Numb. 14.
First, that the necessity of an action doth not make the Law which prohibits it unjust. To let pass, that not the necessity, but the will to break the Law maketh the action unjust, because the Law regardeth the will, and no other precedent causes of action. And to let pass, that no Law can be possibly unjust, in as much as every man makes by his consent the Law he is bound to keep, and which consequently must be just, unless a man can be unjust to himself; I say, what necessa∣ry cause soever preceds an action, yet if the action be forbidden, he that doth it willingly may justly be punisht. For instance, suppose the Law on pain of death prohibit stealing, and there be a man who by the strength of temptation is necessitated to steal, and is thereupon put to death, does not this punishment deterr others from thest? is it not a cause that others steal not? doth it not frame and make their will to justice? To make the Law is therefore to make a cause of Justice, and to necessitate justice, and consequently it is no injustice to make such a Law.
The institution of the Law is not to grieve the delinquent for that which is passed, and not to be undone, but to make him and others just, that els would not be so. And respecteth not the evill act past, but the good to come. In so much as without this good intention of future, no past Act of a delinquent could justifie his killing in the sight of God. But you will say, how is it just to Page 94 kill one man to amend another, if what were done were necessary? To this I answer, that men are justly killed, not for that their actions are not ne∣cessitated, but that they are spared and preserved, because they are not noxious; for where there is no Law, there no killing, nor any thing els can be unjust. And by the right of Nature we de∣stroy, without being unjust, all that is noxious, both beasts and men. And for beasts, we kill them justly, when we do it in order to our own preserva∣tion. And yet J. D. confesseth, that their acti∣ons, as being only spontaneous and not free, are all necessitated and determined to that one thing which they shall do. For men, when we make So∣cieties or Commonwealths, we lay down our right to kill, excepting in certain cases, as murther, theft, or other offensive actions; So that the right which the Commonwealth hath to put a man to death for crimes, is not created by the Law, but remaines from the first right of nature, which every man hath to preserve himself, for that the Law doth not take that right away, in case of criminalls, who were by Law excepted. Men are not therefore put to death, or punished for that their theft proceedeth from election, but because it was noxious and contrary to mens preservation, and the punishment conducing to the preservation of the rest. In as much as to punish those that do voluntary hurt, and none els, frameth and ma∣keth mens wills such as men would have them. And thus it is plain, that from necessity of a vo∣luntary action cannot be inferred the injustice of the Law that forbiddeth it, or of the Magistrate that punisheth it.
Page 95Secondly, I deny that it makes consultations to be in vain; 'tis the consultation that causeth a man, and necessitateth him to choose to do one thing rather than another. So that unless a man say, that cause to be in vain, which necessitateth the effect, he cannot infer the superfluousness of consultation out of the necessity of the election pro∣ceeding from it. But it seemes he reasons thus, If I must needs do this rather than that, then I shall do this rather than that, though I consult not at all; which is a false proposition, a falfe con∣sequence, and no better than this, If I shall live till to morrow, I shall live till to morrow, though I run my self through with a sword to day. If there be a necessity that an action shall be done, or that any effect shall be brought to pass, it does not therefore follow, that there is nothing neces∣sarily required as a means to bring it to pass. And therefore when it is determined, that one thing shall be chosen before another, 'tis determi∣ned also for what cause it shall be chosen, which cause for the most part is deliberation or consul∣tation. And therefore consultation is not in vain, and indeed the less in vain, by how much the ele∣ction is more necessitated.
The same answer is to be given to the third supposed inconveniency; Namely, that admoniti∣ons are in vain, for admonitions are parts of con∣sultations. The Admonitor being a Counsailer for the time, to him that is admonished.
The fourth pretended inconveniency is, that praise and dispraise, reward and punishment will be in vain. To which I answer, that for praise Page 96 and dispraise, they depend not at all on the ne∣cessity of the action praised or dispraised. For, what is it els to praise, but to say a thing is good? Good, I say for me, or for some body els, or for the State and Commonwealth. And what is it to say an action is good, but to say, it is as I would wish, or as another would have it, or according to the will of the State, that is to say, according to Law? Does J. D. think, that no action can please me or him, or the Commonwealth, that should proceed from necessity?
