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WE have heard what Encuclopai∣dia is, and of Ars, and that the subject of it is Res, that hath an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: We have heard more∣over the affections of Arts, and the Species of them, that they are general of the thing acting, or special of the thing acted. Now then the first thing in nature is reason, and here remember what we heard before, that we
may see as God governed things in general by Arts: so in special reason by Logick; and it is most gene∣ral, because it is of most general use, not in regard of his Precepts, for so it is as special as any, but for use, because there can be nothing without Logick, yet Logick may be without speech, quantity, &c. ergo, this is most general. Now true it is, that this, as also the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 proceed from the thing in nature; yet Lo∣gick is more general than any of the rest in regard of his use, for it is in it self in speech, in quantity, &c. so that look where any art is, there Logick is: but it doth not follow, that where Logick is, there Arith∣metick, Geometry, &c. should be. Again, it pleased the Lord to make man his Steward under him over all the Creatures, ergo in this respect it is necessary he should behold all the creatures, to the imployment of the use of the principal Lord, therefore he must first see them, therefore must be prepared with such a fa∣culty, that he may see all things by it. Now this is omnium 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. That there is such an Art, I shew it thus.
If there be reason, then there is an art of it, because reason is ens a primo, and it is for an end, therefore there must be that art, that is of reasons act. For the proposition I proved it before, for reason was for an end; for the Assumption none will deny, but that there is reason, if they will acknowledge themselves to be but men. Our Author cals this art Dialectica, which comes of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, signifying secer∣no, separo, seligo; as for example, if there were many things together, I would sever them, and this name fitteth reasons act very well; for Logick is like a fire among the Chimists, for as fire will congregare homo∣genia, and segregare heterogenia: so Logick is the fire
of all Arts, severing in the same act that fire doth, Logick from Grammar, and Rhetorick from both, &c. and then it congregates to Logick that which is congreans to it, to Grammar that which is homogenie to it, &c. so that when it invents, it picks out homoge∣nies, it disposeth them, and layes them in several pla∣ces, therefore this name Dialectica is very fitly given to this art, that works this wonderful effect. Won∣derful I may call it, for the Chimists can do great ef∣fects, but the Logicians can do greater, for they can see Gods Logick in the things, and had not man faln, he might have come to have seen all the wisdom of God in the Creatures. Now if Logick doth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is, congregare homogenia, and segregare hete∣rogenia by the same effect, it may fitly be so called: now this art is so called, saith Diog enes Laertius, first by Plato, if he were the Author, he was more ancient than Aristotle, and antiquity should have honour with good reason, if we have any reason: nay, Geo∣metry is so called from its subject rather, not metiri from antiquity; but Zenophon in his fourth book of remembrances saith, that Socrates was Platoes School-master, and he never writ any thing, but Plato alwayes: so that Socrates might read it, and Zeno∣phon hear it, for he was his Schollar, for Zenophon & Plato fuere aequales, and Diogenes Laertius might read it in Plato, as he had noted it from Socrates: and the Oracle witnesseth that Socrates was the wi∣sest man in his time, and he was more wise than Ari∣stotle; for Plato that was Socrates Schollar, was his Master; so that for this name we see how fitly it a∣grees to this art, and also the confirmation of it from antiquity. Now Aristotle cals it Logick, I do not deny but the name is good, but it is later, as Laer∣tius
witnesseth that Aristotle gave it first, but it is from the subject ••eason, as the names of most arts are. Arithmetick of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, numerus; Geometry of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, terra, &c. but it doth not so lively name this art as Dialectica doth, which names the life, and delivers the quintessence of Logick: so that Logica, as it is conjugate of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, names it well, but doth not set it out with that vigour that Dialectica doth: So thus we see the reason of the name.
