A vindication of free-grace

The Second Letter to Mr. J. G. In Reply to the SERMON.

Much respected Sir,

UPon failing in my expectation, of your perusing that Copy of your Sermon, preached April 28. 1644. being the Sabbath next after my giving you in two Sheets of writing (which Copy I left at your house the night before your journeying, about May 15.) I since have commended Copies thereof to the strict view of some of your knowne hearers and writers; who upon comparing it with their Noats, finde it exactly to agree with what you delive∣red: which the rather I took care to do, because (as I signified in my Noat left for you, with that Copy the night forementioned) I found by the meer reading, and writing that Copy (which alone I had then done) that 'twas mainly intended by way of answer to the Objections in those two sheets presented; and upon further perusall, I finde you intend it for a full and perfect answer: wherein you give two Arguments, which you affirme, are for the clearing of the whole businesse, being for vindication of your fifth assertion opposed, and afterwards you endeavour to clear it from the opinion of Free-will, and that because 'tis charged there to be the same with a maine maxime of the Arminians there exprest, yea, I can conclude no lesse from your very next Sermon follow∣ing, preached May 5. wherein, without the least intimation of any Objections behind not cleared. You intimated your clearing the matter from all Objections, and ther••upon proceeded to new matter; and that notwithstanding the Friday b••fore; being May 3. upon my speech with you about those Obje••••ions, you informed me, that in perusall you were much straitned in time, and there∣upon, at my desire, you seemed to promise further consideration.

And for as much as I finde, that mine end in that discourse gi∣ven you in being wholly for the truths advantage, instead of being

accomplished is perverted, in that you have thence taken occasion after a grievous manner to defame that truth, which is there grounded on sundry Scriptures against your errour: I count 〈◊〉〈◊〉 meet to wards the attaining that first end, to endeavour the ••••••••••∣cation thereof against all aspersions cast upon it; else will my for∣mer endeavour continue very injurious to that truth, which it was intended to advantage.

Wherein, before my vindicating the main matter, I cannot but take notice of one passage; that whereas upon your inlargements about your fifth Assertion, you gave such an exposition upon Ephes. 2.5. Dead in sinnes, &c. as is at large proved contradictory to evident reason: yet about the beginning of that clearing Sermon, you rehint the same, in these words [Dead in sinnes, &c. in such a sense, as was formerly explained,] and that without the least ti∣tle for its vindication.

Another thing to be observed, is your expression touching your fifth Assertion, which you say in the beginning of that Sermon, is [one passage which it seems some did not so clearly understand] and afterwards [which some could not so well understand or compre∣hend;] by which you make the ground of all the Controversie, to be a mis-understanding; whereas you repeat the same in these very expressions wherein 'twas opposed, as namely, thus.

That if men will be willing to do unfeinedly what God hath ap∣pointed them in a way of nature, God hath promised successe and ac∣ceptation in this way: yea, soon after recited thus, Men putting forth themselves to do according to what God hath inabled them to do in a way of nature, God will meet them with grace and acceptation. Yea, most plainly reitrerated in your after shewing the difference between this, and the opinion of Free-will, in these words. Their opinion asserts not a sufficiency of executive power to do such things as whereto grace is annexed by promise. By which you di∣versifie your opinion from theirs, clearly shewing, that Your opi∣nion asserts a power to do such things, as whereto grace is annexed by promise, which are the very tearms opposed; now it is hard to conceive, how I should mis-understand, in opposing your expres∣sions so often given: whereof you give one various expression; namely, That if men do their utmost, &c. they shall have answerable successe: which expression directly overthrowes your Tenent, That man may so do, as to ingage God to give grace; for if upon

improvement God gives answerable successe, then certainly he gives not saving-grace; for there is an infinite disproportion and unanswerablenesse betweene mans naturall improvement, and Gods superadding supernatur all grace: such shall have answera∣ble successe; namely, in respect of naturall indowments, they shall have the use of their naturals continued, augmented, and shall not be given up to vile affections, which Rom. 1.26. is the punishment of abusers of naturals, but this is far short of saving-grace, which you make to be but successe answerable. Having therefore recei∣ved abundant confirmation that I no way mis-understood the er∣rour, I shall now take boldnesse to proceed; wherein, as God shall assist me, I shall endeavour to sound the depths of those two grand clearing Arguments, supposing, that if God shall inable me to levell those Mountaines lying in the way of mine assertion al∣leadged against your errour, there will need no further attone∣ment for that which you make utterly incurable by any mediation of reason, consideration, distinction, project, &c. one or other: Towards vindication of which mine assertion, (namely, That men naturally have not power to do such things, as whereto God hath pro∣mised grace;) I conceive it very meet here to premise a very perti∣nent Observation, which I received from your selfe, in a Sermon preached June 12.1639. at Caple; on John 20.31. wherein, when you came to answer Objections, you premised this conside∣ration, When men have a truth well grounded on Scripture, though they should meet with a thousand objections, which they could not an∣swer, yet they must not therefore cast away the truth, if they can see it through them all, because it is easier to obscure and shadow many truths by objections, then to clear one truth from all objections. See∣ing therefore the tenent to be vindicated, hath been bottomed on many Arguments from Scripture, I may not in the least question that truth, till those Scripture-grounds be destroyed, and whether you do not rather shadow a truth then oppose an errour, in that you destroy not one Argument of many, though from Scripture, but only produce two remote Arguments to prove the necessity of your errour, this I commend to any impartiall tryall: as also whe∣ther two Arguments alleadged, to arraign and condemne the equi∣ty and righteousnesse of Gods proceedings according to his Word (though not to all crosse reasonings) be sufficient to destroy the truth of his Word.

Which being premised, I shall in Gods Name make 〈…〉〈…〉 against those two Arguments, at least, as they oppose the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pleaded for.

First then, for the first reason; If men must labour, &c. Then God must destroy man for not doing that which is altogether 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of his power to doe: which consequence you count most absurd, senselesse, &c.

Touching which consequence so exploded, That God destroyes, &c. that this is fully agreeable with Gods justice, grace; &c. which you say, it so opposeth, I shall prove clearly from your 〈◊〉〈◊〉 words in your second reason following, viz.

That the Scripture placeth the cause of the equity of Gods pro∣ceedings in condemnation still upon mans will, or on some corrupt••••, frowardnesse, or perversenesse found therein.

Whence it thus followes; if it be equity in God no condg•••••• man for the sinfulnesse of his will, then God may in equity con∣demne man for not doing that which is altogether out of his pow∣er to do; but the former you hold and prove true from Scriptures the latter therefore, that God may in equity condemne man, for not doing that which is altogether out of his power to do, inevi∣tably followes, because to purifie or rectifie mans will, is altoge∣ther out of mans power to do; w^ch thing you peremptorily aff•••••• against the tenent of Free-will: so then, that God destroyes men for not doing that, which is altogether beyond their power to do (which here you make so absure, unjust, &c.) this is a direct consequent upon your own ensuing reason; yea, this very reason proves, that Gods destroying man to, is an act of justice and equity.

[Object] But yet you further objected in discourse, That God destroyes man, not so much for not willing savingly, as for the obstinacy of his naturall will.

[Answ] For answer whereto; first, this distinction between 〈◊〉〈◊〉 wi••••i••g savingly, and obstinacy of will, on which you ground the Objecti∣on, is of no force at all: for he that wils not savingly, is obstinate in his will: so Rom. 8.7. The carnall minds, or the minding of the flesh, is enmity against God: which tearm flesbly winde, being there opposed to the spirituall minds, takes in every mind that is not spirituall; yea, it includes the will, being a chiese part of the minde: and so every naturall will without exception, is en••••••y,

or obstinacy & perversenesse, all which, the tearm enmity imports; so then God destroying man for not willing savingly, doth destroy for obstinacy of will.

