Sabbatum redivivum: or The Christian sabbath vindicated;: in a full discourse concerning the sabbath, and the Lords day. Wherein, whatsoever hath been written of late for, or against the Christian sabbath, is exactly, but modestly examined: and the perpetuity of a sabbath deduced, from grounds of nature, and religious reason. / By Daniel Cawdrey, and Herbert Palmer: members of the Assembly of Divines. Divided into foure parts. 1. Of the decalogue in generall, and other laws of God, together with the relation of time to religion. 2. Of the fourth commandement of the decalogue in speciall. 3. Of the old sabbath, 4. Of the Lords day, in particular. The first part.

CHAP. VII.

Generall Considerations about Time, and its Profita∣blenesse, in Reference to Morall Acti∣ons of Importance.

THe Necessity and Morality of Solemne VVorship having been in the former Chapter discoursed of;* 1.1 We are now to take in hand the consideration of the Time, which may be, or is to be allotted to it, both generally, and for the performance of the severall kinds of Worship Noted: Driving it to this scope, to shew by the Pro∣fitablenesse that may be in a wise determination of Time for Religi∣on and Gods Solemne Worship. [That the determination of one day in seven for a Sabbath, (which we find in the fourth Commande∣ment:) is a Law substantially profitable for all men in all ages to be bound unto.] Which then, (upon the grounds formerly laid, of the Morality of such a Law, though but Positive, unlesse God be found to have clearly repealed it) if we can vindicate from the sup∣posed repeale, which some contend for, (as we believe we shall) we shall have demonstratively proved the perpetuity of that fourth Commandement in that Consideration; and gained the Principall Fort striven for in this Cause. And then the residue will be easie to be dispatched and made ours.

To this end, we suppose it convenient to discourse first,* 1.2 concer∣ning Time in generall, as it may referre to humane Actions, even Ci∣vill; and that for two Causes. 1. That hereby, if it be possible, we may gaine upon mens prejudices, and take them of, while we make it appeare, that we wrest not things about Time to our purpose be∣yond the Nature of them; but that whether we ever meddled with Religion or not; Yet the considerations we shall note, are reall and certaine even in ordinary businesses and civill affaires. And so bring∣ing our Cause before the barre of Reason and Nature (to which our adversaries have appealed, from the words of the Scrip∣ture,) we may take from them all evasions, and wayes of shifting. 2. That hereby the whole matter may be more cleare and distinct, for every one to conceive and beare away; when it is first set down

generally with an Application to Civill Actions, and afterward particularly shewed to agree to matters of Religion and Gods So∣lemne VVorship.

* 1.3And if in the former part we shall seeme to some, somewhat too curious in spinning out distinctions and divisions, we crave a respite of such censure, untill we have added our Application: wherein it will appeare, that not one of all those divisions, how nice so ever it seems, but hath some Profitable (not to say Necessary) Vse, toward the clearing, and giving light to, this most important controversie. On the contrary, if we be charged by others to tautologize in our Application of things to Religion in the following part; We wish such to consider, that many of the Notions being New, and not of ordinary observation; it may be more excusable to say some things a 2d. time over, which pregnant wits might have sufficiently un∣derstood and remembred by once mentioning them, then by a sin∣gle mention of any thing of importance, to endanger the loosing of any ordinary readers apprehension or memory, in a discourse of such length and weight as this is. These things thus premised, we fall to our worke, to scanne the Nature of Time in reference to Hu∣mane and Morall Actions.

* 1.4Time generally considered, is a naturall adjunct, and circumstance accompanying Humane Actions of what kind soever. But yet such a circumstance, as hath, (according as it may be ordered) a reall, as I may say, a substantiall influence into the businesses, for which such Action is performed; and so may be substantially Profitable unto the maine businesse; even according to naturall reason, and in a constant course; supposing the businesse not to be effected by one single and momentaneous Action.

* 1.5Which reallity of the effect of Time toward Morall Actions, be∣ing not observed, or not regarded by disputers in this Cause, hath bred much confusion, and occasioned manifold mistakes: as ap∣peares, even by that one most common Assertion of all the adversa∣ries. [That Time and Place are equall circumstances in Religion,] Which how false it is, and how prejudiciall, not to our Cause only, but to Religion it selfe; If we doe not (anon) demonstrate be∣yond the possibility of any reasonable deniall, we shall despaire of ever prevailing in the Cause we have undertaken. But on the con∣trary, if we shall make manifest (as we are confident, by God

helpe, we shall) That the one (namely Time) is of exceeding im∣portance in Religion, even without respect to any particular institu∣tion or determination of it from God or man; and for that cause, cal∣ling necessarily for some determination, which, if wisely ordered, and strongly authorised, makes it undeniably and most singularly profita∣ble to the soule and spirit, and so to Religion. And that the other, namely Place, to have nothing at all of importance in it toward the soule and spirit, beyond the Naturall and Physicall conveniencies of the body, (except 1. the Typicall references of Places, expresly com∣manded by God himselfe, as the Tabernacle and Temple: And 2. the Memoriall of any act of Gods providence, or the like, at Gods appointment, or from the institution of men, which are meerly acci∣dentall things, and wherein also Time doth fully match Place, having been as well as it allotted to the same purposes, while withall, we say, it exceeds it, beyond all proportion in other respects) VVe hope we shall have gotten so main an advantage in our Cause, as that we shall very much prevent all possibility of future Reply.

VVe say then, That Time being considerable in Philosophie,* 1.6 un∣der a double Predicament: One is that of Quantitie, or the Pro∣portion of Time; which again hath a double respect, 1. Of Continu∣ance so long together; 2. Of Revolution so often againe. The other is that of Quando, or the season of Time: Hence ariseth a three∣fold common affection, or respect of Time, observable in every acti∣on or businesse:

• 1. Quamdiu? The extent of Time,* 1.7 How long together it is continued?
• 2. Quoties? The frequencie of Revolution,* 1.8 How often it is re∣iterated and repeated?
• 3. Quando? The season or order of Time, VVhen it is begun?* 1.9

VVe say, the season when it is begun; for the season when it is ended, belongs properly to the Continuance, or Quamdiu.

