Numb. 29.

T. H.

FIftly, I conceive liberty to be rightly defined in this manner. Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action, that are not contained in the nature, and in the intrinsecall quality of the Agent. As for example, the water is said to descend freely, or to have liberty to descend by the Chanell of the River, because there is no im∣pediment that way, but not across, because the banks are impediments. And though water can∣not ascend, yet men never say it wants the liber∣ty to ascend, but the faculty or power, because the impediment is in the nature of the water and in∣trinsecall. So also we say, he that is tied wants the liberty to go, because the impediment is not in him, but in his hands, where as we say not so of him that is sick or lame, because the impediment is in himself.

J. D.

HOw that should be a right definition of li∣berty which comprehends neither the Ge∣nus nor the difference, neither the matter nor the forme of liberty, which doth not so much as ac∣cidentally describe liberty by its marks and to∣kens; How a reall faculty or the Elective power should be defined by a negation, or by an ab∣absence, is past my understanding, and contrary Page  211 to all the rules of right Reason, which I have learned. Negatives cannot explicate the nature of things defined. By this definition, a stone hath liberty to ascend into the aire, because there is no outward impediment to hinder it, and so a violent act may be a free act. Just like his definition are his instances of the liberty of the water to descend down the Channell, and a sick or a lame mans liberty to goe. The later is an impotence and not a power or a liberty. The former is so far from being a free act, that it is scarce a naturall act, Certainly, the proper na∣turall motion of water, as of all heavy bodies, is to descend directly downwards towards the cen∣ter, as we see in rain, which falls down perpen∣dicularly. Though this be far from a free act, which proceeds from a rationall appetite, yet it is a naturall act, and proceeds from a naturall appetite, and hath its reason within in self. So hath not the current of the River in its chan∣nell, which must not be ascribed to the proper nature of the water, but either to the generall order of the universe, for the better being and preservation of the creatures (otherwise the waters should not moove in Seas and Rivers as they do, but cover the face of the earth, and possess their proper place between the aire and the earth, according to the degree of their gravity.) Or to an extrinsecall principle, whilest one particle of water thrusteth and forceth for∣ward another, and so comes a current, or at least so comes the current to be more impetuous, to which motion the position of the earth doth con∣tribute Page  212 much, both by restraining that fluid body with its banks from dispersing it self, and also, by affording way for a faire and easy descent by its proclivity. He tells us sadly that the water wants liberty to go over the banks, because there is an extrinsecall impediment, But to ascend up the channell it wants not liberty, but power. Why? Liberty is a power, if it want power to ascend, it wants liberty to ascend. But he makes the reason why the water ascends not up the channell, to be intrinsecall, and the reason why it ascends not over the banks to be extrinsecall, as if there were not a rising of the ground up the channell, as well as up the banks, though it be not so discernible, nor alwayes so sudden. The naturall appetite of the water is as much against the ascending over the banks, as the ascending up the channell. And the extrinsecall impedi∣ment is as great in ascending up the channell as over the banks, or rather greater, because there it must moove, not onely against the rising soile, but also against the succeeding waters, which press forward the former. Either the River wants liberty for both, or els it wans liberty for neither.

But to leave his metaphoricall faculties, and his Catachresticall Liberty. How far is his dis∣course wide from the true morall liberty, which is in question between us. His former descrip∣tion of a free Agent, that is, he who hath not made an end of deliberating, though it was wide from the mark, yet it came much neerer the truth than this definition of Liberty, unless perhaps he think that the water hath done deliberating, Page  213 whether it will go over the banks, but hath not done deliberating, whether it will go up the channell.