Contemplations moral and divine The second part.

AN INQUIRY TOUCHING HAPPINESS.

1. ANy man that compares the Per∣fection of the Humane Nature with that of the Animal Nature, will easily find a far greater Ex∣cellence in the former than in the latter: For 1. The Faculties of the former are more Sublime and Noble: 2. The very External Fabrick of the former much more Beautiful and fuller of Majesty than the latter: 3. The latter seems to be in a very great measure ordained in a Subserviency to the former: Some for his Food, some for Cloathing, some for Use and Service, some for Delight: 4. All the inferiour Animals seem to be pla∣ced under the Discipline, Regiment, and Order of Mankind; so that he brings them all, or the most of them, under his Order and Subjection:

2. It is therefore Just and Reasonable for us to think, that if the Inferiour Animals have a kind of Felicity or Happiness attend∣ing their being, and suitable to it, that much more Man, the nobler being, should not be destitute of any Happiness attending his be∣ing, and suitable to it.

3. But rather consequently, that Man, being the nobler Creature, should not only have an Happiness as well as Inferiour Ani∣mals, but he should have it placed in some more Noble and Excellent rank and kind than that wherein the Brutes have their Happiness placed.

4. It is plain that the Inferiour Animals have a Happiness or Felicity proportionate to their Nature and Fabrick; which as they ex∣ceedingly desire, so they do in a great mea∣sure Enjoy: namely, a sensible Good, an∣swering their sensible Appetite. Every thing hath Organs and Instruments answer∣ring to the Use and Convenience of their Faculties; Organs for their Sense and Local motion, and for their Feeding, for their Generation of their kind: Every thing hath its peculiar Instincts and Connatural Artifi∣ces and Energies for the Exercises of their Organs and Faculties for their Preservation and Nourishment: Every thing hath a sup∣ply of External Objects answering those Fa∣culties,

Desires and Instincts; Meats proper for their Nourishment; Places proper for their Repose; difference of Sexes in their several kinds answering their Procreative Appetite: And most commonly such a pro∣portion of Health and Integrity of Nature, as goes a long to that period of time allotted for their duration; and in default thereof they are for the most part furnished with Medicines naturally provided for them, which they naturally know and use, so that they seem to want nothing that is necessary to the complement of a Sensible Felicity.

It is true, they are in a great measure Subjected to the Dominion of Mankind, which is sometimes over severely exercised, but then they have the Benefit of Supplies from them, Protection under them, and, if they meet not with Masters more unreasonable than themselves, they find Moderation from them. They are also exposed to the Rapine one of another, the weaker Beasts, Birds and Fishes, being commonly the prey of the grea∣ter: but yet they are com∣monly endued with Nimble∣ness, * 1.1 Artifices or Shifts to a∣void their Adversaries. But be these what Abatements of their Sensible Happiness may be, yet they have certain Negative Advanta∣ges that conduce very much to their Happi∣ness,

or at least remove very much of what might abate it, and thereby render their fruition more free and perfect and uninter∣rupted, for instance, they seem to have no Anticipations or Fear of Death as a com∣mon Evil incident to their nature: They have no Anticipations of Dangers till they immediately present themselves unto them: They have no great sense or apprehensions of any thing better than what at present they enjoy: They are not under the Obligation of any Law, or under the Sense of any such thing, and consequently the Sincereness of what they enjoy, not interrupted by the strokes of Conscience under a sense of de∣viation from Duty, or Guilt.

5. It is therefore plain, that if the Humane Nature have no greater or better Happiness than what is accommodate only to a Sensi∣ble Nature, they have no greater Happiness than the Beasts have, which is not reasonable to be supposed for a Nature so far exceeding them.

6. Farther yet, if the Humane Nature were not under a capacity of a greater Happiness than what is terminated in Sense, mankind were much more Ʋnhappy than the basest A∣nimal; and the more Excellent the Humane Nature is above the Beasts, nay, the more excellent any one individual of the Humane

kind were above another, the more misera∣ble he were, and the more uncapable of being in any measure happy: for the more Wise and Sagacious any man were, the more he must needs be sensible of Death, which sense would sower all the Happiness of a sensible Good: the more sensible he must needs be, not only of the shortness and uncertainty of sensible Enjoyments, but also of their Poor∣ness, Emptiness, Insufficiency, Dissatisfacto∣riness. It is evident, that a Fool sets a grea∣ter rate upon a Sensible Good than a Man truly Wise, and consequently the Fool could be the only man capable of Happiness: for it is most certain, that according to the measure of the Esteem that any man hath of any good he enjoys, such is the measure of his Happiness in that Enjoyment, Since the Happiness is somewhat that is intrinsecal to the Sense or Mind that enjoys it. A thing really Good can never make that man Hap∣py, who is under a Sense of Evil or Incon∣venience by that enjoyment, so long as he is under that sense. Since therefore it is pre∣posterous and unreasonable to suppose that Man, the best of terrestrial Creatures, and Wise men, the best of men, should be Exclu∣ded from at least an equal degree of Hap∣piness with the Beasts that perish; and since it must needs be that a bare Sensible Good

can never communicate to a man an Equal degree of Happiness with a Beast, nor to a Wise man an Equal degree of Happines with a Fool, it remains, there must needs in com∣mon reason be some other subject wherein the Happiness of a Man, of a Wise Man, must consist, that is not barely Sensible Good.

