The trades-man's jevvel: or a safe, easie, speedy and effectual means, for the incredible advancement of trade, and multiplication of riches;: shewing how men of indifferent estates, may abundantly increase both their own and other mens trading and riches, without parting with money, or any stock out of their own hands: by making their bills to become current instead of money, and frequently to revolve through their hands, with as much in money as the sums therein mentioned do amount unto.

THE TRADES-MANS Jewel, &c.

SECT. I.

THe Advancement of Trade, consisteth chiefly in the great and quick Revolution of Commodity from Sea or Land, through the hands of Tradesmen, to each particular person for his private use.

This Revolution of Commodity, is proportionable to the Revolution of Money, or that which goeth for such(a).

Such Revolution of Money is according to the plenty thereof not hoorded up.

All the Houses, Ships, Goods, Land, &c. in a Nation, are usually much above One hundred times more in value, then all the Money therein(b).

The Multiplication of Money amongst any People, doth through the Revolution there∣of(c), draw in so much Commodity amongst them, (and put men upon Building Houses, Ships, and Improving Land in such sort) as their Estates in other things do soon exceed such multiplied stock of Moneys, accord∣ing to the aforesaid proportion.

Hereby it appears, That if Money could be in∣creased so, as to be always equal in velue to what Mens Estates are otherwise worth(d), (though never so much multiplied by such In∣crease of Money) it would be a means suddenly to Ingross all the Trade and Riches that the World could afford for Money.

Object. But would not such plenty of Money pro∣duce some notable Inconvenience?

Answ. If Mens hands were never so full of Money, the Inconvenience must either be, That there is so much the more kept by, or so much there more laid out.

The Money kept by, doth but imbolden Men to live the more comfortably, whereby Trade is the quicker.

The Money laid out, likewise doth no more harm, then what it doth by Increasing Trade and Riches.

Object. But such plenty of Money would raise the price of Commodity.

Answ. No otherwise then by occasioning more Commodity to be sold in the year then formerly; in which respect any Increase of Trade whatsoever, is as much liable to raise the price of Commodity.

This Objection might be much more fully Answer∣ed, but that I here intend all possible brevity, refer∣ing to the aforesaid Treatise.

SECT. II.

IF it be demanded how Money may be multiplied amongst us here in England, and how it can be kept from being hoorded up?

I answer, If Mens Credit may be transmitted each to other in Bills, and setled upon such firm Security, as Men may be willing (of their own accord) to accept thereof in stead of Money (as sometimes they do Bills of Exchange) it must needs follow, That the Revolution of such Bills would Increase Trade as much, as if the same were ready Money;

The rather, because those Bills are not like to be hoorded up as Money is.

And this (seeing Mens Credits are equal in value to what their Estates are otherwise worth, in Houses, Lands, Ships, Goods, or whatsoever) must needs tend to Increase Trade and Riches, according to the proportion already premised.

To this end therefore, let it be admitted,

1. That some effectual means be discovered, for preventing the falsifying of the said Bills, which I shall undertake to demonstrate in due time.

2. That the security for making good any of these Bills (or all of them at once, if required) be as firm as that of the Chamber of London, Bank of Amsterdam, or any Bills of Exchange; viz. To make them good either in Money at the end of six Moneths, or in Com∣modity immediately: The way to effect which, I shall here discover.

And then (I say, in this Case) Men would be willing to accept of these Bills for Commodity in stead of Money, as I come now to prove.

SECT. III.

THat in the Cases before mentioned, Men would be willing to accept of Bills for Commodity in stead of Money, is manifest, if we consider,

1. That in Flanders this way of Trading upon Bills, is ordinary, and much preferred before that way of dealing upon Credit, here used.

2. If Men be willing here to part with their Ware upon the private Credit of one another (as now they do) they would much rather accept of such security for their Ware, as that of the Chamber of London, &c.

3. Though Bills or Bonds be slighted, when the Se∣curity for Payment of them is not good; yet if the Security be unquestionable, Men are willing to part with Money, much more with Commodity upon such Security.