Or secondly, wh••ther God destroy for enmity of minde, and so of will, or whether for not willing savingly, or according to the expression in that Text, for not subjecting it self to the Law of God; still he destroyes man for not doing that, which is altogether out of his power to do, which is clear from the end of that seventh Verse; where the reason of the mindes, and therein of the wils obstinacy, and of its not becomming subject to Gods law is added, in these words, because it cannot, or because it hath not power, namely to become subject, or to subject it selfe to Gods Law: It must therefore be concluded, that God destroying man upon any of your tearmes, whether for not willing savingly, or for obsti∣nacy, perversenesse, &c. doth destroy man for not doing that which is altogether out of his power to do; and consequently, that according to your own grounds, you inevitably plunge your selfe into that very pit of absurdity, which you digg'd; yea, into such an Abysse, as whereout you conclude, No mediation of reason, project, &c. can redeeme: yea, by your very tearms, the justice and equity of God, in such a destroying of man, is undeniably con∣firmed: By which reasons, striking so directly the root of your first Argument, I conceive tis clearly removed: neverthelesse be∣cause there are such strong holds raised to stand by it, I shall ac∣cording to what power God shall vouchsafe me, assault those also.

Wherein, for those high aspersions cast upon the consequent of that opinion, which opposeth yours, which you make so contrary to the tenour, truth of the Gospel, &c. comparing these with what you say after in the conclusion, that [perhapse for the substance of it, tis no more then the truth] which you give as your finall sen∣tence past upon the same opinion, I cannot but judge that here you little thought what you should speak after, and at the conclu∣sion, you quite forgot what you had said before. But that such a saying rises up with such contradiction against Gods justice, grace, &c. as no principles of reason, common sense, &c. can reconcile, &c. this shall, yea must be granted you, yet all so far from the least disparaging its truth, as that it shal•• have meat out of this eater: for could the heights and depths of Gods justice in wayes of con∣demnation be compast about by the reason and comprehensions of

men, yea or Angels, they could not be themselves incomprehensi∣ble, whose judgments are past finding out; therefore to say they are without the line or sphear of the largest created understanding, is to give them their due valuation: whereas, to say that cannot be justice in God, which no reason can reach, this is to make his justice comprehensible, and that we must believe nothing of Gods wayes above our reason.

And whereas you affirme, ••t were as good reason to say, God de∣stroyes man for not being God, &c. as for not believing, because man can no more do the one, then the other, &c.

First if it be granted, that man hath no more power to believe, then to become God, &c. it followes not therefore, that us as good reason to destroy man for not being God, or for not creating, as for not believing; for in Adam (in whom you after-say, all his posterity stood) man, in order to his perfect happinesse, had a pow∣er to performe what ever might have been by God commanded (for without such a power man-kind, in Adam, could not have had power to stand happy, but had at best bin siable to misery, by diso∣bedience, and that through impotency seeing therefore, that while he could haue stood in a state of life, he prophanly changed it for a state of death, with most reason might God require him, to doe as much for recovering his happines, after lost by his own transgressi∣on, as before for continuing it, and so may require any act from him (whether faith or any other) who was at first created with a pow∣er correspondent; but contrarily, man never had power to be God, nor to create, &c. Therefore 'tis not a like reasonable, to require him to become God, for his recovery, as to believe. Again, 'tis denied, that man hath no more power at all to believe, then to make himself God, &c. For there is such a power in man as may be made a meet subject to receive, and close with Gods work of faith; but man is not made a subject capable of the Godhead, nor of the supremacy of creation.

Next then, to proceed to the chiefe question, whether Adam in innocency had a power of believing, or not. Touching which controversie it seems most necessary to consider strictly, what 'twas for him to have such a power, or wherein it truly consists, that we confound not our selves by compounding it with some other thing; because if we consider not what 'tis simply in it felt, we may conceive it not to be, where 'tis; because some other

power or thing, taken, or indeed mistaken for it, may not be there also: Concerning which, a power of believing (according to your own definition) may be said to be that, whereby the soule is inabled cordially to assent to, or intirely to close, with what God shall reveale to be believed. Which cordiall assenting you ex∣pound to be an act which the whole heart closeth with, even the understanding, will, and affections, as in your Sermon forementio∣ned, preached at Caple, o•• John 20.31. Which act of closing, whether it may be taken in, without an act of recumbency, which you then understood to be immediately, and as it were inseparably following, or else, as essentially comprehending an act of recum∣bency; this needs not be questioned here, both agreeing in this, that a power of believing is a power of entire closing with things re∣vealed, and whether only to be closed with, as true, or vvith re∣lying also, this rather concernes the manner of propounding or revealing, though to follow your definition would be greater ad∣vantage to me; which laid dovvn, may be very usefull tovvards the matter in doubt.

As first, for your first reason against Adam having such a povver, because no necessity thereof, &c. suppose it granted, that he had no need to believe; yet this proves not his not having a povver, for the use or need of a povver given not essence to it, nor is it the essence thereof; there may be a povver to do vvhere no need is, else a man hath not povver to do any thing vvhereof he hath not, need; as not a povver to vvalk, speak, &c. because no need: vvhereas a man hath povver to do thousands of acts needlesse, and God hath a povver to raise of stones children unto Abraham, though it be a needlesse vvork. So that povver is here mis-under∣stood in making povver and need to believe, vvhich are tvvo evi∣dently distinct things to be in one individuall.

But secondly, by vvay of exception against your Argument, that because he needed not to believe to justification, therefore he needed not a power to believe. This consequence may be denied thus.

If there may be need and use of believing this mysterie, in or a∣mong such as have no need, nor use thereof unto justification; then Adams not having need or use of believing to justification, cannot prove his not needing to have believed at all. But the former is true, vvitnesse the Angel Gabriel, Luke. 1.26. Who having no need, nor use of believing to justification, had yet need and use

thereof for the testifying the truth of this mysterie, vvhich he could not have done without a true believing it himself. The like might be proved from that company of Angels solemnizing CHRISTS birth, with a song so befitting it, Luke 2.15. The litter therefore plainly followes, that Adams not having need to believe this my∣stery unto justification, cannot prove that he could not have need to have believed for some other end.

Yea thirdly, and that partly by way of concession, and partly by way of exception, if it be granted, that Adam needed not to have believed this mysterie to justification, nor for any other end; yet this proves not that he needed not a power to have believed this mysterie: because such a power so excellent might be needfull and usefull to the producing of other acts needfull, though altogether uselesse for this; and that it vvas needfull so, appears from the next particular.

Therefore in the fourth place, the thing to be proved is, that he had both need and use of such a power for other ends; that, what you say against Gods Wisdome, in giving man such a power, may thereby be overthrown; and that he needed such a power, I prove from this your own Argument alleadged to evince the contrary, and that thus: Adam standing righteous by the Law of works (which is your Argument) that he might so do, could not but need a power of true closing with the righteousnesse, holinesse, &c. of God, in every work or command required; for without a right apprehending and acknowledging the excellencies of God, in his commands, he could not have rightly obeyed God in any one com∣mand: whence it follows, that in having need of a power of clo∣sing with the holinesse, &c. of God in any command, he therein had need of a power of closing with the truth, and faithfulnesse of God in any promise, whether of Christ, or any other; because the self-same power would necessarily have inabled him to each of those acts a-like; for it had been impossible for Adam to have had a power to have acknowledged God in his holinesse, and not by the same to close with his truth and faithfulnesse; both which go together so inseparably, as that we finde God himselfe most fre∣quently ratifying the promulgation o•• great promises by the Pro∣phets, by declaring himself the holy One, Thus saith the Lord the holy one of Israel, clearly intimating, that the true apprehending of Gods holinesse is such a prevailing argument, as will inforce

men to close with his truth and faithfulness touching the perfor∣mance of all his promises.

