A Plea for succession in opposition to popular exclusion wherein it is evidenced, that an association, or any other such method, is a more immediate way to arbitrary power and a more certain road to popery than a standing up to the right of succession can in any reason be supposed to be : with some remarques on Coleman and his letters.

1. For Arbitrary Power the case is plain.

For it is the confidence, and ordinary boast of these Men, that they do not fear this, while the Exchequer is low. This is plain in the Speech of the Noble Peer, and from numerous instances among that Party. And this very Libel saith, Pag. 5. That the King hath need of the Love of His People: by which it is there plain, he means their Purses, as well as Hearts. Whence they are so far from fearing the King should Press them; that even they are bold to Press the King: and will yield Him no Mony, unless He dearly Buy it, with His own Prerogatives. Men serve themselves on the necessities of the Crown; and are Arbitrary in making their own Will a Law, while they would have more simple minds believe the King is doing so.

Now what is thus able to hinder all, that is Arbitrary, in the present King, is as apt, and powerful in its own Nature, to hinder it in His Successor. There∣fore upon what Grounds, or Reasons, they do not fear this Evil under His pre∣sent Majesty; upon the same Grounds, or Reasons, they need not fear it un∣der a Succeeding Prince. At present then we are free, and even these Men themselves do boast, we need not fear the Yoak: and consequently where they cry out of any Arbitrary Power, it must be from Design, and not from any real Fear.

Whereas if we follow the Association, or any Popular way of Exclusion, we do ipso facto, at the very first motion, step into all, that is Arbitrary. For hereby we cast our Religion, Lives, and Fortunes, into the Power of a few Men, whom Faction, Guilt, or Interest, shall persuade to head the Party.

Which done, they must necessarily run us into another Bloody War, to beat down present Establishments, and to fix their own placits in their room. Which cannot be done, without great Expences, and severe Taxations, toge∣ther with the pretty Tricks of Publick Faith, and the wheedling poor Girls out of all their Plate, viz. Thimbles, and Bodkins. Which Payments must be rais'd, not according to Laws, which are against them, but at their own plea∣sures: and they, that this way take a part, may as well take the whole. Then as to Order and Government, none can say what they will be, because it will ever depend on the Wills of them, that at any time shall be uppermost. Here then our Persons, and Estates, lye all at the mercy of every Proud, and Gree∣dy Committee, who will never want, while the Subject hath it. This then is the Height, and Perfection, of what is Arbitrary, which yet is the insepara∣ble concomitant of Popular Proceedings.

Now in case these Men after a long, and profuse expence of Treasure and Blood, shall gain their point, in subduing the Powers; they must necessarily keep up a standing Army to support the Ʋsurpation; and likewise secure all Elections to themselves, that they may bring in one Member, as another fails; and Purge out that again, if it doth not just jump with the rest. By which means we doubly enslave both our selves, and Posterity at once; that is, both to the head Associators, or Covenanteers, call them what you will; and also to the Army that upholds them. Which two Bodies for Peace, and Mutual Pre∣servation, must indulge each other, and divide amongst themselves the spoils of the People, and the Fat of the Land. And I am sure the People will find fellow Subjects, if once they gain the Government, more Proud, Covetous, and Tyrannical, than any, upon whom the Government Devolves by Legal, and expected Descents. For it hath ever been observed, that suddain, and great Advances, make Men insufferably Imperious, Proud, and Covetous. And when Crown, and Church Lands, are devoured by hungry Armies, and leading Commons; the necessary Charge of many Ʋsurpers, and of a standing Army, will much exceed the Expences of a Crown. Besides all the super∣fluities, that Men of the Bench, and the Sword will have, when they are their own Carvers: which must all come out of the Subjects Pockets. There∣fore the Association, or any Popular way of Exclusion, brings Men immediatly under not only Arbitrary Power, but withal, under the most certain, necessary, and unsupportable Oppressions too.

But some may here Object, that they will avoid all this mischief, for they will only put His Royal Highness by; and clap another in the Throne. They will alter a Person, but leave the Government untouch'd, till Parlia∣mentary ways shall Purge, and Correct the Laws.

