A defence of true liberty from ante-cedent and extrinsecall necessity being an answer to a late book of Mr. Thomas Hobbs of Malmsbury, intituled, A treatise of liberty and necessity. Written by the Right Reverend John Bramhall D.D. and Lord Bishop of Derry.

Numb. 12.

J. D. [argument 5] FIftly, if there be no liberty, there shall be no day of Doom, no last Judgment, no re∣wards nor punishments after death. A man can never make himself a criminall, if he be not left at liberty to commit a crime. No man can be justly punished for doing that, which was not in his power to shun. To take away liberty, ha∣zards heaven, but undoubtedly it leaves no hell.

T. H. THE Arguments of greatest consequence are the third and fift, and fall both into one. Namely, If there be a necessity of all events, that it will follow, that praise and reprehension, reward and punishment, are all vain and unjust. And that if God should openly forbid, and secretly ne∣cessitate the same action, punishing men for what they could not avoid, there would be no belief a∣mong them of heaven or hell.

To oppose hereunto, I must borrow an answer from St. Paul, Rom. 9. ver. 11. from the 11. verse of the Chapter to the 18. is laid down the very same objection in these words. When they (meaning Esau and Jacob) were yet unborn, and had done neither good nor evill, That the purpose of God according to election, not by works, but by him that calleth, might remain firm, it was said to her (viz. to Rebekah) that the elder shall serve the younger. And what then shall we say, is there iniustice with God? God forbid. It is not there∣fore in him that willeth, nor in him that runneth, but in God that sheweth mercy. For the Scripture

saith to Pharaoh, I have stirred thee up, that I I may shew my power in thee, and that my Name may be set forth in all the earth. Therefore whom God willeth, he hath mercy or, and whom he willeth he hardeneth. Thus you see the case put by St. Paul is the same with that of J. D. and the same ob∣jection in these words following, Thou wilt ask me then, why will God yet complain, for who hath resisted his will? To this therefore the Apostle answers, not by denying it was Gods will, or that the decree of God concerning Esau was not be∣fore he had sinned, or that Esau was not necessi∣tated to do what he did, but thus, Who art thou, O Man, that interrogatest God? shall the work say to the workman, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay of the same stuff, to make one vessell to honour, another to dishonour? According therefore to this answer of St. Paul, I answer J .D's objection, and say, The power of God alone, without other help, is suf∣ficient Justification of any action he doth. That which men make among themselves here by pacts and Covenants, and call by the name of Justice, and according whereunto men are counted and tearmed rightly just and unjust, is not that by which God Almighties actions are to be measu∣red or called just, no more than his counsailes are to be measured by human wisedom. That which he does is made just by his doing; Just I say in him, not always just in us by the Examples; for a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the hinderance of the same, if he pu∣nish him, he so commanded for not doing it is un∣just.

So also his counsailes, they be therefore not in vain, because they be his, whether we see the use of them or not. When God afflicted Job, he did object no sin to him, but justified that afflicting him by telling him of his power. Hast thou (sayes God) an arm like mine? Where wast thou when I layd the foundations of the earth? and the like. So our Saviour concerning the man that was born blind, said, it was not for his sin, nor his parents sin, but that the power of God might be shewn in him. Beasts are subject to death and torment, yet they cannot sin. It was Gods will it should be so. Power irresistible justifieth all actions really and properly in whomsoever it be found. Less power does not. And because such power is in God only, he must needs be just in all his actions. And we, that not comprehending his Counsailes, call him to the Bar, commit injustice in it.

I am not ignorant of the usuall reply to this answer by distinguishing between will and per∣mission. As, that God Almighty does indeed per∣mit sin sometimes, And that he also foreknoweth that the sin he permitteth shall be committed, but does not will it, nor necessitate it. I know also they distinguish the action from the sin of the action, saying, God Almighty does indeed cause the action, whatsoever action it be, but not the sinfulness or irregularity of it, that is, the dis∣cordance between the Action and the Law. Such distinctions as these dazell my understanding. I find no difference between the will to have a thing done, and the permission to do it, when he that per∣mitteth it can hinder it, and knowes it will be