Now each of these respects of Time may be conceived,* 1.10 either ac∣cording to denomination of Divisions, taken either 1. from Nature; 2. Or from Art; 3. Or from Accident. 1. From Nature, as yeers, moneths, dayes, which are distinctions of Time observable in Na∣ture. 2. From Art, as houres and minutes, into which, not Nature,

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

but Art divides Time. (And to these, for the avoyding of an un∣certain dispute, we are content to adde Weekes. Though there be some great Scholars that have given more then an intimation, that the division of Time by Weekes (that is, by seven dayes) is a more exact Naturall division according to Dayes, then either Moneths or Yeeres. But this we leave for the present to those Authors to main∣taine.) 3. From Accident, as any remarkable thing past, or which may occasionally happen, or continue; and the like. We may, and doe often speak of the Respects of Time, according to such Accidents: As of the Continuance, while such a thing continued; and the Fre∣quencie, as oft as such a thing hapned, (or the time came about, wherein it hapned) and of the Beginning, when such a thing fell out, and the like. And whensoever we speak any thing distinctly of any respect of Time, we doe and must needs speak of it in some or other of these phrases, denominating it so by Naturall, or Artificiall, or Accidentall divisions. 3. Also one and the same denomination may sometime be applied to all the respects of Time in a distinct and se∣verall consideration: As to say, Such a man stayes at home on Fri∣dayes, implies 1. the continuance, all day: 2. The frequencie, every week: 3. the order, which day of the week.

* 1.114. Moreover, Time, in each of the forenoted respects, is further considerable two wayes: 1. As indefinite and indeterminate: 2. As definite and determinate.

And either way according to a double limit or terme, in regard of which it may be determined or not, which we may call

• 1. Initiall.
• 2. Conclusive.

The Initiall terme or limit of the

• Quamdiu, or Continuance, is the least or shortest that is or may be for that action or businesse.
• Quoties, or Frequencie, is the seldomest Revolution.
• Quando, or Season, is the latest Beginning.

Contrarily, the Conclusive limit or terme of the

• Quamdiu, is the longest Continu∣ance.
• Quoties, or Frequencie, is the oftenest Revolution.
• Quand••, or the Season, is the soonest Beginning.

Also between these Termes there is great latitude oftimes, and much variety of degrees in each of the respects of Time fore∣mentioned.

Now by Time indeterminate, we understand,* 1.12 that which is altoge∣gether uncertaine in any respect, before the action to which it belongs is performed: uncertaine for the Continuance, untill the action be finished: uncertain for the Frequencie, (whether oftner then once) till a man actually goe about the action or businesse a second time, and so forward: and uncertain for the Season, when it shall be be∣gun or gone about, till the very instant of setling upon it. And such indeterminate Time is observable, in the severall respects of Time, in many actions, and businesses of severall kindes.

By determinate Time (contrarily) we understand, That,* 1.13 which before the action is performed, is appointed out in any respect for that action or businesse: which may be from a threefold Efficient:

• 1. The Nature of the Action.
• 2. The Command of a Superior.
• 3. A mans own peremptory Resolution.

1. Sometimes the nature of the action,* 1.14 or businesse to be perfor∣med, determines the Time beforehand, in one or more of the respects; when according to Nature it cannot be done, But 1. in such a continuance of time: as a man cannot read over a Chapter of such length, but in a proportionable continuance of Time spent in it. And so, 2. when the businesse in Nature is not dispatched by one action, how much Time soever a man allot to it: as some Land must be ploughed over more then once, or else it will bear no good Corn. And likewise, 3. when the businesse is lost, if not begun at such a season: as they say of the gathering of Saffron, if it be not taken in the just day, it is lost. All these are determinations by the Nature of the action or businesse in it selfe.

2. Sometimes Superiors,* 1.15 having sufficient authority to oblige to the observation of any respect of Time, doe accordingly (at their pleasure) determine it, and command inferiors to apply it answer∣ably to such action or businesse as they assigne.

3.* 1.16 Somteimes a mans own peremptory resolution determines the respects of Time (for any action or businesse) to himselfe. And these two latter doe specially make Time to be properly called determi∣nate.

And now although it be true, that, when an action is once done, or a businesse finisht, it is all one, in Naturall reason, whether the Time belonging to it were antecedently indeterminate, or determinate, as being then exactly equall one to another, and as exactly measu∣rable or computable one to the other. Yet is there between them before-hand, even in Civill actions, a great and remarkable diffe∣rence, (namely, as much as between may and must) for which they deserve to be carefully observed and distinguished into their natures and degrees.

* 1.17To begin with indeterminate Time. The nature of this is, to be meerly an attendant upon actions and businesse, and a meere circum∣stance. Necessary indeed, but not in any Ethicall or Morall con∣sideration, but meerly Physicall and Naturall (as a shadow is a ne∣cessary, that is, a naturall attendant upon any body in the sun∣shine) in as much as it is simply impossible in Nature to performe any action, without the concomitance and attendance of Time. But on the other hand, the nature of determinate Time is, to be a commander of businesse, requiring the aitendance of such actions as are for the businesse. And it is as necessary Ethically to performe some such actions according to the determinations of Times, as it is Physically to have some Time to accompany actions.

But withall it is to be observed, and the observation will prove of much weight (as we shall see) That even indeterminate Time, to some businesses, (and namely such as admit of variety of degrees) may prove a circumstance of much importance to the ad∣vancement, or disappointment of a mans end in his actions, even ac∣cording to Reason and Nature, and in an ordinary and constant course. We will instance in the businesse of Learning, which to at∣taine to, is a Students businesse, and his end, (though not ultimate) and unquestionably admits of great varietie of degrees. And toward it divers actions are directed, as attendants on his Masters or Tu∣tours teaching, and to give him account of his learning; and con∣versing with his Fellow-Scholars, or Fellow-Pupils, or Fellow-Students, in acts and exercises of Learning, Disputations, and Ora∣tions, and the like: As also studying, reading, and meditating by himselfe,* 1.18 for his further progresse and increase in Learning.

Now to all this we say, even Indeterminate Time may in some respects be of much importance towards the furtherance or hin∣derance

of his businesse of Learning, according as any voluntarily (without any antecedent determination) applies himselfe, and im∣ployes his Time. Namely, this is true of the two first respects of Time, the Quamdiu, or Continuance, and the Quoties, or Fre∣quencie, (which are the two affections of the Quantity or Propor∣tion of Time.) These are in themselves, though indeterminate, very materiall, and as we may say, substantiall circumstances in the busi∣nesse of Learning. But it is not so with the Quando, or season of Beginning. For take that altogether indeterminately, and it is of no value or efficacie at all, to the speeding, or putting back of Learning, that is, not in it selfe, though, perhaps it may be somewhat by acci∣dent. A little further to explaine these things, will be worth our paines: and so we will consider each of these respects severally, as also joyn the two first together, as far as they agree in this Obser∣vation in hand.

