A defence of true liberty from ante-cedent and extrinsecall necessity being an answer to a late book of Mr. Thomas Hobbs of Malmsbury, intituled, A treatise of liberty and necessity. Written by the Right Reverend John Bramhall D.D. and Lord Bishop of Derry.

Numb. 20.

J. D. NOw, to the distinction it self I say first, that the proper act of liberty is election, and election is opposed, not only to coaction, but also to coarctation or determination to one. Necessitation or determination to one, may consist with spontaneity, but not with election or liberty, as hath been shewed. The very Stoicks did acknowledge a spontaneity. So our adver∣saries are not yet gone out of the confines of the Stoicks.

Secondly, to rip up the bottom of this busi∣ness. This I take to be the clear resolution of the Schooles; There is a double act of the will, the one more remote, called Imperatus, that is,

in truth the act of some inferiour faculty, sub∣ject to the command of the will, as to open or shut ones eyes, without doubt these actions may be compelled. The other act is neerer, called actus elicitus, an act drawn out of the will, as to will, to choose, to elect, this may be stopped or hindered by the intervening impediment of the understanding, as a stone lying on a table is kept from its naturall motion, otherwise the will should have a kind of Omnipotence; But the will cannot be compelled to an act repug∣nant to its inclination, as when a stone is thrown upwards into the air, for that is both to incline, and not to incline to the same object, at the same time, which implies a contradicti∣on. Therefore to say the will is necessitated, is to say, the will is compelled so far as the will is capable of compulsion. If a strong man holding the hand of a weaker, should therewith kill a third person, haec quidem vis est, this violence, the weaker did not willingly perpetrate the fact, because he was compelled. But now suppose this strong man had the will of the weaker in his power as well as the hand, and should not onely incline, but determine it secretly and in∣sensibly to commit this act, is not the case the same? whether one ravish Lucretia by force, as Tarquine, or by amatory potions, and Magicall Incantations, not only allure her, but necessi∣take her to satisfy his lust, and incline her effe∣ctually, and draw her inevitably, and irresistibly to follow him spontaneously. Lucretia in both these conditions is to be pittied, but the latter

person is more guilty, and deserves greater pu∣nishment, who endevours also so much as in him lies, to make Lucretia irresistibly partake of his crime. I dare not apply it, but thus only; Take heed how we defend those secret and in∣vincible necessitations to evill, though sponta∣neous and free from coaction.

These are their fastnesses.

T. H. IN the next place, he bringeth two arguments against distinguishing between being free from compulsion, and free from necessitation. The first is, that election is opposite, not onely to co∣action or compulsion, but also to necessitation or determination to one. This is it he was to proove from the beginning, and therefore bringeth no new argument to proove it. And to those brought formerly, I have already answered; And in this place I deny again, that election is opposite to ei∣ther, for when a man is compelled (for example, to subject himself to an enemy or to dy) he hath still election left in him, and a deliberation to bethink which of these two he can better en∣dure; And he that is led to prison by force, hath election and may deliberate whether he will be hailed and trained on the ground, or make use of his feet.

Likewise when there is no compulsion, but the strength of temptation to do an evill action, be∣ing greater than the motives to abstain, necessa∣rily determine him to the doing of it, yet he deli∣berates whiles sometimes the motives to do, some∣times the motives to forbear, are working on him,

and consequently he electeth which he will. But commonly when we see and know the strength that moves us, we acknowledge Necessity, but when we see not, or mark not the force that moves us, we then think there is none, and that it is not Causes but liberty, that produceth the action. Hence it is, that they think he does not chose this, that of necessity choseth it, but they might as well say, fire does not burn, because it burnes of necessity. The second argument is not so much an argument, as a distinction, to shew in what sense it may be said, that voluntary actions are necessitated, and in what sense not. And therefore he alledgeth as from the authority of the Schooles, and that which rippeth up the bot∣tome of the question, that there is a double act of the will; The one he sayes, is actus Impera∣tus, an act done at the command of the will, by some inferiour faculty of the soul, as to open or shut ones eyes, and this act may be compelled. The other he sayes, is actus elicitus, an act allured, or an act drawn forth by allurement out of the will, as to will, to choose, to elect: This he sayes cannot be compelled. Wherein letting pass that Meta∣phoricall speech of attributing command and sub∣jection to the faculties of the Soul, as if they made a Common-wealth or Family among them∣selves, and could speak one to another, which is very improper in searching the truth of the que∣stion. You may observe first, that to compell a voluntary act, is nothing els, but to will it, for it is all one to say, my will commands the shutting of mine eyes, or the doing of any other action, and to