Yea, for further clearing, Adam had not only need, but use of a power of believing, as appears from Gods method, in stating man in that high office of dominion over the whole creation; where∣in, after God had given him command to bear dominion over all creatures, Gen. 1.28. he proceeds in the two following verses to confirme to him that office, by promises as large as that command, Behold I have given to you every Hearb, &c. Which shall be to you for meat: which words are a direct promise, in answer whereto Adam needed a power to believe; because, as God added to the command a promise answerable, and all as needfull for the set∣ling of the dominion upon him, so vvas it as needfull for Adam actually to believe that promise, that thereby he might undertake that office, not vvith doubting, but vvith assurance of successe, which could only be confirmed to him, by a promise from the sole Creator, and Lord over all. Yea, contrarily, if he had not regar∣ded that promise he had thereby prophaned Gods wisdome in exhibiting it, and not believing he had oppugned Gods truth and faithfulnesse touching performance. Seeing then that Adam had both need and use of a power, whereby to believe the truth, yea, the rich grace of God also, in that great promise, which confirmed his universall Soveraignty over the whole creation, hence it fol∣lowes that Adam had both need & use of such a power, as where∣by he could have believed the mystery of Christ (though he needed not, by that power to believe that mystery) which may be fully proved from this reason, because Adam being then upright or per∣fect, could not but believe that first promise of dominion, from a right principle; namely, from a true apprehension and know∣ledge of the faithfulnesse and grace of God, which knowledge (being that spring or fountaine, whence a true believing in Christ doth alwayes, and can alone flow) Adam being furnished with, could not but have believed the mysterie of Christ; because here∣by all the Saints have believed: and indeed God acts so fully like himself, that so far as a man knowes, and believes Gods excel∣lencies, he cannot but know and believe his revealed acts and contrivances what ever they be: but above all others, the my∣sterie of compassing salvation by Christ, holds forth so lively a representation of God, in all his excellencies of Wisdome,

grace, righteousnesse, &c. as would have enforced Adam to have beleeved it, who before had a knowledge of Gods excellen••••••••, in being created in Gods own image, which consisted in know∣ledge, as also in righteousnesse and holinesse. By which Arguments, I conceive, that both Adams having need, and use of 〈…〉〈…〉 power, as could have produced a beleeving in Christ, is evinced; and the Wisedome of God therein vindicated, the vindication whereof is a work of such concernment as will I hope, excus••••y largenesse herein.

But to proceed both to the second and third reason, which are one and the same; The first, because he had not power to fore∣know his fall, nor secondly Christs death, &c. which Argument may be thus destroyed.

If the essence of a power of beleeving consists not at all in the knowledge of Gods Will, before revealed by God, then Adam not having power to know the mystery of Christ, before revealed by God, doth no way prove his not having a power of beleeving that mystery; but the former is true, That the essence of a power of beleeving consists not, &c. Because according to your definiti∣on ••••is a power of cordiall assenting to the truth of a promise of God, that is to say, a promise revealed, or propounded, which must be presupposed; now a power of closing with the truth of what God reveales is far different from a power of fore-know∣ing Gods Will before revealed: for the one, namely the know∣ledge of the secrets of God belongs onely to God, while his re∣vealed will belongs to men: And so God gives a power of belee∣ving to many thousands, and yet reserves his secret Councell from them all; the latter also, That Adams not having power to foreknow, &c. follows inevitably, because when two faculities differ in kind, then the absence of one proves not at all the absence of another.

Next after, you propound an Objection against your selfe, for Answer whereto, you first refer to your fore-going argument against Gods Wisdome, which is already answered at large, after∣wards you close up your answer after this manner of reasoning.

First, you say, Christ could not be revealed, because not conveni∣ent, &c. And thence you infer, that Therfore doubtles Adam had not a power to have beleeved in Christ; no, not on this supposition, That Christ had been then revealed to him. Which Argument is indeed

most contradictory, yea utterly destructive to it selfe: For first, you ground Adams not having such a power upon this reason, be∣cause Christ could not be revealed, and afterwards, you quite de∣stroy that very reason, by supposing, or granting Christ to have been revealed: so that in Answer to a main and most considerable objection, you onely repeat a former reason, already answered, and adde one new, which you immediately destroy by your own contra-supposition, and so the Objection remaines altogether un∣answered.

Next follows your fourth reason, against Adams having such a power, because Christ was not revealed, which may be destroy∣ed thus.

If the want of an outward meanes, though necessary to con∣cur in producing an act, cannot prove the want of the intrinse call power necessary to that act, then it follows, That Adams wanting the Revelation of the object to be beleeved, cannot prove his wanting an inward power to beleeve: But the former is true, that the want of an outward meanes, &c. cannot prove the inward power wanting, because the outward means, and the inward power are two distinct things: for instance; food, the outward means of feeding is one thing, and the appetite, the inward facul∣ty of receiving food, is another; and therefore the having of ei∣ther may well consist with the want of either; one man may have an inward faculty of appetite, and want outward food; and ano∣ther may have outward food, and want an inward receptive fa∣culty: The latter therefore inevitably follows, that Adams wa∣ting the Revelation, &c. proves not his wanting an inward pow∣er, &c. because the Revelation of the object by promise, the out∣ward means of beleeving, being one thing; and faith the inward power of receiving it another thing, distinct from the former: hence it comes to passe, that either of them may be, where either of them is wanting; Adam then might have a power of belee∣ving, and want the word of faith, though now faith comes by hearing even as he was created in Gods image, perfectly at once, though Saints now are transformed into the same image gradually and that by means of the Word, 2 Cor. 3.18. and contrarily many now have the Word, and not that power, the Word being not of the essence of that power.

Secondly, another Argument may be this, if Adam had not

power to beleeve a thing, or object, because the object was not re∣vealed, then 'twill follow that Adam had not a power of sta•••••••• righteous by the Law of works, for if he had not power to bel••••ve a thing, because 'twas not revealed, then by the same reason, he had not power at first to obey any command, because 'twas not revealed, for the Revelation of a command is as much necessary to obeying ••s the Revelation of a promise is necessary to the beleeving therof; and the meer Revelation of a promise would have infused into Adam no more power of beleeving, then the meer Revelation of a com••••nd would have infused power of obeying: whence it follows, that Adam in his first perfection was so far from having power to stand righteous, by a Law of works, by performing any thing to be commanded, as that indeed, when he was at first created, ac∣cording to this your reason, he had not then power to obey any command whatsoever, because his creation was fully finished, be∣fore any command was revealed: yea, from that time forward when ever any command had been revealed, he had stood in ••eed of supply of new power to obey, because before 'twas revealed he had not power to obey. Which consequences utterly over∣throw that perfect power by standing righteous by works, which you expresly affirm, Adam had, making him unable to perform any work, by his first created power.

Thus much in Answer to your reasons alleadged against Adams having power of beleeving, &c. which are all grounded upon a mis-understanding of, and swerving from, the true definition of such a power, and so are made up of an indi••tinct, and consuled conjumbling of other things with it; for neither the need, use thereof, nor the fore-knowledge, or Revelation of an object, are at all essentially necessary to make up such a power, as hath been proved. Touching which matter I must adde one word, viz. that it must needs be dangerous presumption to charge such a per∣son with weaknesse before triall, who for excellency and perfe∣ction of nature, is avouched again and again by God himselfe to be created after Gods own Image and likenesse, Gen. 1. and to be made upright, or righteous, Eccles. 7.29. Yea, especially to ground that charge against him upon such reasons, as wholly tend to prove, that he was not in a capacity of being tryed; whether he had such a power of beleeving or not, by which act the grand Ma∣ster-peece of Gods whol Creation is without all ground vilified.

Against all which, that I may yet adde one passage; I shall in∣deavour to state the question in most cle•••• and full tearmes, which question being, Whether. Adam had a power of beleeving in Christ; (the essence of which power consists in a power to beleeve an object revealed) cannot be truely framed, except with this sup∣position, That Christ had been revealed, so that to go about to ex∣amine, much more to determine, what his power was to beleeve an object, without supposing that object to be revealed; this is a course inconsistent with the nature of this power, which necessa∣rily presupposeth the revelation of an object, for the tryall there∣of: for though such a power may be without an outward Object yet there can be no tryall of its being without it, as a man may have an inward appetite, but we cannot rightly examine his having it, but by giving him outward food, which question there∣fore may be fairly propounded thus, Whether Adam had a power of believing Christ, supposing, Christ had been revealed? An∣swer whereto must be this, That he could not but have such a power, it being essentially necessary to his state of perfection, as appeares by these three consequences.

