A defence of true liberty from ante-cedent and extrinsecall necessity being an answer to a late book of Mr. Thomas Hobbs of Malmsbury, intituled, A treatise of liberty and necessity. Written by the Right Reverend John Bramhall D.D. and Lord Bishop of Derry.

T. H. THe last thing, in which also consisteth the whole controversy, Namely, that there is no such thing as an Agent, which when all things requisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbeare to produce it, or (which is all one) that there is no such thing as freedom from necessity, is easily in∣ferd from that which hath been before alledged. For, if it be an Agent, it can work, And if it work, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the action, and consequently, the cause of the action is sufficients. And if sufficient, then al∣so necessary, as hath been proved before.

J. D. I Wonder that T. H. should confess, that the whole weight of this controversy doth rest upon this proposition. That there is no such thing as an Agent, which, when all things requisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to act; And yet bring nothing but such poor Bull-rushes to support it. If it be an Agent (saith he) it can work, what of this? A posse ad esse non valet argumentum, from can work, to will work, is a weak inference. And from will work, to doth work upon absolute necessity, is another gross inconsequence. He proceeds thus, If it work, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the action, True, there wants nothing to produce that which is produ∣ced, but there may want much to produce that which was intended, One horse may pull his heart out, and yet not draw the Coach whither it should be, if he want the help or concurrence of his fellowes. And consequently (saith he) the cause of the action is sufficient. Yes sufficient to do what it doth, though perhaps with much pre∣judice to it self, but not alwayes sufficient to do what it should do, or what it would do. As he that begets a Monster should beget a man, and would beget a man, if he could. The last link of his argument follows; And if sufficient, then al∣so necessary, stay there; by his leave there is no necessary connexion between sufficiency and ef∣ficiency,

otherwise God himself should not be All-sufficient. Thus his Argument is vanished. But I will deal more favourably with him, and grant him all that, which he labours so much in vain to prove, That every effect in the world hath sufficient causes: Yea more, that supposing the determination of the free and contingent causes, every effect in the world is necessary. But all this will not advantage his cause the black of a bean, for still it amounts but to an hypo∣theticall necessity, and differs as much from that absolute necessity, which he maintains, as a Gentleman, who travailes for his pleasure, differs from a banished man, or a free Subject from a slave.