say, I have the will to shut mine eyes. So that actus imperatus here, might as easily have been said in English, a voluntary action, but that they that invented the tearme, understood not any thing it signified. Secondly, you may observe, that actus elicitus, is exemplified by these words, to Will, to Elect, to Choose, which are all one, and so to will is here made an act of the will, and indeed, as the will is a faculty, or power in a mans soul, so to will is an act of it, according to that power. But as it is absurdly said, that to dance is an act allured or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance; so it is also to say, that to will, is an act allured or drawn out of the power to will, which power is commonly called, the Will. Howsoever it be, the summe of his distinction is, that a voluntary act may be done on compulsion, that is to say, by foul means, but to will that, or any act, cannot be but by allurement or fair means. Now, seeing fair Means, Allurements, and En∣ticements, produce the action which they do pro∣duce, as necessarily as threatning and foul means, it followes, that to will, may be made as necessary as any thing that is done by compulsion. So that the distinction of actus imperatus, and actus elicitus, are but words, and of no effect against necessity.

J. D. IN the next place follow two reasons of mine own against the same distinction, the one taken from the former grounds, that Election cannot consist with determination to one. To this (he saith) he hath answered already. No,

Truth is founded upon a Rock. He hath been so far from prevailing against it, that he hath not been able to shake it. Now again, he tells us, that Election is not opposite to either, (Necessita∣tion or Compulsion) He might even as well tell us, that a stone thrown upwards mooves natu∣rally; Or, that a woman can be ravished with her own will. Consent takes away the Rape. This is the strangest liberty that ever was heard of, that a man is compelled to do what he would not, and yet is free to do what he will. And this he tells us upon the old score, that he, who submits to his enemy for fear of death, chooseth to submit. But we have seen formerly, that this, which he calls compulsion, is not com∣pulsion properly, nor that naturall determina∣tion of the will, to one which is opposite to true Liberty. He who submits to an enemy for saving his life, doth either onely counterfeit, and then there is no will to submit, this disguise is no more than a stepping aside, to avoid a pre∣sent blow, Or els he doth sincerely will a sub∣mission, and then the will is changed; There is a vast difference between compelling and chan∣ging the will. Either God or man may change the will of man, either by varying the condi∣tion of things, or by informing the party other∣wise, but compelled it cannot be, that is, it cannot both will this, and not will this, as it is invested with the same circumstances, though, if the act were otherwise circumstantiated, it might nill that freely, which now it wills freely. Wherefore the kind of actions are called mixt

actions, that is partly voluntary, partly unvo∣luntary. That which is compelled is a mans pre∣sent condition or distress, that is not voluntary nor chosen. That which is chosen, is the reme∣dy of its distress, that is voluntary. So hypothe∣tically supposing a man were not in that distress they are involuntary, but absolutely without any supposition at all, taking the case as it is, they are voluntary. His other instance of a man forced to prison, that he may choose whether he will be haled thither upon the ground, or walk upon his feet is not true. By his leave, that is not as he pleaseth, but as it pleaseth them who have him in their power. If they will drag him, he is not free to walk; And if they give him leave to walk, he is not forced to be dragged. Having laid this foundation, he begins to build upon it, that other passions do necessitate as much as fear; But he erres doubly; first, in his foundation, fear doth not determine the rationall will natu∣rally and necessarily; The last and greatest of the five terrible things is death, yet the fear of death cannot necessitate a resolved mind to do a dishonest action, which is worse than death. The fear of the fiery furnace could not compell the three Children to worship an Idoll, nor the fear of the Lions necessitate Daniel, to omit his duty to God, It is our frailty, that we are more afraid of empty shadows than of substantiall dangers, because they are neerer our senses, as little Children fear a Mouse or a Visard, more than fire or weather. But as a fitte of the stone takes awuy the sense of the gout for the present,