done unless he hinder it. Nor find I any diffe∣rence between an action that is against the Law, and the sin of that action. As for example, be∣tween the killing of Uriah, and the sin of David in killing Uriah. Nor when one is cause both of the action and of the Law, how another can be cause of the disagreement between them, no more than how one man making a longer and shorter garment, another can make the inequallity that is between them. This I know, God cannot sin, be∣cause his doing a thing makes it just, and conse∣quenly no sin. And because whatsoever can sin, is subject to anothers Law, which God is not. And therefore tis blasphemy to say, God can sin. But to say, that God can so order the world as a sin may be necessarily caused thereby in a man, I do not see how it is any dishonour to him. Howsoever, if such or other distinctions can make it clear that St. Paul did not think Esaus or Pharaohs actions proceed from the will and purpose of God, or that proceeding from his will could not therefore with∣out injustice be blamed or punished, I will as soon as I understand them turn unto J. D's opinion. For I now hold nothing in all this question be∣tween us, but what seemeth to me not obscurely, but most expresly said in this place by Saint Paul. And thus much in answer to his places of Scrip∣ture.

J. D. T. H. thinks to kill two birds with one stone, and satisfies two Arguments with one answer, whereas in truth he satisfieth neither. First, for my third reason. Though all he say here, were as true as an Oracle. Though punishment were an act of dominion, not of Justice in God; yet this is no sufficient cause why God should deny his own Act, or why he should chide or expo∣stulate with men, why they did that which he himself did necessitate them to do, and whereof he was the actor more than they, they being but as the stone, but he the hand that threw it. Notwithstanding any thing which is pleaded here, this Stoicall opinion doth stick hypocri∣sy and dissimulation close to God, who is the Truth it self.

And to my fift Argument, which he chargeth and relateth amiss, as by comparing mine with his, may appear. His chiefest answer is to oppose a difficult place of St. Paul, Rom. 9.11. Hath he never heard, that to propose a doubt is not to answer an Argument, Nec bene respondet qui li∣tem lite resolvit. But I will not pay him in his own coin. Wherefore to this place alledged by him, I answer, The case is not the same. The question moved there, is, how God did keep his promise made to Abraham to be the God of him and of his seed, if the Jewes who were the legi∣timate progeny of Abraham were deserted. To which the Apostle answers ver. 6. 7, 8. That that promise was not made to the carnall seed of Abraham, that is, the Jewes, but to his spiri∣tuall

Sons which were the Heirs of his Faith, that is to the beleeving Christians; which an∣swer he explicateth, first by the Allegory of I∣saack and Ishmael, and after in the place cited of Esau and of Jacob. Yet neither doth he speak there so much of their persons as of their posterities. And though some words may be accommodated to Gods praedestination, which are there uttered, yet it is not the scope of that text, to treat of the reprobation of any man to hell-fire. All the posterity of Esau were not eternally reprobated, as holy Job and many others. But this question which is now agi∣tated between us, is quite of another nature, how a man can be a criminal who doth nothing but that which he is extrinsecally necessitated to do, or how God in Justice can punish a man with aeternall torments, for doing that, which it was never in his power to leave undone. That he who did impresite the motion in the heart of man, should punish man, who did onely re∣ceive the impression from him. So his answer looks another way.

But because he grounds so much upon this text, that if it can be cleared he is ready to change his opinion, I will examin all those passages which may seem to favour his cause. First, these words ver. 11. being not yet borne, neither having done any good or evill, upon which the whole weight of his argument doth depend, have no reference at all to those words ver. 13. Jacob have I loved, and Esau have I hated, for those words were first uttered by the

Prophet Malachy, many ages after Jacob and Esau were dead, Mal. 1.2. and intended of the posterity of Esau, who were not redeemed from captivity, as the Israelites were. But they are referred to those other words, ver. 12. The el∣der shall serve the younger, which indeed were spoken before Jacob or Esau were Born, Gen. 5.23. And though those words of Malachy had been used of Jacob and Esau before they were Born, yet it had advantaged his cause no∣thing, for hatred in that text doth not signify any reprobation to the flames of hell, much less the execution of that decree, or the actuall imposition of punishment, nor any act contra∣ry to love. God saw all that he made, and it was very good. Goodness it self cannot hate that which is good. But hatred there signifies Comparative hatred, or a less degree of love, or at the most a negation of love. As Gen. 29.31. When the Lord saw that Leah was hated, we may not conclude thence that Jacob hated his Wife, The precedent verse doth fully ex∣pound the sense, ver. 30. Jacob loved Rachel more then Leah. So Mat. 6.24. No man can serve two Masters, for either he will hate the one and love the other. So Luke 14.26. If any Man hate not his Father and Mother, &c. he cannot be my Disciple. St. Mathew tells us the sense of it Math. 10.37. He that loveth Father or Mother more then me, is not worthy of me.