4. If the Security for making good these Bills in Money within Six Moneths, were equal to that of the Chamber of London, Monyed men would advance ready Money for them, upon Rebatement of Interest; neither would any Man refuse to take them for Com∣modity, at the rate they would yield in ready Money.

5. If most Men should refuse to take them, then the Trading would go all to those that should accept of them.

6. Hereby the Wiser sort of Men would accompt it their great advantage, to publish themselves willing to take them with Rebatement of Interest, seeing at least they have sufficient Security for making them all good within Six Moneths; and, rebating for Interest, are able to procure ready Money for them.

7. As in these Respects few would refuse them, so those that should accept of them, might easily put them off upon those they constantly deal with, much rather then their own single Credit: And if some be willing to take them, others will not refuse them, be∣cause they know whither to go with them.

SECT. IV.

IT were a weak Objection to alleage, That this were no other then to Imbase the Coyn, or put Paper in the place of Money; For

1. These Bills need not be made currant by Law, (as base Money must) but by the Peoples Consent.

2. Brass or Leather Money hath not an Intrinsecal value; whereas there being sufficient Security given to make good these Bills when required, it is equivalent to an Intrinsecal value.

3. The Counterfeiting (and by consequence the Multiplying of Brass or Leather Money beyond all bounds) could never yet be prevented; which as to these Bills may effectually be done, as I have already undertaken to make good.

4. There is no Inconvenience in this way of Tra∣ding upon Bills, which is not much more lyable to the ordinary way of dealing upon Trust.

For, if a Man can take up Ware upon his bare word to pay at a certain time; what hurt can it do the Creditor, to take a Bill under his hand?

If a third Person knowing the Debitors Sufficiency, will accept of this Bill, with rebatement of Interest for that time in stead of Money, and thereupon furnish the Creditor with Commodity; it not this better then if he had been forced to stay for the Money?

If this third Person take up as much Ware from this Debitor, as the Bill, with Rebatement of Interest, amounts to, and returns his own Bill for satisfaction; hath either the one or the other any prejudice thereby?

And thus, though Mens words cannot, yet their Credit in Bills may be transmitted to the second, third, fourth, fifth hand, &c. whereby fully to supply the

place of so much Money, to the abundant Multipli∣cation of Trade and Riches; and that without the least Inconvenience, other then what is already Incident to the ordinary way of Trading on Credit.

SECT. V.

IF any doubt how the security for making good these Bills, should be made as firm as that of the Chamber of London, or rather as any which on earth can be given.

Before I can resolve this Doubt, I must propose the principal terms of an Agreement amongst several Tradesmen, in order to the settling of such a Security.

Admit therefore, that several Tradesmen agreeing together, do cause a certain number of Bills to be printed, and putting a value upon them, as suppose ten pound the piece, do lend the said Bills each to o∣ther, upon no less security then if the same were so much ready Money:

That is, let the whole Company lend to each par∣ticular Member, so many of the said Bills, as for which he shall put in sufficient Security: First, to repay in Money or Bills, within four Moneths after the de∣manding thereof: Secondly, To stand bound with the rest of the Company in maner following; viz.

That the said Company do enter into Bond, as Sure∣ties each for other:

1. To accept of half Bills, half Money, for their Ware.

2. To make payment of these Bills in Money, if de∣manded; viz.

That they appoint an Office, where, upon delivering in of the said Bills, they will give Bond for the pay∣ment of them in Money within six Moneths.

And that each of the Members be bound to make good his proportion of the Bills brought in to the said Office, within (suppose) four Moneths time, after no∣tice thereof left at his house in writing.

Now, this being the substance of the Ingagement (to omit other things) it will be needful in the next place, a little to open the nature thereof.

SECT. VI.

