A defence of true liberty from ante-cedent and extrinsecall necessity being an answer to a late book of Mr. Thomas Hobbs of Malmsbury, intituled, A treatise of liberty and necessity. Written by the Right Reverend John Bramhall D.D. and Lord Bishop of Derry.

Numb. 24.

J. D. FIftly, and lastly, the Divine labours to find out a way how liberty may consist with the prescience and decrees of God. But of this I had not very long since occasion to write a full dis∣course, in answer to a Treatise against the pre∣science of things contingent. I shall for the present only repeat these two things. First, we ought not to desert a certain truth, because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner. God should be but a poor God, if we were able perfectly to comprehend all his Actions and Attri∣butes.

Secondly, in my poor judgment, which I ever do & ever shall submit to better, the readiest way to reconcile Contingence and Liberty, with the decrees and prescience of God, and most remote from the altercations of these times, is to subject future cōtingents to the aspects of God, according to that presentiallity which they have in eterni∣ty. Not that things future, which are not yet exi∣stent & coexistent with God, but because the in∣finite knowledge of God, incircling all times in the point of eternity, doth attain to their future Being, from whence proceeds their objective and intelligible Being. The main impediment which keeps men from subscribing to this way is, be∣cause they conceive eternity to be an everlasting succession, and not one indivisible point. But if they consider, that whatsoever is in God is God, That there are no accidents in him, for that which is infinitely perfect cannot be further per∣fected. That as God is not wise but Wisedom

it self, not just but Justice it self, so he is not eternall but Eternity it self. They must needs conclude that therefore this eternity is indivi∣sible, because God is indivisible, and therefore not successive, but altogether an infinite point, comprehending all times within it self.

T. H. THE last part of this discourse conteineth his opinion about reconciling Liberty with the Prescience, and Decrees of God, otherwise than some Divines have done, against whom he had formerly written a Treatise, out of which he only repeateth two things. One is, that we ought not to desert a certain truth, for not being able to comprehend the certain manner of it. And I say the same, as for example, that he ought not to desert this certain truth; That there are certain and necessary causes, which make every man to will what he willeth, though he do not yet con∣ceive in what manner the will of man is caused. And yet I think the manner of it, is not very hard to conceive, seeing that we see daily, that praise, dispraise, reward, punishment, good and evill, se∣quells of mens actions retained in memory, do frame and make us to the election of whatsoever it be that we elect. And that the memory of such things proceeds from the senses. And sense from the operation of the objects of sense, which are ex∣ternall to us, and governed onely by God Almigh∣ty. And by consequence, all actions, even of free and voluntary Agents are necessary.

The other thing he repeateth is, that the best way to reconcile Contingency and Liberty, with

the prescience and decrees of God, is to subject fu∣ture contingents to the aspect of God. The same is also my opinion, but contrary to what he hath all this while laboured to prove. For, hitherto he held liberty and necessity, that is to say, liberty and the decrees of God irreconcilable, unless the aspect of God (which word appeareth now the first time in this discourse) signifie somewhat els be∣sides Gods will and decree, which I cannot un∣derstand. But he adds, that we must subject them according to that presentiality which they have in eternity, which he sayes cannot be done by them that conceive eternity to be an everla∣sting succession, but onely by them that conceive it an indivisible point. To this I answer, that as soon as I can conceive Eternity an indivisible point, or any thing, but an everlasting succession, I will renounce all I have written in this subject: I know St. Thomas Aquinas calls eternity Nunc stans, an ever abiding now, which is easy enough to say, but though I fain would, I never could conceive it. They that can, are more happy than I. But in the mean time he alloweth hereby all men to be of my opinion, save onely those that conceive in their minds a nunc stans, which I think are none. I understand as little how it can be true that God is not just, but Justice it self, not wise but Wisedom it self, not eternall but Eter∣nity it self. Nor how he concludes thence, that E∣ternity is a ponit indivisible, and not a succession. Nor in what sense it can be said, that an infinite point, &c. wherein is no succession, can compre∣hend all times, though time be successive.