7. All the good things of this Life they are but Sensible Goods, and therefore they can∣not be the true matter of that Happiness, which we may reasonably think belongs to the reasonable Nature as such, the former will appear by an induction of particulars, which I shall pursue in order, with the par∣ticular instances of their Insufficiencies to make up a true Happiness to the Reasonable Nature, as well as that general that they are but Sensible Goods, and meerly accommo∣dated to a Sensible Life and Nature.

1. Life it self is not as such a sufficient constituent of Happiness: and the Instance is Evident, because it is possible that Life it self may be Miserable: there may be Life where there is Sickness, Pain, Disgrace, Po∣verty, and all those External Occurrences that may render life Grievous and Burthen∣some. Life may indeed be the Subject of Happiness, when it hath all those contribu∣tions that concur to make it such; but Life alone, and as such, cannot be Happiness,

because there may be a Miserable Life.

2. Those Bona Corporis or Compositi, the Goods of the Body, are not sufficient to make up a suitable Happiness to the Reaso∣nable Nature; as Health, Strength; for the Beasts themselves enjoy this, and for the most part, the Brutes enjoy a greater mea∣sure of these than Mankind: and besides still, there is that which is like the Worm at the root of the Gourd, that spoils the Hap∣piness that must arise from it; viz. Mortali∣ty and Death, which will certainly pull down this Tabernacle, and Man hath an un∣intermitted Pre-apprehension of it, which sowers the very enjoyment it self. And in this as hath been said, the Beasts that perish have a pre-eminence over Mankind; for though both are Mortal, yet the Beast is not under that Pre-apprehension of it that Man incessantly hath, whereby his Fruition of that Happiness of Health is the more Sin∣cere, and this consideration must run through all those other contributions of Sensible Goods, that hereafter follow. And as for Beauty, the Happiness thereof as it is but fading and empty, so the Felicity that it gives, is not to the party that hath it, but to others, unto whom perchance it may be a delightful and amiable spectacle, but not to him that hath it.

3. There are a secondary sort of Bodily Goods, namely, Pleasures of the Senses, as delightful Meats, Drinks, Sights, Musick, pleasant Odors, and other Gratifications of the Sensitive Appetite; or Lust, as the Lust of the Flesh, the Lust of Revenge, the Lust of Desire, &c. These cannot make up a competent Happiness to the Humane Na∣ture: 1. They are but Sensible Goods, com∣mon to the Beasts as well as Men. 2. Though they may be competent to make up the Hap∣piness of the Sensible Nature, yet they are not such to the Reasonable Nature; because they are still accompanied with a present concurring Sense of Mortality, which Em∣bitters their very Enjoyment, and renders them insipid, if not bitter. 3. The wiser the Man is, the less he values them, and conse∣quently are at best a Happiness to Fools, and such as degenerate from the Nobleness of the Humane Nature into the degree of Beasts by setting an Over-value upon them. Again. 4. They are transient, and the Happiness of them is only before their Enjoyment; when they are Enjoyed to Satiety, they lose their Use and Value. 5. These placenta sensus, especially of the Sensual Appetite, are not for their own sakes, but in order to some∣thing else, viz. To invite and excite the Appetite in order to the Preservation of the

individual, or the species; and therefore cannot be in themselves in relation to a Rea∣sonable Nature any Happiness, since they terminate in something else.

4. Those Bona Fortunae, as Wealth, Ho∣nour, Power, cannot at all pretend to make up a Happiness for the Reasonable Nature; for though in truth we do not find so emi∣nently, in the animal Nature, any such thing as Wealth or Honour, but only some∣what analogal to it, as in Ants and Bees; yet these are of a far inferiour nature to the Bona Corporis, whether Health or Pleasure; for they are in their true Use only in order to them. The primary Corporeal Good is Health, and Conservation of the individual in his being: next to that, and indeed in order to it, are the Refreshments and Sup∣ports by Eating and Drinking. Wealth again is Subservient and in order to that, viz. To have a convenient Store and Provision for the supply of the exigencies of Nature and preserving the individual: what is more then Necessary for that, is Superfluous, Vain, and Unnecessary. Power again is only desi∣rable to secure those Provisions from Rapine and Invasion: so that in truth these are so far from making up a Happiness, that they are only Provisional and in Order to those Goods of the Body, which are before

