Numb. 9.
J. D. [argument 2] SEcondly, they who might have done, and may do many things which they leave un∣done; And they who leave undone many things which they might do, are neither compelled nor necessitated to do what they do, but have true liberty. But we might do many things which we do not, and we do many things which we might leave undone, as is plain, 1 King. 3.11.
Because thou hast asked this thing, and hast not asked for thy self long life, neither hast asked riches for thy self, nor hast asked the life of thine enemies, &c. God gave
Salomon his choise. He might have asked riches, but then he had not asked wisedom, which he did ask. He did ask wisedom, but he might have asked riches, which yet he did not ask. And Act. 5.4.
After it was sold, was it not in thine own power? It was in his own power to give it, and it was in his own power to retein it. Yet if he did give it he could not retein it; And if he did retein it, he could not give it. Therefore we may do, what we do not. And we do not, what we might do. That is, we have true liberty from necessity.
Page 49T. H. THE second argument from Scripture consi∣steth in Histories of men, that did one thing, when if they would they might have done ano∣ther. The places are two, one is in the 1 Kings 3.11. Where the history sayes, God was pleased that Salomon, who might, if he would, have as∣ked riches or revenge, did nevertheless ask wise∣dom at Gods hands. The other is the words of St. Peter to Ananias, Act. 5.4. After it was sold, was it not in thine own power?
To which the answer is the same, with that I answered to the former places. That they proove there is election, but do not disproove the necessi∣ty which I maintain of what they so elect.
J. D. WE have had the very same answer twice before. It seemeth that he is well pleased with it, or els he would not draw it in again so suddenly by head and shoulders, to no purpose, if he did not conceive it to be a Panchreston, a salve for all sores, or
Dictamnum, soveraign Dit∣tany, to make all his adversaries weapons drop out of the wounds of his cause, onely by chew∣ing it, without any application to the sore. I will not wast the time to shew any further, how the members of his distinction do cross one ano∣ther, and one take away another. To make eve∣ry election to be of one thing imposed by neces∣sity, and of another thing which is absolutely impossible, is to make election to be no election at all. But I forbear to press that in present. If I may be bold to use his own phrase; His an∣swer
Page 50 looks quite another way from mine Ar∣gument. My second reason was this, They who may do, and might have done many things which they leave undone, and who leave un∣done many things which they might do, are not necessitated, nor precisely, and antecently de∣termined to do what they do.
But we might do many things which we do not, and we do many things which we might leave undone, as appeares evidently by the texts alledged. Therefore we are not antecedently and precisely determined, nor necessitated to do all things which he do. What is here of election in this Argument? To what proposition, to what tearm doth T. H. apply his answer? He neither affirmes, nor denieth, nor distinguisheth of any thing contained in my argument. Here I must be bold to call upon him for a more pertinent answer.
