The logicians school-master: or, A comment upon Ramus logick.: By Mr. Alexander Richardson, sometime of Queenes Colledge in Cambridge. Whereunto are added, his prelections on Ramus his grammer; Taleus his rhetorick; also his notes on physicks, ethicks, astronomy, medicine, and opticks. Never before published.

Virtus voluntatis est quae facultatem voluntatatis perficit.

That a man may behave himself well, he must be bonis instructus, and they are totius hominis, aut partis, i. e. Corporis or animi. And all these are necessary that a man may bene se gerere; and he must have the virtues of the mind as intelligentia &c. that he may be perfect in the practice of all arts: and whereas the common Philosophers require only prudentiam and justiam universalem indeed all these are requisite. Now follow the vertues of the will and these are the cheifest of all and are only in bono: but now bonus may have gratiam, authoritatem, bona corporis and intellectûs but he must be bonus that hath bona voluntatis, though in infimo gradu, and ergo these vertues do most conduce ad bene se geren∣dum. So that we see as in divinity summum bonum is the subject of the will, so also in Ethicks will hath his object bonum. Now we are to know that Ethicks look at such an one as Adam was before his fall, for he was indued with all bona both interna and ex∣terna, both intellectus and voluntatis so that he is our pattern. Now virtus voluntatis hath alwayes ad∣joyned unto it conscience, so had Adam a conscience to accuse and excuse. But what is conescince?

Answ. It is so much of the Law as yet is in man; or it is the lecture of the understanding reading the Law that is in the will. Now for all the distinctions in Schools of conscience as it is good or bad &c. they are false; for conscience is neither good nor bad: but when we do a thing and afterward know it to be evil then we call it an evil conscience, or if there

be no effect of vertue we call it no conscience: So that this it is, if a man do evil and his conscience be against it, they say it is a bad conscience and yet this conscience is good.

Si adsit, excusan∣tem & haec Voluptatem Praemii expectationem.

That is if it be according to moral vertue it brings with it delight; (not that voluptatem which we shall heare of hereafter,) and expectation of the reward, for the very natural man wil expect it.

Si absit, accusantem et haec Dolorum Paenae metum.

That is if vertue be absent there it will whip him; and hence is grief and fear of punishment; which is opposed to pleasure and expectation of reward. So Adam had his conscience when he hid him in the garden.