Secondly, those words ver. 15. I will have mercy on whom I will have mercy, do prove

no more but this, that the preferring of Jacob before Esau, and of the Christians before the Jews, was not a debt from God, either to the one or to the other, but a work of mercy. And what of this? All men confess that Gods mer∣cies do exceed mans deserts, but Gods punish∣ments do never exceed mans misdeeds. As we see in the Parable of the Labourers, Matth. 20. Friend, I do thee no wrong, did not I agree with thee for a penny, Is it not lawfull for me to do with mine own as I will? Is thy eye evill be∣cause I am good? Acts of Mercy are free, but acts of Justice are due.

That which follows ver. 17. comes something nearer the cause, The Scripture saith unto Pharoah, for this same purpose I have raised thee up, (that is, I have made thee a King, or I have preserved thee) that I might shew my power in thee. But this particle (that) doth not alwaies signifie the main end of an action, but some∣times onely a consequent of it. As Matth. 2.15. He departed into Egypt, that it might be fulfilled which was spoken by the Prophet, out of Egypt have I called my Son; without doubt Josephs aim or end of his journey was not to fulfill prophe∣sies, but to save the life of the Child. Yet be∣cause the fulfilling of the prophecy was a con∣sequent of Josephs journy, he saith, That it might be fulfilled. So here, I have raised thee up that I might shew my power. Again, though it should be granted that this particle, that, did denote the intention of God to destroy Pharaoh in the Red Sea, yet it was not the Antecedent

intention of God, which evermore respects the good and benefit of the creature, but Gods consequent intention upon the praevision of Pharaohs obstinacy, that since he would not glorifie God in obeying his word, he should glo∣rifie God undergoing his judgements, Hitherto we find no aeternal punishments nor no tempo∣ral punishment without just deserts.

It follows ver. 18. whom he will he hard∣neth: Indeed hardness of heart is the greatest judgement that Gods lays upon a sinner in this use, worse then all the Plagues of Egypt. But how doth God harden the heart? not by a na∣turall influence of any evill act or habit into the will, nor by inducing the will with perswa∣sive motives to obstinacy and rebellion, for God tempteth no man, but every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and inti∣sed. Jam. 1.13. Then God is said to harden the heart three wayes, First, negatively, and not positively, not by imparting wickedness, but by not imparting grace, as the Sun descending to the tropick of Capricorne, it is said with us to be the cause of Winter, that is, not by im∣parting cold, but by not imparting heat. It is an act of mercy in God to give his grace free∣ly, but to detein it is no act of injustice. So the Apostle opposeth hardning to shewing of mer∣cy, To harden is as much as not to shew mercy.

Secondly, God is said to harden the heart occasionally and not causally, by doing good, which incorrigible sinners make an occasion of growing worse and worse, and doing evill; as a

Master by often correcting of an untoward Scholar, doth accidentally and occasionally harden his heart, and render him more obdu∣rate, insomuch as he growes even to despise the Rod. Or as an indulgent parent by his patience and gentleness doth incourage an obstinate son to become more rebellious. So, whether we look upon Gods frequent judgments upon Pharaoh, or Gods iterated favours in removing and with∣drawing those judgments upon Pharaohs re∣quest, both of them in their severall kinds, were occasions of hardning Pharaohs heart, the one making him more presumptuous, the other more desperately rebellious. So that which was good, in it was Gods; that which was evill was Pha∣raohs. God gave the occasion, but Pharaoh was the true cause of his own obduration. This is cleerly confirmed Gen. 8.15. When Pharaoh saw that there was respite, he hardned his heart. And Gen. 9.34. When Pharaoh saw, that the Rain and the Hail, and the Thunders were cea∣sed, he sinned yet more, and hardned his heart, he and his servants. So Psal. 105.25. He tur∣ned their hearts, so that they hated his people, and dealt subtilly with them: That is, God blessed the Children of Israel, whereupon the Egyptians did take occasion to hate them, as is plain Exod. 1. ver. 7, 8, 9, 10. So God hardened Pharaohs heart, and Pharaoh hardened his own heart. God hardened it by not shewing mercy to Pharaoh, as he did to Nebuchadnezzar, who was as great a sinner as he, or God hardned it occasionally, but still Pharaoh was the true cause of his own

obduration, by determining his own will to evill, and confirming himself in his obstinacy. So are all presumptuous sinners Psal. 95.8. Harden not your hearts as in the provocation, as in the day of temptation in the wilderness.