so the greater passion doth extinguish the less. The fear of Gods wrath, and eternall torments doth expell corporall fear, fear not them who kill the body, but fear him who is able to cast both body and soul into hell. Luk. 7.4. Da veniam Impe∣rator, tu carcerem, ille gehennam minatur, Excuse me, O Emperor, thou threatens men with pri∣son, but he threatens me with hell. Secondly, he erres in his superstruction also. There is a great difference, as to this case of justifying, or not justifying an action between force and fear, and other passions; Force doth not only lessen the sin, but takes it quite away, Deut. 22.26. He who forced a betrothed Damsell was to die; but unto the Damsell (saith he) thou shalt do no∣thing, there is in her no fault worthy of death. Tamars beauty, or Ammons love did not render him innocent, but Ammons force rendred Tamar innocent. But fear is not so prevalent as force, Indeed if fear be great, and justly grounded, such as may fall upon a constant man, though it do not dispense with the transgression of the ne∣gative Precepts of God or Nature, because they bind to all times, yet it diminisheth the offence, even against them, and pleades for pardon. But it dispenseth in many cases with the transgression of the positive Law, either Divine or humane; Because it is not probable, that God or the Law, would oblige man to the observation of all posi∣tive Precepts, with so great dammage as the loss of his life. The omission of Circumcision was no sin, whilest the Israelites were travelling through the wilderness. By T. H. his permission. I will

propose a case to him. A Gentleman sends his servant with mony to buy his dinner, some Ruf∣fians meet him by the way, and take it from him by force, The servant cryed for help, and did what he could to defend himself, but all would not serve. The servant is innocent, if he was to be tried before a Court of Areopagites. Or suppose the Ruffians did not take it from him by force, but drew their swords and threatned to kill him, except he delivered it himself; no wise man will conceive, that it was either the Ma∣sters intention, or the servants duty, to hazard his life, or his limbes, for saving of such a trifling sum. But on the other side suppose this servant, passing by some Cabaret, or Tennis-court, where his Camerads were drinking or playing, should stay with them, and drink or play away his mo∣ny, and afterwards plead as T. H. doth here, that he was overcome by the meer strength of temptation, I trow, neither T. H. nor any man els would admit of this excuse, but punish him for it, because, neither was he necessitated by the temptation, and what strength it had, was by his own fault, in respect of that vitious habit which he had contracted of drinking or gaming, Jam. 1, 14. Every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and entised. Disordered pas∣sions of anger, hatred, lust, if they be conse∣quent (as the case is here put by T. H.) and flow from deliberation and election, they do not only not diminish the fault, but they aggra∣vate it, and render it much greater.

He talks much of the motives to do, and the

motives to forbear, how they work upon and determine a man, as if a reasonable man were no more than a Tennis-ball, to be tossed to and fro by the Racketts of the second causes; As if the will had no power to moove it self, but were meerly passive, like an artificiall Popingay re∣mooved hither and thither by the bolts of the Archers, who shoot on this side and on that. What are motives but reasons or discourses fra∣med by the understanding, and freely mooved by the will? What, are the will and the understan∣ding but faculties of the same soul? and what is liberty but a power resulting from them both? To say that the will is determined by these mo∣tives, is as much as to say, that the Agent is determined by himself; If there be no necessita∣tion before the judgment of right reason doth dictate to the will, then there is no antecedent, no extrinsecall necessitation at all. All the world knowes, that when the Agent is determined by himself, then the effect is determined likewise in its cause. But if he determined himself freely, then the effect is free. Motives determine not naturally but morally, which kind of determi∣nation may consist with true liberty. But if T. H. his opinion were true, that the will were naturally determined by the Physicall and spe∣ciall influence of extrinsecall causes, not onely motives were vain, but reason it self, and delibe∣ration were vain. No, saith he, they are not vain, because they are the means. Yes, if the means be superfluous they are vain, what needed such a circuit of deliberation to advise what is

fit to be done, when it is already determined ex∣trinsecally, what must be done.

