A defence of true liberty from ante-cedent and extrinsecall necessity being an answer to a late book of Mr. Thomas Hobbs of Malmsbury, intituled, A treatise of liberty and necessity. Written by the Right Reverend John Bramhall D.D. and Lord Bishop of Derry.

Numb. 3.

T. H. THe Praeface is an handsome one, but it appears even in that, that he hath mi∣staken the question; for whereas he saies thus, If I be free to write this discourse, I have obteined the cause, I deny that to be true, for 'tis not enough to his freedom of writing, that he had not written it, un∣less he would himself; if he will obtein the cause, he must prove that before he writ it, it was not necessary he should write it afterward. It may be he thinks it all one to say I was free to write it, and it was not necessary I should write it. But I think otherwise; for he is free to do a thing, that may do it if he have the will to do it, and

may forbear if he have the will to forbear, And yet if there be a necessity that he shall have the will to do it, the action is neces∣sarily to follow. And if there be a neces∣sity, that he shall have the will to forbear, the forbearing also will be necessary. The question therefore is not, whether a man be a free agent, that is to say, whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent, ac∣cording to his will, but whether the will to write, and the will to forbear, come upon him according to his will, or accor∣ding to any thing else in his own power. I acknowledge this liberty, that I can do if I will, but to say I can will if I will, I take it to be an absurd speech. Wherefore I cannot grant him the cause upon this Pre∣face.

J. D. TAcitus speaks of a close kind of adver∣saries, which evermore begin with a mans praise. The Crisis or the Catastro∣phe of their discourse is when they come to their, but, As he is a good natured man, but he hath a naughty quality; or he is a wise man, but he hath committed one of the greatest follies, So here the Praeface is an handsome one, but it appears even in this, that he hath mistaken the question. This is to give an Inch, that one may take away an Ell without suspicion, to praise the handsomness of the Porch, that he may gain credit to the vilifying of the House. Whether of us hath mistaken the

question, I refer to the judicious Reader. Thus much I will maintain, that, that is no true necessity, which he calls necessity, nor that liberty which he calls liberty, nor that the question which he makes the question.

First for liberty, that which he calls li∣berty is no true liberty.

For the clearing whereof it behooveth us to know the difference between these three, Necessity. Spontaneity, and Liberty.

Necessity and Spontaneity may some∣times meet together, so may spontaneity and liberty, but reall necessity and true liberty can never meet together, somethings are necessary and not voluntary or sponta∣neous, somethings are both necessary and voluntary, somethings are voluntary and not free, somethings are both voluntary & free; But those things which are truly ne∣cessary can never be free, and those things which are truly free can never be necessa∣ry. Necessity consists in an Antecedent determination to one, Spontaneity consists in a conformity of the Appetite, either in∣tellectual or sensitive to the object; True liberty consists in the elective power of the rational will; That which is determi∣ned without my concurrence, may never∣theless agree well enough with my fancy or desires, and obtein my subsequent con∣sent; But that which is determined with∣out my concurrence or consent, cannot be the object of mine election. I may like that which is inevitably imposed upon me

by another, but if it be inevitably impo∣sed upon me by extrinsecall causes, it is both folly for me to deliberate, and impos∣sible for me to choose, whether I shall un∣dergo it or not. Reason is the root, the fountain, the originall of true liberty, which judgeth and representeth to the will, whether this or that be convenient, whether this or that be more convenient. Judge then what a pretty kind of liberty it is which is maintained by T. H. such a liberty as is in little Children before they have the use of reason, before they can consult or deliberate of any thing. Is not this a Childish liberty? and such a liberty as is in brute Beasts, as Bees and Spiders, which do not learn their faculties as we do our trades, by experience and conside∣ration; This is a brutish liberty, such a liberty as a Bird hath to flie, when her wings are clipped, or to use his own com∣parison, such a liberty as a lame man who hath lost the use of his lims hath to walk; Is not this a ridiculous liberty? Lastly (which is worse then all these) such a liberty as a River hath to descend down the Channell; what will he ascribe liber∣ty to inanimate Creatures also, which have neither reason, nor spontaneity, nor so much as sensitive appetite? Such is T. H. his liberty.

