Page 207
Numb. 27.
T. H. THirdly, I conceive, that in all deliberations, that is to say, in all alternate succession of con∣trary appetites, the last is, that which we call the Will, and is immediatly before the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other appetites to do and to quit, that come upon a man during his deliberation, are usually called intentions, and inclinations, but not wills, there being but one will, which al∣so in this case may be called last will, though the intention change often.
J. D. STill here is nothing but confusion, he con∣founds the faculty of the will, with the act of volition, he makes the will to be the last part of deliberation. He makes the intention, which is a most proper and elicite act of the will, or a willing of the end, as it is to be attained by cer∣tain means, to be no willing at all, but onely some antecedaneous inclination or propension. He might as well say, that the uncertain agita∣tion of the needle hither and thither, to find out the Pole, and the resting or fixing of it self dire∣ctly towards the Pole, were both the same thing. But the grossest mistake is, that he will acknow∣ledge no act of a mans will, to be his will, but onely the last act, which he calls the last will. If the first were no will, how comes this to be the last will? According to this doctrine, the will of a man should be as unchangeable as the Will of God, at least so long as there is a possi∣bility to effect it. According to this doctrine