A defence of true liberty from ante-cedent and extrinsecall necessity being an answer to a late book of Mr. Thomas Hobbs of Malmsbury, intituled, A treatise of liberty and necessity. Written by the Right Reverend John Bramhall D.D. and Lord Bishop of Derry.

Numb. 18.

J. D. BUt the Patrons of necessity being driven out of the plain field with reason, have certain retreats or distinctions, which they fly unto for refuge. First, they distinguish between Stoicall necessity and Christian necessity, between which they make a threefold difference.

First, say they, the Stoicks did subject Jupiter to destiny, but we subject destiny to God; I answer, that the Stoicall and Christian destiny are one, and the same, fatum quasi effatum Jovis. Hear Seneca, Destiny is the necessity of all things, and actions, depending upon the disposition of Jupiter, &c. I add, that the Stoicks left a greater liberty to Jupiter over destiny, than these Stoicall Christians do to God over his decrees, either for the beginnings of things as Euripides, or for the progress of of them as Chrysippus, or at least of the circum∣stances of time and place, as all of them gene∣rally, So Virgil, Sed trahere & moras ducere, &c. So Osyris in Apuleius, promiseth him to

prolong his life Ultra fato constituta tempo∣ra, beyond the times set down by the desti∣nies.

Next, they say, that the Stoicks did hold an eternall flux and necessary connexion of causes, but they believe that God doth act, praeter & contra naturam, besides and against nature. I answer, that it is not much materiall, whether they attribute necessity to God, or to the Starrs, or to a connexion of causes, so as they establish necessity. The former reasons do not onely condemn the ground or foundation of ne∣cessity, but much more necessity it self upon what ground soever. Either they must run into this absurdity, that the effect is determined, the cause remaining undetermined, or els hold such a necessary connexion of causes, as the Stoicks did.

Lastly, they say, the Stoicks did take away liberty and contingence, but they admit it; I answer, what liberty or contingence was it they admit, but a titular liberty, and an empty sha∣dow of contingence? who do profess stifly, that all actions and events which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise, after any other manner, in any other Place, Time, Number, Order, Measure, nor to any other end than they are, and that in respect of God, de∣termining them to one; what a poor ridiculous liberty, or contingence is this?

Secondly, they distinguish between the first cause, and the second causes; they say, that in respect of the second causes many things are

free, but in respect of the first cause, all things are necessary. This answer may be taken away two wayes.

First, so contraries shall be true together; The same thing at the same time shall be deter∣mined to one, and not determined to one; the same thing at the same time must necessarily be, and yet may not be. Perhaps they will say, not in the same respect. But that which strikes at the root of this question is this, If all the causes were onely collaterall, this exception might have some colour, but where all the causes being joined together, and subordinate one to another, do make but one totall cause, if any one cause (much more the first) in the whole series, or subordination of causes be necessary, it deter∣mines the rest, and without doubt, makes the effect necessary; Necessity or Liberty is not to be esteemed from one cause, but from all the causes joyned together. If one link in a chain be fast, it fastens all the rest.

Secondly, I would have them tell me whe∣ther the second causes be predetermined by the first cause or not; If it be determined, then the effect is necessary, even in respect of the second causes; If the second cause be not determined, how is the effect determined, the second cause remaining undetermined? Nothing can give that to another which it hath not it self. But say they, nevertheless the power or faculty remai∣neth free. True, but not in order to the act, if it be once determined. It is free, in sensu di∣viso, but not in sensu composito, when a man

holds a bird fast in his hand, is she therefore free to flie where she will, because she hath wings? Or a man imprisoned or fettered, is he therefore free to walk where he will, because he hath feet and a low motive faculty? Judge without pre∣judice, what a miserable subterfuge is this, which many men confide so much in.

T. H.Certain distinctions which he supposing may be brought to his arguments are by him remooved.

HE saith, a man may perhaps answer, that the necessity of things held by him, is not a Stoicall necessity, but a Christian necessity, &c. but this distinction I have not used, nor indeed have ever heard before. Nor do I think any man could make Stoical and Christian two kinds of ne∣cessities, though they may be two kinds of do∣ctrin. Nor have I drawn my answer to his argu∣ments from the authority of any Sect, but from the nature of the things themselves.

But here I must take notice of certain words of his in this place, as making against his own Tenet, where all the causes, saith he, being joy∣ned together, and subordinate one to another, do make but one totall cause; If any one cause, much more the first, in the whole series of subordination of causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and without doubt maketh the effect necessary. For, that which I call the necessary cause of any effect,

is the joyning together of all causes subordinate to the first into one totall cause. If any one of those, saith he, especially the first, produce its effect ne∣cessarily, then all the rest are determined, and the effect also necessary. Now, it is manifest, that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the ef∣fects that are next, and immediat to it, and therefore by his own reason, all effects are neces∣sary. Nor is that distinction of necessary, in re∣spect of the first cause, and necessary in respect of second causes mine; It does (as he well noteth) imply a contradiction.

