The logicians school-master: or, A comment upon Ramus logick.: By Mr. Alexander Richardson, sometime of Queenes Colledge in Cambridge. Whereunto are added, his prelections on Ramus his grammer; Taleus his rhetorick; also his notes on physicks, ethicks, astronomy, medicine, and opticks. Never before published.

Disponitur.

He would have further rules of consecution from the third argument, that he might know how to use them; but indeed the rule of syllogismus is the rule of consecution, ergo, those maxims, as they call them, are consecutions from the rules of invention, and are prosyllogisms. Now here is a disposition whereof Kickerman was not aware, whilst he would distribute Logick into a simple conceit, a double conceit, and into discursus: for if disposition be general both to his double conceit, and to his discursus, then he leaves out two rules, the definition and distribution of di∣sposition, ergo, let us hold the right. Ita disponitur, because in a simple syllogism there is the disposition of the part of the question with the third argument, consequens in propositione, antecedens in assumptione, and in a composite syllogism there is the whole question placed with the third argument alone in the propo∣sition, ergo, the question as the better man must have the third argument for his companion, for he is the Gentleman, ergo, he saith, quaestio cum argumento, and ••••t argumentum cum quaestione. Again, the third ar∣gument is for the questions sake, ergo, it is he that is the more lofty, but this is not quaevis quaestio, but that quaestio quae ita disponitur, ut posito antecedente necessa∣rio concludatur. He cals it an antecedent, ergo, a syl∣logism

consisteth of two parts, an antecedent and a consequent. An antecedent is so called, because it goes before, and a consequent because it comes after: again, an antecedent and a consequent are not yoked together as two Oxen, as in a copulate axiom, but one before another as Horses trace, as in a connex hang∣ing upon the former by a necessity of consequence. Now this question is so posita cum argumento, as that the question doth follow on them two, for the third argument never comes into the consequent part. Here positum is as it were put case, as put case there be an antecedent, tum necessarium concludatur.

Object. Doth every syllogism conclude necessary truth? Yes, not but that it may be contingent, but he means necessario, that is, that this consequent will follow necessarily upon the antecedent, for the Art or rule of a syllogism: as otiosus est amator is contin∣gent, Egistus est otiosus, is contingent, ergo, est amator, this consequent doth necessarily follow upon the antecedent: so that necessario goes not with the conclusion, but with the inference of the conclu∣sion.