Things may be therefore necessary, and yet prayseworthy, as also necessary, and yet dispraised, and neither of both in vain, because praise and dis∣praise, and likewise reward and punishment, do by example make and conform the will to good or evill. It was a very great praise in my opinion, that Velleius Paterculus gives Cato, where he sayes, he was good by nature, Et quia aliter esse non potuit.
The fift and sixt inconvenience, that Councells, Arts, Arms, Books, Instruments, Study, Medi∣cines, and the like, would be superfluous, the same answer serves that to the former; That is to say, that this consequence, if the effect shall necessari∣ly come to pass, then it shall come to pass without its cause, is a false one. And those things named, Councells, Arts, Arms, &c. are the causes of those effects.
Page 97He saith, that no Law can possibly be unjust; And I say, that this is to deny the conclusion, which deserves no reply; But to give him satisfaction, I will follow him in this also. If he intended no more, but that unjust Lawes are not Genuine Lawes, nor bind to active obedience, because they are not the ordinations of right reason, nor instituted for the common good, nor prescribe that which ought to be done, he said truly, but nothing at all to his purpose. But if he intend (as he doth) that there are no Lawes de facto, which are the ordinances of reason erring, insti∣tuted for the common hurt, and prescribing that which ought not to be done, he is much mi∣staken. Pharaohs Law to drown the Male Chil∣dren of the Israelites, Exod. 1.22. Nebuchadnez∣zars Law, that whosoever did not fall down and worship the golden image which he had set up, should be cast into the fiery furnace, Dan. 3.•…. Darius his Law, that whosoever should ask a Petition of any God or man, for thirty dayes, save of the King, should be cast into the Den of Lions, Dan. 6.7. Ahashuerosh his Law, to de∣stroy the Jewish Nation, root & branch, Esther 3.13. The Pharisees Law, that whosoever confessed Christ, should be excommunicated, John 9.22. were all unjust Lawes.
The ground of this errour is as great an errour it self (Such an art he hath learned of repac∣king Paradoxes) which is this. That every man makes by his consent the Law which he is bound Page 100 to keep; If this were true, it would preserve them, if not from being unjust, yet from being injurious: But it is not true. The positive Law of God, conteined in the old and new Testa∣ment; The Law of Nature, written in our hearts by the Finger of God; The Lawes of Conque∣rors, who come in by the power of the Sword; The Lawes of our Ancestors, which were made before we were born, do all oblige us to the ob∣servation of them, yet to none of all these did we give our actuall consent. Over and above all these exceptions, he builds upon a wrong foun∣dation, that all Magistrates at first, were elective. The first Governors were Fathers of Families; And when those petty Princes could not afford competent protection and security to their sub∣jects, many of them did resign their severall and respective interests into the hands of one joint Father of the Country.
And though his ground had been true, that all first Legislators were elective, which is false, yet his superstructure fails, for it was done in hope and trust, that they would make just Laws. If Magistrates abuse this trust, and deceive the hopes of the people, by making Tyrranicall Lawes, yet it is without their consent. A pre∣cedent trust doth not justifie the subsequent er∣rours and abuses of a Trustee. He who is duely elected a Legislator, may exercise his Legislative power unduely. The peoples implicite consent doth not render the Tyrannicall Lawes of their Legislators to be just.
But his chiefest answer is, that an action for∣bidden, Page 101 though it proceed from necessary causes, yet if it were done willingly, it may be justly pu∣nished, which according to his custome he prooves by an instance; A man necessitated to steal by the strength of temptation, yet if he steal wil∣lingly, is justly put to death. Here are two things, and both of them untrue.