• First, because without it, upon the revealing of Christ (which is here supposed) Adam must have been miserable by opposing the truth of God in that promise, and that through want of power.
• Or secondly, if upon the revelation of this mystery, he had not had power to have beleeved it, then necessarily he must have, needed supply of new power, whereby to have beleeved, and so upon this revelation (supposed) his condition, would have been the very condition of unbeleevers now, who upon the revealing of this mystery need new power to beleeve it; both which con∣sequences are utterly inconsistent with the nature of his first com∣pleat power of standing happy.
• Yea thirdly, supposing that Mystery to have been revealed to Adam, to be beleeved, the very revelation hereof would have re∣quired, and commanded him to have beleeved it, and his belee∣ving would have been a proper act of Obedience to the Law of that promise requiring faith; If therefore he had not a power to have obeyed the law of that promise by beleeving, then it fol∣lows, That his first power could not have inabled him to stand by a Law of Works, by perfect obedience, which (as you expresly grant) he was fully able to do.

And yet, before passing from this question, I mi••t 〈…〉〈…〉 word to prevent the mistaking mine and in answering it, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 is, That I have not endeavoured to prove Adams ••aving 〈◊〉〈◊〉 power, from this reason, because without it God could not ••••••••∣stice destroy mankinde; for whether he had a power of beleeving or no, is a Question needlesse and impertiment, touching the ••••••¦ring of Gods justice in mans destruction, as may be made ••••••••¦fest thus.

If Adam, in whom (as you acknowledge) all his posterity stood, had such a power, under the first Covenant, as was su••••••••••¦ent to justifie God in the death or destruction of man disobeying then to examine, whether Adam had power to beleeve a second Covenant is altogether ••••••iceess••ry to clear Gods Justice, in ••••∣stroying man, disobeying; But the former is true, this Adam had &c. because God after stating him in his first power, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thereupon as a righteous Judge, fore, passe or denounce the ••••••••¦ning or sentence of death or destruction upon him, if he sho•••••• disobey, Gen. chap. 2. vers. 17. Thou shall surely ••ye. W•••••••• threatning could not have been justly denounced against 〈◊〉〈◊〉 except his first power and perfection, had such an answera∣ble proportion thereto, as might justifie that threatning. The latter also, That to examine, &c. is a needlesse question for clearing Gods justice, &c. follows inevitably, because seeing the est••••ce of Adams first power was sufficient to justifie God in destroying man, disobeying; 'tis therefore needlesse to inquire, what 〈◊〉〈◊〉 power could produce. Yea, seeing you understand a power of beleeving, as having relation to the second Covenant onely, t•••• therefore could not be at all necessary to the clearing of Gods ju∣stice in mans death or destruction, because the threatning of death was denounced against him; onely with relation to the t••a•••••• of the first Covenant, which alone he know; which threa••••ing was as just before Gods promising Christ in a second Covenant, upon mans fall, as afterwards, because God made not that pro∣mise to clear his justice.

To proceed now to the second sort of reasonings, being on supposition, That Adam had such a power, yet that this would not avail, because God having made a new Govenant, &c. to which I reset. Touching which it must be affirmed. 1. That for God to daprive man of the blessing, &c. As you there expresse, this is

wholy 〈…〉〈…〉 with and destructive ••o the ••ss•••••••• of a Co∣ve•••••••• of Univ••••s••ll goo••••, 〈…〉〈…〉 enyes that all ••••••e pow∣er to obtain Gr••ce or intere••••e thou••••••lves therein, but if we speak of the Covenant of Free-Grace, them the truth is for God that he might not deprive any man of the ob••ssing of it, therefore to hold it forth on such tearmes, as are attainable by mans improve∣ment, as upon which Go••••••gagi•• ••••••••••••ly by 〈…〉〈…〉 of th••s Co∣venant, to grant acceptation and grace, (which you assir•••• to up∣hold the freedome of his grace) this is 〈…〉〈…〉 and destructive to the very 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and ••outh of that Covenant of grace, which con••••••ws saving grace peculiardy 〈◊〉〈◊〉 so•••••• for 'twould be impossible for God 〈◊〉〈◊〉 not to fa••••fi••••e s•••••• a Co∣venant, as should both promise grace to some ••••ely, and not to there, (which the Covenant of grace doth) and yet also should promise the same grace, after the s••••e manner, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 all 〈◊〉〈◊〉. It must therefore be 〈…〉〈…〉, that the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of the second Co∣venant are utterly 〈…〉〈…〉 by 〈◊〉〈◊〉 utmost power, but yet this no way destroyes the freedome of Gods 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in that Co∣venant, for though God therein ••••••••••••ds ••••••tai••••ble conditi∣ons from all, yet his promise wherein 〈◊〉〈◊〉 work those conditions in some, is of Free grace. Gods 〈…〉〈…〉 do ••••••t make hi•• pro∣mises of none effect. And touching your instance of a Noble f••∣••••ly, 'tis wholy impertinent, for all it shews is ••••t this: That the conditions required in the Covenant Gr••••ce, are such as cannot tender all, no, n••r any one capable of grace, by his 〈7 letters〉〈7 letters〉st indeavour, which is ••••••d enviably 〈◊〉〈◊〉, ••••••g th•••• 〈…〉〈…〉 of God, to work such conditions in 〈◊〉〈◊〉, i•• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Free Grace, this is still to be proved. By which instance you deny the Gospell to pro∣••••sse any peculiar thing to some, making it onely to 〈…〉〈…〉 the same conditions from all, whereas i••••••••ed its promises and as large to some, as the command 〈…〉〈…〉.

'Tis then most ground le••••t 〈…〉〈…〉, because the Covenant of Grace is not common to all 〈◊〉〈◊〉 g••••••••lly upon improvement, that therefore 'tis not of grace to some, for grace in i•••• own na∣ture is more free and transcend 〈◊〉〈◊〉, because to some onely and not to others, Which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 may be p••••••ll••••••ed to the ••••so thus, viz. suppose a Prince 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a No•••••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 guilty of high 〈…〉〈…〉 so as that without 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of justice, he cannot but condemn them, if now lie will give 〈◊〉〈◊〉 onely son, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be ••••c••••ficed, 〈…〉〈…〉

randome for part of them, from the condemnation, because ••e findes nothing in them to satisfie his justice without their destru∣ction: this betokens abundance of grace; y•••• further, to work also in them that necessary condition, which he requires; because they cannot attain thereto of themselves: this is also a high strain of Free-grace.

Next follows your applying that instance, They that make the s••∣ving tearms of the Gospel, &c. Concerning w^ch it must be affirmed, that in respect of obtaining grace to salvation, man by his utmost improvement, cannot tread as much as one sure or steady step in that way; so that his utmost improvement shall of it self at best be successelesse therein. And this is so far from rendring the Go∣spel reproach, as that Paul establisheth the freedome of Gods dispensation upon this very ground, Rom. 9.16. Where after ex∣amples given to set our the freedome of Gods grace, Verse▪ 11. in choosing and refusing, according to his good pleasure, without any regard had to any improvement or work done, be layes down this as a sure conclusion, Verse▪ 16. So then, tis not of him that wil∣leth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that s••emeth mercy▪ where Paul, that he might lay down and declare the sure ground of salvation, like a wise builder, he first destroyes the rotten ground of the Arminians, and that by ••utting off all manner of intailement or ingagement of grace, on mans willing, yea, and running; which tearms cannot but import greatest intention and ext••ntion of abilities: he saith not, upon willing or running, God hath promised mercy or grace, but tis not of him, &c. but of God, &c. The Apostle most emphatically expresseth it by the rearme (but) a knowne particle of opposition; thereby cutting off any binding of the latter, Gods mercy to the former, mans improve∣ment. The reason of which method is clear: because if it were of him that willeth or runneth, so as that to, and upon it, grace is ••••nexed, then it could not be free, and without respect to mans improvement; which thing Paul is proving, Verse▪ 11. but must then have been of Grace, ingaged upon running.

