The idiot: in four books. The first and second of wisdome. The third of the minde. The fourth of statick experiments, or experiments of the ballance. By the famous and learned C. Cusanus.

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Title
The idiot: in four books. The first and second of wisdome. The third of the minde. The fourth of statick experiments, or experiments of the ballance. By the famous and learned C. Cusanus.
Author
Nicholas, of Cusa, Cardinal, 1401-1464.
Publication
London :: Printed for VVilliam Leake, and are to be sold at the signe of the Crowne in Fleet-street, betweene the two Temple gates,
1650.
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Subject terms
Wisdom
Intellect
Weight (Physics)
Cite this Item
"The idiot: in four books. The first and second of wisdome. The third of the minde. The fourth of statick experiments, or experiments of the ballance. By the famous and learned C. Cusanus." In the digital collection Early English Books Online 2. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A87710.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 23, 2024.

Pages

Page 151

CHAP. XIII. How that which Plato called the soul of the worlds and Aristotle nature, is God which worketh all things in all things? and how he crealeth the mind in us.

Phil.

ENough of this; what saiest thou of the soul of the world?

Id.

The time will not suffer all things to be discursed; but I thinke Plato called, that, the soul of the world, which Ari∣stotle called nature; and for my part, I suppose that neither that soul nor that nature, are any other thing then God, which worketh all things in all things, and whom we call the spirit of all things.

Phil.

Plato said that that soul doth in∣delibly containe the samplars of things, and move all things. Aristotle said, that it was wise nature that moves all things.

Id.

It may be Plato meant, that the soul of the world, is as the soul of a ser∣vant that knows the mind of his Lord, and executes his will; and this know∣ledge

Page 152

he called notions or samplars, which are never defaced by oblivion, that the execution of the Divine providence may not faile. And that which Plato cals the knowledge of the soul of the world, Arisiotle would have to be the sagacity of nature, which had understanding to fulfill the will of God. Therefore to that soul of nature, they attributed the ne∣cessity of complexion, because it is de∣terminately necessitated so to doe, as ab∣solute necessity commandeth; but that is nothing but the manner of understan∣ding, namely when our minde concei∣veth God as the Architectonicall Art, whereunto there is another art of exe∣cuting subordinate, that the divine con∣ception may proceed into being: but in asmuch as all things do necessarily obey the will of the almighty, therefore the will of God needs no other executor, for in omnipotence willing and doing do coincide: As a glasse-maker, whilest he makes glass, blows in a breath which ex∣ecutes his will; in which breath is the word or conception, and the power; for unlesse the power and conception of the glasse-maker were in the breath which he

Page 153

sends forth, there would not arise, or be made, such a glasse. Conceive therfore an absolute creative art, subsisting by it self, that the art may be the workman, and the mastery the master; this art hath in its essence necessarily, omnipotence, that nothing can resist it; wisdome, to know what it doth; and the connexion of omnipotence with wisdom, that what it willeth may be done. That connexi∣on, having in it self wisdome and omni∣potence is the spirit, as it were, will, or desire; for of things impossible, and ut∣terly unkown, there is neither will nor desire. So in the most perfect will, there is wisdome and power, and by a certain similitude; it is called a spirit, because motion is not without, spirit; insomuch that whatsoever causeth motion in the mind, and all things else, we call a spi∣rit. And by motion, all men do what they will do. Therefore the power of a creative art, which is an absolute and infinite art, or the blesshed God, doth all things in his spirit or will, in the which is the wisdome of the Son, and the om∣nipotence of the Father, that his worke may be of one individed Trinity. Of this

Page 154

connexin, spirit, or will, the Platonists were ignorant, which did not see this spirit to be God, but thought it to be principiated by God, and to be the soul of the world, as our understanding soul animates our body. Nor did the Peri∣pateticks see this spirit which thought this power to be nature hidden in all things, from which is motion and rest, when indeed it is God absolute blessed for evermore.

Orat.

How it rejoyceth me to hear so plain an exposition; but I pray thee help us againe with some example, to conceive the creation of our mind in this our body.

Id.

Thou hast already heard of this matter; but because variety of exam∣ples, makes that which in it self is unex∣pressible, somewhat more clear, I will obey thee. Behold, thou knowest that our mind is a certaine power having the image of that Divine art we spake of. Therefore all things which are most tru∣ly in the Divine art, are truly in our mind, as the image thereof. Therefore our mind is created by that creating art, as if that art would create it self. And because that infinite art is un-multiply∣able,

Page 155

it behooveth that there arise an i∣mage thereof even as if a painter would paint himself, and himself being not mul∣tiplyable by painting himself, there should rise his image.

And because an image, how perfect soever (if it cannot become more and more perfect, and conformable to the samplar) is never so perfect, as any im∣perfect image, which hath power to con∣form it self more and more without li∣mitation to the unapproachable samp∣lar, for in this the image, after the best manner it may, doth imitate infinity. As if a painter should make two pictures of himself; whereof the one being dead, should seem actually more like him; but the other should be alive, and though for the present, lesse like, yet such a one, as being by its object stirred up to motion, could alwayes make it self more and more conformable to the samplar; no man would doubt that this second pi∣cture were more perfect, and more ex∣pressing the art of the painter: So every mind, yea even ours, though created be∣neath all others, hath from God, that as well as it can, it is a perfect, and living

Page 156

image of the infinite art. Therefore it is three and one, having power, wisdome, and the connexion of both, after such a manner, that as a perfect image of the art, being stirred up, it can more and more conforme its self to its samplar; So that our mind, though in the beginning of its creation, it have no actuall resplen∣dence of the creating art, in Trinity and unity: yet it hath that concreated pow∣er, that being stirred up, it can make it self more and more conformable to the actuality of the Divine art. And there∣fore in the unity of its essence, is power, wisdome, and will: And in-its essence do coinside the master, and the mastery, as in a living image ot the infinite art, which being stirred up, can all wayes without end, make it self more and more conformable to the Divine actuality, the inaccessible precision of the infinite art alwayes remaining.

Orat.

Most wonderfully and plainly; but I pray thee how it the mind infused by creati∣on?

Id.

Then haft heretofore heard me of this argument: Now take the same thing againe by another example.

Page 157

Ath.

Then the Idiot taking a glasse, and letting it hang down between his finger and thumb, he touched the glasse and it gave a found, and after a little while, the glasse was crack'd and the sound ceaseth. Then said the

Id.

In this fame hanging glasse, by my power, there arose a certaine power which moved the glasse, whence came sound; and when that proportion of the glasse in the which the sound was, and by consequence the motion resided was dissolved; the motion there ceased, and likewise upon the ceasing of the motion, the sound. But it that power had not depended upon the glasse, and therefore would not have ceased upon the crack∣ing of the glasse, but have subsisted with∣out the glasse; thou should'st have an example how that power is created in us, which makes motion and harmony, and then ceaseth to make it, when the propor∣tion is dissolved, though for all that, it doth not cease to be. As if I, in giving thee a Lute, should in and with the Lute give thee the skill & cunning to play up∣on a Lute, if the art and skill did not de∣pend upon the given Lute, though given

Page 158

in and with the Lute; then although the Lute were broken, yet the art and skill for all that would not be dissipa∣ted, though there were never a Lute found in the whole world that were fit for thee.

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