First, he failes in his assertion. Indeed we suffer justly for those necessities which we our selves have contracted by our own fault, but not for extrinsecall, antecedent necessities, which were imposed upon us without our fault. If that Law do not oblige to punishment which is not intimated, because the subject is invincibly ignorant of it; How much less that Law which prescribes absolute impossibilities, unless perhaps invincible necessity be not as strong a plea as invincible ignorance. That which he addes, if it were done willingly, though it be of great mo∣ment, if it be rightly understood, yet in his sense, that is, if a mans will be not in his own disposi∣tion, and if his willing do not come upon him ac∣cording to his will, nor according to any thing els in his power, it weighs not half so much as the least feather in all his horse-load. For if that Law be unjust and tyrannicall which commands a man to do that which is impossible for him to do, then that Law is likewise unjust and tyran∣nicall, which commands him to will that which is impossible for him to will.
Secondly, his instance supposeth an untruth, and is a plain begging of the question. No man is extrinsecally, antecedently and irresistibly ne∣cessitated Page 102 by temptation to steal. The Devill may sollicite us, but he cannot necessitate us. He hath a faculty of perswading, but not a power of compelling. Nos ignem habemus, spiritus flam∣mam ciet, as Nazianzen. He blowes the coles, but the fire is our own. Mordet duntaxat sese in fauces illius objicientem, as St. Austin, he bites not untill we thrust our selves into his mouth. He may propose, he may suggest, but he cannot moove the will effectively. Resist the Devill, and he will flie from you, Jam. 4.7. By faith we are able to quench all the fiery darts of the wicked, Eph. 6.16. And if Sathan, who can both propose the object, and choose out the fittest times and places, to worke upon our frailties, and can suggest reasons, yet cannot necessitate the will (which is most certain,) then much less can outward objects do it alone. They have no naturall efficacy to determine the will. Well may they be occasions, but they cannot be causes of evill. The sensitive appetite may engender a proclivity to steal, but not a necessity to steal. And if it should produce a kind of necessity, yet it is but Moral, not Natural; Hypothetical, not Absolute; Coexistent, not Antecedent from our selves, nor extrinsecall. This necessity, or ra∣ther proclivity, was free in its causes, we our selves by our own negligence in not opposing our passions when we should, and might, have freely given it a kind of dominion over us. Admit that some sudden passions may and do extraor∣dinarily surprise us; And therefore we say, motus primo primi, the first motions are not always in Page 103 our power, neither are they free, yet this is but very rarely, and it is our own fault that they do surprise us. Neither doth the Law punish the first motion to theft, but the advised act of stea∣ling. The intention makes the thief. But of this more largely numb. 25.
He pleades moreover, that the Law is a cause of justice, that it frames the wills of men to ju∣stice, and that the punishment of one doth con∣duce to the preservation of many. All this is most true of a just Law justly executed. But this is no god-a-mercy to T. H. his opinion of absolute necessity. If all actions, and all events be prede∣termined Naturaly, Necessarily, Extrinsecally, how should the Law frame men morally to good actions? He leaves nothing for the Law to do, but either that which is done already, or that which is impossible to be done. If a man be chained to every individual act which he doth, and from every act which he doth not, by in∣dissolvible bonds of inevitable necessity, how should the Law either deterre him or frame him? If a dog be chained fast to a post, the sight of a rod cannot draw him from it. Make a thou∣sand Lawes, that the fire shall not burn, yet it will burn. And whatsoever men do (according to T. H.) they do it as necessarily, as the fire burneth. Hang up a thousand Theeves, and if a man be determined inevitably to steal, he must steal notwithstanding.
He addes, that the sufferings imposed by the Law upon delinquents, respect not the evill act past, but the good to come, and that the putting Page 104 of a delinquent to death by the Magistrate for any crime whatsoever, cannot be justified before God, except there be a real intention to benefit others by his example. The truth is, the punishing of delinquents by Law, respecteth both the evill act past, and the good to come. The ground of it, is the evill act past, the scope or end of it, is the good to come. The end without the ground cannot justifie the act. A bad intention may make a good action bad; but a good intention cannot make a bad action good. It is not law∣full to do evill, that good may come of it, nor to punish an innocent person for the admonition of others; that is to fall into a certain crime, for fear of an uncertain. Again, though there were no other end of penalties inflicted, neither pro∣batory, nor castigatory, nor exemplary, but on∣ly vindicatory, to satisfie the Law, out of a zeal of Justice, by giving to every one his own, yet the action is just and warrantable. Killing, as it is considered in it self without all undue circum∣stances, was never prohibited to the lawfull Ma∣gistrate, who is the Vicegerent or Lieutenant of God, from whom he derives his power of life and death.
