The logicians school-master: or, A comment upon Ramus logick.: By Mr. Alexander Richardson, sometime of Queenes Colledge in Cambridge. Whereunto are added, his prelections on Ramus his grammer; Taleus his rhetorick; also his notes on physicks, ethicks, astronomy, medicine, and opticks. Never before published.

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Title
The logicians school-master: or, A comment upon Ramus logick.: By Mr. Alexander Richardson, sometime of Queenes Colledge in Cambridge. Whereunto are added, his prelections on Ramus his grammer; Taleus his rhetorick; also his notes on physicks, ethicks, astronomy, medicine, and opticks. Never before published.
Author
Richardson, Alexander, of Queen's College, Cambridge.
Publication
London :: Printed by Gartrude Dawson, and are to be sold by Sam. Thomson at the White-Horse in Paul's Church-yard,
1657.
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Subject terms
Logic
Ramus, Petrus, -- 1515-1572
Talon, Omer, -- ca. 1510-1562
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A91783.0001.001
Cite this Item
"The logicians school-master: or, A comment upon Ramus logick.: By Mr. Alexander Richardson, sometime of Queenes Colledge in Cambridge. Whereunto are added, his prelections on Ramus his grammer; Taleus his rhetorick; also his notes on physicks, ethicks, astronomy, medicine, and opticks. Never before published." In the digital collection Early English Books Online 2. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A91783.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 10, 2024.

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Gravitas. Levitas.

Gravitas and Levitas do arise from the continual act of the forme: for where there is a great deal of forme, and little matter, there is most levity. So in the highest Heavens, because the principia were to∣gether, and there is much acting of the forme, hence is it most light, and hath the highest place. And gravity is a privation as it were of levity, as opacity is of light. And so the same matter may be more light by the action of the forme, not more grave. And so the first matter was most grave, because it was with∣out

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forme: and as it was every thing imperfectly so 'twas in loco, and was quantum imperfectly; though limits of place and quantity be so far as matter and form reach: and 'twas without forme, ergo imper∣fect. And for so many legions of Spirits in a mans body, we are to imagine them to have distinct places; so when we pull a thing, we would have it in two places, ergo it rents. And acts are either internal, when the forme extends the matter; and hence is subtilitas and crassities, and this is the true arising of subtilitas, some say it ariseth from heat, and rarity: but there may be subtility where these are not, as in the highest Heavens: and this is plain in the Ele∣ments which have one common matter, and yet by their forms they are more or less extended: neither is heat the cause of extension, for the earth will be more extended, if the forme of Water be in it. Again, when the form extends the matter beyond its reach, till it rent, this is rarity: Gravitas is from more matter, and less forme, levitas contrà: The external act is of the matter and forme. Raritas and Densi∣tas. Rarity is the extension of the matter by the forme, that it rents and becomes porose, and so is every thing, for if Angels can extend themselves, then tis from their rarity and density, and ergo from porosity: and so for Adam, and the patriarchs, and the rest, they being in the highest Heavens, there must needs be cessio corporum, and there must be no vacuum, ergo there is a caelestis aura that doth cedere. Scaliger saith when the air is extended tis porosus, and yet he cannot tell what 'tis that is in the pores of it; for if it were air, then it should still be one continu∣ed body with it: but all the Elements are together

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by apposition; so that there are other elements in it. And raritas and densitas are not qualities, saith Aristotle, but the distance of the parts, and as it were a kind of ratio. And these may be of the same thing as the air may be more rare, and more dense. And these are internal acts. The external, act the power of action and passion: For where there is much po∣tentia actionis, there must be much potentia passionis, and so antipathy: where if there be much action, then there must be patientis fuga, or else it perisheth. Now where there is much action and affection to his like as is cause, effect, subject or adjunct, this is Sympathy.

Multiplex & disconti∣nuum unum mun∣dum efficit ordine, et hinc ascensus. descensus.

Multiplex & disconti∣nuum unum mun∣dum efficit contiguitate, & hinc nullum da∣tur vacuum.