We answer, This is a right Fools Paradice; and as Impracticable a thing, as the building Castles in the Air. For,

1. A Rebellion, if prosperous, can never set Bounds to it self, that thus far, and no farther will we go. Which we prove two ways.

1. From matter of Fact; for the Commons that took up Arms against the late King, pretended they would only remove Evil Counsellors, and bring the King to His Parliament. And truly, I believe the Body of those Men did intend no more, but to make the King a slave to His Parliament, and them∣selves. But this Army soon fell into many wretched Sects, and had as ma∣ny Interests as Parties: by which means, while they all Conspired against what was an Obstruction to the whole; they were yet in contest, who should make his best advantage of it, when the point should be gain'd. Which done, the strongest Party carries away the Ball, and follows not what was in∣tended by others, but what was most advantageous to themselves. And while these use the Sweat, and Blood of Fools, that first began the War, to their own ends; up starts a new Player, who changes the Scene, and be∣fools

them all. And upon every change things still run to a farther excess; till at last those, who began, and set Bounds to this Monster, viz. Popular Tumult, were inslaved with them, whom they first opposed. This is just like the Man in the Horn, the farther he creeps, the more he is straitned, till at last he would fain get out, if he could. When Men in these ways fight, as some yet speak, pro aris, & focis, they usually fight, till they have nothing, but smoak and ashes left them. For while Members were excluded; Generals, and other Commanders chang'd; and Governors crept up, and again thrust down one another; we gradually fell under a Monster of Government, that had so many Heads, we could neither number, nor well understand, which they were: and things were driven beside, and beyond, the first intention, to such Tragical events, that will blush in History to all Posterities.

2. From Reason, which gives us to expect the like mischiefs from a like success of Arms. For here are the same Parties, the same Principles, the same Interests, the same wicked Policies, cunning Heads, Self ends, and (which is the complement of all) the same Devil working in the Sons of Disobedience, that there was before: whence we must expect the same Contests, and Confu∣sions; for the same Cause will still produce the same Effect.

If there be any alteration among these People, it is for the worse: for they are much more giddy-headed, rash, and implacable, than they were before the beginning of the last Rebellion. And the Presbyterians, who are for Govern∣ment, though not for such; are generally sunk into Independency which is for such a Government, that it is indeed for none at all. For all our Conventicles are in their present state Independent; every such Body, like a flock of wild Geese, following none, but their own giddy motions. If any thing guides them, it is meer Opposition, which once ceasing, they fall by the Ears among themselves. Therefore having lived Libertines so many Years, they will ne∣ver receive any Yoak: and consequently confusions must be greater, and things run to farther excesses, than before. But,

2. In case of success of Arms, these Men would never design, or yield to set up a King. For,

1. While they are in the way of Conquest, they will, as fast as may be, seize not only all Church Lands, and honest Mens Estates, but all the Revenues of the Crown too: which, as they are gain'd, must go not only to the necessary support of these kind of Commons, or States, and payment of the Army; but must be given to some as rewards of their Services, and to others to secure them to the Party; and when these leading Men have once got them in their Clutches, they will never resign them; but will be against a King, that they may still enjoy His Revenues.

2. Soldiers are always for continuing in Arms; and for that Reason alone, will be against a King, and a settled Government; which rendering them use∣less, will soon Disband them.

3. If they yield to any Form of Government, it will be such, that them∣selves may partake in; and therefore such, whereby they may farther secure their own Ʋsurpations, and Arbitrary Proceedings.

Men are quite-mistaken in their measures between Lawful Governors, and Ʋsurpers: The former have nothing, whether Power, or Revenues, but what is their own; and from them is to descend to their Heirs: therefore as they fear none, so they bend their thoughts to the good of the Subject, as well as of themselves: and many times prefer the Peoples, before their own particular advantages: as His Majesty hath done in many instances, viz. in making the Thirty Ships of War more large, and fit for Service, than the Tax given by the Parliament would do: in passing the Irish Bill; and in maintaining about Three Years War at Tangier, to the expence of near One Hundred Thousand Pound per annum, and bringing things to an honorable, and advantageous Ac∣commodation;

commodation; and all at the very time: when, beside the keeping a Fleet of Ships continually in the Streights, for preserving our Trade; the Commons did successively signifie, they would give no Mony, how pressing soever the ne∣cessities of State might be. As Kings are Fathers of their Country in the Language of Nature; and Nursing Fathers in that of Revelation, so they have a Paternal Care, and Love of their Subjects; Providence hath made them a Sun, and a Shield, whose Influences, and Protection, reach to all Parts of their Dominions. The Peoples folly, and madness, may look upon their own In∣terest, as distinct from that of the Crown; but Kings esteem them so entwisted together, that they cannot be separate.

