CHAP. II. That the Imagination can make Nega∣tive Propositions.
WHat follows, is perhaps of the same rank: For I understand neither the force, nor the address of the reasons he produceth to shew, that the Imagination makes no Negative propositions; although that were a Subject which might furnish him with quantity of fair observations, and wherein he might exercise all the Niceties of his Logick. In the mean time he contents himself to say, That the Imagination makes no Negations, and knows them not, because in effect they are nothing; and that they cannot furnish images to make themselves known. Could he be ignorant, and did he think that I did not my self know, that Negation may be considered two ways: Directly, carrying our thoughts out∣right on the absence and the privation which is on the subject; and obliquely in considering the sub∣ject deprived of such a thing, and which is not such a thing. We are agreed, that the direct Negation is a Non ens, and is in effect Nothing; and the Understanding only can conceive it, because it re∣quires a most subtile abstraction, and an exact re∣flexion on the Knowledge. But we also hold, that the Subject which hath not any thing, is truly de∣prived of the thing which it hath not; and that after that manner the Imagination may make a Negation. For even as he who kills a man, makes Page 73 that the Man is no more, although he doth not directly make the Negation of the Man: So the Imagination separating those images which make a whole, makes that that whole is no more.
On the other side, as all these things are made of themselves, or accidentally, the Negation which the Knowing faculties form is made only by acci∣dent, because no action can be precisely terminated in a Non ens. For he that kills, gives the blow; and the loss of life comes by accident in pursuance of the blow: So the Imagination separates the images; and to this separation, which is a real and true action, happens the Negation.
How the Negation may be represented by the Imagination.
But M. C. says, (p. 142.) That the Negation, whatever it be, cannot furnish any Image to make it self known. We have already answered this ob∣jection: For if the word Image signifies only the representation of an absolute thing, it's true that the Negation furnisheth no image to make it self known: But if it comprehends the Modification of images, as is not to be doubted, it's certain that the Negation furnisheth an image at least to make it self known by Accident; forasmuch as the sepa∣ration which is a modification of images, is repre∣sented in the images; and that by this separation the thing is no more what it was before in the thought. So that even as the Imagination makes Affirmative propositions when it unites the phan∣tasms, it must also make Negatives, if it can sepa∣rate Page 74 them. And as it imploys the word Est to mark the union of images, it hath also some exterior sign which designs the separation it makes of them, and then it expresseth them by the term Non est, or by some other which is equivalent.
Nothing remains then, but for us to shew M.C. That the Imagination separates Images. But what means is there to make a man see any thing, that shuts his eyes, and who would not so much as be∣lieve them when they should be made known? All the Reasons we have deduced have the same evi∣dence for the separation of images, as they have for their union. And since it is certain, that in Dreams and Sicknesses the Imagination assembles phantasms which are not of the same order; To assemble them, she first of all must separate those with which there was a natural tye. Yet will not M.C. con∣sent to this truth, as cleer and evident as it is. And he says, That to perswade him, I must imploy Reasons like those I use to prove, That the Imagination knows the substance of objects. I am very glad that M.C. who is so serious, would sport himself here. He must also give me leave to say, That he might do it more modestly then he hath done: For in stead of playing upon me, he offends me; and instead of using raillery, he wrongs me. Were I to revenge my self, I should only answer, That since he did not apprehend the Reasons he speaks of, it had been useless for me to have produced the like: But as there is a great appearance that he will be now better instructed than he was then, and that the confusion he will be in to have used me so un∣worthily, is revenge enough for me; I shall con∣tent Page 75 my self to assure him, that I have not only taken the leisure, but also care to examine the Reasons he condemns, and that others as judicious as himself have approved them; And that for his reputation it had been to have been wished, that he himself had not had the leisure to have examined them. For, had he been contented with what he had said here, He could have made those believe which had net the commodity of reading them, that they were as strange as he imagined them. But the passion he hath to leave nothing uncontradicted, by which he had finish'd his work, hath in the Ad∣dition made it appear, that he understood them not. And I am confident that this happened through his fault, and none of mine.
After all this, could I not have shewn that the Imagination makes Negative propositions, it were indifferent for the design I had to prove, That Animals reason. It's sufficient that she makes Af∣firmatives to infer what I pretend, as we shall see in the pursuit. I had made it appear in my first Discourse, That I built no foundation on the proof which I might draw from Negative propositions, speaking thereof but by the way, and with that briefness which the Examen of those things re∣quired, which are quite contrary to those of which hath been amply treated. So that without forsaking the opinion I have of these Propositions, I shall grant M.C. that I have not well established them, so as he will confess that he hath not sufficiently destroyed them; And should he have succeeded, that it would nothing prejudice the Right which I defend.
How Beasts judge of Things.
But let us conclude this troublesom Discourse by the address which he useth to shew. That Beasts judge not whether things are good or ill unto them. For he will have it pass for an authentique proof, (p. 143.) The sense of most part of Philosophers, who believe they judge of nothing; and that they know the things which are good for them by simple conceptions, without affirming that they are good. And indeed, if he could oblige me to admit for the Judges of a Dispute, those who are my Adversaries, he would have found a good Expedient to have gain'd his Cause. I know that it is the common opinion, and that the School teacheth, That the Imagination is not said to compose, but in that it considers two images at once, as he says. But these are Judges or interessed Witnesses which I refuse in this cause. Were it to be decided by Authority, M. C's. would alone of it self have as much power over me, as that of all the Philosophers which he quotes. And where it is not necessary to produce Reasons, I shall as willingly follow his opinion, as that of all the Schools. But here we must of necessity: And 'tis not sufficient to say, That Beasts judge of no∣thing; It must be proved by some Reasons which at least must be probable, and must not subject us to the tyranny of these Philosophers, who have no other motive to believe things, but that their Master said it.