He saith, that the ignorance of the true causes, and their power is the reason, why we ascribe the effect to liberty, but when we seriously consider the causes of things, we acknowledge a necessity. No such thing, but just the contrary. The more we consider, and the cleerer we understand, the greater is the liberty, and the more the know∣ledge of our own liberty. The less we consider, and the more incapable that the understanding is, the lesser is the liberty, and the knowledge of it. And where there is no consideration, nor use of reason, there is no liberty at all, there is neither morall good nor evill. Some men, by rea∣son that their exteriour senses are not totally bound, have a trick to walk in their sleep. Sup∣pose such an one in that case should cast him∣self down a pair of staires, or from a bridge, and break his neck, or drown himself, it were a mad Jury that would find this man accessary to his own death. Why? because it was not freely done, he had not then the use of reason.

Lastly, he tells us, that the will doth choose of necessity, as well as the fire burnes of necessity. If he intend no more but this, that election is the proper and naturall act of the will, as burning is of the fire, or that the elective power is as ne∣cessarily in a man as visibility; he speaks truly, but most impertinently; For, the question is not now of the elective power, in actu primo, whether it be an essentiall faculty of the soul, but whether the act of electing this or that par∣ticular

object be free, & undetermined by any antecedent and extrinsecall causes. But if he in∣tend it in this other sense, that as the fire hath no power to suspend its burning, nor to distinguish between those combustible matters which are put unto it, but burnes that which is put unto it necessarily, if it be combustible: So the will hath no power to refuse that which it wills, nor to suspend its own appetite. He erres grossely. The will hath power, either to will or nill, or to sus∣pend, that is neither to will nor nill the same object; Yet even the burning of the fire, if it be considered as it is invested with all particular circumstances, is not otherwise so necessary an action as T. H. imagineth. Two things are re∣quired to make an effect necessary. First, that it be produced by a necessary cause, such as fire is; Secondly, that it be necessarily produced, Pro∣tagoras an Atheist, began his Book thus. Con∣cerning the gods, I have nothing to say, whether they be, or they be not, for which his Book was condemned by the Athenians to be burned. The fire was a necessary agent, but the sentence or the application of the fire to the Book, was a free act, and therefore the burning of his Book was free. Much more the rationall will is free, which is both a voluntary agent, and acts volun∣tarily.

My second reason against this distinction of Liberty from Compulsion, but not from necessi∣tation is new, and demonstrates cleerly, that to necessitate the will, by a Physicall necessity, is to compell the will so far as the will is capable of

Compulsion, and that he, who doth necessitate the will to evill, after that manner is the true cause of evill, and ought rather to be blamed than the will it self. But T. H. for all he saith he is not surprised, can be contented upon better ad∣vise to steal by all this in silence; And to hide this tergiversation from the eyes of the Reader, he makes an empty shew of braving against that famous and most necessary distinction between the elicite and imperate acts of the will; first, because the termes are improper; secondly, be∣cause they are obscure. What Triviall and Grammaticall objections are these, to be used a∣gainst the universall currant of Divines and Phi∣losophers. Verborum ut nummorum, It is in words, as it is in mony. Use makes them pro∣per and currant, A Tyrant at first, signified a lawfull and just Prince; Now, use hath quite changed the sense of it, to denote either an Usur∣per, or an Oppressor. The word praemunire is now grown a good word in our English Lawes by use and tract of time; And yet at first it was meerly mistaken for a praemonere. The names of Sunday, Munday. Tuesday, were derived at first from those Heathenish Deities, the Sun, the Moon, and the warlike God of the Germans. Now we use them for distinction sake onely, without any relation to their first originall. He is too froward that will refuse a piece of coin that is currant throughout the world, because it is not stamped after his own fancy. So is he that rejects a good word, because he understands not the derivation of it. We see forreine words are

daily naturalized, and made free Denizons in every Country. But why are the tearmes im∣proper? Because, saith he, It attributes com∣mand, and subjection to the faculties of the soul, as if they made a Common-wealth or family among themselves, and could speak one to another, There∣fore he saith, they who invented this tearm of Actus Imperatus, understood not any thing what it signified. No, why not? It seemeth to me they understood it better than those who except against it. They knew, there are mentall tearmes, which are onely conceived in the mind, as well as vocall tearmes, which are expressed with the tongue, They knew that howsoever a Superiour do intimate a direction to his inferiour, it is still a command. Tarquin commanded his son, by onely striking off the topps of the Poppies, and was by him both understood and obeyed. Though there be no formall Common-wealth or family either in the body, or in the soul of man, yet there is a subordination in the body, of the in∣feriour members to the head, there is a subordi∣nation in the soul of the inferiour faculties to the rationall will. Far be it from a reasonable man, so far to dishonour his own nature, as to equall fancy with understanding, or the sensitive appetite with the reasonable will. A power of command there is without all question, though there be some doubt in what faculty this com∣mand doth principally reside, whether in the will or in the understanding. The true resolu∣tion is, that the directive command for counsel is in the understanding; And the applicative com∣mand,

