, because that Rhetorick to which dicere doth belong, was seen most especially

in pleading before Judges, hence they gave it that name dicere; which cometh of dico, and dico cometh of the Greek word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which signifieth the decision of a Controversie; and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 bifariam, or as some say 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 divido, which may well be, because in pleading of controversies, they divide their speeches. Loquendi, not Ars Scribendi, for if they take it for the Orthographie of a word it is accidental; neither are the letters the same in every tongue, therefore not the same writing of them: Again, the letters may be changed, though not well, for the Hebrew letters are given with great reason, and the other are taken from them: if they take writing as general as speak∣ing, it is the same with Grammer: now the cause of it was this, Man receiveth into his understanding the notions of things, these notions are expressed and made known from him to another man by words, now because man was not to live alwayes, neither by reason of the distance of place could speak unto every one, hence was the necessity of writing.

Bene.

For a man may loqui and yet not bene loqui, i. e. according to bona locutio, whereof Grammer gives precepts: but he that speaks according to the rule of Grammer, whether he know he doth so or no, it is no matter, he doth bene loqui, i. e. he speaketh such a speech as is pure according to the custome of the place where the speech is spoken: for in nature there is great variety of speech by reason of the heat and cold in men, which is according to the place wherein they are: hence many consonants in Dutch and our English tongue; so thar variety of sounds is not alwayes from the party named, but the party

naming: and he that hath more heat, intentionally is more apt to pronounce, hence Englishmen are almost to learn any tongue.

Id autem Latinis Latine.

Here is a Commoration where he cometh into the Latin Grammer, as if he should say, in Latin after the Latin manner: for there are not so many Gram∣mers as there are kinds of Speech, but it is as if he should say, Grammer is either the Latin, Greek, or Hebrew Grammer; which is a distribution of the adjunct into the subjects: for as there is but one Greek Grammer, yet many dialects: so the several Grammers are but so many several dialects or idioms of the general Grammer.

Partes Grammaticae qua sunt Etymologia & Syntaxis.

Here is a copulative axiome, and the Arguments are Grammatica the integrum, and Etymologia and Syntaxis the membra, which are yoaked together. There are two parts of Grammer, first, because two of Logick: for if Grammer be the carrier of Logick betwixtmen, then it must be answerable to Logick to carry the simples and composit; for otherwise we shall not carry well. Again secondly, Speech is a garment to cloath our reason, and as we would think a Taylor a fool that should make a garment with one sleeve for him that hath two arms: so for Gram∣mer, if we should make it with one sleeve to cover Logick that hath two arms. Et contra as we count that Taylor an idiot, that makes many sleeves for him that hath but two arms; so for him that makes many parts of Grammer to cloath Logick that hath

but two parts; though now a dayes I know not how many sleeves and hang-bys they make. For Orthography and Prosody they are not part of Grammer, but common adjuncts, and run through whole Grammer as blood through the whole bo∣dy.

Etymologia.

Cometh of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 verus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 sermo, i. e. verilo∣qutio, and in very deed according to the notation it belongeth rather to Logick than to Grammer, for it is nothing else but notatio, and so the Grammari∣ans use to give examples, as lepus from the adjunct, quafi levipes, but the Grammarians, it being before used in Logick, brought it into Grammer and so use hath received it; even as some will have Dia∣lectica to come of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 colloquor, and so be∣long to Grammer.

The reason of this distribution is for that every speech consisteth of words, for that as Syntax an∣swereth to judgment, so Etymology to invention: the occasion of it was this, In ancient time when Grammer was first invented in Greece, it was only observed in letters and syllables; the next observa∣tion among the Greeks, was to look at the notation and reason of words, and so came to call that part of Grammer Etymology, and afterwards the Grecians found out the whole Art of Grammer before any o∣ther Nations.

Syntaxis.

Cometh of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 consuo or construo: because in the beginning they laid the words together accor∣ding to the matter, so they did in Greek and Hebrew

till the Orators took that liberty to them to change: and because as Logick layes things together; so doth Syntax utter them, if Grammer be right it must tye nothing together but that which Logick doth tye: Hence is Logick before Grammer in genesi, but Grammer before Logick in analysi, so is Grammer before Rhetorick in genesi, but Rhetorick before Grammer in analysi: hence do we remove the Rhetorick to see the Grammer and Logick in analy∣si.