The world consisteth of many parts, which are not continua, but contigua: yet we may call the world one, as he that made it is one; scilicet in method or order, not in continued quantity. And by reason, that all things are one by method, hence there can be no vacuum: First, because there would be a crypsis of this method: again, vacuum is non ens; but on∣ly ens à primo is part of the world, ergo not non ens, for nothing cannot be a part of something. Nature is manifold, but 'tis made one by method: as every rule of Logick are divers in themselves, but make but one act by method, so nature being manifold in it self, is made one by method. And here are a great many Controversies answered; as, That the world is

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not one by continuity but method, we know is the wisdom of God, according to which God created and governs things; ergo the things do appetere their place, as God hath placed them: hence 'tis that things ascend and descend. Some say 'tis for their own preservation: which indeed is the final cause, but the efficient cause is method. And as a Painter, when he paints a thing, should make a deformity, if he should set things out of order: so nature, if things should not be rightly placed, so that there be no crypsis of method. And here comes in the world, which is multiplex and discontinua natura: here also by reason of this method there comes to be conti∣guity of every thing; so that there cannot be va∣cuum: for then the world should not be one, and so we should make two worlds, and make nothing something. And though Gods wisdom, Power, and other Attributes, be, and in God, yet he would have them appear instar omnium, and to be sufficient for all things: and so he made them many, to shew the variety of this wisdom. Now again, as they are many in themselves, yet they must be but one, to shew that the variety of this wisdom is but one in him. And they are in one method, and so make one world. So we say in Logick, and 'tis sometimes true, That the cause and the effect be like: and so is God and the world. So the world is but one: and is round, as being the most capacious figure of all: now 'tis one, not in continuity, for then it should but have one quantity, and so one forme, but as be∣fore in contiguity as it were 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, i. e. an heap, but an orderly heap, and so is but one in method. And hence every thing desireth its place and order

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by the rule of method; which commands that natu∣râ prior must praecedere: ergo the outmost things must first be made; and ergo they must have more forme than matter, that they may ascend: and so by order, from the highest nature, goeth down to the lowest: And for those Philosophers which make Nature to be God, I doubt it, and methinks 'tis like their o∣pinion which made the God-head the form of every thing. But we must not wrong God, but acknow∣ledge the principia to be causes of things, and give them their effects, for they say in that such qualities—such a thing, 'tis from God: But as a man doth write with pen, so God hath made a creature which worketh of it self, even as the Pen writeth, but is governed by God even as the pen by the writer. So that natures work is when the two causes do work according to Gods Logicum artificium: and Nature is the cause of natural effects; and is to be distinguished from God. So that here we see the disposition and order of every thing. So when I see a Tree bring forth fruit, I conclude there is Logick; and yet neither tree nor fruit hath reason: ergo there is one greater that hath reason: which methinks were sufficient to convert any Atheist. And from this or∣der of things comes contiguity: for there must be no vacuum, as before, since that would be a breach of method. So we see Water and Earth will go up even into the element of Fire for the preservation of the unity of this world. And if there should be a vacuum it must needs be something or nothing, then in the world or out of the world; if out of the world, then it were not all things; if in the world, then a part of the world, then as before in ens it should be

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ens; if in the world and not ens, then the world must be two. And from method 'tis that the Load-stone desireth to stand North and South; and so doth every thing, yea naturally, not guided by coun∣sel desire natale solum. And when we do transplant trees, 'tis a monster and against nature; and so that one woman should nurse an other womans child: And one woman may have three children, though she have but two dugs, so that she have milk for them. And from sympathy it is, that the iron goeth to the load-stone, for 'tis his food; ergo his preser∣ving cause; and the stone may act through a Table. For descensus. What is the reason that fire cometh down? Common Philosophers ascribe it to plate, which belongeth to subjectum; but 'tis place, which is order, and belongeth to method: and that is the next cause, though the final cause be as before, ne detur vacuum. So when I cast a stone, that it flies, 'tis propria forma; the reason why it flies from me is that it doth pati, and ergo doth flie his enemy. The common Philosophers ascribe it to the air, which in very deed doth hinder it as themselves shall confess; for cast a stone upward, and when it falleth down again, what is the reason it moveth faster when 'tis near the center, than when tis farther off, but because when tis near the center there is less resistance of the air than there was above? So what is the reason we take force to strike with an Ax, and that goes far∣ther, than if we set it upon a thing and lay great weight on it? because the wood can resist the Ax well enough. Now we lift up our hands, because all the vital spirits in the legs and other parts of the bo∣dy come to inable that part which acteth most; and

