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DIsposition hath two parts, judicium and metho∣dus, this is the true disposition: these do com∣municate in a disposition: for why? here in judge∣ment we dispose arguments with arguments, in me∣thod
we dispose axioms with axioms, ergo, both of them dispose. Again, their instruments are consent∣ing in cold, ergo, both of them are contrary to hear, for that will sever things. Drith and moisture clea∣ving together, ergo, these are the parts judicium of disposing arguments to judge them, method of pla∣cing axioms to remember them. Judicium is first, because method disposeth onely that which judge∣ment frames, even as invention is before disposition: and this is wonderful to consider, for there can no∣thing be well and soundly remembred, but that which is first judged, and nothing soundly remembred, but that wch is throughly invented And it is true with me, if I understand a thing rightly, I never forget it, else I never remember it: so that if a man forget any thing, he hath not judged it well, because he hath not in∣vented it well: to see a thing in the cause, that is, the argument, for there causa is general, that is, our intel∣ligentia, to make axioms is our scientia, to discourse is our sapientia, to apply every thing in time and place is our prudentia, to work the like our Art, these are the things that make a man a scholler, and a wise man, ergo, a man that shall take this course in his studies shall be an exquisite man every way, ergo, in the stu∣dy of any Art this must be the way for him that de∣sireth to be a scholler, first to see the rule of his Art, then the arguments, then the sapientia, then the pru∣dentia, and so he shall remember it for ever.
What Disposition is we have heard, and how there are two kinds of it; now judicium est dispositio ad bene judicandum; so that the use of this second part is of great use for the perfecting of judgement, for if we read things without judging them, we shall many times swallow that for truth, which we shall in the end find to be sophistry.
Axioma, The word in his proper signification is, worthiness, or dignity, and by a metonimie of the adjunct for the subject, it signifieth such a truth as is worthy the receiving, or believing: now axioma du∣bium is not worthy this worthy name Axioma, be∣cause it is not per se manifestum, but we are fain to de∣mur upon it, so that some axioms are not so plain as others: others also there are which are so plain, as he that cannot see them, or doubteth of them, deser∣veth the whip, Now because this first part of dispo∣sition is of a clear truth, ergo, he calls it axioma, as if he should say an honorable truth: putting us in mind thereby, that though this name be common to all axi∣oms, yet it is principally to them which are per se manifesta. Again, he rather takes this name, because others will not so well fit his purpose. Again, the other names enunciatum, enunciatio, &c. belong ra∣ther to a syllogisme.
That is acknowledged, that there is such an axiome, as is plain, palpable and manifest: yet are there o∣thers also laid together with such a subtile hand, as we cannot easily see them, the thred is so fine as that we cannot see it without a candle or torch. To see the cause in nature why Iron goeth to a Load-stone, is hard: and axioma dubium, and subtillitas, in their tropical signification are all one: such are those argutiae arguing in a fine manner.
Objection. If man had stood, should he not have needed syllogistical judgement, had there been no use of that?
Answ. Yes, for he should have first invented be∣fore
he had judged, and though his reason should have been so clear, as that he should have seen many things in nature, yet not all: For these Rules are eternall.
Again, some things lye upward, which are plain, some also lye downward, which are not easily per∣ceived: Again, if we will acknowledge that in Art many deductions 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 may be drawn from a first Rule, and that we may apply a first Rule a thou∣sand wayes, why then we must acknowledge syllo∣gisticall judgement. Before he told us that dispositio was pars Logicae de disponendis argumentis: here he saith Judicium is dispositio argumenti cum argumento, here there is dispositio argumenti cum argumento, be∣cause Judicium is dispositio, but to dispose one argu∣ment with another is peculiar to an axiome.
Here question may be made, whether it may not be dispositio argumentorum cum argumentis, or argumenti cum argumentis, or argumentorum cum argumento? Yes, but if it be argumentorum it is argumenti, ergo, this is more generall: so that he saith argumenti cum argumento, as in a simple axiome: or argumentorum cum argumentis, aut contra, as in a composite axiom: so here is the playing at two-hand ruffe, for here are but to sides in an axiome, ergo, in this respect he saith, argumenti cum argumento, argumenti in ge∣nerall, because all the kinds of arguments may be di∣sposed in an axiome.
So that the drift of judicium is to look at an ali∣quid, so doth invention; but yet it goes further, and judges it esse aut non esse. Now aliquid, a thing, that is ens in genere, being an aliquid, is judged to be this or that: so that here we may see that what the com∣mon
Logicians teach, that in an axiome there is a subject and a predicate; and the predicate is so cal∣led because it is foretold in the subject, & contra: as when I say, homo est animal, animal tells me some∣what of homo, and homo tells me somewhat of animal: and the aliquid, which is the subj••ct, is she ed esse, aut non esse: hence it is, that an axiome shewes ali∣quid esse, aut non esse, because every thing that is, is composite, and the simples are imperfect: he doth not say, aliquid esse verum, aut falsum; for if I say, homo est lapis, I say a thing to be, though it be false; and when I say, homo est animal, I say a thing to be, and it is true.
