The glory of this kingdome: or A discourse by way of conference and arguments, of the happinesse and successe of former Parliaments.: With some observations upon the proceedings of this present Parliament.

THE GLORY OF THIS KINGDOME.

SIR

I Have according to my small abillity, and the the shortnesse of time fulfilled your command, in sending to y••u this briefe and plaine discourse, concerning the ancient opinions and esteeme of English Parliaments, for that was all that you desired; without any reflect••on upon the pro∣ceedings of this present Parliament: accept it only as a plaine peece of common ta••ke which I would have delivered, had I beene pre∣sent with you; such discourses had no neede of Rhetoricke.

The Constitution of our English Monarchy, is by wise men e∣steemed one of the best in Europe, as well for the strength and honour of the Prince, as the security and freedom of the People; and the Basis on which both are sounded, is the conveniency of that Councell the high Court of Parliament.

Without which, neither can the Prince enjoy that Honour and Felicity, which Phillip de Commines, a forrainer so much admires where he de ivers what advantages the Kings of England have by that representative body of their People; by whose assistance in any action they can neither want meanes, or loose reputation, nor

on the other side, can the People have any possibility of pleading their owne Rights and Liberties; For in the interim betweene Parliaments, the People are too scattered and confused a Body to appeare it vindication of their proper Interests; and by too long absence of such assemb ies they would loose all, for (as Iunius ob∣serves) Populus authoritatem suam tante non utendo amittit, sic plerumque accidit ut quod omnes curare tenentur, curet nemo quod omnibus Comissam est, nemo sibi commendatum putet.

The Peop••e sencib••y loose their power for want of useing it, for so it happens, that what all should looke after no man does, what is Committed to all, no man thinks his owne cha••g.

And in that interim it happens, those Optimates Regni (as he speakes) who under the Prince are entrusted with Government, meaneing Counsellours, Iudges, and other great Magistrates, either through feare, flatterie or private Corruption, doe after betray the Peoples R••ghts to the Prince.

The state of government standing thus. If distempered times Continnue, as they doe, (as our Chronicles have shewed some) whereby dissention betwene King and People, & the Kingdomes ruine is endangered, it doth not prove that the Eng••ish goverment is not the best, as that the best Government may be abused for in every Monarc••y how limmited soever, the Pr••nce his person is invested with s••e much Majesty, that it would seeme a mockerie in State, if there were not considerab e power entrusted into his hands, yea somuch as that if he be bad or weak he may not endan∣ger the Ruine of the Kingdome, so necessa y is it for all Humane Ordinances how wise soever, to leave somewhat to chance, and to have alwayes need of Recourse to God for his assisting and curing providence.

And though the Kingdome of England by vertue of the Go∣vernement thereof, wilbe as hardly brought into confusion as any Europe, yet there is no warrant aga••nst the Probability of it, for it was ever heretofore seen that our Parliaments were rather strength and advantage to an Honourable and a wise Prince, then a reme∣dy against a bad or weake one, or if we change the expression they were rather an excellent diet to preserve a good Reign in strength, then Physicke to Cure a bad one, and therefore have ben asmuch

Loved by sound healthy Princes, as loathed by them that were out of temper, the latter having thought them depression of their dig∣n••ty, as the former have esteemed them an advantage to their strength so that in such times onely the true convenience of that great Councell have beene perceived by England, and admired by Forraigne Authors, in other times it was that those witty com∣plaints have beene in fashion, as Sir Robert Cotton speakes of a bad time, that Princes in Parliaments are lesse then they should be, and Subjects greater but on the contrary that they have beene an advantage to Kings, the constant Seires of our Historie will shew.

1 First by those great Atcheivements which they have enabled our wise Kings to make, who were most constant in calling them and consenting to them.

2 Secondly noe one Prince was ever yet happie without the use of them.

It may therefore seeme A parrodox, that any Prince should disafect that which is so High an advantage to him, and a great wonder that some Kings of England not vitious in their dispositi∣ons, nor very shallow in their understandings, have so much kicked against Parliaments, and that such have been before, we shew what reasons may be of it: see the chartecters of some Princes, whose successe and fortunes are knowne to all that reade the Histories, as they are de••ivered by Pollidor Virgill who in his sixteenth Booke speakes thus of Henry the Third, fuit ingenio, mitti, animo magis nobili quam magno cultor religionis adversus inopes liberalis; he was of a Gent••e Nature, a minde rather Noble then great.

In his 18. Booke, thus of Edward the Second, fuit illi, natura bona in g••nium, mitte quem primo juvneeli, errore actum in leviora vitia incidentem tandem in graviora malorum consuitudiues et con∣silia traxerunt, non decreant illi animi vires si repudiatis malis sua soribus illas juste exercuisset.

He was of a good nature and mild disposition, who first by the errors and rashnesse of Youth fading into small faults, was after∣wards drawne into greater by the society and councells of wick∣ed men; there was not wanting in him strength of minde, if (a∣voyding evill councell) he could have made a just use of it.

And in his 20th Booke, thus of Richard the Second, fuit in illo spirritus non villis quem consociorum improbitas et ins••sitas extinxit He was of a spirit not ••ow nor base, but such as was quite de∣stroyed by the wickednesse and folly of unhapy consociates.

A reason of this accident may be, that their soules thought not visions have not been so large, nor their affections so publique, as their great calling hath required; but being to much mancipaid to private fancies and unhapy Favourites: and long flattered in those affections, under the specious name of firmenesse and friend∣ship (not being told of that the adequate object of a Prince, his love should be to the whole Peo le. And that they who receive publique honour should returne as publique love and care, they have too much neglected the Kingdome, and grow at last afraid to looke their faces in so true a glasse as a Parliament; And fly∣ing the remedy increase the disease, till it come to that unhapy height, that rather then acknowledg any unjust action, they strive for an unjust power to give it countenance; and so by a long con∣sequence become hardly reconcilable to a Parliamentary way.

Such Princes (though it may seeme strange) have bin a greater afliction to this Kingdome.

1. They have not beene so conscious to themselves of great crymes, and therefore not so apt to be sensible of what they have beene accidentally made to do against their People by evill Coun∣sell, whose poyson, themselves did not perfectly understand: And therefore they are more prone to suspect the People as unkind to them, then themselves as faulty, and so the more hardly drawne to prevent their Actions, or meete hartily with a Parliament as from the People, who Naturally looke with honour upon the Prince, and when they finde none or few personall vices in him (nor con∣sidering that the true vertue of Princes have a larger evtent then those of private men) will more hardly be brought to thinke (though them selves feele and suffer for it) that hee is faulty there∣fore some times (which would hardly bee beleeved if experience had not shewed it the People (have beene so rash as that to mainetaine for the King an uniust prerogative, which themselves understand not they have to their ruine and the Kings too (as it hath after prooved,) deserted that great Counsell whome them∣selves

have chosen, and by whome they could be preserved in their iust Rights, untill to late for the Kings happinesse, and there∣fore they have seene and Repented their great folly.

Such a desertion was so sadly seene at the end of that Parliament of Edward the 2. where the two Spencers were banished and the Tragicall effects that followed, when the King found so great a party both of Clergie and Laytie, as enabled him to call home againe his banished favourits, and proved fatall to so many Parliamentary Lords, as the like execution of Nobillity had never before beene seene in England, over whose graves the People wept when it was too late, and proceed, ••urther in their revenge, then became the duty and Alleagiance of Subjects.

FINIS.