The idiot: in four books. The first and second of wisdome. The third of the minde. The fourth of statick experiments, or experiments of the ballance. By the famous and learned C. Cusanus.

CHAP. VIII. How it is the same thing, to the mind to con∣ceive, to understand notions, and to make assimilations. And how sensations are made, according to the naturalists.

Phil.

ENough of this, least we ex∣ceed our purpose now tell me, if in or to the mind, to conceive, be to understand?

Id.

I have said that the mind is the power of conceiving; so that being stir∣red up, it moveth it self by conceiving till it understand. Wherefore understan∣ding is the perfect motion of the mind.

Phil.

When is it said to conceive?

Id.

When it makes the similitudes of things: or, if thou hadst rather say, notions, or kinds, differences, species, proper, and accident. For God created in the soul the power of conceiving, and

the mind doth the things aforesaid; yet are all these one and the same thing, the power of the mind, conception, simi∣litude, notion, kind, and species. And although we do not call it the same thing to understand and to conceive, yet whatsoever is understood, is conceived, and whatsoever is conceived is under∣stood: but onely that which is actuall is understood, and not conceived.

Phil.

How meanest thou that?

Id.

To conceive is nothing but to comprehend either after the manner of matter, or form, or some other way; but that which is actually, is said to be un∣derstood; that is, the property of it is comprehended by the mind. The mind is also said to understand, by which it is moved, and the beginning of the mo∣tion is rather called passion; the per∣fection of it, understanding. But as a di∣sposition and habit are the same, con∣sidering a disposition tends to perfection, and after perfection is a habit; so the passion of the mind and the understand∣ing are one and the same thing.

Phil.

Yet the understanding doth not seeme to say, or imply perfection.

Id.

Thou sayest well; properly the mind is said to understand when it is moved; although it be not called un∣standing, but after perfection.

Phil.

Are therefore all these one and the same, to wit, the power of concei∣ving, conception, similitude, notion, passion, and understanding?

Id.

They are so the same, that the power of conceiving is not any of them: because it is called a power, from an ap∣titude, which it hath from its creation; a conception, from the imitation, be∣cause it imitates the matter or forme, namely, in that it comprehends after the manner of the matter or form of the compound.

And in what respect it is called con∣ception, in the same also it is called the similitude or notion of the thing; and these names are truly predicated one of another, and every one of them is called understanding.

Phil.

I wonder how conception can be called understanding?

Id.

Although the conception be cal∣led from imitation, and understanding from perfection, yet it is perfection,

which is the cause why understanding is called conception: for then doth the mind conceive, when the understanding is lead to perfection.

Phil.

Paradventure thou wilt likewise admit that the understanding should be called the passion of the mind?

Id.

Yes that I will; for the under∣standing is the motion of the mind, the beginning whereof is passion.

Phil.

Therefore conception is a pas∣sion too?

Id.

It follows not, as thou seest of thy self. In like manner although the kinds and species be the understanding, yet are they not therefore passions of the soul; for the passions of the soul vanish, and yet the kinds and species of things re∣maine.

Phil.

Enough of this, seeing divers men speak diversly thereof. But tell me, how doest thou call that power of the mind by which it sees all things in the necessity of complexion; and that o∣ther by which it sees them in an abso∣lute necessity?

Id.

I that am an Idiot, do not much regard words, yet I thinke that power

may conveniently be called discipline, whereby the mind looking to its own immutability, considers the forms of things without matter; because that by discipline and learning men come to this consideration of the form. But that power, by which the mind looking to its own simplicity, doth therein behold all things without composition, may be called intelligence.

Phil.

It is read, that some men call that power which thou callest doctrine or learning, intelligence; and that which thou callest intelligence, intelligibility.

Id.

It doth not displease me; for they may conveniently be so called.

Orat.

I could wish to hear from thee Phi∣losopher, how the Naturalists suppose sensati∣ons are done; for in this I thinke thee more skilfull then the Idiot, who will also be glad if thou wilt so do.

Phil.