Now divers bring in here quaestio, and they say it is simplex, which is the same with an Argument; or Composite, which is the same with an Axiome: as if there were no use of an Axiome, but by way of question: but we know that a question belongs to a Syllogisme, and to make it as generall as Axioma, will not be either 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
Our Author s••ays upon the naming of Axioma, because few Logicians besides himself have received this name, therefore lest his Schollars should think it strange whereabout he goes, and whether he had forgotten himself, he tells them, that he means by axioma that which others call Enunciatum, &c. Pro∣positio properly belongs to a Syllogisme, and is the thesis, and the assumptio is the apothesis. Why saith he Latinè, because axioma is graecè: as if he should say, I use this word as best sitting my turn, for no La∣tine term utters this thing so well. Again, the rea∣son is (as if he should say) I had rather use this term,
because the Latines fetching the tongue from the Greeks, have not names so fitting the things as they, because enunciatum, enunciatio, &c. have an adheren∣cie of words, and they doe name Logick by Gram∣mar, whereas we know an Axiome may be when it is not uttered.
Enunciatum signifies the thing concrete, and enun∣ciatio signifies the axiomation (as we may say) of it, the disposition of it, and so of the rest.
We have heard that there are but two sides of an axiome, and to this end qua judicatur aliquid esse, aut non esse. Now this axiome is distributed first into his adjuncts, therefore affirmatum and negatum at∣tend upon the esse and non esse, which the axiome doth deliver. Homo est animal, here aliquid esse dicitur, and it is affirmatum: homo non est animal, here aliquid non esse dicitur, and it is negatum: so homo est lapis, here aliquid dicitur esse, & affirmatur: homo est lapis, here aliquid dicitur non esse, & negatur: so that the affirma∣tion and negation of an axiome is not of the esse and non esse of it. If he said affirmatum, qua esse aliquid, here he doth not mean esse, but esse, that is affirma∣tum: as when I say, homo est lapis, Esse, and non esse are other things then affirmatum and negatum: but when a thing is so, it ought to be affirmed, and when it is not so, it ought to be denied. Here I say, he di∣stributes an axiome into his proper adjuncts, ergo, this distribution is not imperfect, as we said before; because then the species which follow should be left out, for some there are which say a distribution is
perfect or imperfect, even as a definition is perfect, or descriptio; but that is false: for we use not a de∣scription, when we can have a perfect definition, but we use a distribution ex adjunctis, when we also have a distribution generis in species. Again, it is not im∣perfect, because it cannot be a distribution of genus into the species, or of integrum into the members im∣perfectly; for then affirmatum would signifie a sim∣ple axiome, and negatum a composite axiome. A∣gain, if this distribution were left out, there would want a rule of Art, which is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
Now before we heard of Arguments that were af∣firmantia and negantia, here he saith, axioma est af∣firmatum aut negatum, for the band is it that denies or affi••ms the arguments one of another, er∣go, the axiome is denyed, aut contra: yea when there are Arguments affirmantia and negantia disposed in an axiome, it is affirmatum aut negatum: as when I say, darness is not light, the band denies light of darkness.
Why have we not yet heard of vinculum? If here be his first place, why doth he not describe it?
Answer. Because we heard that Dispositio was pars Logicae de disponendis argumentis, and that judicium was dispositio argumenti cum argumento qua esse ali∣quid aut non esse judicatur: and in disposition we have this band, for though there be a positio of argu∣ments, dis that is a sunder: yet there is a composition too: so that we have it both in the generall defini∣tion of disposition, and in the speciall description of Judicium.
Now indeed vinculum is vox aequivoca, for it is the band of an axiom, of a syllogism, and of method:
the band of method is called transitio, which ties two several doctrines together, as two banks that have water running between them are tied together by a bridge, ergo, in this case it cannot be defined.
Then we see that the affirmation of the axiom is from the band, and not from the arguments: and when we say homo est lapis, and homo non est lapis, we have a vinculum in both: though indeed where the arguments agree, there should be an est, and where they disagree, there should be a non est.
For if it be ••ffi••matum, quando vinculum ejus affir∣matur, so negatum contra: so that here evermore look to the vinculum: now this distribution doth not re∣quire that we should alwayes affirm and deny too the same axiom and so look at it, neither shall we alwayes find it so, though it may be so; because these are but adjuncts to an axiom, and where the same axiom is affirmed or denyed.
So that in contradiction there is this peculiar, that the same ••xiom must be affirmed and denyed: so that the true place of contradiction is here: he saith, Hinc nascitur: whence? from the affirmation and nega∣tion of the same axiom. Now the reason why the same axiom may be affirmed and denyed, is because these are not essential to an axiom, and the axiom is the same whether it be affirmed or denied: the same it is also for esse, and non esse, but not for affirmation and negation: it is the same man that was in the morning cold, and warm at noon. Now here in dis∣putation we are carefully to observe, that there be a
contradiction, where we make one.
That is, the same arguments must be both affirmed and denied, one of another: and this we must care∣fully look unto, else may we contend de lana caprina. Again, he said idem.
Object Homo est doctus, and homo non est doctus, are these the same arguments? yes, and the same axiom, but differing onely in quality; they are subjectum and adjunctum: but when I say homo est doctus, and un∣derstand it of homo, which is not doctus, ••s Thirsites, it is still the same argument, but the arguments are dis∣parates.