shewn incompetent to that End; and with∣out that respect they are vain and imperti∣nent things. But besides this, there are cer∣tain Specifical Defects that accompany these Goods, that render them utterly uncapable of making up a Happiness to Mankind: 1 It is impossible they can be as large as the Hu∣mane Nature; because unless there were some Poor, none could be Rich; unless some were Under, there could be none in Power; if all were equal in Wealth and Power, there could be no such thing as Wealth or Power: and consequently the supposition of Happiness in those who are Rich or Pow∣erful, would exclude the greatest part of Mankind from any share in that which must make up their common Happiness. 2. In the fruition of all Wealth, Honour and Power, besides the common fate of Morta∣lity, which imbitters their very Enjoyment, there is annexed a certain peculiar Infelicity that renders them uncapable of making up a Happiness: For, 1. They are the common mark of Covetousness, Envy, Ambition, and Necessity, which most ordinarily render Rich and Powerful, and Great Men less safe than others, and ordinarily they stand tot∣tering dangerously, and subject to fall. 2. There is always Care and Anxiety at∣tending the possessors of Great Honour,

Wealth, or Power, which imbitters the ve∣ry injoyment, and puts it out of the capa∣city of being a Happiness; for it is impossi∣ble that great Cares and great Fears can con∣sist with true Happiness. And thus far of Sensible Goods.

8. Besides these Sensible Goods there seem to be two sorts of Goods that Mankind is peculiarly capable of, which are not com∣mon to the Beasts; viz. First, The Good of Esteem, Glory and Reputation, wherewith perchance the Beasts are not affected, though some seem to have somewhat analogal to it, but this cannot at all make up a Happiness to the Humane Nature: 1. Because it is not accommodate to all Uses and Exigents: Laudatur & alget. 2. Because it resides not in the party, but in those who give it; a man may have a great esteem with others and a low esteem of himself. 3. It is of all others the most brittle and unstable possession: those that perchance deservedly give it, may undeservedly resume it: a Word or Action mistaken by others, a false Report, Envy, Emulation, want of success in any one Action: the mis-interpretation of the Superior or the Vulgar, may quite overturn the greatest, and perchance most deserved Reputation, and render a man more despised and contemptible than he was before emi∣nent

or esteemed: he that bottoms his Hap∣piness upon such an unstable blast, inherits the wind.

9. But yet there (are) certain Bona A∣nimae which are competible to Man, but not to Beasts, which are of two kinds, accord∣ing to the two great Faculties in Man, his Understanding and Will: viz. Knowledg, and Moral Virtues, and although these are excellent Goods, yet (exclusively of true and sound Religion) they cannot make up that Happiness which we may reasonably Judg to be proper and specifical to the Humane Nature: First, Therefore for Knowledg there are these Incompetences in it, in reference to our Happiness: 1. Our Knowledg is very little and narrow in re∣spect of the Object of it: What we know is the least part of what we know not: Though we daily converse with things natu∣ral, even with the frame of our own bodies, we scarce know the nature or cause or moti∣on of any one Nerve or Muscle. 2. Even in those things we think we know, our know∣ledg is very Dark and Uncertain; and from these ariseth: 3. That our increase in Know∣ledg is our increase of Sorrow and Trouble: Trouble to attain that little Knowledg we have, and Sorrow in that we can acquire no more: 4. The whole Scheme of Knowledg

we attain, for the most part serves only the meridian of our short, unstable, uncertain life: And what kind of Happiness can that be, which while we are attaining, we can∣not secure to be of any long or certain con∣tinuance, and vanisheth, or proves utterly unuseful when we die? Of what use will then the knowledg of Municipal Laws, of History, of Natural Philosophy, of Po∣liticks, of Mathematicks, be in the next World, although our Souls Survive us?

As to the 2. Namely, Moral Virtues: It is true, Aristotle, 1. Ethicor. Cap. 7. Tells us that Happiness or Blessedness is the Exer∣cise or Operation of the Reasonable Soul, according to the best and most perfect Vir∣tue, in vita perfecta, in a perfect Life: But he tells us not what that vita perfecta is, nor where to be found, and yet without it there is no Happiness.