Here then, 1. we affirm, that [the Quamdiu, or continuance of Time,* 1.19 even altogether Indeterminate and uncertain before-hand, and only prolonged by a mans own will, according to present affections and oc∣casions, or shortened accordingly, doth answerably promote a mans Learning, or defeat it.] For infallibly, the longer (supposing his bodily spirits not tyred) a Student continues attending his Tutour, and receiving directions and instructions from him, or exercising him∣selfe with others in matter of Learning, or hearing them, or studying by himselfe; and so in any of these (or all these) continues the pur∣suit of Learning, the more he prospers: and the lesse while he con∣tinues, the lesse he advances in such learning. So that a man may both foretell of two Students of equall capacitie, (and opportunity of helps) that he who hath bestowed, even altogether voluntarily, and without any antecedent determination, a longer Time, such Day, upon Learning, hath gotten more that Day, then the other that be∣stowed lesse Time. As also by observing the progresse of two such, any Day, he may, even without all examination which of them con∣tinued longest at his study, (or with his Tutour, and the like) con∣clude and pronounce demonstratively, That he who hath profited most, did continue longest; and he who hath profited lesse, did con∣tinue a shorter time.

2. We say the like of the Quoties, or reiteration of Time,* 1.20 even altogether uncertaine and indeterminate, (till a mans own minde

made him voluntarily returne to his study) That the frequencie of such returne to study, and to his Tutour for helpe, and the like; or the seldomnesse of it, doth exceedingly set forward, or keep back a mans Learning. For infallibly, he that reiterates it every day, twise a day, (or so) prospers and goes on; and he that returnes to it but once or twise a week, or moneth, or yeere, makes little or nothing of it in comparison: Other things being equall, as we touched before. So that here again a man may both foretell and judge infallibly be∣tween two, (otherwise equall) which is or will be the better Pro∣ficient, namely he that is more frequent in returning to his study, and he the worse that reiterates it (remarkably) seldomer. Also by discerning their different progresse, he may without examination say demonstratively, Such an one studied more Dayes in a Week, or Moneth, or Yeere; and such an one fewer.

* 1.213. Insomuch, as taking these two Considerations of Time to∣gether, they are the usuall Periphrasis of a good Scholar or Student, [He is one that continues and keeps close to his study for a good while together, when he is at it; and is diligent in returning to it constantly day by day, Or in going often to his Tutour, or frequent∣ing Acts and Exercises, and the like, whereby Learning is gotten.]

* 1.224. Withall, it is not to be forgotten, That even such [Voluntary applying of Time indeterminately, much, or little together, and often, or seldome] where there is no necessary or just impediment, is a most evident and undeniable demonstration, what speciall affection a man hath to Learning, much, or little. Neither is it almost possible for a man to expresse his own love (or anothers) to Learning, or want of love to it but by imploying at least somewhat about the Propor∣tion of Time; the Continuance, long, or short; and the Reiterati∣on, often, or seldome, for such imployment.

* 1.235. Finally, This application of the continuance and frequencie of Time to any thing, hath so great an influence into all businesse of importance, that we usually count a man wise, or unwise, according to the spending of his Time, (even voluntary) Reckoning him vain and light-headed, that setles not for any remarkable continuance, to some one businesse or other; or that pursues one thing to day, and another thing to morrow, and a third thing the third day, and so returnes not in any frequencie to the same imployment, particular or generall. And esteeming him wise, that doth the contrary.

But now, none of all this will be found concerning the Quando,* 1.24 or season of beginning, any Time, to set to study, or the like, volun∣tarily and indeterminately, It is not at all of any importance, that is, not in it selfe, though by accident perhaps it may be somewhat, as was touched before. By accident, we say, it may be of some im∣portance, and that in three cases specially. 1. When his body, and bodily spirit may be more fit, or unfit, by beginning sooner, or later, at this houre, or that. 2. When at such or such a season, a man may have more or lesse helpe, from his Tutour, or others, then at another time. 3. When the delay, or hastening the beginning to study, fals in with, or crosses the other respects of Time forespoken of, (which are in themselves of importance) as when a man thereby shall have liberty and opportunity, or not, to continue longer, or reiterate oftener his study, and the advantages of getting Learning. But all these are accidentall things, and not constant to such seasons of Time; wherein indeterminately and voluntarily study may be begun, or a Student may repaire to his Tutour, or the like.

And so setting aside such Accidentall Considerations, It will, we say, appeare, that in the Quando, or beginning of Time, (according to any denomination of Nature, as this or that Day; or of Art, this or that Houre, as we spake before) there is no materiality at all to∣ward the advantage, or disadvantage of Learning. One part of Time (according to which, every moment, a new Quando begins, wherein a man, if he please, may begin to study) is as behovefull as another, one Minute as another, one Houre as another, one Day as another, and none more then another. So that here a man can neither rationally foretell, nor conclude any thing, (as he might in the former respects) what Progresse, much or little, a man hath made: Nor 2. whether more or lesse, compared with another, who begun at another season, sooner or later: Not yet 3. what Affection he hath to Learning; For a man may sometimes begin to study in the Morning early, meerly by having nothing else to busie himselfe in at that season; and he may forbeare to begin, not for want of affection, but through interruptions of other businesse: Nor 4. by seeing any ones progresse in Learning, can it be judged (unlesse from some accidentall thing withall) what Day or Houre he began to study; or which Houre or Day he took for study, out of any num∣ber, if he intermitted any. And so 5. in conclusion, it appeares, that

the Quando, or Season of beginning (at this or that particular Time) indeterminately, and voluntarily (without respect to some accident that may fall in with it) is a thing meerly indifferent, and no matter of wisedome, or importance at all toward Learning, or any other like businesse.

Which difference, between the Quando or beginning of Time even indeterminate, and the other two respects, of the quantity or proportion of Time, the Continuance and the Frequencie, must be re∣membred against hereafter. For it will be of speciall use, to more purposes then one.

* 1.25And so we proceed to the consideration of Time determinate, and specially as it is determinate by the command of another; or by a mans owne peremptory resolution. And so the determination of the Affections or Respects of Time admits of a double difference, name∣ly in regard

• 1. Of the Respects themselves.
• 2. Of the manner of determination.