Etym logia est prima pars Grammaticae, quae vocum singularum proprietates interpretatur.

This definition is not so good as if he had said est de voce, or praecipit de voce, though praecipere be too large, for it is in Art. And Etymologie doth in∣terpretari not only the properties of words, but also letters, and fyllables, which are the causes of words.

Est prima pars.

Here prima and pars are Logical terms, therefore not genus to etymologia. The word interpretari be∣longeth to analysis, and is all one with it. Etymo∣logia ergo est prima pars Grammaticae, quae est de voce, here is a definition ab integro & subjecto.

Etymologia est.

If there be vox, then there is etymologia, but there is vox. Ergo.

Prima pars.

For there is a simple consideration of a thing there∣fore there must be a simple consideration of the name of a thing, whereof etymoligia must give pre∣cept. It is prima because I must consider a word, first simply in its own nature before I joyn him with another.

De voce.

So that the subject of Etymology is vox (oratio, and sermo, belong properly to Syntax) as argumen∣tum of invention, and Grammer goes no farther then vox: so that all we shall hear of in this part of Gram∣mer is of a word alone. Hence not the thing chest, but the name chest is a noune: for the three general Arts all take their notions from ens, and yet ens it self may belong to Physicks. Logick takes notion of it as it hath causes, effects, subjects, and adjuncts: Grammer as it doth notifie it by its name to another. Physick as it consists of principles. And for that distinction of vox to be primae or secundae intentionis, it is a toy: as animael say they, is primae intentionis genus secundae. But I would ask them is animal & genus the same thing? No, for they belong to divers Arts: And genus in his own Art is as well primae intentionis as animal is, and it is a meer fallacia accidentis.

De voce.

Simplici not de vocibus. And for one word to be laied to another word is but accidental to it, so that Syntax doth not handle vox. He saith vox, not dictio,

though sometimes they be the same, yet it is dictio, as Rhetorick takes the notion of it; and here we may note two things, namely that first when we look at, or consider a thing Grammatically, we first give it a vox that is a name, for that is the most simple consideration of a thing. Secondly, It is not only vox which is spoken, but which is written al∣so.

Vox est nota quâ unumqu••dque vocatur.

Some call it dictio, some vocabulum, but vox is best, because it names the thing from his special use, à vo∣cando.

Nota.

Here nota is not general to vox, for nota is a Lo∣gical term, and belongeth to adjunct, so that this definition is from the subject and the conjugate, and he means (as if he should say) vox is that whereby notice of the thing is given us. It is nota; here he doth not consider vox as it is a quality in man pro∣ceeding from such causes, but as it doth notifie the thing whereof it is vox: So our eye of reason, as it is a part of man, and faculty of the soul, belongeth to Physicks, as vox doth: but as it doth act for that Eupraxie, for which it was made, so it belongeth to Logick. In that he calls it nota, we see it is another thing than the thing it self whereof it is a note, and vox is nota, i. e. a notifying and making known the apprehension of mans mind, even as wax having the picture of the seal is to the seal it self: and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 was man to name things. And here is a fallacy very use∣ful, to say this or that is a true speech, when it is not

the speech in property, but the Logick clothed in the speech, that is true or false.

Ʋnumquodque.

For Grammer is a general Art. Ergo, ens is his subject more remote, so that here he doth but spe∣cialize ens: so that vox is but the subject of Gram∣mer more special, unumquodque more general: and as affectio is to argumentum, so is vocatio to the thing called: so also that which was the aliquid in argu∣mentum, as Grammer takes his notion of it, is unum∣quodque: And that definition of nomen, of a thing that may be seen, felt, heard, or understood, is erroneous; for I can see, feel, or understand a thing, and yet name it not. But doth res belong to Grammer? No, but things attending ens, for o∣therwise ars in general is about ens, and words are terms given unto things, so their doctrine must be general. So that every thing hath its name, which notatio in Logick sheweth.

Again, Here we may see that verbs, adverbs, and conjunctions are voces; and hence we may see the definition of a Noune to be too general, and secondly, their errour in calling nomen not vox.

Vocatur.

Here I am told how this nota is used, which is for the calling of a thing, and the naming of it; hence when we are asked what part of Speech such a thing is, we are to know that the thing is no part of speech, but the name of it: so it is fallacia divisionis, when they ask, what part of Speech a whole Speech is.

