One in regard of the Client, and another in respect of the Cause.
A motion in the behalfe of a poore person, of a weak widow, of a fatherlesse child, or of a publike Servitour in a Common∣wealth, is in hearing to be preferred before the causes of such as be rich, well assisted, of discretion, or private persons.
The Cause it selfe also may deserve preferment, either in con∣sideration of the prioritie of time that it hath in Court, or for the imminent danger in which it may stand, if it be not speedily heard.
But that any Counsellour should be heard before other, in re∣gard of his person alone, without beholding the Cause or Client, hardly may any sound reason be assigned: And of that undue fa∣vour, these evils amongst others do ensue:
First, by that ready lending of the eare to some onely, or to them chiefly, those only suits are expedited, which these few selected persons do undertake; and in the meane space, all other causes are suspended, albeit they have prioritie of time, or other good reason of preferment: the which unnecessarie (or rather voluntarie) delay is meere injustice, since justice consisteth not only in the deliverie of right, but also in affording the same with all agreeable and due expedition.
Secondly, by making such choyse of a few Favourites, other good Practitioners in the Law are discouraged, to the great losse and griefe, as well of them in their owne particular, and of ma∣ny toward Students, that are thereby taught to seek favour more than to rest upon sound knowledge, as also of as many Clients as doe repose themselves and their suits upon the fidelitie and good learning of those, which seek not the influence of the like favourable aspect.
Thirdly, the culling, and cherishing of Favourites, draweth the Favourer into suspition of corrupt partialitle, especially if the Favoured be not of better gifts and ornaments by Art and Nature than other men, as many of them are not found to be.
Fourthly, godly and vertuous Practitioners will not use unlaw∣full meanes for the gaining of this favour, the which (without sinister practice) is not alwayes vouchsafed; and then belike