J. D. BEcause T. H. disavowes these two distincti∣ons, I have joyned them together in one pa∣ragraph. He likes not the distinction of necessity or destiny, into Stoicall and Christian, no more do I. We agree in the conclusion, but our mo∣tives are diverse. My reason is, because I acknow∣ledge no such necessity, either as the one or as the other, and because I conceive, that those Christian writers, who do justly detest the na∣ked destiny of the Stoicks, as fearing to fall into those gross absurdities and pernicious conse∣quences which flow from thence, do yet privily (though perhaps unwittingly) under another form of expression, introduce it again at the back∣dore after they had openly cast it out at the fore∣dore: But T. H. rusheth boldly without distin∣ctions (which he accounts but Jargon) and without foresight upon the grossest destiny of all others, that is, that of the Stoicks. He confes∣seth, that they may be two kinds of doctrine,

May be? Nay, they are without all peradven∣ture. And he himself is the first who beares the name of a Christian that I have read, that hath raised this sleeping Ghost out of its grave, and set it out in its true colours. But yet he likes not the names of Stoicall and Christian destiny, I do not blame him, though he would not wil∣lingly be accounted a Stoick. To admit the thing, and quarrell about the name, is to make our selves ridiculous. Why might not I first call that kind of destiny, which is maintained by Chri∣stians, Christian destiny? and that other main∣tained by Stoicks, Stoicall destiny? But I am not the inventer of the tearme. If he had been as care∣full in reading other mens opinions, as he is confident in setting down his own, he might have found not only the thing, but the name it self often used. But if the name of fatum Chri∣stianum, do offend him, Let him call it with Lipsius, fatum verum, who divides destiny into four kinds; 1. Mathematicall or Astrologicall de∣stiny, 2. Naturall destiny, 3. Stoicall or vio∣lent destiny; and 4. true destiny, which he calls ordinarily nostrum, our destiny; that is, of Chri∣stians, and fatum pium, that is godly destiny, and defines it just as T. H. doth his destiny, to be a series or order of causes depending upon the di∣vine Counsail, de const. l. 1. cap. 17.18. & 19. Though he be more cautelous than T. H. to decline those rocks which some others have made shipwrack upon. Yet the Divines thought he came too neer them, as appeares by his Epistle to the Reader, in a later Edition. And by that

note in the margent of his twentieth Chapter, Whatsoever I dispute here, I submit to the judg∣ment of the wise, and being admonished, I will convert it. One may convince me of error, but not of obstinacy. So fearfull was he to overshoot himself, and yet he maintained both true liber∣ty, and true contingency. T. H. saith, he hath not sucked his answer from any Sect; And I say so much the worse; It is better to be the dis∣ciple of an old Sect, than the ringleader of a new.

Concerning the other destinction of liberty, in respect of the first cause, and liberty in respect of the second causes, though he will not see that which it concerned him to answer, like those old Damiae, which could put out their eyes when they list; As namely, that the faculty of willing, when it is determined in order to the act (which is all the freedom that he acknowledgeth) is but like the freedom of a bird, when she is first in a mans hand, &c. Yet he hath espied ano∣ther thing wherein I contradict my self, because I affirm, that if any one cause in the whole se∣ries of causes, much more the first cause, be ne∣cessary, it determineth the rest. But, saith he, it is manifest, that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next. I am glad, yet it is not I who contradict my self, but it is one of his manifest truths which I contradict. That the first cause is a necessary cause of all effects, which I say, is a manifest falshood. Those things which God wills without himself, he wills freely not necessarily. Whatsoever cause acts or works

necessarily, doth act or work all that it can do, or all that is in its power; But it is evident, that God doth not all things without himself, which he can do, or which he hath power to do. He could have raised up children unto Abraham of the very stones, which were upon the banks of Jor∣dan, Luk. 3.8. but he did not. He could have sent twelve Legions of Angells to the succour of Christ, but he did not. Matth. 26.53. God can make T. H. live the years of Methuselah, but it is not necessary that he shall do so, nor probable that he will do so. The productive power of God is infinite, but the whole created world is finite. And therefore God might still produce more, if it pleased him. But this it is, when men go on in a confused way, and will admit no distinctions. If T. H. had considered the difference between a necessary being, and a necessary cause, or between those actions of God, which are imminent within himself, and the transient works of God, which are extrinsecall without himself, he would never have proposed such an evident error, for a manifest truth. Qui pauca considerat, facile pronuntiat.