These phrases I find not in the Scripture. I wonder therefore, what was the designe of the School-men, to bring them up, unless they thought a man could not be a true Christian, unless his understanding be first strangled with such hard sayings.

And thus much in answer to his discourse, wherein I think not onely his squadrons, but also his reserves of distinctions are defeated. And now your Lordship shall have my doctrine concerning the same question, with my reasons for it positive∣ly and briefly as I can, without any tearmes of Art in plain English.

J. D. THat poor discourse which I mention, was not written against any Divines, but in way of examination of a French Treatise, which your Lordships Brother did me the honour to shew me at York; My assertion is most true, that we ought not to desert a certain truth, because we are not able to comprehend the certain manner. Such a truth is that which I maintain, that the will of man in ordinary actions is free from ex∣trinsecall determination. A truth demonstrable in reason, received and believed by all the world. And therefore though I be not able to comprehend or express exactly the certain man∣ner how it consists together with Gods Eternall Prescience, and Decrees, which exceed my weak capacity, yet I ought to adhere to that truth, which is manifest. But T. H. his opinion of the absoute necessity of all events, by reason of their antecedent determination in their extrinse∣call

and necessary causes, is no such certain Truth, but an innovation, a strange paradox, without probable grounds, rejected by all Au∣thours, yea, by all the world. Neither, is the manner how the second causes do operate so ob∣scure, or so transcendent above the reach of rea∣son, as the Eternall Decrees of God are. And therefore in both these respects he cannot chal∣lenge the same priviledge. I am in profession of an old truth derived by inheritance or succession from mine ancestors. And therefore, though I were not able to clear every quirk in Law, yet I might justly hold my possession untill a better title were shewed for another. He is no old Pos∣sessor, but a new Pretender, and is bound to make good his claime by evident proofs, not by weak and inconsequent suppositions, or inducements, such as those are which he useth here, of praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, the memory of good and evill sequells, and events, which may incline the will, but neither can nor do necessi∣tate the will. Nor by uncertain and accidentall inferences such as this, The memory of praises, dispraises, rewards, punishments, good and evill se∣quelis do make us (he should say dispose us) to elect what we elect, but the memory of these things is from the sense, and the sense from the operation of the externall objects, and the Agency of externall octjects is onely from God, therefore all actions, even of free and voluntary Agents, are necessary. To pass by all the other great im∣perfections, which are to be found in this Sorite. It is just like that old Sophisticall piece: He

that drinks well, sleeps well, he that sleeps well, thinks no hurt, he that thinks no hurt lives well, therefore he that drinks well lives well.

In the very last passage of my discourse, I proposed mine own private opinion, how it might be made appear, that the Eternall Pre∣science and Decrees of God are consistent with true liberty and contingency. And this I set down, in as plain tearmes as I could, or as so profound a speculation would permit, which is almost wholly misunderstood by T. H. and ma∣ny of my words wrested to a wrong sense. As first, where I speak of the aspect of God, that is his view, his knowledge, by which the most free and contingent actions were manifest to him from eternity, Heb. 4.11. All things are naked and open to his eyes, and this not discur∣sively, but intuitively, not by externall species, but by his internall Essence; He confounds this with the Will, and the Decrees of God: Though he found not the word Aspect before in this dis∣course, he might have found prescience. Second∣ly, he chargeth me that hitherto I have main∣tained, that Liberty and the Decrees of God, are irreconcilable. If I have said any such thing, my heart never went along with my pen. No, but his reason why he chargeth me on this man∣ner, is because I have maintained, that Liberty and the absolute necessity of all things are irre∣conciliable. That is true indeed. What then? Why (saith he) Necessity and Gods Decrees are all one. How all one? that were strange indeed.