It is a great question which Scaliger in his Book, De causts linguae Latinae, whether words be ex thesi, or ad placitum?

But for Compound words they are ex thesi, as first words also in propriety of speech; for we know that speech is the creature of God, yea and that words signifie this or that thing, it is also from the providence of God: so God taught Adam to name the Creatures: and so God wrought the Confusion of Tongues: Now man was to name them, and God by man; because that speech was to be the carrier betwixt man and man.

Again, Man was to be the Lords Steward over his Creatures, and therefore he must know their names; and Adam did name things with reason, and according to his apprehension, which we may see by men now adayes that name things so, as, ac∣cording to their apprehension, they can give a rea∣son thereof. So that words are given with respect to the thing named, and the reason of the things na∣med is in the thing, so that words are not ad placi∣tum; so we give to little things little names, so in English things that are glib have their names run much upon (l) or other semi-vowels: if greater things, then their names run upon grosser let∣ters.

Now the Art of Speech is ars bexe sermocinandi, for that is general both to Grammer and Rhetorick. And the wisdom of God concerning Speech is double, pure, and ornate, and these are in the things, which Rhetorick shewes, in that there is rea∣son in every Trope, and figura teacheth us to figu∣rate the Speech as the thing is; and if it be great,

we give it a great name: if little, we give it a little name.

And hence do arise the three stiles of Tully, That for a lofty thing we have a lofty stile, for a mean thing a mean stile, for a little thing a low stile, and that with good reason, for Speech is the garment of Reason, and therefore ought not to be too little, or too great for it.

And for their Rules these Arts are eternal though changed by man, which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and di∣stinguisheth things by their names, and Rhetorick is the same to all the world.

And so for Grammer, the Rule for variation is e∣ternal, though the variation of words be according to the variation of men, and this consists either in single words, or in construction of more words, where alwayes note, that as the word governed doth depend upon the word that governeth it, so do the things.

Vox constat syllabâ; syllaba constat literâ; litera est ex sono individuo.

For sonus is the material cause of it, the form is from the figuration of it with the instruments of the mouth: For the word litera some think it cometh from litteratura, and therefore write it with a double it, whereas it should be with a single t; some think it comes of lineatura, and so of linea, from the matter: some think it comes of litura a blot, which Scaliger believeth not, because it is from the destruction of it: but this reason is more witty than sound, for man is called mortalis of his

death, but I think it comes of litura a blot, because when we set black upon white, we do as it were blot the white paper: and so sometime bloting and writing are confounded.

Linea comes of linum, linen, made of flax, (because thread was the first thing that was con∣sidered for a line) and not of lino, which signifieth to blot out, so as delinere is the same with delere.

Litera est vocalis aut consona.

The reason in nature is, because there are two prin∣cipal sorts of the position of the mouth: the first is when we make a sound without any more ado: the second is, where there is a more special kind of the use of the Organs in the mouth; which letters either make a complete sound in themselves, or an incom∣pleat; and even as in nature the first matter was in∣complete, yet makes things which are complete: so the Consonants, which in themselves are incom∣plete, with vowels make syllables, which are com∣plete.

This word vocalis signifieth vocal, i. e. sounding of himself; for he needeth no other, though he be joyned with another. Now for vocalis, they usually define it litera quae per se syllabam potest efficere: this is à priore but not generally true, for in our English tongue our w, oo, ee, never make a complete sound, neither in Hebrew, and yet there they make a com∣plete sound, though they be not without a conso∣nant.

Now for my own part, I would define a vowel to be litera quae completum sonum edit, or quae plenè sonat, or rather quae constat sono completo; but in

Hebrew I am content with Mr. Junius, quâ movetur syllaba, for a vowel is in a syllable, as the soul in a body, and as the soul moveth it self and the body also, so doth a vowel move it self and the conso∣nants also: and the Hebrews may seem to have held the vowels to have been some spiritual thing, and therefore did not figure them with characters or bo∣dies, but with pricks only: and hence at the first they wrote without pricks: and afterwards when they used pricks, they did not set them in the letters, neither do they alwayes now, but above and under the letter, because they would shew that the soul doth move all parts, as if they should say, anima est tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte: and as the An∣gels by the rule of Divinity, were made puncto tem∣poris: so the Hebricians thinking the vowels to be spirits, figured them out punctis: also, because they thought spirits had not quantity. Vocalis is com∣monly defined litera quae per se syllabam potest efficere.