But even this exercise of Virtue (though much more noble than the bare habit of Vir∣tue, which is but in order to Action or Ex∣ercise) if considered singly and apart, and abstractively from the reward of it, is not enough to constitute a Happiness suitable to the Humane Nature: 1. The Actions of Vir∣tue for the most part respect the good and benefit of others more than of the party that exerciseth them, as Justice, Righte∣ousness,

Charity, Liberality, Fortitude; and principally (if not only) Religion, Temperance, Patience, and Contentation, are those Virtues that advantage the party himself; the rest most respect the good of others. 2. We find it too often true, that most good men have the least share of the comforts and conveniencies of this Life, but are exposed (many times even upon the ac∣count of their very Virtues) to Poverty, Want, Reproach, Neglect, so that their ve∣ry Virtues are occasions oftentimes of such Calamities, which must needs abate the per∣fection of Life, which is a necessary ingre∣dient into Happiness. 3. But if their life be not rendred grievous upon the account of their Virtues, yet they are not thereby priviledged from many Calamities, which render their lives unhappy, and oftentimes renders them uncapable of the exercise of those Virtues, which must make up their Happiness: Poverty disables them from acts of Liberality; Neglect and Scorn by great Men and Governors renders them uncapable of acts of distributive Justice; Sickness and tormenting bodily Diseases many times attack them, and render their lives misera∣ble, and many times disables even their very intellectuals; and to these disasters they are at least equally lyable with others; and if

all these Calamities were absent, yet there are two states of life, which they must ne∣cessarily go through if they live, that in a great measure renders them necessarily un∣capable of these actions of Virtue, namely, the Passions and Perturbations of Youth, and the decays and infirmities of Old Age. 4. The highest Good attainable by the ex∣ercise of Virtue in the party himself is Tran∣quillity of Mind; and indeed it is a noble and excellent portion; but as the case stands with us in this life, (without a farther pro∣spect to a life to come,) even such a Tran∣quillity of mind is not perfectly attainable by us, and hath certain appendances to it, that abate that sincereness of Happiness, that is requirable in it, to compleat the Hap∣piness of the Humane Nature: and these are principally these two: 1. The necessity that we are under (considering the weak∣ness of our nature) by our daily failings, Errors, and Sins, to turn aside from the per∣fect rule of Virtue; whereby we are under a kind of moral necessity of violating or abating that Tranquillity of mind; so that it seems in it self morally impossible either fully to attain, or constantly and uniformly to hold that Tranquillity of mind: 2. Still Mortality, Mortality, Death, and the Grave terminates this Felicity, if it only respect

this life; and the fear and pre-apprehension of such a termination sowers and allays even that Felicity, which Tranquillity of mind otherwise offers: This fear and anti∣cipation of death (as the Apostle says, Heb. 2.) detains men Captive all the days of their life, and in a great measure breaks that Tranquillity of mind, which is the con∣stituent of this Happiness. Again, though Virtue, and Virtuous actions have had their Elogia by excellent Philosophers, Orators, Poets, and we are told by them, that Si Vir∣tus oculis cerneretur, it would appear the most beautiful thing in the World; yet it hath had but few followers in respect of the rest of the World; and possibly would find a much colder entertainment, if the recom∣pence of Reward were not also propounded with it and believed: Therefore there is and must be somewhat else besides bare Plato∣nick Notions of Virtue and naked proposals of it, that must give it a conquest over the satisfaction of our Lusts and Pleasures, espe∣cially in the time of our Youth and Strength, and before old age overtake us.

And hence it is, that in all ages wise Ru∣lers and Governors have annexed sensible Rewards and Honours, and such things as have a lively and quick relish with them unto the exercise of Virtue.

And hence it is that the most wise God himself hath not propounded Virtue and Goodness to the children of men singly as its own and only Reward, but hath also pro∣mised and really and effectually provided a Recompence of Reward for it, that Hap∣piness which I have been all this while in quest after, and hath made Virtue and Goodness the way, the method to attain that happiness, which is in truth the end of it.

Upon the whole matter I therefore con∣clude that the Happiness of Mankind is not to be found in this life, but it is a flower that grows in the Garden of Eternity, and to be expected only in its full complement and fruition in that life which is to succeed after our bodily dissolution: that although Peace of Conscience, Tranquillity of mind, and the sense of the favour of God, that we enjoy in this Life, like the bunches of Grapes brought by the Spies from Canaan, are the prelibations and anticipations of our Hap∣piness, yet the complement of our Happi∣ness consists in the Beatifical Vision of the ever blessed God to all Eternity; where there is a vita perfecta, a perfect life free from Pain, from Sorrow, from Cares, from Fears, vita perfecta, a perfect life of Glory and Immortality, out of the reach or dan∣ger

of Death, or the loss of that Happiness, which we shall then enjoy in the presence of the ever Glorious God, in whose presence is fulness of Joy, and at whose right hand are Pleasures for evermore, Amen.

Notes

• * 1.1

  v. Lactant. de Opi∣fic. Dei. c. 2.