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Hou seemest, out of the great fulnesse of thy mind, as though thou meantest, that
as the infinite minde is the absolute for∣mative power; so the finite minde is the conformative or configurative power.
I doe indeed for that which is to be said, cannot conveniently be expressed, & therefore is the multiplication of speech very profitable. Now marke further, than an image is one thing, and an explication another; for equality is the image of unitie, for from unitie once ariseth equa∣litie. Therefore is equality the image of unitie; yet is not equality but plurality, the explication of unitie : therefore is equally the image of the explication of of unity, not the explication. So doe I meane, that the minde is the most sim∣ple image, of the divine minde, amongst all the images of divine complication. And so is the minde the first image of that divine complication, which by his simplicity and power, complicateth all images of complication. For as God is the complication of complications, so the minde which is the image of God, is the image of the complication of com∣plications: and after the images, are the plurality of things which explicate the divine complication. As number ex∣plicates
unity, motion rests, time eter∣nity, composition simplicity, time the present, greatness a point, motion a moment, inequality equality, diversity identity, and so of the rest. From hence gather the admirable power of our minde, for in the vertue thereof, is com∣plicated the assimulative power of the complication of a point, by which it finds in it self a power, wherein it assimu∣lates it selfe to every greatnesse.
So also because of the assimulative pow∣er of the complication of unity, it hath power to assimulate it selfe to every mul∣titude. And so by the assimulative power of the complication of now or the pre∣sent, it hath power assimulate it selfe to all time; and so by the assimulative power of th complication of rests, to all motion; and of simplicity to every com∣position, and of identity to all diversity; and of equality to all inaquality, and of conjunctionto every dis-junction. And by the image of the absolute complica∣tion, which is the infinite minde, it hath power by which it can assimulate it selfe to every explication: and many such things thou seest of thy selfe, may be
said, which our mind hath, because it is a certaine image of the infinite simplici∣ty which complicateth all things.
It seemeth then, that onely the mind is the image of God.
So it is properly: because all things that are after, (or beneath) the mind, are not the image of God, but on∣ly ly so far forth as the mind shineth, or ap∣peareth in them: as it more shineth in perfect living wights, then in imperfect ones; and more insensible things, then in vegetables; and more in vegetables, then in minerals; so that creatures that want the mind, are rather explications, then images of the Divine simplicity: al∣though according to the shining or ap∣pearing of the mentall image, in expli∣cation, they do diversly partake of the image.
Aristotle said, there was no no∣tion concreate (or made together with) the minder or soul, because he likened it to a smooth and shaven table: but Plato saith, there were notions concreated with it, yet that for the moles and weights of the body , the soul forgot them; what do'st thou thinke to be the truh
Undoubtedly our mind was, by God, put into this body, to the profit and advantage thereof; and therefore it must needs have from God all that, with∣out which it could not acquire that pro∣fit and advantage, it is not therefore cre∣dible, that there were notions concrea∣ted with the soul, which it lost in the bo∣dy: but because it hath need of a body, that the concreated power may proceed unto act. As the visive power of the soul cannot see actually, except it be stirred up by the object; and that cannot be, but by the representing of multiplied specis by then esn of the organ, and so it hath need of the eye. Even so the power of the mind, which is the comprehensive and nationall power, cannot porceed to its opperations, except it be stirred up by sensible things, which it cannot be but by the mediation of sensible phantasmis. Therefore it hath need of an organicall body, and such an one, without which it could not be stired up. In this there∣fore, Aristotle seems to have thought a∣right, that there are no notions of the soul concreated from the beginning, which it lost by being incorporated. But
because it cannot profit, if it want all udgement, as a deaf man can never pro∣fit to become a lutenist, because he hath in himself no judgement of harmony, by which he may discerne whether he do profit, therefore our soul hath a concre∣ated judgement without which it could not profit. This judging power is natu∣rally concreated with the mind, by which, of it self it judgeth whether dis∣courses be weak, strong, or concluding. Which power if Plato called a concreat∣ed notion, he was not out of the way at all.
How clear is thy delivery, which every man that hears, is forced to assent unto. These things must be diligently marked, for we plainly find a spirit in our mind speaking and judging this good, that just, the other true, and re∣prehending us, if we decline from the just; which speech and judgement it learned not, and therefore it is connate or concreate.
By this we prove, that the mind is that power which though it want all notionall form, yet being stired up, can assimilate it self to every form, and make
notions of all things: like, after a man∣ner, to a sound eye which is in darkness, and never saw the light, for it wanteth all actuall notion of visible things; yet comming into light, and being stirred up, it assimilates it selfe to the thing vi∣sible, that it may make a notion.
Plato saith, that judgement is then required, when the sence ministers contrary things at once.
He spake subtilly , for when the touch confusedly finds hard and so ft, or heavy and light, one contrary in another, then there is recourse to the understan∣ding, that it may judge of the quiddity of both so confusedly perceived, that there are many things discreet.
So when the sight confusedly sees great and little, is there not need of the discre∣tive judgement of the understanding; what is great, and what little? but if the sence were of it self sufficient, there would no recourse be had to the judgements of the understanding, as in the sight of that which is light, when there is nothing pre∣sented which is contrary to it.