T. H. hath one plea more. As a drowning man catcheth at every Bulrush, so he layes hold on every pretence to save a desperate cause. But first, it is worth our observation to see how oft he changeth shapes in this one particular. First, he told us, that it was the irresistible power of God that justifies all his actions, though he com∣mand one thing openly, and plot another thing Page 105 secretly, though he be the cause, not only of the action, but also of the irregularity, though he both give man power to act and determine this power to evill, as well as good; though he pu∣nish the Creatures, for doing that which he himself did necessitate them to do. But being pressed with reason, that this is tyrannical; first, to necessitate a man to do his will, and then to punish him for doing of it, he leaves this pre∣tence in the plain field, and flies to a second. That therefore a man is justly punished, for that which he was necessitated to do, because the act was voluntary on his part. This hath more shew of reason than the former, if he did make the will of man to be in his own disposi∣tion, but maintaining, that the will is irresisti∣bly determined to will whatsoever it doth will, the injustice and absurdity is the same; First, to necessitate a man to will, and then to punish him for willing. The dog onely bites the stone which is thrown at him with a strange hand, but they make the first cause to punish the instrument, for that which is his own pro∣per act. Wherefore not being satisfied with this, he casts it off, and flies to his third shift. Men are not punished (saith he) therefore, because their theft proceeded from election (that is, because it was willingly done, for to Elect and Will, saith he, are both one; Is not this to blow hot and cold with the same breath?) but because it was noxious and contrary to mens preservation. Thus far he saith true, that every creature by the instinct of nature, seeks to preserve it self; cast Page 106 water into a dusty place, and it contracts it self into little globes, that is, to preserve it self. And those who are noxious in the eye of the Law, are justly punished by them to whom the execution of the Law is committed; but the Law accounts no persons noxious, but those who are noxious by their own fault. It punisheth not a thorn for pricking, because it is the nature of the thorn, and it can do no otherwise, nor a child before it have the use of reason. If one should take mine hand perforce, and give another a box on the ear with it, my hand is noxious, but the Law punisheth the other who is faulty. And there∣fore he hath reason to propose the question, how it is just to kill one man to amend another, if he who killed did nothing but what he was ne∣cessitated to do. He might as well demand how it is lawfull to murther a company of innocent Infants to make a bath of their lukewarm blood, for curing the Leprosy. It had been a more rational way; first, to have demonstrated that it is so, and then to have questioned why it is so. His assertion it self is but a dream, and the reason which he gives of it why it is so, is a dream of a dream.
The sum of it is this; That where there is no Law, there no killing or any thing els can be un∣just; that before the constitution of Common∣wealths every man had power to kill another, if he conceived him to be hurtfull to him; that at the constitution of Commonwealths particular men lay down this right in part, and in part re∣serve it to themselves, as in case of theft, or mur∣ther. Page 107 That the right which the Commonwealth hath to put a malefactor to death is not created by the Law, but remaineth from the first right of Nature, which every man hath to preserve himself, that the killing of men in this case is as the killing of beasts in order to our own preserva∣vation. This may well be called stringing of Paradoxes.
But first, there never was any such time when mankind was without Governors and Lawes, and Societies. Paternall Government was in the world from the beginning, and the Law of Nature. There might be sometimes a root of such Barbarous Theevish Brigants, in some rocks, or desarts, or odd corners of the world, but it was an abuse and a degeneration from the nature of man, who is a politicall crea∣ture. This savage opinion reflects too much up∣on the honour of mankind.
Secondly, there never was a time when it was lawfull ordinarily for private men to kill one another for their own preservation. If God would have had men live like wild beasts, as Li∣ons, Bears or Tygers, he would have armed them with hornes, or tusks, or talons, or pricks; but of all creatures man is born most naked, without any weapon to defend himself, because God had provided a better means of security for him, that is, the Magistrate.