Touching your next expression, Were I of the judgement of Ar∣minius, I could, &c. I must with griefe of heart say thus much; I fear your left hand hath learned too much of this cunning; and indeed there in that enmity in the understanding of reasonable man against the truth, that is may be more easie to represent ma∣ny

e••••ours plansible to them, then one truth.

Next followes your second reason, upon supposing Adams ha∣ving a power of believing &c. which will not justifie God, &c. because justice stands in a Geometricall proportion, &c.

Which Argument reaches far higher then the tenent it should prove; yea, makes it void: For this proves not that God is in∣gaged by promise, &c. but which is far more intolerable, this makes it but an act of justice in God, to give men life, or save them from condemnation upon improvement. For if after mans fal∣ling from his perfect power God cannot in equity condemn•• man, doing his utmost, and that because justice stands in a Geometricall proportion, or in taking an exact accompt or consideration of the persons present power and improvement, in answer to their pow∣er lost; which (according to your instances produced, and your direct application of all to Adams case) you understand by those expressions of Geometricall proportion: hence then it followes, that Gods ingaging himself by promise to improvement, is no ne∣cessary ground of mans salvation; but Gods justice beholding them and their improvements, is made a necessary ingagement on God to save such improvens: so that without salvation of such his justice cannot be salved, and consequently his grace needs not act in their salvations but for the right improvement of your Argu∣ment, I adde this. Mans losing his first perfect power of obedi∣ence, &c. cannot but in equity justifie God in his condemning man, doing his utmost according to his power now remaining; and that from your very reason, Because justice stands in a Geo∣metricall proportion; or in a strict consideration of persons, their conditions, abilities, &c. For if Gods justice stands in judging acts according to the abilities, where with the person is intrusted, then it must in reference hereto, count what abilities have been gi∣ven him: whereupon finding man in Adam, to have been intru∣sted with a fulnesse of power; to believe (which power through∣out your second reason you suppose and grant) it cannot but re∣quire an act correspondent: for as much therefore as man after utmost improvement cannot but fall infinitely short of such an act (which you also grant) Gods justice, upon computing both toge∣ther, must needs be so far from rewarding it with grace; as that it cannot but condemne man, for acting no way answerable to the power given; and that in greatest equity, because of the infinite

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disproportion between each, which ••ight 〈…〉〈…〉. If Gods justice in judging the 〈…〉〈…〉, be so ••••ri••t 〈◊〉〈◊〉 comp••••ng the 〈◊〉〈◊〉, given 〈◊〉〈◊〉 person in relation to the act, as that a great sa•••••••• from a m••••ied 〈…〉〈…〉 then two ••••iter from a widow, and that because it judgeth according to their respective abilities; then certainly justice weighing spirituall actions, with the power given 〈…〉〈…〉 Ad•••• (which you suppose) cannot but condemn 〈…〉〈…〉, because his actions ••••••ct utmost improvement, hold a vast disprop••••tion with that power.

Againe, according to the parable of the talent, ••f justice so ex∣actly requires by way of ••••ta••iation, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 for ••alout, two for two, five for five, then open r••qui••ing acts, answerable to the power, here supposed to be given man in Adam, it m••st needs 〈◊〉〈◊〉 man falling 〈◊〉〈◊〉 short ••t best.

So that indeed there is no congruity between the reason and the instances. For first, your reason is mainly grounded on this sup∣postion, That man had power in Adam, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 so 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it. But the instances import not the least ••ittle of my power, which 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Widd••w or Lords servants had and lost.

Againe, the instances prove it a matter of equity to accept of the endeavours of such as act propo••ti••nably to their 〈◊〉〈◊〉, but fall infinitely short of proving the acceptance of such as act no way answerable to their talents.

Which instances can only be parallel'd to your second reason, th••••, That 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the Widow been in••••••sted with a great 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and ••ewdly spet•••• all but two 〈◊〉〈◊〉, yet those m••st in justice have been co••••ted us much as the large contributions of others; because she hath now no more left. And the Lords s••rva•••• after ••osing ten talents, being intrusted with one more, upon his improving that to his power, (though not well) his Lord in justice must 〈◊〉〈◊〉 such improvement, and not require satisfaction for the 〈…〉〈…〉; whereas in just sevei••ty, h••••ust his other servant 〈…〉〈…〉 dark∣nesse, o••••ly for not making profit of ••m single ••alent, though 〈◊〉〈◊〉 mis-spent it not, but 〈◊〉〈◊〉 it up.

Yet I would not here be mista••e••, as if I conceived it matter of mo••••nt to shew your mis-application of there insta••••••••; for could they be proved to be answerable to 〈…〉〈…〉 would no way advantage it; for though you 〈…〉〈…〉 by way

of proofe, yet in so doing you pervert the use of instances, which may indeed illustrate a matter, but cannot prove it, according to that approved sentence — Theologia parabolica non est argumen∣tativa; or thus, parabolae illustrant non probant.

And touching your applying all to Adams posterity, that, though it be supposed they had a power of believing, &c.

'Twould indeed be tedious work it to reckon up the least part of all the dangerous confequences thereof; for if Adams fallen po∣sterity may do that, which may be of more consideration in point of equity, &c. as you expresse. Then it followes, that mans fall is no prejudice at all, but matter of advantage rather.

Againe, hence 'twill follow, that God hath no respect to the state of the person acting, whether he be in a state of acceptation with God, or of rejection; but only to the action done, in that man full of enmity, may do that, which may be of greater consi∣deration in the eye of Gods justice, then what spotlesse Adam could doe. Whereas touching the acceptance of the person, in re∣lation to the acceptance of acts, 'tis evident from the generall cur∣rent of Scripture, that the acceptance or non-acceptance of acts, principally depends on the acceptation or non-acceptation of the person; hence, the prayer of the wicked is an abomination to the Lord, while the prayer of the upright is his delight, Prov. 15.8. so God accepted Abel and his offering; Whence was his offering accepted? even from Gods free accepting the person, and not the person for the offerings sake. But here you make God bound by equity, as much, yea more, to accept an accursted man for his im∣provements sake, then Adam a righteous man, and his righteous works: which argument directly maintaines justification by works and merit, in that you say, Man may now do what is as good or better in val•••• then Adam, who then stood by works.

To adde yet one word against the force of all your Arguing, up∣on supposition of Adams having a power to beleeve, &c. viz. Man beinging death on himself by breach of the first Covenant, the work of justice hereupon is to inflict death, what ever tearmes therefore are tendered to prevent death, these are all fruies of free-grace: though then those tearmes are unatta••••able by man fallen; God may, notwithstanding without any injustice, suspend the gift of a power answerable to them, though man perish thereby. God was not bound in justice to offer any tearmes beside those to

Adam, Doe thus, else thou shalt surely dye, much lesse is he bound, to give a power correspondent to new tearms.

Next followes your second reason, If men putting forth them∣selves, &c. and not finde grace, &c.

Touching which, I must affirme, that though in my former dis∣course I gave you no ground to think I feared your opinion to com∣ply with the opinion of Free-will in the Gospel sense, yet am I con∣strained to affirme, that the force of this second reason, is that ve∣ry opinion which may thus be proved.

If mercy putting forth their utmost power, and not finding grace with God, &c. may be destroyed for want of an executive power, without any miscarriage or sinfulnesse at all in the will, then men may so far put forth themselves by their own power without grace, as whereby, they may be without any sinfulnesse at all in the will, which is indeed to have full power of Free-will. The former whereof is the expresse force of your reason; the lat∣ter also plainly followes; for he that can by his own power at∣tain to a freedome from all sinfulnesse in his will, cannot but have Free-will to close with God; because without such a free closing with God, the will cannot be free from all sinfulnesse: so than man by his own power rendring himself free from, or without any sinfulnesse at all in his will, thereby removeth all that kept him from a power of Free-will; which you afterwards grant in owning that of Augustine, Take away mans will, and take away Hell and all.

