The logicians school-master: or, A comment upon Ramus logick.: By Mr. Alexander Richardson, sometime of Queenes Colledge in Cambridge. Whereunto are added, his prelections on Ramus his grammer; Taleus his rhetorick; also his notes on physicks, ethicks, astronomy, medicine, and opticks. Never before published.

Quales sunt singulae rationes solae, & per se consideratae.

We have heard what argumentum is, and the first thing that we are to look at in simples is this, the glue to be affectioned: as if we should look for a cause, see whether it be affected to be so: we have heard the fallacians in part before; as first, where there is no argument, but petitio principii, and that either where there is no petitio principii, and that either where there is no petitio at all, or where the same thing is uttered in a synonymie, or to the same purpose. Again, it is a breach of this rule, when that is brought for an argument, which is no argument, as baculus stat in angulo; or when the third Argument is more obscure and doubtful, then the arguments of the que∣stion, these and all other petitiones principii are breaches of this rule in general, and not of any special ones. Again, it is a breach of the definition of an argument, when we mistake the aliquid, though the argument be good, and so that Heterozetesis is a fal∣lace of argumentum in genere; as when I talk of Chalk, he talks of Cheese. Now we come to the commoration after argumentum, quales sunt fingula rationes solae, &c. He hath defined argumentum from that affection that is continually in it; for the act is accidental, and may be wanting, for potentia (as we

hear in nature) ariseth from the act of the form up∣on the matter. Now he saith singulae, that is, argu∣ment by argument, the cause alone, the effect alone, and so all the arguments from the beginning to the end. He saith rationes rather than argumenta, first because there is an equivocation in that word, many have thought it to belong to a syllogisme onely; and so when we say, I deny your reason, there it is taken for an axiome. Now it is taken sometimes for the faculty of reason, sometimes for the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in things. Here he shews that it is taken for the same with argu∣mentum. Solae, that is as they are to be considered in invention without judgement, and that he explains further per se, that is, they are in their definitions not respected with some thing externally, these are tales, that is such as I have defined unto you: so that he doth here commorari, because of difference with Ari∣stotle, or rather with the Aristotelians, even as he stayed before upon the definition of Dialectica, for they thought there was no argument but in judge∣ment, and therefore have question with Ramus whe∣ther an argument be to be taught before we come to a syllogisme. Ramus here propounds it, and deter∣mines it for his own part, that it may be without judgement, and look at others, and you shall see them define all arguments, from their use in a syllogisme, as we may see in all topick places of Aristotle, so that it is not so strait as they take it, and Ramus would teach us here, that to argue is accidental to an argument and disposition to: so that their mistaking makes him here to demurre and stay upon it: Now indeed there must of necessity be a simple considera∣tion of argumentum, for though things in nature are disposed together, yet they were severed at the first;

and again we are to consider them so still, though they be together▪ Consideratae, he useth this word, because thought, invention and judgement are joyned together in nature, yet he would here tell us, that we are to sever them by our consideration, as thus, I can see heat without fire, cold without water, &c. So that singulae ratione•• are solae, & per se consideratae non in usu, for so they cannot be: but they are solae, & per se consideratae, in consideration, for so they be, he saith quales, because argumentum was defined, from his qua∣lity, or property of affection, and properties are qua∣lities.