His necessity is just such another, a ne∣cessity upon supposition, arising from the

concourse of all the causes, including the last dictate of the understanding in rea∣sonable creatures. The adaequate cause and the effect are together in time, and when all the concurrent causes are determined, the effect is determined also, and is be∣come so necessary, that it is actually in being; But there is a great difference be∣tween determining, and being determined; if all the collaterall causes concurring to the production of an effect, were antece∣dently determined, what they must of ne∣cessity produce, and when they must pro∣duce it, then there is no doubt but the ef∣fect is necessary. But if these causes did operate freely, or contingently, if they might have suspended or denied their concurrence, or have concurred after a∣nother manner, then the effect was not truly and Antecedently necessary, but either free or contingent. This will be yet clearer by considering his own instance of casting Ambs-Ace, though it partake more of contingency then of freedom. Supposing the positure of the parties hand who did throw the Dice, supposing the fi∣gure of the Table and of the Dice them∣selves, supposing the measure of force ap∣plied, and supposing all other things which did concur to the production of that cast, to be the very same they were, there is no doubt but in this case the cast is necessary. But still this is but a ne∣cessity

of supposition; for if all these concurrent causes or some of them were contingent or free, then the cast was not absolutely necessary. To begin with the Caster, He might have denied his concur∣rence and not have cast at all; He might have suspended his concurrence, and not have cast so soon; He might have doubled or diminished his force in casting, if it had pleased him; He might have thrown the dice into the other table. In all these cases what becomes of his ambs-ace? The like uncertainties offer themselves for the ma∣ker of the tables, and for the maker of the dice, and for the keeper of the tables, and for the kind of wood, and I know not how many other circumstances. In such a mass of contingencies, it is impossible that the effect should be antecedently necessary. T. H. appeales to every mans experience. I am contented. Let every one reflect up∣on himself, and he shall find no convincing, much less constreining reason, to necessi∣tate him to any one of these particular acts more than another, but onely his own will or arbitrary determination. So T. H. his necessity is no absolute, no antecedent, ex∣trinsecall necessity, but meerly a necessity upon supposition.

Thirdly, that which T. H. makes the question, is not the question. The question is not, saith he, Whether a man may write if he will, and forbear if he will, but whe∣ther

the will to write or the will to forbear come upon him according to his will, or ac∣cording to any thing els in his own power. Here is a distinction without a difference. If his will do not come upon him accor∣ding to his will, then he is not a free, nor yet so much as a voluntary agent, which is T. H. his liberty. Certainly all the free∣dom of the agent is from the freedom of the will. If the will have no power over it self, the agent is no more free than a staff in a mans hand. Secondly, he makes but an empty shew of a power in the will, either to write or not to write. If it be pre∣cisely and inevitably determined in all oc∣currences whatsoever, what a man shall will, and what he shall not will, what he shall write, and what he shall not write, to what purpose is this power? God and Nature never made any thing in vain, but vain and frustraneous is that power which never was and never shall be deduced into Act. Either the agent is determined be∣fore he acteth, what he shall will, and what he shall not will, what he shall act, and what he shall not act, and then he is no more free to act than he is to will. Or els he is not determined, and then there is no necessity. No effect can exceed the ver∣tue of its cause; if the action be free to write or to forbear, the power or faculty to will, or nill, must of necessity be more free. Quod efficit tale illud magis est tale.