Againe, from the conclusion of that your second reason, com∣pared with the former part of it, this dangerous consequence un∣avoidably proceeds, viz. that man is able of himself to remove all the ground of his condemnation, which appears thus.

If the Scripture placeth Gods justice in condemnation alwayes, upon some sinfulnesse in the will, and man himself by improve∣ment be able to free himself from all such sinfulnesse; then man is able of himself to remove all the ground of his condemnation, or to save himself from destruction by his own improvement, not needing grace to salvation. The former, that Gods justice is clea∣red from the sinfulnesse of the will, you prove from Scripture. A∣gaine, that man can render himself free from all such sinfulnesse; this is the main strength of your reason. The conclusion therefore necessarily followes, that man hath power to take away or re∣move

the ground of his condemnation. For if God in justice can only destroy man for such sinfulnesse; then man freeing himselfe from all such sinfulnesse, takes away thereby all just ground of condemnation; and so layes a sure ground for salvation, which is only opposed by sin.

And touching those many Texts insuing, what they prove is granted, which is, that mans condemnation is laid upon some sinful∣nesse in the will; but these are all far from proving, that man hath power to free himself from all the sinfulnesse of the will, the scope of all which is to set out the obstinacy of the will, in the wicked actings thereof, which is a point distinct from that of shew∣ing the main ground of its continuing so perverse: For, there is no necessity of shewing, that man wants power to subdue the per∣versenesse of his will in every place, where that perversenesse is spoken of: the grounds therefore of such perversenesse must be sought for there, where the Holy Ghost distinctly expresseth it: one speciall place for which, John 6.36. compared with Verse 44. & 65. was proved to be in the discourse given you. But yet among those many Scriptures, I shall take notice of one, which you main∣ly ground upon; which is Acts 7.51. which you thus alleage and open.

Ye have alwayes resisted; now how did they resist, &c. not by any defectivenesse of power, &c.

Whereas 'tis cleare that the former part of the Verse layes down the ground of their perversenesse first, as the precedent article of their condemnation, in this clause, ye uncircumcised in heart; whence indeed their resisting arose; so that the question is, whe∣ther they had power to take away this main obstacle, the uncir∣cumcision of their hearts; but 'tis certaine they cannot; for this is peculiarly within Gods power, as Deut. 30.6. The Lord thy God will circumcise thy heart. Seeing then they resist from the un∣circumcision thereof, it followes, that they resist through want of power, for that they need power from above to circumcise their hearts.

And so all those other Texts prove not at all mans not want∣ing a power, &c. From all which you would force in this tenent, That man wants no power to reduce his will to Gods, which is to say he hath a power of Free-will, as appears from that, Acts 7.51. whence you say, Man resists not from any want of power; the

selfe-same from John 5.40. Ye will not come, they wan•••••• not pow∣er to come: though it be proved in the discourse given you, that the reason thereof is declared to be a want of power, in Chap. 6.44.

Next you raise a Quere, how your opinion differs from the opinion of Free-will? Which Quere I finde you make from this ground, because your opinion is feared to comply with the Arminian tenent of Free-will, as you expresse soon after the beginning of this clear∣ing Sermon. Touching which, what I did, & do fear and finde is this; that your fifth and main assertion impleaded, is the same with that Arminian Maxime, there exprest, facienti quod in se est, &c. Which opinion you take to be that of Free-will; and so in∣deed you may, for both are the same in effect: For if man may so do as to ingage God to give grace (which you affirme) he doth thereby that which is as surely effectuall to salvation; as Free-will to act savingly: for God cannot but performe what he hath p••••∣mised to man upon doing. And that this your opinion is the grand tenent of the Arminians, may be proved by the testimony of Do∣ctor Robert Sanderson, in his first Sermon, ad populum, on 3 Kings 21.29. § 26. where he hath this passage.

It appears from the premises, that Gods thus dealing with wick••d &c. gives no warrant or strength at all, either to that popish or cur∣rupt doctrine of Meritum congrui, in deserving the first grace, by the right use of naturals, or to that rotten principle and foundation of the whole frame of Arminianisme, facienti quod in se est, Deus non potest, non debet denegare gratiam.

Which latter is your very opinion; for, if man may do such things as whereupon God hath promised to give grace (which you affirm) then man may so do, as wherupon God neither ought nor can deny grace; because God for his truth and faithfulnesse sake, nei∣ther can, not ought to violate his owne ingagements; so that by maintaining your fifth assertion, as a tenent so necessary, you up∣hold the rotten foundation of the whole frame of Arminianisme.

The same also may be further proved out of Dr. Twisse his di∣spute about Mr. Perkins and Arminius, where Sect. 2. lib. 3. upon the sixth errour, Mr. Perkins charges the Arminian School••men, with this very tenent thus, Si faseret, De•• adjuvants, quod in se est, Deus illum illuminaret supernaturali gratia.

Yea further, lest it be thought, the Arminians may be wronged, Arminius himself repeats this very tenent, more plainly, in his

reply immediately following; yea, which is very considerable, he labours to prove it after that very manner, as you doe, by ma∣king God ingaged by promise, as in these words.

Annon isto dicto Christi, babenti dabitur, promissio ista contin••a∣tur, qua Deus spondet se gratia supernaturali illuminaturum, qui lumine naturali recte utetur, a••t salt•• utetur minus male.

Which text, to him that hath shall be given, Arminius produ∣ceth, instead of those Texts of yours, ask and you shall have, &c. whence he affirmes the same with you, saying, that by that pro∣mise, to him that hath shall be given; God ingages himselfe to en∣lighten with supernaturall grace, such as rightly use naturall light, or at least; who will use it, as much as he can, lesse evilly.

So that touching the great difference you make between your opinion, and that of Free-will, as if yours were not Arminian, 'tis plain, Arminius holds the one as strongly as the other: yours op∣posed, he plainly holds, and labours so to prove it, as you do; for instead of perfect free-will, he acknowledgeth some defect in the will, as by that his expression, lesse evilly, whereby granting some sinfulnesse therein.

Yea, that Arminius holds both opinions; how contradictory soever to each other, I finde expresly in Doctor Twisse, in his third book and first digression, touching the sense of that Text, to him that hath shall be given, as appears by this sentence. Quamvis re∣quirant gratiam ad r••••te ••••••dum naturalibus, ••amque supernatu∣ralem, tam••u i••rerd•••••• diser••e d••ce••••, bo••••inem ista natura vipra∣••••are posse, which he there proves from C••rvinu••: It appeats there∣fore from these testimonies, that your opinion of ingaging God to give grace, &c. which you go about to quit them from, is most usuall amongst them, being more plausible; and that which de∣nies a necessity of supernaturall grace, is but rarely found among them.

And touching your complyance with both these opinions, as their former is your fifth assertion, so the latter of Free-will in the gro••••st sense, is directly maintained, by the force of your second reason, as is before proved.

Furthermore, seeing you professe your ••nd in all, to be the pre∣v••ning of such 〈…〉〈…〉 p••essions, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 are given by the most a∣gainst the Arminians (〈…〉〈…〉 discourse, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 in the ••••d of this Sermon 〈◊〉〈◊〉 intimated) it seems meet to ••••quaint you, ••ow greatly you

have crost your own designe, and that by the second and maine point of difference, which you make between your opinion and theirs. For whereas you there charge them with this, as their main and only tenent, viz. That man hath power to produce a sa∣ving act, without any supernaturall assistance, it appears from those words prescript; Quamvis requirant gratiam, &c. supernatura∣lem; that when they are their Crafts-masters, they do, and that generally, require supply of supernaturall grace; so that you seem uncharitably to take them alwayes at the worst.