What art is we have heard before, this it is, every thing hath an 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is accomplished by many petty 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which causes the precepts of art to be answerable thereunto; so that Logicks main end is bene disserere: bene invenire, and bene judicare are the petty acts of it. Now if Logica, and Diale∣ctica shew the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 and frame of mans reason, and di∣rect it to the chief end, its happiness, where the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 esteth, then it is ars: at, ergo.
First disserendi, for the explanation of the word, dissero comes of dis and sero, sero signifies first to sow and dis a sunder, or dissero, that makes disserui▪ to sow asunder; whether it be so used I find not, I for my part ever read it in this Logical signification, and that which I told you of concerning dialectica, is true 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his, that as there was things to be sown, and a sa∣ti•• secernendorum, and a sowing them asunder: so there are first semina, which are arguments in inven∣tion: Secondly, a satio of them, that is, a disposing of them Axiomatically, and syllogistically; and lastly, a disserio, that is, a disposing of them according to true method and order; so that in this disserere we have the nature of reason quite through, as we had in Dia∣lectica.
So that this name delivers also to us very fitly the very soul of Logick; for as in mans body there is a soul or a form per quam res est, id quod est, & a caeteris rebus distinguitur; so there is of this art, or rather of the subject of it, reason: and as in other things the Lord hath wrought so cunningly, that we cannot see their forms, but onely the next acts to the formes: so here our Author desireth to give to us the form of reason; which because he cannot do, therefore he delivers it by the final cause, the next act to the form: so that when he saith dialectica est ars bene disserendi, he means it is such an art that hath such a form that doth bene disserere, therefore I conclude thus: if this be the happiness, the act, and soul of reason, then it is defined fitly Ars bene disserendi, at. ergo.
Here it is an adverb, for Grammar here doth de∣clare some controversie, and an adverb is a part of speech joyned to the verb to shew his signification, therefore bene is here added to make perfect the act of this disserere, ergo, bene disserere is not two things, but one thing, and this is a commendation in defining arts, to break the forms of them, as little as we can, be∣cause the form is but one argument; and if we put two or more words into the form, we break it into so many peices. Now for the reason of bene in a Art, this it is, Art is the rule of the frame of Ens a primo: so Logick is the rule of reason, as it is Gods creature, ergo, as it is good, ergo, bene is here put in well to shew the Act of the goodness of this reason. Now since the fall of man, his reason is weakned, & darkned, & so there is a bona ratio, and a mala ratio▪ though mala ratio is not ratio indeed, but the errour of rario, and
this act is to guide reason, as it doth bene disserere, not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 disserere, ergo, it is well put in to sever them. For if Dialectica be ars rationis bene agentis, then it is ars bene disserendi onely, and not male disserendi, at, ergo. So Grammar is the Art onely bene loquendi, though it discrie male loqui: now here among the Logicians are many questions, and controversies against our Author. As some except against the name dialecti∣ca, and makes it more special than here Ramus takes it, and they distribute reason into three parts, Dia∣lectica, Sophistica, and Apodictica, which was the di∣stribution of the Aristotelians, not of Aristotle him∣self; but Simplicius that chief fellow, was the first man that brought it up, and afterward it was gene∣rally received in Schooles from him. By Dialectica they understand all probable reason, and probality in Schools is taken in two significations, sometime it is taken for a contingent true axiome, ergo it belongs to one little particle of the doctrine of axioma. Some∣times it is taken for axioma dubium, or quaestio, and then it belongs to the doctrine of Syllogismes; so that we shall find probability in these two places; but to make Dialectica so special, is to make a Camel go through the eye of a needle; is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 no more general then so? doth it not go through all judge∣ment, yea and invention too?