* 1.26In regard of the respects themselves, Time may be determined.

• 1. In any one of these respects, sin∣gle.
• 2. In any two of them joyntly.
• 3. In all three of them together.

1. There may be a determination of any one of these affections of Time single, the other being left undetermined, as—

• * 1.271. Of the Quamdiu, or Continuance, alone, saying, [Let an houre together be bestowed on study] not determining whe∣ther more then once, or when for the season.
• 2. Of the Quoties, or Reiteration alone, saying, [Every day bestow Time on study] not determining how long at once, or what houre.
• 3. Of the Quando, or Season of beginning alone, saying, [At seven in the morning begin to study] not determining how long to continue, or whether oftener then that one day.

* 1.282. There may be a determination of any two of these respects of Time joyntly, and the third left undetermined, as—

• 1. Of the Continuance and Frequencie joyntly [Let an hour•• together each day bestowed on study,] not determining at what houre to begin.
• 2. Of the Continuance and Beginning joyntly [Let an ho•••••• together beginning at seven in the morning be bestowed study.] not determinating whether oftener then that one
• 3. Of the Frequencie and Beginning joyntly [Every day be∣gin at seven in the morning to set about study,] not determi∣ning how long to continue.

3. Likewise there may be a determination,* 1.29 of all the three Re∣spects of Time together, saying [Let an houre together each day, be∣ginning at seven in the morning be bestowed on study.]

Again,* 1.30 in regard of the manner of determination of these Affections or Respects of Time, (any of them or all of them) there are con∣siderable differences, for it maybe

• 1. Remisse and at large.
• 2. Strict and exact.

A remisse determination,* 1.31 is when Time (in any of the respects) is so determined in some Generall expression, as that both the termes or limits are left undetermined, as to appoint—

• 1. For the Continuance [Let a good while, or a little while to∣gether be bestowed on study] not determining how long, or how little while, clearly.
• 2. For the Frequencie [Often, or seldome, bestow Time upon study,] not determining how often, or how seldome, particu∣larly.
• 3. For the Season [Begin betimes, or late to set about study,] not determining, how early or how late, distinctly.

A Strict and Exact determination, contrarily is,* 1.32 when both the limits are (or at least one of them is) so particularly and punctually exprest as no doubt can be made, how long or short, often or sel∣dome, early or late, is required for study by the determination, as namely, in all those mentioned, of one respect single, or two, or all three.

Yet againe, this strict and punctuall determination, admits of some variety, for it may be three fold;

• 1. Initiall.
• 2. Conclusive.
• 3. Exclusive.

We call that an Initiall determination,* 1.33 when the Initiall terme of

the Respects of Time, is expresly mentioned and determined, that it must be so long, so often, and so soone, and no lesse while, nor no seldomer, no not later; But yet with an intimation, that somewhat more is (and will be) required, in each respect, or in any, by some other determination, though not by this.

* 1.34On the other side, we call that a Conclusive determination, which though it forbids not, more then the determination Names for Con∣tinuance, Frequencie, or soone beginning. Yet strictly commands no longer, nor no oftener, nor no sooner, only commands so long without faile, and so often, and so soone, and forbids a shorter Con∣tinuance, a seldomer revolution, and a later beginning.

* 1.35Also we call that an Exclusive determination, which both affirma∣tively and negatively, by way both of command and prohibition, prescribes so peremptorily the limits on all sides, as that nothing is allowed on any respect otherwise then is exprest. As that the Continu∣ance must be so long infallibly, and no longer, as well as no losse while; and the Frequencie so often, and no oftener, as well as no seldomer; and the Beginning, on that season, or point of Time, and no sooner, as well as no later, according to the direct words of the Determination, as to say [Bestow six houres upon study] every moneth, the first of the moneth, from six in the morning, till noone, without variation, augmentation or diminution.

* 1.36After all, it is to be observed, concerning all these determinations of Time in any respect. That every one of them may upon the pleasure of the determiner, (if it be a Superiour) either declared concurrently with the determination, or any Time after, admit of a Reservation, or dispensation, for some particular thing or occasion, which may interrupt somewhat the determination, in any respect, according to the manifestation of such pleasure or allowance of his: And for the residue, the determination may remaine firme and obligatory to all purposes. As a Master may determine his scholar to study a whole weeke together every day, from six in the morning, to six at night, and yet admit the interruption of meale Times, and such like occasions of necessity.

* 1.37And now, having thus layd downe the maine distinctions that belong to Time generally considered; We come to make further way, toward our scope, by considering the speciall profitablenesse of determinate Time in one or two, or all the three Respects; and that

in a threefold Gradation, sutable to the steps we have already troden. 1. The profitablenesse (or even necessity) of having any determina∣tion of Time at all, for any humane businesse, and namely for Lear∣ning, to keepe still to that instance. 2. What kind of determinati∣on of any one of the respects of Time, single, or of any two of them ioyntly, or of all three of them together, is profitable (or necessa∣ry) for it? 3. What manner of determination, Remisse, or Exact, Initiall, Conclusive or Exclusive, is specially profitable (or necessa∣ry) towards it, according to the rules of Naturall Reason and ex∣perience.

The first of these is discernable by the Causes, that shew gene∣rally a profitablenesse, (and even a necessity for some persons at least) of having some determination of Time for Learning, or any such like businesse. Which Causes may be reduced to 5. Heads. And one or other of them is perpetually to befound in all wise determi∣nations of Time for any businesse whatsoever; and commonly di∣vers of them concurre to the profitablenesse, and specially to the necessity of such determination.

1. The importance (and specially the necessity) of the businesse;* 1.38 learning to be attained by a professed Scholar or student, is the fun∣damentall ground of a wise and profitable determination of any respect of time for it. This makes it worthy to have time set apart for it, which else were vaine and foolish.

2. The impossibility of attending that businesse,* 1.39 the pursuite of Learning, Sufficiently, together with other businesses, (also important and necessary in their nature and degree,) at the same instance of Time: Each of them taking up the whole Man for the while: This is a further Recommendation of the convenience and Profitable∣nesse, of some Determination of Time, at least for one of those busi∣nesses, and namely for that which is most important, (as we suppose Learning to be a professed Student) that that may be so farre secured thereby, and then in the residue of Time the other businesse (or businesses) may also be conveniently attended.