Thirdly, that right which private men have to preserve themselves, though it be with the killing of another, when they are set upon to be murdered or robbed, is not a remainder or a Page 108 reserve of some greater power which they have resigned, but a privilege which God hath given them, in case of extreme danger and invincible necessity, that when they cannot possibly have recourse to the ordinary remedy, that is, the Ma∣gistrate, every man becomes a Magistrate to him∣self.
Fourthly, nothing can give that which it never had; The people, whilest they were a dis∣persed rabble (which in some odd cases might happen to be) never had juftly the power of life and death, and therefore they could not give it by their election. All that they do is to prepare the matter, but it is God Almighty, that infu∣seth the soul of power.
Fiftly and lastly, I am sorry to hear a man of reason and parts to compare the murthering of men with the slaughtering of brute beasts. The elements are for the Plants, the Plants for the brute beasts, the brute beasts for man. When God inlarged his former grant to man, and gave him liberty to eat the flesh of the creatures for his sustenance, Gen. 9.3. Yet man is expresly excepted, ver. 6. Who so sheddeth mans blood, by man shall his blood be shed. And the reason is as∣signed, for in the Image of God made he man. Before sin entred into the world, or before any creatures were hurtfull, or noxious to man, he had dominion over them, as their Lord and Master. And though the possession of this sove∣raignty be lost in part, for the sin of man, which made not onely the creatures to rebell, but also the inferiour faculties, to rebell against the su∣periour, Page 109 from whence it comes, that one man is hurtfull to another, yet the dominion still re∣maines; wherein we may observe how sweetly the providence of God doth temper this cross, that though the strongest creatures have with∣drawn their obedience, as Lions and Beares, to shew that man hath lost the excellency of his dominion, and the weakest creatures, as Flies and Gnats, to shew into what a degree of con∣tempt he is fallen, yet still the most profitable and usefull creatures, as Sheep and Oxen, do in some degree retain their obedience.
The next branch of his answer concernes con∣sultations, which (saith he) are not superfluous, though all things come to pass necessarily, be∣cause they are the cause which doth necessitate the effect, and the means to bring it to pass. We were told Numb. 11. that the last dictate of right reason was but as the last feather which breaks the horses back. It is well, yet that rea∣son hath gained some command again, and is become at least a Quarter-master. Certainly if any thing under God have power to determin the will, it is right reason. But I have shewed sufficiently, that reason doth not determine the will Physically, nor absolutely, much less ex∣trinsecally, and antecedently, and therefore it makes nothing for that necessity which T. H. hath undertaken to prove. He adds further, that as the end is necessary, so are the means; And when it is determined, that one thing shall be chosen before another, it is determined also for what cause it shall be so chosen. All which is Page 110 truth, but not the whole truth; for as God or∣daines means for all ends, so he adapts and fitts the means to their respective ends, free means to free ends, contingent means to contingent ends, necessary means to necessary ends. Whereas T. H. would have all means, all ends, to be neces∣sary. If good hath so ordered the world, that a man ought to use and may freely use those means of God, which he doth neglect, not by vertue of Gods decree, but by his own fault; If a man use those means of evill, which he ought not to use, and which by Gods decree, he had power to forbear; If God have left to man in part the free managery of human affaires, and to that purpose hath endowed him with under∣standing, then consultations are of use, then provident care is needfull, then it concerns him to use the means. But if God have so ordered this world, that a man cannot, if he would, ne∣glect any means of good, which by vertue of Gods decree it is possible for him to use, and that he cannot possibly use any means of evill, but those which are irresistibly and inevitably imposed upon him by an antecedent decree, then not only consultations are vain, but that noble faculty of reason it self is vain: do we think that we can help God Almighty to do his proper work? In vain we trouble our selves, in vain we take care to use those means, which are not in our power to use, or not to use. And this is that which was conteined in my prolepsis or prevention of his answer, though he be pleased both to disorder it, and to silence it. We can∣not Page 111 hope by our labours, to alter the course of things set down by God; let him perform his de∣cree, let the necessary causes do their work. If we be those causes, yet we are not in our own disposition, we must do what we are ordained to do, and more we cannot do. Man hath no remedy but patience, and shrug up the shoulders. This is the doctrine flowes from this opinion of absolute necessity. Let us suppose the great wheel of the clock which setts all the little wheels a going, to be as the decree of God, and that the motion of it were perpetual infallible from an intrinsecal principle, even as Gods de∣cree is Infallible, Eternal, All-sufficient. Let us suppose the lesser wheels to be the second causes, and that they do as certainly follow the motion of the great wheel, without missing or swerving in the least degree, as the second causes do pursue the determination of the first cause. I desire to know in this case what cause there is to call a Councell of Smiths, to consult and order the mo∣tion of that which was ordered and determined before their hands. Are men wiser than God? yet all men know, that the motion of the lesser whee is is a necessary means to make the clock strike.