Necessity may be a consequent of Gods De∣crees, it cannot be the Decree it self. But to cut his argument short. God hath decreed all effects which come to pass in time, yet not all after the same manner, but according to the di∣stinct natures, capacities and conditions of his creatures, which he doth not destroy by his De∣cree; Some he acteth, with some he coopera∣teth by speciall influence, and some he onely permitteth. Yet this is no idle or bare permissi∣on, seeing he doth concurre both by way of ge∣nerall influence, giving power to act, and also by disposing all events necessary, free, and con∣tingent to his own glory. Thirdly, he chargeth me, that I allow all men to be of his opinion, save onely those that conceive in their minds a Nunc stans, or how eternity is an indivisible point, ra∣ther than an everlasting succession. But I have given no such allowance. I know, there are ma∣ny other wayes proposed by Divines, for recon∣ciling the Eternall Prescience, and Decrees of God, with the Liberty and Contingency of se∣cond causes, some of which may please other judgments better than this of mine. Howsoever, though a man could comprehend none of all these wayes, yet remember what I said, that a certain truth ought not to be rejected, because we are not able, in respect of our weakness, to understand the certain manner, or reason of it. I know, the Load-stone hath an attractive pow∣er to draw the Iron to it; And yet I know not how it comes to have such a power.

But the chiefest difficulty, which offers it self in

this Section is, whether Eternity be an indivi∣sible point (as I maintain it) or an everlasting succession; as he would have it. According to his constant use, he gives no answer to what was urged by me, but pleads against it from his own incapacity. I never could conceive, saith he, how eternity should be an indivisible point. I be∣lieve, that neither we, nor any man els can com∣prehend it so cleerly, as we do these inferiour things. The neerer that any thing comes to the essence of God, the more remote it is from our apprehension. But shall we therefore make po∣tentialities, and successive duration, and for∣mer and later, or a part without a part (as they say) to be in God? Because we are not able to understand cleerly the divine perfection, we must not therefore attribute any imperfection to him.

He saith moreover, that he understands as little how it can be true which I say, that God is not just but Justice it self, not eternall but Eternity it self. It seemes howsoever he be versed in this question, that he hath not troubled his head over∣much with reading School-Divines, or Meta∣physicians, if he make faculties or qualities to be in God, really distinct-from his essence. God is a most simple or pure act, which can admit no composition of substance and accidents. Doth he think that the most perfect Essence of God cannot act sufficiently without faculties and qualities? The infinite perfection of the Divine essence, excludes all passive or receptive powers, and cannot be perfected more than it is by any

accidents. The attributes of God, are not divers vertues, or qualities in him, as they are in the creatures, but really one and the same, with the Divine Essence, and among themselves. They are attributed to God, to supply the defect of our capacity, who are not able to understand that which is to be known of God, under one name, or one act of the understanding.

Furthermore he saith, that he understands not how I conclude from hence, that Eternity is an indivisible point, and not a succession. I will help him. The Divine Substance is indivisible; But Eternity is the Divine Substance. The major is evident, because God is actus simplicissimus, a most simple act, wherein there is no manner of composition, neither of matter and forme, nor of subject and accidents, nor of parts, &c. and by consequence no divisibility. The minor hath been cleerly demonstrated in mine answer to his last doubt, and is confessed by all men, that what∣soever is in God, is God.

Lastly he saith. He conceives not how it can be said, that an infinite point, wherein is no suc∣cession, can comprehend all time which is suc∣cessive. I answer, that it doth not comprehend it formally as time is successive, but eminently and virtually, as Eternity is infinite. To day all Eternity is coexistent with this day. To morrow all Eternity will be coexistent with to morrow, and so in like manner with all the parts of time, being it self without parts. He saith, He finds not these phrases in the Scripture. No, but he may find the thing in the Scripture, that God is

infinite in all his attributes, and not capable of any imperfection.

And so to shew his antipathy against the School-men, that he hath no liberty or power to contain himself, when he meets with any of of their phrases or tenets, he falls into another paroxisme or fit of inveighing against them; And so concludes his answer with a plaudite to him∣self, because he had defeated both my squadrons of arguments, and reserves of distinctions,

Dicite Io Paean, & Io bis dicite Paean.

But because his eye-sight was weak, and their backs were towards him, he quite mistook the matter. Those whom he see rowted and run∣ning away were his own scattered forces.