3. The unwillingnesse of minde in such,* 1.40 whom that most impor∣tant businesse concernes, to be at all (or sufficiently) conversant in it; (which unwillingnesse is found often enough in sundry professed Schollers and Students) Recommends not onely as profitable, but as Necessary (equally with the necessity of that businesse of learning,

to such spirits,) that there be some determination of time allotted to it: and namely such, as may conveniently Secure and Promote the at∣tainment of necessary learning for them.

* 1.414. The danger of interruptions, preventing the setting about such businesse (of learning) or calling of from it, when one is about it: (Even such interruptions, as are unworthy to hinder or divert, & yet are apt to be allowed by minds not over desirous of pursuing learn∣ing;) addes to the Profitablenesse (and necessity) of some determina∣tion of Time for it; which may forbid, and so disappoint, the admit∣ting of any such unnecessary preventions and interruptions of lear∣ning, and study.

* 1.425. The want of Wisdom, to resolve steadily upon the sudden, and Iudge constantly at the instant, what Time or Times are necessary or sufficient to be imployed for the Attainment of Learning, and to leave sufficient for other businesses; Makes up not the profit only, but also the necessity of having a convenient determination of Time for Learning. Whereby both the Ʋnwilling may be put from his frivolous excuses, and vaine pretences, whereby he would cover his unwillingnesse: As also a Man willing to share his Time prudently between his variety of Businesses, may not be disquieted (as other∣wise he would often be, whether he studied or studied not) but his minde may now rest satisfied, that there is a faire allotment of Time for his chiefest businesse of Learning; as also conveinent roome left for other businesses of importance, which may be shared among them either determinately again, or otherwise, as occasions are. These are the causes that recommend as Profitable, or even cal for as Necessary, some determination to be made for some persons, in matter of learning, either by themselves, or by some Superiour over them.

* 1.43In the next place to speake of the kindes of determination in re∣gard of the respects of times themselves. It is to be considered,

1. That those respects of Time, which have in them a Mate∣riality, and Substantiality, toward the businesse of Learning; when they are but Voluntarily, and Indeterminately Applied to it (as hath been shewed of the Quamdiu or Continuance, and the Quoties or Frequency) as they cannot loose of their Validity, by being deter∣mined (if it be wisely done in regard of degrees) so may they un∣doubtedly be Profitably determined: and upon the former supposi∣tions must be Necessarily (and that whether we take them singly,

or jointly, as we shall see by and by) For such a Determination, wisely ordered, makes the Profit that may arise from the observa∣tion of such proportions of Time, Certaine, which was before (in the most willing) Contingent, because of the hazard of interrup∣tions, or want of wisdome: and in the Ʋnwilling, was not to be hoped, would be had at all, because it is certaine without some de∣termination, they would not observe any such Times at all.

2. But now for the Quando, the Season (or Order) of beginning:* 1.44 As we have shewed that there is no Validity or Efficacy in it (ex∣cept by Accident) towards a mans benefiting himselfe in learning, (or any like businesse) so it is observable, that a determination of it, is no further Profitable (or much lesse Necessary) or capable of any exercise of Wisdom about the degrees of it, then so far as it may ap∣pear that any Accidentall respect, doth or will make it serviceable, and beneficiall: As having (or being likely to have) 1. More free∣dome and better temper of Spirits at that season then at another: Or 2. Better help and lesse interruption: Or 3. Better security of observing the other respects of continuance and frequency, being be∣fore Profitably determined. Unto which last purpose, although it seem necessary, that there be some determination of the Quando or Season, as to the observing of an hour certainly every morning for study, it seemes in a sort necessary to determine the particular houre, least it else be slipped: Yet in exact consideration, this needs not absolutely be done beforehand, by another, or ones selfe: For even the nature of the former determination doth it thus far sufficiently, that even it determines the last houre, if a former were not observed. And so still the determination of this or that particular Quando, or season (or order) of beginning is of it selfe of no substantiall profit toward Learning, or any such like businesse.

3. Whence it followes clearly,* 1.45 That whereas a determination of the Continuance and Frequencie of Time for Learning, cannot be altered in any remarkable degree, without an answerable altera∣tion in the profit of it, (whether more or lesse according as the deter∣mination now is;) and so being once wisely made, remaines con∣stantly so farre forth profitable for Learning: It is quite otherwise with the season or order of Time. For of the determination of that, there may be a remarkeable alteration, (as from the last houre to the first, or from the second day to the sixth, or the like;) and yet no

alteration at all in the profit of it: There being still as much advan∣tage, (substantially in the Continuance and Frequencie unaltered, and accidentally in the new season determined) for the getting of Learning as there was before. And so, if any new accident recom∣mend a new season, in the least degree, it may without any preju∣dice at all to the maine businesse be removed to that; while yet the determination of the Continuance and Frequencie is suffered to re∣maine, because of the constant profitablenesse of it.

* 1.464. In a businesse, which requires intention of mind in the pursuite of it (as it is most unquestionably in matter of Learning) a determi∣nation of the Continuance in some sort largely, is certainly profita∣ble; and moreover it is even necessary, that it be determined in so large a proportion as may conveniently satisfie the intendment of the occasion: (if it were but even once, and so one single Continuance determined without any joynt Frequencie or revolution) even as much as any one single Continuance can. Neither can any such Con∣tinuance be too largely determined, unlesse a mans naturall Spirits will not hold out to the whole length of the Continuance, or that some other businesse of present necessity should call for a share, du∣ring that Continuance: (Both which cases may yet perhaps be sa∣tisfied by a Reservation made for them, and so the determination of the Continuance may hold on notwithstanding.) But except those cases, we say againe, that the determination of a large Continuance is most mainly profitable (and necessary) even the largest that can be; by reason. 1. That the mind is not alwayes in temper readily to ap∣prehend the Notions of Learning, even when a man sets himselfe to it; comming newly from other businesse which hath filled his head and heart with conceptions different enough from that which he now setles to: And so if he have not a convenient. Continuance de∣termined, he may get little or nothing at all at that Time, being ta∣ken off againe before his mind fixes strongly and throughly upon the matter. 2. For that also divers peeces of the businesse of Learning are difficult enough: So as if a man have not a conveniently large Continuance, to digest the Notions throughly, he may soone loose and forget, even those which he seemed to have gotten; and even though his returnes to his study should be very frequent. Short snatches and sudden fits, how often soever reiterated doe (in experi∣ence) make a student but a slow proficient. Neither indeed do we

usually count a man a good student, that doth not allot, (or at least voluntarily imploy,) a considerable Continuance of Time to it, how often soever he takes up a booke in his hand to study, or makes fre∣quent returnes to it, as well as frequent interruptions from it.