But Ʋsurpers have at the most but their own Lives in the case, the Devil knows who may follow 'em; therefore they care not how Beggarly they leave the Soil to the next Invader. They have nothing, but what is other Mens; whence they fear both the Right owner, and what is their only due, viz. Sen∣tence, and Execution for the Violences, they have done. Therefore all their Designs lie, not for the Peoples Good, but their own Preservation. And be∣cause nothing is so jealous as Guilt, they never think themselves safe, but when their security, viz. the Sword, is in their own Hands: whence they will never part with their Power to any, for fear they should, at least accidentally, betray themselves. The King before His Restauration, promised Pardon to all, the Regicides only excepted; the performance of which Promise, they might have been Infallibly certain of, both from the King's Nature, and the then pre∣sent circumstances of things: and yet both the Rump, and the Army, were as irreconcilably set against His Return, as if the One was to have been Roasted, and the Other Tyed up, the first day the King should set Foot on the Shore: and the Reason was not only that they might still Domineer, and Eat up the People; but might still stand their own Defenders. Nothing is so sweet as stolen Honors, and Command: nor so satisfactory to a Guilty Male∣factor, as self-Defence.

But you will say the cases are not alike: for the Army will set up a Person, from whom they will have no Pardons, but Smiles to receive for their Services. Those looked upon the King at best, but as a reconciled Enemy; from whom they could hope for nothing, but to escape Hanging: but these will look upon this Person as their Friend, who will be ready to advance, and benefit them: and therefore will be more ready to set up him, than the others were to re∣ceive the King.

We Answer,

1. That this supposed Army will be as unwilling to be put out of a way to Live, and to give up the Power, and Revenues, they have got into their Hands, as the other were before; and consequently will be as much against a King, as they.

2. The Heirs to the Crown must be supposed, at least some of 'em, still in being; and therefore waiting an opportunity of recovering their own: for which very cause, as well as others, they will not part from their Power, in giving the Sword out of their Hands; lest by some slip of Government, or any other means, the Right owner return; from whom (after a second Rebellion) they must not expect so large an Indemnity.

When the Roman Armies Rul'd the Empire, they were never willing to part from their Power; though indeed they made Emperors, yet they unmade them again at their pleasure, and forc'd the Senate to confirm their next Election, that for many successive Reigns, they still rode Masters of the Go∣vernment. In like manner the Parliament Army would have shook off Oli∣ver Cromwell, though at last their General, and set up by themselves: nei∣ther could he have held it; had he lived but a little longer. Next they tumble down his Son Richard, and set up themselves again under their Ge∣neral

Lambert. Nor must you ever expect that another Army of the People, if it once come to tread down all Authority, and Laws, will act any other∣wise; because it is their Interest to do so. They will not voluntarily give up their Arms, and become your Servants, and be turn'd a Begging at your plea∣sure; when they are once become your Masters.

But to return a little back, whom will you suppose this Army to set up? It must not be the Lawful Successor, which is His Royal Highness, for whose Exclusion, they pretend to rise: nor His next Heirs, who will not take it over a Fathers Head; and in whose Hands Rebels will not put themselves, least Justice should overtake them. But it must be one, whom we must sup∣pose a very Ʋsurper; who therefore, like the Protector, must keep up this Ar∣my to secure himself. For if he Disband them, he is exposed to the Lawful Heir; to whom the Loyal Party will adhere, and great part of these Forces so Disbanded will fly; some out of revenge, and others, that they may still have somthing to do. Therefore in fine it comes to this, viz. that you must Petiti∣on, and ask this Army first, whether you shall have a King or not: and then afterwards, how long you shall keep Him. For if they stand, they are able to put by your King at pleasure; and if Disbanded, they make way for the owner.