I should be glad if I could re∣hearse any part of that which I have heard. That which thou required is thus: The Naturalists say, that the soul is mixt with a most thin and subtile spi∣rit, scattered clean through the Arteries; so that, that spirit is the carryage of the

soul; and the vehiculum or carryage of that spirit, is the blood. There is there∣fore one nerve or artery full of that spi∣rit, which is directed to the eyes, so that near unto the eyes it is forked, and be∣ing filled with that spirit, it comes to the bals of the eyes wherein is the apple; that spirit then so dispersed through the arte∣ries, the instrument of the soul, by which it exerciseth the sense of seeing; Two arteries full of the same spirit, are dire∣cted to the eares; likewise to the nostrils, and to the palate, are certaine arteries directed; and that spirit is diffused by the marrow even unto the extremities or ends of the joynts. That spirit which is directed to the eyes is most active and nimble: and therefore when it finds any outward objects, the spirit is repercussed or stricken back, and the soul is stirred up, to see that which it meets withall. So in the ear it is repercussed with the voice, and the soul excited to comprehend: and as hearing is done in a most thin aire, so is smelling in a thick or rather fu∣mous aire, which when it entreth the no∣strils, by its sumosity retards the spi∣rit, so that the soul is excited to compre∣hend

the odour of that fumosity. Like∣wise when a spongious humour enters the palate, the spirit is retarded, and the soul excited to taste; So the soul u∣seth the spirit diffused through the mar∣row, for the instrument of touching: for when any solid thing meets with the body, the spirit is offended, and after a manner retarded, and thence is touch∣ing. About the eyes, the soule useth a fiery power, about the ears an aethere∣all, or rather a pure ayrie one; about the nostrils a thick and fumous ayrie one; about the palate, a watery power; about the marrow, an earthy one; And this according to the order of the foure elements. That as the eyes are higher then the eares, so the spirit which is di∣rected to the eyes, is higher and superi∣our, and may after a manner be called fiery. So that in man, the disposition of the senses is in a manner like the disposi∣tion of the order of the four elements, whereupon seeing is swifter then hear∣ing, and therefore we see the lightning before we hear the thunder, although they be both at once. Moreover the strong subtile and acute direction of the

beams of the eyes, makes the aire give way unto it, and nothing can withstand it, except it bee grosse, earthy, or wa∣tery. Seeing then the spirit is the instru∣ment of the senses, and the eyes, nostrils, and other sensories, are as windowes and wayes by which that spirit may go out to perceive, it is manifest that nothing is perceived but by a let or obstacle, that (as soon as any thing hinders it) that spirit which is the instrument of percei∣ving may be retarded, and the soul be∣ing as it were retarded, may confusedly by the senses comprehend the thing that hinders it. For the sense, of it self, ter∣minates nothing: and if when we see any thing, we put a bound in it, that is not the worke of the sense, but of the ima∣gination which is joyned to the sense. There is moreover in the fore part of the head, in the phantasticall cell, a certain spirit much more subtile and nimble then that which is diffused through the Arteries, which when the mind useth as its instrument, it is made more subtile, that though the thing be absent, it can comprehend the form in the matter, which power of the soul is called imagi∣nation;

because by it, the soul conforms unto it self the image of the thing ab∣sent; and it differs in this from the sense, because the sense comprehends the form in the matter, onely while the thing is present; but imagination doth it as well, when the thing is absent, but confused∣ly, so that it discernes not the state, but comprehends many states together con∣fusedly. But there is in the middle part of the head, to wit, in that cell which is called rationall, a most subtile spirit, thinner far then that in the fantasticall cell, and when the soul useth that spirit as her instrument, it is yet more subtible, insomuch that it discerneth state from state; yet doth it not comprehend the truth of things, because it comprehends formes mingled with matter; but mat∣ter confounds the thing formed, so that the truth of it cannot be comprehended. And this power of the soul is called rea∣son. After these three manners the soul useth a corporall nstrument. By it self the soul comprehends, when it takes it self into it self (or retires into it selfe) so that it useth it self for an instrument, as we have heard from thee.