But M. C. would have us believe from his bare word, That Beasts judge not of the objects of their Page 77 Appetite, but as the External senses judge, That an Odor is good or ill; that Fire burns; that Honey is sweet, and Wormwood bitter; without its being ne∣cessary to know those things, for the tongue to say, This is sweet, and this is bitter.
First he confounds those Knowledges which are altogether different: For the Senses know after another manner, that Honey is sweet, and Worm∣wood bitter, then they do that Fire burns, and that a Smell doth good or ill. And I shall always grant, that Beasts judge not of the objects of their Appe∣tite, but as the Senses know that Fire burns, or that an Odor is ill. But at the same time I shall deny, that they judge of the objects of their Appetite in the same manner, as the Taste judgeth of the sweet∣ness of Honey, and bitterness of Wormwood. For the Sense may by a simple conception judge of the sweetness of Honey, for as much as it is the proper and immediate object of the Taste; and that it is not always necessary that the Imagination should make a progress from one thing to another: But when it judgeth that the Fire burns, it passeth not only from the cause to the effect, but it adds also one Image which is not sensible, to one which is; by judging that Burning is evil, which is an Image which the Senses furnish it not withall: since to be good or ill, useful or useless, are such things which know per species non sensatas, as the School saith, and which require, besides the judgment of the Senses, that of the Estimative faculty.
But I say yet more; To make this Judgment, Reason is often imployed therein: For when an Animal sees the Fire, and that he will not come neer Page 78 it for fear of being burnt by it, he must have prov'd that 'tis the effect of Fire to burn, and remember the evil which formerly it had done unto him; and consequently he must unite the image of the burning, and the ill which he received thereby, with that of the present object, and that of the ill which he apprehends therefrom: Which could not be done without discourse, as we shall shew here∣after.
Besides, what need had he to adde, That to know things, it was not necessary for the tongue to say, This is sweet, and this is bitter? Doth he believe Propo∣sitions may not be made without speaking; and that the judgments which the soul makes in it self without expressing it by language, are not true judgments? If that were so, Dumb persons would be more unhappy then we think them to be, since they should not only have lost their speech, but even their judgment and their reason. However it be, it is not the Tongue which makes propositions, it's the Faculty of the Soul, and words are but their images and the copies of them.
But perhaps M. C. would have said the same thing, but that his tongue (as they say) went before his thought: For it's very probable, that in stead of saying, That when the Sense judgeth of the sweetness of Honey, and bitterness of Wormwood, it is not necessary to know these things, that the Imagination should conceive that this is sweet, and that is bitter, since it knows those objects by a pri∣mary and simple conception; he hath also written unawares, That it's not necessary the Tongue should speak it. For my part, who intend to deal candidly Page 79 with him, I shall quit the advantage those words have given me, and grant, That it's true, that when the Senses know their objects by a simple concepti∣on, the Imagination makes no propositions, because it then makes no union, and that the things present themselves unto it altogether united. But that is not to say, that it always represents them so, and that it often knows them not the one after the o∣ther: For an Animal may see Honey, without knowing that it's sweet; and after he knows the sweetness thereof, he may unite the image of Sweet with that of Honey, in which case without question a proposition is made. And truly it's impossible to conceive the active and moving nature of this Fa∣culty, without observing how at the same time it passeth from one thing to another; and having the power to preserve the images, it at the same time at pleasure assembles and separates them.
I add this word to undeceive M.C. who (p. 140) believed the Choice and Liberty was important; for our tongue commonly useth it as well as that of Will to mark the actions which Animals make of their own proper motions. So they say, that a Beast goes whither it will, that it eats what it pleas∣eth, &c. And in this sense there is no inconveni∣ence, That the Imagination unites the images as it pleaseth.
But it is the custom of M. C. Critically to amuse himself on words,* and to give them what explication he pleaseth, as he doth here, and as he once did on the word of a Negative Abstraction. For on what I had said, That the Imagination could conceive an Page 80 Accident without taking heed of others, and that it was called a Negative Abstraction, he says, That that may be done without a Negation, and that 'tis not to speak according to the terms of Art to call it so.
But besides that, after I had explicated my self what I understood by that word, and that it was lawful for me to call it what I would, I could answer him, That he makes me suspect that all terms of Art are not known to him, and that he hath never heard of certain things which the Schools say are every way Negatively. Or this term, as well as that of Negative Abstraction, although it imports not a direct Negation, yet it marks an oblique and in∣direct one. In effect, when we say that the Imagi∣nation conceives one thing, without taking notice of another, we indirectly design the Negation of the things which we minded not.
But let us forbear these Whimsies, and ask M.C. if after we have made the defects of the objections he hath produced appear, he will believe, That there was any temerity in me to maintain, That the Ima∣gination of Beasts makes Propositions. And if he fears not left this reproach should justly fall on him, having made so much noise, and to so little purpose, when he would triumph after having so ill defended himself; Certainly if he succeed not better here∣after, I well perceive that he will have a great share of the glory I shall have to have shewed, That Beasts reason; the weakness of his Discourse being at capable to perswade this Truth, as is the force of mine.