The same profitablenesse (and even necessity) of a very large Con∣tinuance determined is evident, where a businesse calls for varie∣ty of actions toward the advancement of it: As for a students progresse in Learning to attend upon another to read to him and in∣struct him, Also 2. to attend, and beare part in disputes and con∣ferences, and other exercises of Learning, private and publike (ac∣cording to opportunities,) And 3. specially to study alone, reade and meditate and write by himselfe: All these require the largest Continuance that may be, to secure and promote the generall busi∣nesse of Learning, by affording a convenient space, not only for the prosecuting of each of these, but also for the drawing out of every one of them so competently as to make the mind a gainer in Lear∣ning by them all, severally and joyntly.

5. Furthermore, as where the businesse is permanently of importance,* 1.47 & not wholly dispatcht by one attendance upon it, how long so ever the Continuance be extended; (As it is with the businesse of Learning to the professed Scholar, which is still of as much importance and ne∣cessity as ever;) There it is profitable (and even necessary) that there be some determination of the Frequencie of Revolution, such namely as may conveniently secure and promote the businesse of Learning; as was in part toucht before: So we are to observe more particu∣larly; That, where the businesse is also liable to decay, and to be put backward (as well as capable of advancement) Which cannot be denied in matter of Learning, a man may loose as well as gaine, de∣crease as increase in it: There it is profitable (and necessary) to have a determination of very great Frequency of returnes to it, even as Frequent as can be imagined compatible with other necessary busi∣nesses; [As to say with the Painter nulla dies sine linea,] a Frequen∣cie of every day, or twise every day:* 1.48 even although by reason of o∣ther necessary businesses, which must also have their Times and Turns as often, it be convenient not to make any determination of the Con∣tinuance at all, (or at least only Remisse) with these so frequent returnes, but leave that to occasions, which even so will sometimes serve to afford a man that is any thing willing to follow Learning,

faire Continuance to attend it, when he is once at it, and so make by fits a very remarkable gaine, when interruptions call him not off, for a good while together, as now and then it will happen. However, the very Frequencie of Returnes will greatly help to prevent much decay in Learning, and keep him in breath toward it, and in it. Specially if there be (besides this single determinati∣on of so great Frequencie) added a joint determination of a conve∣nient large Continuance, with a convenient frequent Returne: Of which our next Consideration is to speak.

* 1.496. And upon the former suppositions of the importance of the businesse of Learning permanently, and its requiring intention of mind to get and retaine the notions of it, when one is about it, and prevent decayes afterward, it cannot be denied, but such a joint de∣termination of a large Continuance frequently, is profitable and ne∣cessary for it, besides the single determination of the great Fre∣quencie forementioned: Or else, considering the Unwillingnesse, and danger of Interruptions, and want of Wisedome forenoted; There will be not only no considerable advancement in the businesse of Learning, but infallible decayes also, though perhaps not great∣ly sensible soon, yet after a while discernable to every eye that looks after it. Withall it is to be noted, that such a joint determination of a large Continuance, with frequencie of Returne, cannot but be [The chiefe determination of Time] for the prosecution of that businesse of Learning,* 1.50 that is, the most substantially-profitable deter∣mination of all other, supposing the degrees of both be rightly or∣dered, in reference to mens naturall abilities to hold out so long at once, and other necessary businesses to admit of so frequent a con∣tinuance to be determined for that. We say, such a determination is the most substantially-profitable of all other, as having in a just and convenient proportion the strength of both the profitable respects of Time, the Continuance and Frequencie joyned. And so the Time accordingly determined by it, may fitly be termed, [The necessary and ordinarily sufficient cheife Time determinate for Learning.] As without which no other Time is sufficient, nor any other extra∣ordinary Time, so necessary for the generall businesse of Learning; and the necessary ordinary Time every day, being not so chiefe a Time for gaine in Learning, as wanting a determination of the Continu∣ance with all. This then, being wisely determined, must needs be

the chiefe Time, and is both necessary, and for the chiefe Time, ordi∣narily sufficient. Therefore it is very considerable, by what Rules of Wisedome it may be made. Of which, besides what we have im∣plied already, of the holding out of naturall abilities so long, and other businesses not refusing so frequent a Continuance, to be de∣termined for this one businesse of Learning; We have a particular Consideration to adde, On which side the waight should be put in this joint determination, whether on the side of the Continuance to de∣termine the largest Continuance that may be, with a convenient Frequencie, or a very great Frequencie with a lesse or shorter Con∣tinuance? Of which we thus propound our apprehensions.

7. Where the businesse requires various actions towards the ad∣vancement of it,* 1.51 and each of them requires intention of mind to a right performance of it, as it is evidently with the businesse of Lear∣ning, as hath been noted; And that withall there are divers other businesses of importance, which must have also frequently their just spaces allotted to them: There, of the two, it is more profitable in both considerations, (of promoting Learning, and serving others occasions and businesses) to have the determination weigh most upon the side of the Continuance, and make that as large as may be, with some competent Frequencie, rather then to make the Returne more frequent, with a remarkably shorter Continuance. This, we conceive, may easily be made good, if we suppose any proportion of Time, in the whole equall, to be divided first between a large Continuance, and lesse Frequencie; 2 between a shorter Continuance, and greater Frequencie. As for instance: A whole Day, of ten or twelve houres, or more, as a mans naturall spirits are able to hold, (even with the reservation of a dining time, if he will) will be more profitable for the advancement of Learning, though but with a determination of a scanty Revolution, once in a Week, (remembring withall the former supposition of a single determina∣tion of some Time every Day, or even twise a Day) then to share those ten or twelve houres between five, or six, or seven Dayes in a Week, and so make each Day to have but between an houre and two houres continuance at the most: For the former shall have full scope for all variety of actions forenamed toward Learning, and for his mind to settle it selfe fully to improve each of them: The other can only meddle with one or two at the most, to doe any good of it, and

oftentimes shall find the greatest part of his Continuance spent, be∣fore he can throughly bring his mind to fix upon it to any purpose. And if we suppose a lesse Continuance, still the thing will be more cleare. Also on the other hand, considering other businesses, it will be far the more profitable determination, to take the chiefe Time for Study and Learning, at one large Continuance lesse frequent, then with more frequent revolutions and returnes of lesse Continuance: For the frequent returnes, though with the continuance of no more then an houre at once, (or even lesse) would prove very often great∣ly prejudiciall to those other important businesses; and so hazard either the disappointing of them, or the trenching upon the deter∣mined houres for Learning: whereas the larger Continuance, and lesse frequent returnes, would have been more out of danger both wayes, and prevented the inconvenience of either incroaching upon the other.