In case this Security for making good these Bills, ei∣ther in Money within six Moneths after the demand∣ing thereof, or in Commodity with half Money, will be found to be as good as that of the Chamber of London, or rather as any which on earth can be given, as shall be proved in the Section following:

I say in this Case, it cannot be doubted, but that each Member of this Company may procure Wave upon these Bills, far more easily then otherwise he might upon his own single credit; and consequently that they will go about for Commodity in the place of Money, as is manifest by the several Reasons already given to that effect:

The rather, for that few men will trouble themselves, either to sell their Bills to monyed men, or stay six Moneths for their Money, when few will refuse them for Commodity, at the same rate they will yield in ready Money, who for the same reason will put off the trouble of exchanging them upon others, and so ad in∣finitum.

Now, seeing this Company is not bound to make good any of these Bills in Money, until they be brought in to the said Office, and from that day, have six Moneths time allowed for payment of them: It fol∣lows,

That so long as any of them go about in the place of Money, the said six Moneths time doth not commence, but the Money due upon these Bills from the said Company, is forborn.

And when the Bills shall be brought in, then they have six Moneths time to pay for the Ware which they did procure upon such Bills.

And though all these Bills should be sent in at once, yet the security will be abundantly sufficient to make them good within six Moneths, as shall be immedi∣ately proved.

Neither will the Company be any thing prejudiced thereby; for having procured Wave upon their Bills, before they parted with them, they are hereby onely required to pay for the same in Money, within the time appointed.

Yet it is not probable, that any considerable number of them will ever be brought in together; and those that shall be so brought in, the Company exchanging for Money, may make use of immediately in stead of such Money.

SECT. VII.

THat the security for making good these Bills, may be as firm as any which on earth can be given:

Let (if it be thought needful) a whole Company of Insurers (bound each for other) have one per Cent. for Insurance, and permitted to have a Negative voyce in the Loan of these Bills.

And then considering, First, that the whole Com∣pany of Undertakers are bound each for other.

2. That the whole Company of Insurers, are bound for the Undertakers.

3. That each of the Undertakers puts in such se∣curity for himself, as the Insurers are willing to in∣sure for one per Cent.

I say in this case, it can hardly be imagined, That one of the Undertakers amongst an hundred, could so fail, as neither he nor his Sureties should be able to make good the loss.

2. It is not the failing of one in an hundred, that can make the loss so considerable, but that the one per Cent. given for Insurance, much more the whole estates of all the Insurers, yea, and the estates of all the Under∣takers, together with their Sureties, are fully able to make good.

3. It cannot be imagined, That those few failers can both in themselves and Sureties fail so, as not to make good the most part of what was borrowed by them.

Now, except the loss be so great, as neither the sai∣lers with their Sureties, nor the whole Company of In∣surers, nor yet the whole Company of Undertakers with all their Sureties, be able to make good by their whole estates, the security for making good these Bills, according to the terms proposed, is a firm as any which on earth can be given.

And how any such loss should happen without some general confusion, (by surprisal of an enemy or such like) cannot be imagined; To the danger of which, the security of the Chamber of London, mens trading on credit without these Bills, nay their estates in their own hands, is no less liable.

SECT. VIII.

IF the difficulty of producing security for borrowing of these Bills, be pleaded;

I answer, When any of the Halls of London proffer to lend Money to yong beginners gratis, it is ac∣compted so great an advantage, as there are few but will make all possible shift to procure any security that shall be demanded.

Yet I say, That the Loan of these Bills shall be much greater advantage to the borrowers, then if they were proffered the Loan of so much Money gratis.

For hereby the deal in such a kinde of Money, as will be sure not to go far about, without returning with as much in other Money upon their own hands (they being the onely persons that are engaged to take it;) whereas those that borrow the usual currant Money now abroad, so soon as ever they lay it out, are never like to see it again.

Now this quick and thick Revolution of Bills (with as much in Money) through their hands, shall multi∣ply their Trading to the utmost degree that they are possibly able to manage, as is fully cleared in my aforesaid Treatise.