In which alleaging of these testimonies, though I cannot but ac∣knowledge my prolixity, yet must I partly justifie it, from the necessity thereof, even to establish that truth by the mouth of two or three witnesses, which being only affirmed before, you did so lightly put by.

And yet must I adde one word, to minde you of your politick method, used about denying your tenent to be Arminian; that whereas their opinion of Gods being ingaged, &c. (given in those words, facienti quod in se est, &c.) is directly yourfifth assertion; and their main maxime you wholly neglect to prove, wherein your opinion differs from that maxime, contenting your self only to shew how it differs from another Arminian opinion, which you were not at all charged with: so that still your opinion lyes under this heavie charge, of being the main•• foundation of the whole frame of Arminianisme, which is now made good by clear evidence.

Next you raise a question touching the difference between an exe∣cutive and willing power, or a principle drawing out that power in∣to act, &c.

The occasion of your opening which distinction, I finde to be from a passage in my discourse given you; where 'tis denied, that man hath an executive power to believe, which now you would farther prove.

In opening of which power you seem to contradict yourself, for you take it to be a power, whereby to act, and yet by those in∣stances, you understand that to be an executive power, which can∣not inable to act: you say A rich man hath an executive power to be liberall, whilst of a penurious disposition, though by that power he is never the nearer being liberall: but how contradictory is it to say, A man by means of such a thing, hath power to ex•••••••••• such a worke, though by that thing be is never the nearer execution

thereof; by this you seem to nullifie that power in respect of in∣abling to an act, which you call a power to act.

Again, you say he hath an executive power to do, though that power be defective touching doing, but that which is defective in order to an act, cannot be a power to act, for a power to act is in∣consistent with defectivenesse, or want of power; power and want of power are contraries.

But for brevity sake, I shall endeavour to grant the utmost extent of your instances, viz. A penurious rich man hath such a power in him, in order to acts of liberality, as an Infant hath principles of reason and understanding, which may of themselves in an ordina∣ry way of nature, become executive to answerable acts, without any super-naturall infusion; so a rich penurious man hath such principles as by consideration, councell, &c. may be inclined to liberality, without a super-naturall change of those principles, but yet whilst penuriously disposed, he is as far, or farther, from an executive power, as a willing; as a child is in the case given.

And thus may the rest be understood, As that Gen. 31.••9. 'tis in the power, &c. that is, he had a sufficiency of outward strength and such a naturall principle of revenge, as might act revenge, if not hindered by an extraordinary hand, and so, have not I pow∣er to eate, &c. man hath a naturall receptive faculty for that end.

The tenour of which instances being thus considered, the maine is to examine; what is in them to serve your purpose, which is to prove, that a man hath an executive power to beleeve: Between which instances, and the things you would prove, there is as vast a dis-proportion, as between naturall and supernaturall acts, for all that these prove, is but that men have an executive power to per∣forme such acts, as may be done without supernaturall influence, as to be liberall, to frequent the Ordinances, or (to speak in your own language) to sin, revenge, eate, drink, &c. Now 'twere most unadvised to conclude, because men have an executive power to the externall acts of Religion, frequenting the Ordinances; to acts naturall, eating, drinking; morall, as to be liberall, &c. that therefore they have a like power to supernaturall acts. Of all which instances, the most genuine scope, is to prove mans free-will to beleeve, for the main Argument of both your Sermons, is touching mans power towards attaining faith, which power

you call executive, which so called, you demonstrate by making it like that power which those instances hold forth•• but to all those severall acts, the persons respectively have a power of free will; those concerning men have, because all those acts may be done by man in his pure naturalls, those which concern God are much more within his power to will, as they are acts requiring power, for God is not capable of receptive power (though God wills not ••••••••se••••ring acts) therefore in making mans executive power to come to Christ, or beleeve, to be such as those instances have, you necessarily make man to have Free-will ••o beleeve, else all those instances are to no purpose.

In briefe thou a man cannot be said to have an executive power to any act, but what he can voluntarily do, and is within the li••e of that power, so as to stand in need of no ext••••ordinary divine assistance; 'tis contradictory to say an executive power cannot execute of it selfe, for if a supernaturall power must co-operate to execution, then the other power cannot be executive, but the work of faith cannot be executed, without a divine power infu∣sed (which you else-where grant) therefore man cannot have an executive power to beleeve, till he be so inspired; insteed there∣fore of a willingnesse to draw out an executive power to act faith which you speak of there must be a putting in a new power, before any drawing out to act can be.

To and this therefore, I desire to know directly what this pow∣er is by name, which you call executive, for it forms not imagina∣ble, that the name executive should be any other then a nick name of such a power as cannot execute. Who ever then can distin∣guish between an executive power, or a principle whereby to act, (••syo••••••pl••mit) and such a principle as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 produce a••••act, such a one will doubtlesse out the hair indeed.

But yet between your unfolding the distinction of powers, you insert two particulars, one is a quaere about Ar•••••••••• T••••••••••s, which is for substance the same with your opening the dis••••••••ce, between your opinion, and that of free will, which being already ••••ale with, I passe over.

The other particular is an Objection from Joh••••••: 44. Which in the ••i••••o•••••••• given you, is ••llendged, 〈…〉〈…〉 through was of power; which for answer, you 〈…〉〈…〉; Now 〈◊〉〈◊〉 come▪ 〈…〉〈…〉

put forth himself in any such way, wherein God hath promised to meet him with grace.

By which expression, No man can come, you understand can proceed so far in a way of nature, in order to grace, as wherein God hath promised to meet him with grace; but this destroyes the sense, for 'tis most evident, that the expression cometh imports a coming to life with saving grace, which might be proved from many other Texts, some whereof are given in that discourse, as John 5.40. so John 6.37. He that cometh to me, which imports coming with saving faith; which place you have understood so. Now there is a great contrariety between these, for mans doing that wherein God hath promised to meet him with grace, is a do∣ing by himself without grace; upon which doing, you say, God meets with grace; but the comming here is a saving comming, or unto life by saving grace; therefore not a comming in the course of naturall abilities, to meet with grace thereupon.

Againe, there appears not the least ground for such an interpre∣tation, because here is never a word spoken of pawing forth in a course of nature, but of comming to Christ, or believing (which in the discourse given, are proved to be tearms equivalent) nor yet is there the least tittle of a promise of meeting man with grace upon comming.

And for that clause, except my Father draweth, which you ex∣pound, except be interpose with some greater power then ordinary's that you understand thereby, Gods inabling to improve naturals to the utmost, in order to grace, is plaine, in that you make Gods interposing to be a carrying of man so far in a course of nature, as wherein God hath promised to meet him with grace, and so you make Gods drawing to be, but by way of preparation unto grace, promised thereupon; against which 'tis evident, 'tis such a draw∣ing as whereby man commeth unto Christ, or believeth both be∣ing one; therefore drawing is an act of divine power, working saving-grace, and not a carrying of man so to do, as upon which doing, God will afterwards meet him with the gift of grace. Af∣terwards you adde another Exposition, no man hath any foresight of any compleat power of comming; which implyes, man hath in himself a power to come to Christ, before Gods drawing; so that by drawing; God only gives him sight of that power: But this directly opposeth the words which are, no man can or hath a

power to come; he saith not, no man hath a sight that he can come.

For establishment of which exposition, you re-assume your di∣stinction of powers already dealt with; by opening of which executive power to come to Christ, you make mans power of comming to Christ, or believing, to be a power of Free-will, as is before proved from the instances.

After that, you expresly conclude from what is delivered in that Sermon, The necessity of your fifth assertion, touching Gods promi∣sing grace, &c.