* 1.528. Where the businesse equally concernes divers, who live in a neer∣nesse one to another, and so may, (and accordingly should) help one another; and contrariwise may possibly interrupt and hinder one an∣other: As it is with Scholars in a Schoole, or Students in an Uni∣versitie: There, as the common concernment of the businesse equally recommends as profitable (and necessary) the same joynt determina∣tion (upon the former suppositions of consistencie with Naturall spirits, and other necessary occasions) from that known Axiome, [A quatenus ad omne valet consequentia:] And the cause being the same to all, brings forth the same effect for all. So is it Profitable and even Necessary (from those accidentall occasions) to have not only some Quando, Season (or Order) of Beginning, determined with the Continuance and Frequencie, and so make a compleat determination of all the three Respects of Time together: But also to have the selfe same; as the same Day in a Week or Moneth, the same Houre of the Day, and the like, for Beginning, and so to run along toge∣ther till the end of the Continuance; at least so far forth as may secure the possibility of helping one another in Learning, and prevent the hindering one of another; In that all, from the first to the last, are to be so busied about Learning, as none is allowed to interrupt another, or admit of an interruption from another wholly out of the way of Learning. Thus far, we say, a determination of the Quan∣do, the Season, or Order of Beginning, may also be profitably deter∣mined,

with the other respects of Continuance and Frequencie: and when it is so, then is it a most compleat determination, which is so made of all three, for the kinde of it: Though still for the degree (or particularity) of the Quando, Season, or Order, there is no speciall profitablenesse in this, or that; but another might, and would have done as well.* 1.53

In the third and last place, we must also say somewhat, what manner of determination may be conceived profitable, of any of the forementioned kinds. We say then,

1. Where the businesse is of so chiefe importance, all a mans life time, as that the more it prospers, the better it is with a man, (as it is in point of Learning, with a professed Scholar) There, an exclusive determination cannot be profitable, (much lesse necessary) relating to the generality, or whole, of the businesse of Learning, (how large soever the proportions be made either for Continuance or Frequencie) as that a man may never look after Learning, longer at once, nor oftener, nor sooner, then the determinations expresse. Though for some particular cases, by accident, (as to a sickly man, or in the fore∣sight of some other businesse of speciall waight) it may possible be fit, and even necessary.* 1.54

2. Where there is wisedome to make a determination, and not to trench upon other necessary businesse; There it is (so far) very pro∣fitable to make at least an initiall determination, clearly of so much Continuance, and no lesse while together; and so often Returnes, and no seldomer, (and even of so soon, and no later Beginning.) And upon the former suppositions of Unwillingnesse, and danger of In∣terruptions, and want of present Wisedome at all instants, it is even necessary to make at least such an initiall determination. For so (and so only) shall the unwilling be necessitated, and certain, to afford to the pursuit of Learning such a proportion of Time; and the willing shall be at liberty for it, and secured from others offering, or at least from their own admitting any unnecessary interruptions.

3. Where there wants either 1. Wisdome,* 1.55 to discerne certainly how much Time is ordinarily necessary and sufficient to be imployed in pursuing the businesse of Learning; Or 2. Willingnesse to imploy. Time in it; Or 3. Sufficient Authority, to awe unwilling Inferiors, whom the determination must concerne: There a conclusive deter∣mination of the chiefe time for Learning, in all probability cannot

be profitably made by such persons. For either through want of Wis∣dome, they will misse the just degrees and proportions for Continu∣ance, or Frequencie, or both, and they may erre on either hand: Or through Ʋnwillingnesse, they will be sure to determine the propor∣tions too scantly, too short, or too seldome, or both: Or lastly, their determination, how wisely soever made, will be to little or no purpose; For the want of Authority will make it be despised in∣fallibly, by the unwilling; And a determination not observed, (spe∣cially not likely to be observed, beforehand) is all one in effect with no determination at all. As appeares often in Scholars, when their Masters or Tutours are absent, and leave them to such as they stand not in awe of.* 1.56

4. Contrariwise therefore, a conclusive determination of the chiefe Time for Learning, made by such as have sufficiency of Wise∣dome, and 2. Affection to have it promoted, and 3. Authority to awe inferiors to observe it, is certainly a profitable, even a most singularly profitable determination. In that hereby all, of all sorts and dispo∣sitions, whom such a determination concernes, shall have their own want of Wisedome supplied, and a necessary and sufficient tye laid up∣on the unwilling; and affording the willing a welcome and pleasing liberty and security to the utmost of ordinary convenience.* 1.57

5. Where one is willing to try others affections, to the businesse of Learning, (specially Inferiors) There a remisse determination may be so far profitable to be made, in any of the respects of Time, or in all, (As, Continue a good while at your study, when you are at it; Or, Study often; Or, begin betimes in a morning, for feare of wanting Time, or being interrupted) yet particularizing nothing in any re∣spect. Thus much (generally recommending the businesse) may be a pregnant triall of their willingnesse or unwillingnesse: For the wil∣ling will readily improve this, to a remarkable advantage: And the unwilling will shift and make excuses, as if still uncertain what they were determined unto: and so discover their want of affection, as the other their good affection to it. But otherwise, this manner of determination is in no wise sufficient, for the whole, or even for the chiefe Time for Learning, toward either 1. the unwilling, or 2. those that are in danger of Interruptions, or 3. those that want Wisedome, (as was forenoted) to share that Time equally between the varieties of businesse, and so to secure sufficiently their maine businesse of Learning.

6.* 1.58 A determination for a particular action within the compasse of the bussnesse of Learning, I may possibly for a while be profitable for that; and afterward be so no more: and so though it might have been of some use still in some respect, yet withall it may now become a bur∣den convenient to be taken away. Notwithstanding which, a con∣clusive determination for the chiefe Time for Learning, may (upon the grounds forenoted) remain perpetually and undeniably, a substan∣tially-profitable determination: and for this cause may be perpetua∣ted, when others are discharged of lesser consequence, and whose pri∣mary immediate end now no longer recommends them so profitable as they were before.