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the higher it goeth the more forciblly it cometh, for that it is more able to resist the air; as also there is a double motion, natural and violent: and it will come down more easily, because it is a natural moti∣on; not upward so well because tis violent unto it. So a thing that hangs down, that part moveth most which is farthest from the center, for that it suffereth violence. So what's the reason, that put salt Beef in∣to the Sea and it will be fresh; but put fresh in, and it will be salt? because tis the nature of salt to con∣stringe; and that's the reason salt Beef occupieth less place than fresh doth: now its pores being filled with salt, the salt water cannot get in, but only the fine water pierceth in, and so takes away the salt: but if it be fresh the pores be so open, that the salt water entreth in, and so it becometh salt.

Materiale est 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in naturâ primum substratum: and this is fons passionis. Formale est essentia in na∣turâ prîmum superstratum, as before: and this is fons actionis. And from these principia many things in nature may be made manifest. As from hence, things natural have finitness of essence, which belongeth to every nature: and thence limits of quantity, as the Angels have; and thence they are alwayes under some figure; thence also have they limits of place; and so Zanchius saith, an Angel is in his own place. Again, if every natural thing have these principia, then tis principiatum; ergo tis in tempore, and had a beginning: hence nature must have an efficient; ergo not eternal: and this efficient only can turn the constant nature into nothing; but they are not re∣solvable per se, because they are proxima to nothing in their kind: otherwise if nature should resolve

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them, it could work a miracle, which is above na∣ture, for nature found them created, and must so leave them, for creatio and annihilatio are not effects of nature, but above it: Hence the soul of man could not be created by nature; for then either of something or nothing; not of nothing. For creatio is above nature, if of something, then resolvable a∣gain. Again, if every thing in nature be of these principia, hence is generatio ex aliquo, and corruptio in aliquid; from these principia comes actus & poten∣tia; actus est ex acto formae in materiam; potentia est ex actu formae per materiam: From these inward acts come (1) levity and gravity; and there are two causes of levity, the first is a form more active; the second is less proportion of matter: The causes of gravity are contra: again the causes of subtility are more proportion of forme, and more active, and less proportion of matter: again rarity and density are degrees of porosity; and every thing is porose; so Angels do contract themselves, by retracting (as I may say) themselves into their pores; neither need we to fear vacuum ergo, in the highest heavens; for there is a calestis aura to prevent it: so also the highest heavens are porose, neither is there any door to open and shut, but God doth that at his pleasure: so also fire can extend and tontract it self, and that because of rarity and so porosity; much more ergo the Angels. And extension and contraction comes from porosity: which will plainly appear in the E∣lements which are together by apposition; for one is in the pores of an other; and this is that which Kickerman calls a misture; and indeed besides this ap∣position there is a kind of imperfect misture in them,

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so that I may call the Earth or any of them a Meer. Potentia is ex actu formae per materiam. I call it rather potentia than Qualitas; because the other is alwayes in act, but this sometimes doth not work. This po∣tentia excitatur ad actionem by passio; and this passio is either amica or inimica: amica is that sympathy which is between consentanies; inimica that antipa∣thy between dissentanies: and these are ex rei alicu∣jus preservationis appetitu. Now from both these comes motus which is either naturalis, or violentus: naturalis ex amicâ passione; violentus ex inimicâ▪ Naturalis is flower at the beginning, and swifter at the end; because tis nearer to that which it doth ap∣petere, and so moves faster: and this sheweth that there is an appetitio of consentanies, and as I may call it a kind of raptus. Motus violentus is swift at the be∣ginning, and flower at the end; for it makes haste, till it be out of the reach of its enemy, and then it thinks it may go more slowly: and according as agens acts, so doth patiens pati: now this patiens is ergo debilior, or fortior: if debilior, then resistentia, and as I may say, oppugnatio: if fortior, then also re∣sistentia and patientis fuga.

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