Concerning all which, to speak truly supposing these two Ar∣guments (which you say are for the clearing of the whole businesse) were unanswerable, yet would they be far from such a clearing; for all the arguing of Men or Angels shall never prove this, with∣out bringing a promise of God for it; which throughout this Ser∣mon you no where attempt, though all your former texts preten∣ded to containe such promises alleaged in your former Sermon, are prowed wholly impertinent, in that discourse given in. The thing you would prove by these Arguments is, That God is inga∣ged by promise to naturall improvers; but if this promise be such as God hath been graciously pleased to make (which you affirme) then you cannot prove such a promise by Argument, but only from expresse exhibition; because what God doth of Free-grace, can proceed from no ground or reason, but his own freenesse, for which, being Gods essence, no reason can be given.

Yes, of all grounds, that whereon you build the strength of all your Arguments; namely, the vindication of Gods justice, must needs be most weak: it seems of all reasonings most absurd, to say God cannot but freely promise grace, because his justice binds him to it. And seeing you expresse your maintaining that assertion to be of so great necessity for upholding the truth, &c. of the Gospel. I wonder you omit, both the justifying it, by any one Scripture, after all the Scriptures alleaged are proved contrary; and likewise the vindicating it from those pernicious consequences, which in the discourse given you, are shewed to be most inevitably deduceable thence; because in what degree that suffers, whereon you make the truth, grace, &c. to depend; so much must the truth, grace, and uprightnesse of the Gospel, &c. suffer.

And touching that of Augustine, take away, &c. if it be com∣pared with a passage immediately foregoing, which is, that men

may be destroyed without any malignancy in their wils, both put together, plainly make man to have power of Free-will; for you make taking away all malignancy of will to be within mans pow∣er, which being taken away, nothing hinders from Free-will.

Next you further refer this controversie to your disputes against the Arminians; diverse things, wherein especially in the two last Exercises, seem justly liable to exception, but I shall decline fur∣ther dealing there with on this ground, because the substance there∣of is repeated in this Sermon: and though I intended to have ad∣ded a word about that Text, To him that hath shall be given, I shall wholly omit it, referring to that learned discourse of Doctor Twisse upon the sense thereof, in his Third Book fore-cited.

Touching the use you make of all, in which is implyed your great care in all this, to study out mollifying, and to prevent harsh expressions, which (as you intimated in discourse) are given out by most against the Arminians; I may not unfitly insert a passage which you used against the Arminians, being here fitly applicable, viz. While you go out of the Kings high-way in relation to Free-grace, and seek out by-wayes of mans ingaging God by improve∣ment, censuring Gods justice, the freenesse of his grace, &c. you hereby fall into worse wayes, though you endeavour so to pave them, that they may seem most smooth.

And whilest you professe great care against harsh unsavoury ex∣pressions, &c. I know not what expressions can be more harsh then such, as belch out such calumny against the justice of God, the freenesse of his grace, &c. of which it may fitly be said, who art thou that repliest against God? nor know I with whom such ex∣pressions can be savoury after triall, except with the Arminians themselves.

And touching your Apology, I commend this Quare to serious consideration, whether it would not be a more ingenuous way of Apologizing to disclaime your own errour, and with that mouth to justifie that truth wherby you have condenmed it, rather then to please your self with this saying. If so be we cannot come to expresse our selves, &c. We shall content our selves with some such manner of excuse as this is, That God hath not given us that ability and fa∣culty of utterance and expressions, and that we conceive the businesse better in our mindes, then we are able to give account of to others? Which I the rather refer to consideration, because of that fluency

of utterance and expression, which God hath vouchsafed you a∣bove many.

And seeing you conclude, The Scripture affords suitable expres∣sions for this matter, and that such are here most necessary, I won∣der you omit searching out such from Scripture; and instead thereof take upon you so hard a task, as to create or frame Go∣spel, or promise of grace, out of reason and argument, without any Scripture-proof.

And touching your advice, closing up all; seeing in my former discourse I endeavoured to pleade for the truth of God. I have in this endeavoured (according to Gods assistance vouthsafed) to quallifie that hardnesse, which your Arguments have attempted to cast upon it.

Yet one word more, touching your scope in propounding and maintaing your fifth assertion, seeing you hold it so necessary for the encouraging of naturall men, I wonder you wholly omit to teach them what particular duties are to be done by them in this way of improvement: For whilest you tell them, If they put forth themselves to do what God hath inabled them in a way of na∣ture, they may do such things as whereunto God hath promised grace, you neglect to tell them what those things are. Now you know, Dolus latet in generalibus, deceit lyes in generals; and therefore in the issue such generall tearms must needs become snares of de∣ceit to naturall men, who after doing ever so much, are still left to seek out what actions they be, upon which God hath promised grace, which tearms (to retort upon you with your own language) are indeed like to the demanding to catch all the fishes in the sea, or foules of the aire; or like the leading men into a Laby••inth, o•• in∣to the middle of the boundlesse Ocean, and there leaving them: For you give naturall men a boundlesse task of doing such things as whereto God hath annexed grace by promise; but what or how many those things are, is not at all shewed, but is left to their own judgement; which being wholly erroneous, must necessarily lead them to presumption or dispaire. Much like in some respect to the doctrin of many heretofore, urging in generall a necessity of le∣gall terrou••s, before any true comfort could be had, by which means multitudes have laid lo••ds of per•••••••• upon themselves one after another; and after all, find•• no more ground com∣fort then at the beginning, because they can sin••e not Scripture

Standard to measure such qualifications by. Seeing then you count this doctrine (of naturall mens doing such things as whereupon God hath promised grace) so necessary; you may do well in a matter so weighty, not to lead and leave them to be beguiled by generals; but let them know in particular, what, and how many actions they are to do, upon doing whereof God hath promised grace; that so af∣ter they have finished such a tale, they may sing a Quietus est to their soules through confidence of their happy state, as the Papists do, upon their Opus aperatum, after they have mumbled over the full tale of their prayers, according to the number of their Beads.

And now in answer to your method, I should shut up all with a word of use, which may be first for caution to such as take up∣on them to promote the truth of God, viz. forasmuch as errour is of so bewitching a nature, as that men are apt to maintain one errour by the broaching of others worse, rather then to relinquish and disclaim the first, this should provoke such persons in speciall, to great jelousie against every errour, least one errour received prove an in-let to more and worse.

Or secondly, by way of direction to men, both in improving the meanes of grace, and in tryall of their state.

First, then for direction in improving; first negatively, let no man because he labours, in the strength of his naturalls, to improve the outward meanes of grace, therefore addresse himself to God, with this confidence; Lord I have endeavoured with utmost in∣tention, &c. Therefore do thou, according to thy promise made to these improvements, give me saving grace, for this is to mist in lying vanities, and to go to God with a lye in steed of a pro∣mise, because God hath made no such promise; but contrarily, in all thine improvements, acknowledge with thankfulnesse Gods long suffering, and freedome of dispensation, who might in justice have hurld thee from out of the womb, the place of thy sinfull conception, into hell the place of endlesse woe, as he hath done multitudes; and may now justly leave thee in all thy improvements, to go with the five foolish Virgins to the gate, through which the wise Virgins entred in, ••nd yet shut thee for ever out of the bride chamber; neverthelesse waite thou in Gods prescribed way, abhorring thy self in all thine endeavours, as being so far from ingaging God to give grace, as that the loath∣somenesse of them all may justly provoke God for ever to sus∣pend his grace from thee.

Again, in point of tryall, sing not this requiem to thy soul, I have earnestly laboured to reach the terms of the Covenant of Grace, therefore certainly God hath added thereto the work 〈◊〉〈◊〉 faith, because otherwise the Gospell could not be a Covenant of Free-Grace; but contratily, examine whether the powers of na∣ture in thee, be so carried up above themselves, by divine operati∣on as that they renounce, and abhor thy most choyce improve∣ments, as having no worth, no comfort in them, and in steed thereof do cleave vigorously, and intirely unto Christ, as the onely fountain of all true comfort; yea, all this done so, as in steed of finding matter of self-boasting in thine own improvements, thou findest great ground of admiring the free dispensation of Gods over-powring grace, working such a change in thee, contrary to, & above thy self; this being found may afford much comfort. But I must totally, though most abruptly, decline further progresse.