People are thus vilely mistaken, in reckoning what mighty feats, they may do by Arms; because they do not consider the different Interest of the Peo∣ple, and of an Army. Take the People peaceably imbodyed together, and they are a Civil Society, whose Interest is Government, and Trade; without either of which they perish: but raise an Army from amongst this Body, let them ride over all Authority, and Power, and their circumstances are quite al∣tered; for they are now unhous'd, disfurnish'd of Goods, Tools, Implements, and Commodities: and some never had any: they are now grown Idle, Proud, and Imperious: and can neither Beg, nor Work. Therefore their Interest is quite altered too: which is no more to sit under Laws, and follow their Labour, and Trades; but to continue in Arms, to inslave, and eat up the People. And those very Men of them, that have other thoughts now, yet will have these, if they ever fall into such Circumstances: a Man's mind, and sentiments, usu∣ally vary with his condition. For Men are always ready to follow their Inter∣ests, to take their advantages, and make their own markets. Therefore the People in such ways do but conjure up a Devil, which they will never be able to lay: and which will give them no King, unless such an one, as Jupiter gave the Petitioning Frogs, which devoured some, and made all the rest a weary of him.

Nor is there any help in such a case, unless it fall down from Heaven, as it did before; For the Commons, whom you suppose to have Commissioned these Forces, and from whom alone you can expect it; neither will, nor can help it. For,

1. They share with the Army in their stollen Revenues, and Estates, ergo, will not help it.

2. This Army, if displeas'd, will exclude some Members, and terrifie the rest; or set up a single Person themselves, who be sure shall be one, that hath no pretences to the Crown, lest he should keep it longer, than he serves their Interest; but must be a Person whom themselves may reign under: Ergo, the Commons cannot help it; but each must comply with the other for Mutual preservation. The Commons must Vote Mony for the Army, and themselves to∣gether: and then the Army must force the People to pay it. Whence the Friends to this way will be utterly disappointed, and find themselves passed out of God's Blessing into the warm Sun; and will soon become a Thousand times more weary of their Arms, than they are of what they please at present to call their Grievances.

4. Look to the People, and there can be no expectation of a King from them, who are made up of so many, and so different Parties; of whom some can dispense with the Name, but not with the Power of Kings; they would possibly give the Title, so they may keep the Authority themselves: under whom (for he must not live above 'em) a King should not be half so happy, as a Man, that hath but five honest Tenants, whereof one pays Ten, another Twelve, another Fifteen, and the other each about Twenty Pound per annum. For this Man knows what he hath to trust to, and may command his own: but the other lives precariously, and can command nothing. Others are for an Universal equality: who, that themselves might never want, would have none above 'em. Here are a pure sort of Saints, that will indure none, but King Jesus. And there a late Sect of Puritans, yet descended with the rest from the old 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, demure things, a narrow Soul'd People, whose Consci∣ences cannot stretch so wide, as to call any Man Master, or own any Guide, but the Light within 'em. A special Medley! A Parcel like to pull down, and destroy, if they can; but not to Establish, and Build up a Government. Dis∣cord brought a Babel to nought, and shattered the first Monarchy in pieces, and hath ruin'd all the Empires of the World; Ergo the Poets, to signifie all her Works are Desolation, Paint her in a tatter'd Garment; and if (after the Observation, and Experience of all Ages to the contrary) we expect to see her Erect a Throne, and Build up a Church, and that while she is threatning the ruine of both; we betray our own weakness, and make our selves one of the greatest Instances of Vanity, that the wise Man hath found under the Sun. But,

3. They never can set up a King, if they would.

For finding so much fault with the Power of Kings, they will never set up One, unless upon certain Terms, and Restrictions; making Him to hold His Crown, as one did of old, by feeding of an Horse; or, it may be, some worse Creatures, as Mules, and Asses. We may conclude the particulars some such, as these, viz.