Again, for Apodictica, which is de necessariis, that belongs to a necessary axiome, for no syllogismes are necessary, but the axiomes which they consist of; but the syllogistical judgement is the same both of neces∣sary and contingent axiomes, and a syllogisme of con∣tingent propositions is necessary as well as that, which is of necessary axioms. Now for Sophistica, that is shut out, for if I see the truth, what need I look far∣ther:
and whereas they alledge that it is of the ap∣parency of truth, what care I for that? yet it is counterfeit: so that they would have all Logick to consist in a necessary and a contingent axiome, for no syllogismes are so: and that is the reason, that Ramus denies that demonstration; for their neces∣sary that they speak of, is in axiom, not in syllogisme. Again, Sophistica is general to all arts, and not special to Logick, for all arts have their errors. Now the Schools distribute Logick into Dialectica, Gramma∣tica, and Rhetorica, which savours of a notorious equi∣vocation. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 indeed signifies ratio, and oratio, but this is onely a distributing of the name, not of the thing, as if they should say Logica signifies ratio, or speech: many also there are that find fault with Ra∣mus, for the reason of this name, some say it comes of 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, colloquor; but that is not because of their collocutio; but because of their reasoning in their speech together: but again, what hath Logick to do with words, and to name Logick from speech hath no rea∣son at all, for it may be without it. There is also a great question, whether Dialectica be Ars, as Scali∣ger will have it; because saith he opus post se reliquit; or if it be facultas, as Craelius holds, or whether it be scientia, as others say. These are bables, we have heard that the wisdom of God is Ars in the thing, it is called scientia by a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, which is properly the judgement of a rule of art: so that here is a double trope, first a metonimy of the adjunct for the subject, the know∣ledge of the art for the art it self: then a Synechdo∣che of the part for the whole, the rule for the whole art, for facultas, that is the subject ratio: ergo, Crae∣lius speaks by metonimy of the subject for the ad∣junct;
for the faculty is reason it self; so that dia∣lectica est ars: as for their distribution in Schooles, that ars doth 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and scientia onely 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or contemplare, it is a bable, we see scientia is the know∣ledge of the Art, and ars is rei, as A••ithmetick is of number, Geometry of magnitude, &c. and Logick of reason, so that the scientia or Theory of Art is fallacia accidentis, to take it for the art it self, and is as if we should say, a painted man is a true man, ergo, when we say a man is a good Logician, we mean a man hath that knowledge of reason, and so for o∣ther arts; so that our knowledge of an art is no more of the essence of it, then my knowledge of a man is of the essence of the man. Again, when I say the knowledge of an Art, I say two things, know∣ledge, and art, which are subject and adjunct, ergo, knowledge is but accidental to the art. For bene disserendi there are many adversaries, and one grand enemy, some say it is rather ars bene utendi ratione, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 is an adjunct to art, and it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 not artis, as for example, we cannot say, the Merchant, or Marriner useth the Shipwrights art, but his work, but this is the chief absurdity that it breaks the form into peices.
Kickerman cries out against Ramus for this defi∣nition, and sayes it is a trope, ergo, ought not to be in art, he forgets his rules, for Rhetorick is a general art, ergo, it may be every where, but saith he, is it not bet∣ter to teach with proper words, then with tropical, they are fit for simple men, not for judicious? I will confess it, and Ramus too, for Grammar is before Rhetorick, ergo, should be preferred: yet Tropes may be as plain, and as significant as other words some∣times; but I make no doubt, but that disserere is ever
used in other sense then this Logical signification: but if it be, let him give me a better word; but he cannot, because he doth not but sayes, logica est ars dirigendi mentem in cognitione rerum▪ and so breaks all in peices. Again, what doth dirigere here? It be∣longs to art in general, for dirigere is as large as rege∣re, and regere as regula, and regula as praeceptum; so that here he cannot be content to horse me up to art in general, for the genus onely, but for the form too. Again for mens, he cannot abide Tropes; but what means he by mens? 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 signifieth properly the divine part of the soul of man, and sometimes it is taken for the faculties of the soul, but here he must take it for reason, ergo, here are two Tropes, first a metonimy of the subject for the adjunct, the faculties for the soul it self. Secondly, a Synecdoche of the part for the whole, reason for the soul. For cognitio it comes of con and notio, to see things laid together, and it is the judgement of an axiome, and belongs to it, which is but a little particle of Logick.