But he tells me in great sadness, that my ar∣gument is just like this other; If I shall live till to morrow, I shall live till to morrow, though I run my self through with a sword to day, which saith he, is a false consequence, and a false propo∣position. Truly, if by running through, he un∣derstands killing, it is a false, or rather a foolish Page 112 proposition, and implyes a contradiction. To live till to morrow, and to day to dy, are inconsistent. But by his favour, this is not my consequence, but this is his own opinion. He would perswade us, that it is absolutely necessary, that a man shall live till to morrow, and yet that it is pos∣sible that he may kill himself to day. My Ar∣gument is this. If there be a liberty and possi∣bility for a man to kill himself to day, then it is not absolutely necessary, that he shall live till to morrow; but there is such a liberty, there∣fore no such necessity. And the consequence which I make here is this. If it be absolutely necessary, that a man shall live till to morrow, then it is vain and superfluous for him to consult and deliberate, whether he should dy to day, or not. And this is a true consequence; The ground of his mistake is this, that though it be true, that a man may kill himself to day, yet upon the sup∣position of his absolute necessity it is impossible. Such Heterogeneous arguments and instances he produceth, which are half builded upon our true grounds, and the other half upon his false grounds.
The next branch of my argument concerns Admonitions, to which he gives no new answer, and therefore I need not make any new reply; saving only to tell him, that he mistakes my ar∣gument; I say not only, If all things be necessa∣ry, then admonitions are in vain, but if all things be necessary, then it is to no more purpose to admonish men of understanding than fools, chil∣dren, or mad-men. That they do admonish the Page 113 one and not the other, is confessedly true; and no reason under heaven can be given for it but this, that the former have the use of reason, and true liberty, with a dominion over their own actions, which children, fools and mad-men have not.
Concerning praise and dispraise, he inlargeth himself. The scope of his discourse is, that things necessary may be praise-worthy. There is no doubt of it, but withall their praise reflects up∣on the free agent, as the praise of a statue re∣flects upon the workman who made it. To praise a thing (saith he) is to say, it is good. True, but this goodness is not a Metaphysicall goodness, so the worst of things, and whatsoever hath a be∣ing, is good. Nor a natural goodness; The praise of it passeth wholy to the Author of Nature; God saw all that he had made, and it was very good. But a morall goodness, or a goodness of actions rather than of things. The morall goodness of an action is the conformity of it with right rea∣son. The morall evill of an action, is the de∣formity of it, and the alienation of it from right reason. It is morall praise and dispraise which we speak of here. To praise any thing morally, is to say, it is morally good, that is, conformable to right reason. The morall dis∣praise of a thing is to say, it is morally bad, or disagreeing from the rule of right reason. So mo∣rall praise is from the good use of liberty, morall dispraise from the bad use of liberty: but if all things be necessary, than morall liberty is quite taken away, and with it all true praise and dis∣praise. Whereas T. H. adds, that to say a thing Page 114 is good, is to say, it is as I would wish, or as an∣other would wish, or as the State would have it, or according to the Law of the Land, he mistakes infinitely. He and another, and the State, may all wish, that which is not really good, but on∣ly in appearance. We do often wish what is pro∣fitable, or delightfull, without regarding so much as we ought what is honest. And though the will of the State where we live, or the Law of the Land do deserve great consideration, yet it is no infallible rule of morall goodness. And therefore to his question, whether nothing that proceeds from necessity can please me, I answer, yes. The burning of the fire pleaeth me when I am cold; And I say, it is good fire, or a creature created by God, for my use, and for my good: Yet I do not mean to attribute any morall goodness