If the will be determined, the writing or not writing is likewise determined, and then he should not say, he may write or he may forbear, but he must write, or he must forbear. Thirdly, this answer contradicts the sense of all the world, that the will of man is determined without his will, or with∣out any thing in his power; Why do we ask men whether they will do such a thing or not? Why do we represent reasons to them? Why do we pray them? Why do we intreat them? Why do we blame them if their will come not upon them accor∣ding to their will. Wilt thou be made clean? said our Saviour to the Paralitike person, John 5.6. to what purpose if his will was extrinsecally determined? Christ complains, We have piped unto you, and ye have not danced, Matth. 11.17. How could they help it, if their wills were determined without their wills to forbear? And Matth. 23.37. I would have gathered your chil∣dren together as the Hen gathereth her Chickens under her wings, but ye would not. How easily might they answer accor∣ding to T. H. his doctrine, Alas blame not us, Our wills are not in our own power or disposition, if they were, we would thankfully embrace so great a favour. Most truly said St. Austin, * 1.1 Our will should not be a will at all, if it were not in our power. This is the belief of all mankind, which we have not learned from our Tu∣tors,

but is imprinted in our hearts by na∣ture; We need not turn over any obscure books to find out this truth. The Poets chant it in the Theaters, the Shepheards in the mountains, The Pastors teach it in their Churches, the Doctors in the Uni∣versities. The common people in the mar∣ketts, and all mankind in the whole world do assent unto it, except an handfull of men, who have poisoned their intellectu∣alls with paradoxicall principles. Fourth∣ly, this necessity which T. H. hath devi∣sed, which is grounded upon the necessita∣tion of a mans will without his will, is the worst of all others, and is so far from lesse∣ning those difficulties and absurdities which flow from the fatall destiny of the Stoicks, that it increaseth them, and rendreth them unanswerable. No man blameth fire for burning whole Cities, No man taxeth poi∣son for destroying men, but those persons who apply them to such wicked ends. If the will of man be not in his own dis∣position, he is no more a free agent than the fire or the poison. Three things are re∣quired to make an act or omission cul∣pable; First, that it be in our power to per∣form it, or forbear it, Secondly, that we be obliged to perform it, or forbear it respe∣ctively. Thirdly, that we omit that which we ought to have done, or do that which we ought to have omitted. No man sins in doing those things

which he could not shun, or forbearing those things which never were in his power. T. H. may say, that besides the power, men have also an appetite to evill objects, which renders them culpable. It is true, but if this appetite be determined by anothers, not by themselves, Or if they have not the use of reason to curb or re∣strain their appetites, they sin no more than a stone descending downeward, ac∣cording to its naturall appetite, or the brute beasts who commit voluntary er∣rours in following their sensitive appetites, yet sin not.

The question then is not whether a man be necessitated to will or nill, yet free to act or forebear. But having the ambiguous acceptions of the word, free, the question is plainly this, whether all agents, and all events natural, civill, moral (for we speak not now of the conversion of a sinner, that concerns not this question,) be predeter∣mined extrinsecally and inevitably without their own concurrence in the determina∣tion; so as all actions and events which ei∣ther are or shall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise, after any other manner, or in any other place, time, number, measure, order, nor to any other end, than they are. And all this in respect of the supreme cause, or a concourse of extrinsecall causes deter∣mining them to one.

So my preface remaines yet unanswered.

Either I was extrinsecally and inevitably prede∣termined to write this discourse, without any con∣currence of mine in the determination, and with∣out any power in me to change or oppose it, or I was not so predetermined; If I was, then I ought not to be blamed, for no man is justly bla∣med for doing that which never was in his po∣wer to shun. If I was not so predetermined, then mine actions and my will to act, are neither compelled nor necessitated by any extrinsecall causes, but I elect and choose, either to write or to forbear, according to mine own will, and by mine own power. And when I have resolved, and elected, it is but a necessity of supposition, which may and doth consist with true liberty, not a real anteeedent necessity. The two hornes of this Dilemma are so strait, that no mean can be given, nor room to pass between them. And the two consequences are so evident, that in stead of answering, he is forced to decline them.

Notes

• * 1.1

  De lib. Au. l. 3. c. 30.