Lastly, for res, that is as general as ens, which is as general as ars, ergo, thus he hoists me up, and down, first to ars in general; then down again to natural Philosophy, for mens belongs thither, then to one peice of Logick: then again up to ars; and thus much for the explanation of the rule: the practise of it stands in this: God hath made all things for man, therefore he must have an eye to see them, and all of them must be liable to it, ergo, this rule tels us, first, if we would look at any thing we must take it with us, for it is ars bene disserendi, and so we shall see it: so that if we would do any thing with reason this puls us by the ear and sayes it is the art to reason well: so that here we may see the commendation of this
art not onely in respect of the general use of it, but in that it teacheth us how to work by it, as God hath done before us: so that it first teacheth us Gods will and pleasure in things; and then what he would have us to do in the managing and governing of them: and here we may see, that all things at the first were made for one man.
We have heard what Dialectica is, and have seen the reason of every word therein. Now Ramus doth commorari upon this rule, and tels us that eodem sensu Logica dicta est: the reason of it is, because here he tels us of a controversie betwixt him and Aristotle, which I prevented before, when I spake of their di∣stribution of Logick into Dialectica, Apodictica, and Sophistica. Now Ramus onely sets down the rule according to truth, for thus it stands, if Dialectica delivers the Art of reason, then Logick and it are all one, but this is the Art that appertains to reason, and that is but one, ergo, so then if Logica signifie the same that Dialectica doth, therefore there is the same definition of them both, for they are one in indivi∣duo, as the Schools speak, ergo in form, ergo but two names signifying the same thing.
Meaning that that name of Aristotles is the same with that Socrates gave; and whilst Plato doth in∣terpret Logica to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and Aristotle saith it is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: they grant it to be the same with Dialectica, and for the distinction of Logick in∣to those three, they must needs hold that those parts contain as much as the whole, but they do not by their own confession; so that this distribution was made by Simplicius, which did not understand Ari∣stole,
or at leastwise Logick, otherwise let them tell me any thing in Logick, that is not in Dialectica, ac∣cording to our Authors definition of it. For Ra∣mus will not deny but Dialectica and Logica are ta∣ken specially in Aristotle, as ratio is sometimes used for argumentum, but that is by a Synecdoche, for he wanting special names cals things by general words: as an exhalation he cals a fume, whereas a vapour is also a fume, and often he useth it in his Politicks, Eodemque sensu, &c. that is, Logick is so defined, ars bene disserendi, even as Dialectica is, and whatso∣ever other conceits men have had concerning Dia∣lectica, they are out of the way, for if they will say there is a necessary, a probable, and a sophistical ar∣gument, as many do speak, that belongs to an axiome, not to an argument, and whereas they say syllogismus is necessarius, that is Apodicticus, contingens and so∣phisticus, if we look at a necessary syllogisme in Bar∣bara, why there may be a contingent syllogisme, that is a syllogisme consisting of contingent axioms, for so they mean, nay I will make a false syllogisme in Barbara, that shall be true and good, as omnis homo est lapis, omnis afinus est homo, ergo omnis asinus est lapis: and a demonstrative syllogisme, as omne animal ratio∣nale est visible, omnis homo est animal rationale, ergo omnis homo est visibilis: so that these lie not in the syllogisme, for then a dialectical syllogisme would not be an apodictical, or sophistical, aut contra, but these lie in the axiome: for why? whatsoever is ne∣cessary is true, and a contingent axiome doth pro∣nunciare aliquid esse verum, though it may be false, ergo whither truth belongs, thither they belong; now truth and falsehood follow upon affirmation, and negation, and they arise from an axiom, neither doth
a man say aliquid esse, aut non esse, when he means an argument alone, till there be a disposition, ergo those that make a distribution of syllogismes by their matter deceive us: so that here we see it is true that our Author tels us, that eodem sensu Logica dicta est.