or empire, for putting in execution of what is directed, is in the will. The same ans∣wer serves for his second impropriety, about the word Elicite. For, saith he, as it is absurdly said, that to dance, is an act allured, or drawn by fair means out of the ability to dance; So it is ab∣surdly said, that to will or choose is an act drawn out of the power to will. His objection is yet more improper than their expression. The art of dan∣cing rather resembles the understanding, than the will. That drawing, which the Schools in∣tend, is cleer of another nature, from that which he conceives; By elicitation, he understands, a perswading or enticing with flattering words, or sweet alluring insinuations, to choose, this or that. But that elicitation, which the Schools in∣tend, is a deducing of the power of the will into act, that drawing, which they mention, is meerly from the appetibility of the object, or of the end, as a man drawes a Child after him with the sight of a fair Apple, or a Shepheard drawes his sheep after him with the sight of a green bough: So the end drawes the will to it, by a Metapho∣ricall motion. What he understands here by an ability to dance, is more than I know, or any man els, untill he express himself in more pro∣per tearmes, whether he understand the locomo∣tive faculty alone, or the art, or acquired habit of dancing alone, or both of these jointly. It may be said aptly without any absurdity, that the act of dancing is drawn out (elicitur) of the locomotive faculty helped by the acquired habit. He who is so scrupulous about the received

phrases of the Schools should not have let so many improper expressions have dropped from his pen; as in this very passage he confounds the compelling of a voluntary action, with the com∣manding of a voluntary action, and willing with electing, which he saith, are all one. Yet to will properly respects the end, to elect the means.

His other objection against this distinction of the acts of the will into Elicite and Imperate, is obscurity. Might it not (saith he) have been as easily said in English, a voluntary action. Yes, it might have been said as easily, but not as tru∣ly, nor properly. Whatsoever hath its originall from the will, whether immediatly or mediatly, whether it be a proper act of the will it self, as to elect, or an act of the understanding, as to de∣liberate, or an act of the inferiour faculties, or of the members, is a voluntary action, but neither the act of reason nor of the senses, nor of the sensitive appetite, nor of the members are the poper acts of the will, nor drawn immediatly out of the will it self, but the members and fa∣culties are applyed to their proper and respective acts by the power of the will.

And so he comes to cast up the totall sum of my second reason, with the same faith, that the unjust Steward did make his accounts, Luk. 16. The sum of J. D.'s distinction is (saith he) that a voluntary act may be done on compulsion (just contrary to what I have maintained) that is to say, by foul means. But to will that, or any act cannot be but by allurement or fair means. I con∣fess

the distinction is mine, because I use it, as the Sun is mine, or the Air is mine, that is com∣mon to me, with all who treat of this subject. But his mistakes are so thick, both in relating my mind, and his own, that the Reader may conclude, he is wandered out of his known way. I will do my duty to shew him the right way. First, no acts which are properly said to be com∣pelled, are voluntary. Secondly, acts of terrour (which he calls foul means) which are some∣times in a large improper sense called compulso∣ry actions, may be, and for the most part are con∣sistent with true liberty. Thirdly, actions pro∣ceeding from blandishments or sweet persuasi∣ons (which he calls fair means) if they be in∣deliberated as in children, who want the use of reason, are not presently free actions. Lastly, the strength of consequent, and deliberated desires doth neither diminish guilt, nor excuse from pu∣nishment, as just fears of extreme and immi∣nent dangers threatned by extrinsecall agents of∣ten do, because the strength of the former pro∣ceeds from our own fault, and was freely ele∣cted in the causes of it; But neither desires nor fears, which are consequent and deliberated, do absolutely necessitate the will.