• Imprimis, That the King shall keep none but True Protestant Misses, such as the Noble Peer, and other good People, use to do.
• Item, That He shall keep no more Guards, than Oats, or Bedloe; upon pain of having them Indicted.
• Item, That He shall Borrow no Mony, lest He make His loving Subjects Enemies to the State.
• Item, That He shall be Ruled by His good Subjects.
• Item, —
• Item, —
• Item, — &c.

In which, the People will agree well enough. But the main difficulty will be about that, which they have the least of, viz. Religion, and Church-Govern∣ment. It is this, they pretended to Fight for; therefore as every Party did ven∣ture his Blood, so every Party must be satisfied. This then is a Boat, that eve∣ry one must have his Oar in; till, like Noah's Ark, it have in it Forty Beasts for One Man. And if in this great concern, you put these Questions, viz. Whether the People shall meet in a Steple-House, a Barn, or Stable; or whether (lest the Spirit should be confin'd) they shall Assemble, as the Heathen did, in the open Air? Whether they shall have set Preachers, or Gifted Men; whe∣ther this, or either Sex; and whether these shall Prophesie by turns, or as the Spirit moves? When Baptism shall be Administered; and whether the Per∣sons shall be Baptized by Sprinkling, or Diping; and whether in a Wooden Dish, a Platter, or a Kookingstool? Whether they shall have Parochial, or Ga∣thered Churches? Or whether the Preachers maintenance shall be rais'd by Tyth Pigs, or Womens Pettitoes? And you have cut them out Work for their

whole lives. But take in all the great matters of Government, Do∣ctrine, and Worship, and no two Parties can any more agree, than heat, and cold. For their Principles are monstrously different, and the Parties so intol∣lerably stiff, they will yield in nothing: in all their Religious controversies every Party are like those, that told Queen Elizabeth, they would not leave an hoof behind, but are resolv'd to have every Beast of Opinion with 'em. And when the Church was fallen under them, they were set as much Tooth, and Nail, one against another. For the Bishops were not more severely dealt with, as to verbal Abuses, by all Parties; than the Presbiterian afterward was by the Independent; and the Quaker by the rest. Therefore though they now all Herd under the comprehensive shade of True Protestants, yet if ever they run down present Establishments, they fall into numerous little Fractions; which can no more accord, than Whig, and Tory: being as much Dissenters one from another, as they are from the Church.

If therefore any shall draw a Scheme of Ecclesiastical Polity, it must whol∣ly accord either with no Party; but be in some points suited to more, or to all, and then it pleases none of 'em; or with only one, and then it displeases all the rest. It is therefore impossible they should ever agree upon what terms to set up a King; and consequently impossible they should ever set up any at all. But they must necessarily live in continual Feuds, and act as strength, and op∣portunity shall enable 'em. Whence it must necessarily follow, that, either they must rend one another in pieces; or fall under some subtile head, that shall inslave the whole. Therefore after all the tricks of wickedness against King, and Government; and hope of Chimerical constitutions; which, like your entia rationis, shall never be found any where else, but in Mens fansies, these Men will at last (if they had their way) bring their Hogs to a fair Market; as the Devil before them, who choak'd 'em in the Lake.

Therefore notwithstanding this Objection of shutting out all these confusi∣ons, by setting up such a Person; himself is like to fall from the greatest Glories of the Kingdom, matters of the Crown only excepted; which Glo∣ries he once did, and may again, if himself please (and all good Men wish, and pray he would) injoy; to be tossed up and down, as the Peoples slights: and the People themselves to fall under that Arbitrary Power, and Tyranny, which an Association, a Covenant, or a Popular Exclusion, unavoidably leads to. In which, if I may not be believed, yet I am sure, that Cassandra like, I speak the Truth.

The result then is this, that instead of Evils in posse, this is the way to have them in esse. And thus to inslave our selves at present, lest we should be in∣slaved some time hereafter, we know not when; is to Act worse than the Man, that Kill'd himself for fear of Death. For his Death was certain; but this supposed Slavery, Men fear, is not so. A deep piece indeed, whose Policies, we do not yet discern, to run into present, and intollerable Miseries under fellow-Subjects; rather than live in a possibility of being miserable un∣der Lawful Governors.