to the fire, nor give any morall praise to it, as if it were in the power of the fire it self, either to communicate its heat, or to suspend it, but I praise first the Creator of the fire, and then him who provided it. As for the praise which Vel∣leius Paterculus gives Cato, that he was good by nature. Et quia aliter esse non potuit, it hath more of the Oratour than either of the Theolo∣gian or Philosopher in it. Man in the State of innocency did fall and become evill, what pri∣vilege hath Cato more than he? No, by his leave. Narratur & dij Catonis saepe mero caluisse virtus. but the true meaning is, that he was naturally of a good temper, not so prone to some kinds of vices as others were; This is to praise a thing, not an action, naturally, not morally. Socrates was Page 115 not of so good a naturall temper, yet prooved as good a man; the more his praise, by how much the difficulty was the more to conform his dis∣orderly appetite to right reason.
Concerning reward and punishment, he saith not a word, but onely that they frame and con∣found the will to good, which hath been suffi∣ciently answered. They do so indeed, but if his opinion were true, they could not do so. But be∣cause my aim is not only to answer T. H. but also to satisfie my self; Though it be not urged by him, yet I do acknowledge, that I find some improper and analogicall rewards and punish∣ments used to brute beasts, as the hunter re∣wards his dog, the master of the Coy-duck whipps her, when she returns without company. And if it be true, which he affirmeth a little before, that I have confessed, that the actions of brute beasts are all necessitated and determined to that one thing which they shall do, the difficulty is increased.
But first, my saying is misalleged. I said, that some kinds of actions which are most excellent in brute beasts, and make the greatest shew of reason, as the Bees working their Honey, and the Spiders weaving their Webbs, are yet done without any consultation, or deliberation, by a meer instinct of nature, and by a determination of their fancies, to these only kinds of workes But I did never say, I could not say, that all their individuall actions are necessary, and antecedently determined in their causes, as what dayes the Bees shall flie abroad, and what dayes and houres each Bee shall keep in the Page 116 Hive, how often they shall fetch in Thyme on a day, and from whence. These actions and the like, though they be not free, because brute beasts want reason to deliberate, yet they are contin∣gent, and therefore not necessary.
Secondly, I do acknowledge, that as the fancies of some brute creatures are determined by nature, to some rare & exquisite works; So in others, where it finds a naturall propension; Art which is the Imitator of Nature, may frame & form them ac∣cording to the will of the Artist, to some particular actions and ends, as we see in Setting-doggs, and Coy-ducks, and Parrots; and the principall means whereby they effect this, is by their backs, or by their bellies, by the rod, or by the morsell, which have indeed a shadow, or resemblance of rewards and punishments. But we take the word here properly, not as it is used by vulgar people, but as it is used by Divines and Philo∣sophers, for that recompense which is due to ho∣nest and dishonest actions. Where there is no morall liberty, there is neither honesty nor dis∣honesty, neither true reward nor punishment.
Thirdly, when brute creatures do learn any such qualities, it is not out of judgment, or deli∣beration, or discourse, by inferring or concluding one thing from another, which they are not ca∣pable of. Neither are they able to conceive a reason of what they do, but meerly out of memo∣ry, or out of a sensitive fear, or hope. They re∣member, that when they did after one manner, they were beaten; and when they did after ano∣ther manner, they were cherished, and accor∣dingly Page 117 they apply themselves. But if their in∣dividuall actions were absolutely necessary, fear or hope could not alter them. Most certainly, if there be any desert in it, or any praises due un∣to it, it is to them who did instruct them.
Lastly, concerning Arts, Arms, Books, In∣struments, Study, Physick, and the like, he an∣swereth not a word more than what is already satisfied. And therefore I am silent.
