A defence of true liberty from ante-cedent and extrinsecall necessity being an answer to a late book of Mr. Thomas Hobbs of Malmsbury, intituled, A treatise of liberty and necessity. Written by the Right Reverend John Bramhall D.D. and Lord Bishop of Derry.

Numb. 17.

J. D. [argument 5] FIftly, take away liberty, and you take away the very nature of evill, and the formall rea∣son of sin. If the hand of the Painter were the law of painting, or the hand of the Writer the law of writing, whatsoever the one did write, or the other paint, must infallibly be good. Seeing therefore, that the first cause is the rule and Law of goodness, if it do necessitate the will, or the person to evill, either by it self immediatly or me∣diatly, by necessary flux of second causes, it will no longer be evill. The essence of sin consists in this, that one commit that which he might a void. If there be no liberty to produce sin, there is no such thing as sin in the world. Therefore it ap∣peares, both from Scripture and reason, that there is true Liberty.

T. H. TO the fift Argument from reason, which is, that if liberty be taken away, the nature and formall reason of sin is taken away, I answer, by denying the consequence. The nature of sin con∣sisteth in this, that the action done proceed from our will, and be against the Law. A Judge in

judging whether it be sin or not, which is done against the Law, looks at no higher cause of the action then the will of the doer. Now when I say the action was necessary, I do not say it was done against the will of the doer, but with his will, and so necessarily, because mans will, that is, every act of the will, and purpose of man had a sufficient and therefore a necessary cause, and consequently every voluntary action was necessitated. An a∣ction therefore may be voluntary and a sin, and nevertheless be necessary. And because God may afflict by right derived from his Omnipotency, though sin were not. And the example of punish∣ment on voluntary sinners, is the cause that pro∣duceth Justice, and maketh sin less frequent. For God to punish such sinners, as I have shewed be∣fore, is no injustice. And thus you have my an∣swer to his objections, both out of Scripture and reason.

J. D. SCis tu simulare cupressum. quid hoc? It was shrewd counsail which Alcibiades gave to Themistocles, when he was busy about his ac∣counts to the State, that he should rather stu∣dy how to make no accounts. So it seemes T. H. thinks it a more compendious way to baulk an argument, then to satisfie it. And if he can produce a Rowland against an Oliver, if he can urge a reason against a reason, he thinks he hath quitted himself fairely. But it will not serve his turn. And that he may not complain of misun∣derstanding it, as those who have a politick deaf∣ness, to hear nothing but what liketh them, I

will first reduce mine argument into form, and then weigh what he saith in answer, or rather in opposition to it. That opinion which takes a∣way the formall reason of sin, and by conse∣quence, sin it self, is not to be approoved; this is cleer, because both Reason and Religion, Nature, and Scripture do proove, and the whole world confesseth, that there is sin. But this opi∣nion of the necessity of all things, by reason of a conflux of second causes, ordered and determi∣ned by the first cause, doth take away the very formall reason of sin; This is prooved thus. That which makes sin it self to be good, and just, and lawfull, takes away the formall cause, and di∣stroyes the essence of sin; for if sin be good, and just, and lawfull, it is no more evill, it is no sin, no anomy. But this opinion of the necessity of all things, makes sin to be very good and just, and lawfull; for nothing can flow essentially by way of Physicall determination from the first cause, which is the Law and Rule of Goodness and Justice, but that which is good, and just, and lawfull, but this opinion makes sin to pro∣ceed essentially by way of Physicall determina∣tion from the first cause, as appeares in T. H. his whole discourse. Neither is it materiall at all, whether it proceed immediatly from the first cause, or mediately, so as it be by a ne∣cessary flux of second and determinate causes which produce it inevitably. To these proofs he answers nothing, but onely by denying the first consequence, as he calls it, and then sings over his old song, That the nature of sin consi∣steth

in this, that the action proceeds from our will, and be against the Law, which in our sense is most true, if he understand a just Law, and a free rationall will; But supposing (as he doth) that the Law injoines things impossible in them∣selves to be done, then it is an unjust and Ty∣rannicall Law, and the transgression of it is no sin, not to do that which never was in our po∣wer to do. And supposing likewise (as he doth) that the will is inevitably determined by speciall influence from the first cause, then it is not mans will, but Gods Will, and flowes essen∣tially from the Law of Goodness.

That which he addes of a Judge, is altogether impertinent, as to his defence. Neither is a Ci∣vill Judge the proper Judge, nor the Law of the Land the proper Rule of Sin. But it makes strongly against him; for the Judge goes upon a good ground, and even this which he confesseth, that the Judge looks at no higher cause, then the will of the doer, prooves, that the will of the doer did determine it self freely, and that the male∣factor had liberty to have kept the Law, if he would: Certainly, a Judge ought to look at all materiall circumstances, and much more at all essentiall causes. Whether every sufficient cause be a necessary cause, will come to be examined more properly, Numb. 31. For the present, it shall suffice to say, that liberty flowes from the sufficiency, and contingency from the debility of the cause. Nature never intends the generation of a monster. If all the causes concur sufficiently, a perfect creature is produced, but by reason of

the insufficiency, or debility, or contingent a∣berration of some of the causes, sometimes a Monster is produced. Yet the causes of a Mon∣ster were sufficient for the production of that which was produced, that is a Monster, other∣wise a Monster had not been produced. What is it then? A Monster is not produced by vertue of that order which is set in Nature, but by the contingent aberration of some of the naturall causes in their concurrence. The order set in Nature, is, that every like should beget its like. But supposing the concurrence of the causes to be such as it is, in the generation of a Monster, the generation of a Monster is necessary; as all the events in the world are when they are, that is, by an hypotheticall necessity. Then he be∣takes himself to his old help, that God may pu∣nish by right of omnipotence, though there were no sin. The question is not now what God may do, but what God will do, according to that Co∣venant which he hath made with man, Fac hoc & vives, Do this and thou shalt live, whether God doth punish any man contrary to this Co∣venant, Hosea. 13.9. O Israel, thy destruction is from thy self, but in me is thy help. He that wills not the death of a Sinner, doth much less will the death of an innocent Creature. By death or destruction in this discourse, the onely separa∣tion of Soul and Body is not intended, which is a debt of nature, and which God, as Lord of Life and Death, may justly do, and make it not a punishment, but a blessing to the party; but we understand the subjecting of the Creature to

eternall torments. Lastly, he tells of that bene∣nefit which redounds to others from Exemplary Justice, which is most true, but not according to his own grounds, for neither is it Justice to punish a man for doing that which it was impossible alwayes for him not to do; Neither is it lawfull to punish an innocent person, that good may come of it; And if his opinion of ab∣solute necessity of all things were true, the desti∣nies of men could not be altered, either by ex∣amples or fear of punishment.