If the hazzard of being bound each for other, be objected:

I answer, The hazard is no whit greater then to be bound for the Chamber of London, or Bank of Am∣sterdam, in any thing wherein a whole Company of Insurers should be bound to save them harmless: For,

1. The whole Company of Undertakers have suf∣ficient Security from each particular Member.

2. If one Member amongst many should fail, both in himself and Sureties, the Insurers must save the Un∣dertakers harmless.

3. It is not to be doubted, but the Insurers will be careful enough to take such Security as the one per Cent. given for Insurance, shall on time with another, more then make good all the losses incident to this un∣dertaking; The contrary to which must not be granted.

4. If it might be admitted, that any such thing could happen once in an age, wherein neither the one per Cent. nor yet the whole estates of the Insurers,

would be able fully to make good the loss, yet not any one person alone, but the whole Company of Under∣takers, are to discharge the rest proportionably, where∣in each mans share would scarce be considerable.

5. The ordinary way of Trading upon Trust, is lia∣ble to much greater hazard, which by this means will be made altogether needless.

For in the said ordinary way of Trading, men use not either to take Security from their Debtors (much∣less to insure that Security) or to have any to bear the least share of the loss, that frequently happens by trust∣ing them.

Whereas those of this Engagement, seeing they may have as much Trading with ready pay in Money and Bills, as they are able to manage, shall not need to trust any man whosoever.

Yet if the difficulty of procuring Security, and the hazard of being bound each for other, do stick in mens mindes;

I shall propose a way for removing of both, to those whom it concerns, when need requireth.

SECT. IX.

THis Enterprise is demonstrated in my aforesaid Treatise, to be of such a nature, as whereby

First, A very few men may both begin and continue the practise thereof; and that so, as if others do not joyn with them, they will suddenly be able (by un∣derselling them through their quick returns) to ingross all the Trading into their own hands.

2. Hereby all the Tradesmen in the Land would be both encouraged and necessitated to joyn in the same Practise.

3. Seeing the number of Bills would thereby be increased proportionably, it would produce as much

Trading to the Generality of men, as they could pos∣sibly manage.

4. Besides the things formerly mentioned, viz. Their having as much lent them (without paying In∣terest) as they are able to put in Security to borrow, with as much Trading as they are able to manage, and all that with ready pay, either in Money or Bills:

Their Estates being increased by such quick Tra∣ding, with such doubled stock, they may procure great∣er Security, whereby to borrow more Bills to the doubling of such increase, and so ad infinitum.

Now, this perpetual doubling the Increase of their stock, is of so great concernment, as though mens Trading should be but ordinary; yet it will make an Estate of 1000 l. to amount in 40 years to 500 Milli∣ons, as is cleared in the said Treatise: And by conse∣quence, it would make the people of this Nation to be worth in 40 years (the World affording but Commo∣dity enough for Money) five hundred thousand times more then now they are; that is, he who is now worth but twenty shillings to be worth five hundred thousand pounds, and so of others proportionably.

Further, If this would be the consequence, although men Trading should be but ordinary, what may we think will follow, when their dealings shall be perpetu∣ally as great as they are able to manage?

Many other considerable Advantages would follow from this Enterprise (without any inconvenience to counterpoise the same) as is particularly demonstrated in the aforesaid Treatise, which I earnestly desire that all men will seriously peruse, who tender the good of this Commonwealth.

Soli Deo Gloria.

FINIS.

Notes

• (a)

  For men cannot afford to sell more Ware in the year (up∣on Credit, or otherwise) then one time with another they re∣ceive money for.
• (b)

  It is verily beleeved, that all the Houses, in and about London alone, are worth ten times more then all the Money in the Land.
• (c)

  The quantity of Goods taken in from Land or Sea, is proportionable to the quantity of Money yearly revolving.
• (d)

  Whereby for every twen∣ty shillings that men have in their hands, one time with an∣other, they would then have above One hundred pound, to the abundant Multiplication of Mens expences; and by conse∣quence of Trading.