7. Finally,* 1.59 (to end these Considerations about the manner of De∣terminations, and withall the whole about Time generally:) Where there is evidently to be foreseen some necessary Interruptions, that will certainly, (or may in likelihood) call off from the strict obser∣vation of the Time determined in any respect: There it is profitable, (and even necessary) to make it with sufficient reservations, generall or particular, for all such necessary Interruptions, (as refreshing the naturall spirits by eating or drinking, or the like; or dispatching any pressing sudden businesse) and after those occasions satisfied, that the strength of the Determination shall returne, and stand in its pro∣per force and validity, for the residue of the Time determined. Which will prevent its being really burdensome, and all pretences that it is so, when there is no cause to complaine.

And now how far all these Considerations of Time in Nature are appliable to Religion, and the solemn Worship of God,* 1.60 though we cannot doubt but judicious eyes doe much discern already; Yet for the satisfaction of all Readers, we must distinctly and particularly set down in the ensuing Chapters; And hope to doe it so clearly, as to give satisfaction to the most, if not to all; which in matters of Controversie, indeed, seldome happens to the most rationall Discourse.

Notes

• * 1.1

  I. Scope of the ensuing dis∣courses about Time.
• * 1.2

  II. Why we first handle it ge∣nerally with respect to Ci∣vill Actions.
• * 1.3

  III. Why we use so many di∣stinctions and divisions; And apply them a second Time. Melim est do∣ctos onorare no∣tis, quam rudes fraudare dis∣cendis. Leo Magnus. Phil. 3.1. To write the same things, to me indeed it is not grie∣vous, But for you it is safe.
• * 1.4

  IV. Time an ad∣junct, yet may be substanti∣ally profita∣ble.
• * 1.5

  V. This conside∣ration hath been hurtfully neglected. And Place un∣fitly paralel∣led with Time in Reli∣gion.
• * 1.6

  VI. Three distinct respects of Time obser∣vable in acti∣ons.
• * 1.7

  1. The length.
• * 1.8

  2. The number.
• * 1.9

  3. The order. All which are very much confounded and jumbled together in the Discourses of our Disputers, to the great disappointment of a right conceiving of the Truths in question.
• * 1.10

  VII. All three con∣sidered as de∣nominated by Nature, Art, Accident.
• * 1.11

  VIII. Time is inde∣terminate, or determinate: Each respect having a dou∣ble limit.
• * 1.12

  IX. Indetermi∣nate Time described.
• * 1.13

  X. Determinate Time, three∣fold.
• * 1.14

  XI. 1. By the na∣ture of the action.
• * 1.15

  XII. 2. By a Supe∣rior.
• * 1.16

  XIII. 3. By a man∣selfe.
• * 1.17

  XIV. Indetermi∣nate Time is attendant on businesse.
• * 1.18

  XV. Yet profitable even volunta∣rily applied: Proved.
• * 1.19

  XVI. 1. In the Con∣tinuance.
• * 1.20

  XVII. 2. In the Fre∣quencie.
• * 1.21

  XVIII. 3. In both.
• * 1.22

  XIX. 4. An evi∣dence of Af∣fection.
• * 1.23

  XX. 5. And Wis∣dome.
• * 1.24

  XXI. But not in the Quando, un∣lesse by acci∣dent.
• * 1.25

  XXII. Time deter∣minate di∣stinguished.
• * 1.26

  1. In regard of the re∣spcts them∣selves.
• * 1.27

  1. Any one a∣lone.
• * 1.28

  2. Any two jointly.
• * 1.29

  3. All three together.
• * 1.30

  XXIII. 2. The man∣ner of deter∣mination.
• * 1.31

  1. Remisse.
• * 1.32

  2. Exact or strict ••hree∣fold.
• * 1.33

  1. Initiall.
• * 1.34

  2. Conclusive: This addes strictly the conclusive terme to the Initiall.
• * 1.35

  3. Exclusive.
• * 1.36

  XXIV. Yet admit∣ting a reser∣vation.
• * 1.37

  XXV. The profita∣blenesse of this determi∣nation, by the 5. Causes of it.
• * 1.38

  XXVI. 1. The im∣portance of the businesse.
• * 1.39

  XXVII. 2. The im∣possibility to attend it and other busi∣nesse.
• * 1.40

  XXVIII. 3. The un∣willingnesse to it.
• * 1.41

  XXIX. 4. The danger o•• interrupti∣ons.
• * 1.42

  XXX. 5. Want of Wisdome.
• * 1.43

  XXXI. For the kindes of determina∣tions.

  The determi∣nation of the continuance and frequen∣cy is very profitable.
• * 1.44

  XXXII. Not of the Quando, but by accident.
• * 1.45

  XXXIII. Therefore an alteration of it, is not hurt∣full.
• * 1.46

  XXXIV. The profita∣blenesse of the determinati∣on of the Continuance as largly as may be.
• * 1.47

  XXXV. The profita∣blenesse of the determi∣nation of the Frequencie as largely as may be.
• * 1.48

  Even though it be but a single deter∣mination of it alone.
• * 1.49

  XXXVI. The Profita∣blenesse of a joynt deter∣mination of the Continu∣ance and Frequencie both, with convenient largensse.
• * 1.50

  XXXVII. Such a deter∣mination is the cheife and most substan∣tially profita∣ble of all other.
• * 1.51

  XXXVIII. In the joint determinati∣on of the Continuance, and Frequen∣cie. The lar∣gest Continu∣ance, with a conveniencie, is more pro∣fitable then the greatest Frequencie, with a lesse Continuance supposing the proportion in generall to be equall in both.
• * 1.52

  XXXIX. The same Quando pro∣fitably deter∣mined to ma∣ny.
• * 1.53

  XL. For the man∣ner, 1. An ex∣clusive deter∣mination is not profitable.
• * 1.54

  XLI. 2. An Initiall is,
• * 1.55

  XLII. 3. Not a Con∣clusive to some.
• * 1.56

  XLIII. 4. Though to others.
• * 1.57

  XLIV. 5. A remisse determinati∣on is profita∣ble to try af∣fections.
• * 1.58

  XLV. A particular determinati∣on may be ta∣ken away.
• * 1.59

  XLVI. A reservati∣on is profita∣ble when in∣terruptions are foreseene.
• * 1.60

  XLVII. The conclu∣sion.