Quae Syllabam.

This word syllaba hath been oft enough repeated before, and therefore needeth no repetition here a∣gain. Vocalis is litera, and litera is before a syllable in nature, therefore this is à posteriori.

Per se.

This is not general, for in ab, eb, ib, ob, ub, these do not per se syllabam efficere. Again, this potentia is not general at all times in use; for this vowel, a, in this syllable ab, cannot make a full sound. And again, for per se, in english our w, oo, ee, do never per se syllabam efficere; now from the definition it followeth

that so many syllables so many vowels; now for consonants the very name sheweth that they cannot make a compleat and full sound, and therefore they require a more special position of the mouth, for their prolation: and hence is our order in writing a, b, c, d, not good; but first setting the vowels and then the consonants, yet some have thought that some liquids make a full sound, which is not true, for that they alwayes have a vowel going before them, as mut••s have ever a vowel coming after them: thus for all Grammers do agree, but here is a Question, Whether a letter or a syllable be brevis or longa? and in old time we know they used to write a longae with a double aa, so in Greek ▪ and ω, ε and ο, only differ in time: but to Answer to the Question, We must needs confesse that the vowel is the motor, but yet a short vowel by reason of the consonants joyn∣ed with it may be made long & contra, and there∣fore I think it more proper of a syllable than of a let∣ter. For thus I reason, One letter should have but one character, Ergo▪ yet we will speak of them here. The reason therefore of length and shortness in speech is this, The Lord hath appointed speech to be the carrier from man to man, therefore it must be such as will easily be received, therefore must be or∣dered by time and tune: for as every act is ordered with time, so must speech be: Again, little things are to have little names, therefore short names: great things great names, ergo, long names: now for a semi-short, or the like, they belong to Musick and not to Grammer. Now in our short time we may be as long as we will, as men when they are angry will be as short in the long, as at other times they are

in the short. Brevis is simplicis temporis, longa is du∣plicis; that is, look as your short is, your long must be twice as much.

A Vowel is either diduct or contract, diduct is with the mouth drawn wide, and that is either with a greater rictus, as a, or with a lesser as e and i: a is first, for it is the first in nature, and it is the first letter that we speak, though it have a greater yawn∣ing than either e or i: Now the lesser yawning was common to both e and i, which shewes the affinity betwixt them: hence did jed in the Hebrew stand for both e and i, and they call them cousen vowels: so also in Latin we write indifferently turrem or tur∣rim. Contract is of the drawing together of the mouth, for the form of the letter is from the form of the mouth in the pronunciation of it. C••ntracta is either a poach-mouth, or a hens-tayl: i e. either wide or round: now in a contract it is required first that the mouth be drawn round: secondly, that as in a diduct the tongue was lifted up to the palate: so here contrarily it should be pressed down; and it is o, or u, and y. The difference of these is in a more full or lesser orbe in the pronouncing of them, and in Hebrew o and u, are usually set in letters, namely, in vau, and this sheweth how they do co∣incidere, which is in use: so θs in Greek is changed into us, in Latin, as papyros into papyrus: yet o is with a more full orb, u with a more contract: and the figuration of the Latin letters is from the Greek, and the Greek from the Hebrew: yet this is not al∣wayes, but there are some exceptions: For e in the Hebrew seems to be from the Assyrians, so the single θ in the Greek seems to be from the Assyrians:

yet they might have it from the frame of the mouth, but so it would be the same with u, and in the Greek υ is like half an o: now the o must have a full globe, and the tongue is drawn into the solum; and this letter, if we mark, soundeth more inwardly in the mouth, whereas u and y make as it were a whistling through the lips, and so sound through the lips: The Grecians o short, which is the same with camets hatuph: the Greek long ο is as two long ωω: so in English we have our short o, with o alone; and our long o sometimes with oa, as coal: sometimes with ow, or owe: or more seldom with ou, as ought: but it were better if we had the Greek ω, or some other character: now for u, this hath a more contract mouth for the prolation of it, and seems to whistle through the lips; u also hath the tongue brought back in the mouth, and it soundeth almost in the ve∣ry opening of the mouth: in Hebrew gibbuts soun∣deth like u, or as we do in tu and the like: Surech soundeth as ▪ in Greek, υ is their u short, ov is their long u, and is rather a vowel than a dipthong; for there is but one position of the mouth in it.

Caetera desunt.