Thirdly, God is said to harden the heart per∣missively, but not operatively, nor effectively, as he who only lets loose a Greyhound out of the slip, is said to hound him at the Hare. Will you see plainly what St. Paul intends by hard∣ning? Read ver. 22. What if God willing to shew his wrath and to make his power known (that is, by a consequent will, which in order of nature followes the provision of sin,) indured with much long suffering the vessells of wrath fitted to destruction. And that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessells of mercy, &c. There is much difference between induring and impelling, or inciting the vessells of wrath. He saith of the vessells of mercy, that God prepa∣red them unto glory. But of the vessells of wrath, he saith only, that they were fitted to destruction, that is, not by God, but by themselves. St. Paul saith, that God doth endure the vessells of wrath with much long suffering, T. H. saith, that God wills and effects by the second causes all their actions good and bad, that he necessitateth them, and determineth them irresistibly to do those acts which he condemneth as evill, and for which he punisheth them. If doing willingly, and en∣during, If much long suffering, and necessita∣ting, imply not a contrariety one to another, red∣dat mihi minam Diogenes, Let him that taught

me Logick, give me my money again.

But T. H. saith, that this distinction be∣tween the operative and permissive Will of God; And that other between the action and the irregularity do dazell his understanding. Though he can find no difference between these two, yet others do, St. Paul himself did, Act. 13.18. About the time of 40. yeares suf∣fered he their manners in the Wilderness. And Act. 14.16. Who intimes past suffered all Na∣tions to walk in their own wayes. T. H. would make suffering to be inciting, their manners to be Gods manners, their wayes to be Gods wayes. And Act. 17.30. The times of this ignorance God winked at. It was never heard that one was said to wink or connive at that which was his own act. And 1 Cor. 10.13. God is faithfull, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that you are able. To tempt is the Devills act, there∣fore he is called the Tempter, God tempts no man to sin, but he suffers them to be tempted. And so suffers, that he could hinder Sathan, if he would. But by T. H. his doctrine, To tempt to sin, and to suffer one to be tempted to sin, when it is in his power to hinder it, is all one. And so he transforms God (I write it with hor∣rour) into the Devill, and makes tempting to be Gods own work, and the Devill to be but his instrument. And in that noted place, Rom. 2.4. Despisest thou the riches of his goodness, and forbearance, and long-suffering, not knowing that the goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance, but after thy hardness and impenitent heart trea∣surest up unto thy self wrath against the day of

wrath, and revealation of the righteous judgment of God. Here are as many convincing Argu∣ments in this one text against the opinion of T. H. almost as there are words. Here we learn that God is rich in goodness, and will not punish his creatures for that which is his own act; Se∣condly, that he suffers and forbeares sinners long, and doth not snatch them away by sudden death as they deserve. Thirdly, that the reason of Gods forbearance is to bring men to repentance. Fourthly, that hardness of heart and impeniten∣cy is not casually from God, but from our selves. Fiftly, that it is not the insufficient proposall of the means of their conversion on Gods part, which is the cause of mens perdition, but their own contempt and despising of these means. Sixtly, that punishment is not an act of absolute dominion, but an act of righteous Judgment, whereby God renders to every man according to his own deeds, wrath to them and only to them who treasure up wrath unto themselves, and eternall life to those who continue patiently in well-doing. If they deserve such punishment who onely neglect the goodness and long suffe∣ring of God, what do they who utterly deny it, and make Gods doing and his suffering to be all one? I do beseech T. H. to consi∣der what a degree of wilfulness it is, out of one obscure text wholly misunderstood, to contradict the clear current of the whole Scripture. Of the same mind with St. Paul was St. Peter, 1 Pet. 3.22. The long suffering of God waited once in the dayes of Noah. And 2 Pet. 3.15. Account that the long suffering of the Lord is salvation. This

is the name God gives himself. Exod. 34.6. The Lord, the Lord God, mercifull and gracious, long suffering, &c.

Yet I do acknowledge that which T. H. saith to be commonly true, That he who doth permit any thing to be done, which it is in his power to hinder, knowing that if he do not hin∣der it, it will be done, doth in some sort will it. I say in some sort, that is, either by an antece∣dent will, or by a consequent will, either by an operative will, or by a permissive will, or he is willing to let it be done, but not willing to do it. Sometimes an antecedent engagement doth cause a man to suffer that to be done, which other∣wise he would not suffer. So Darius suffered Da∣niel to be cast into the Lions den, to make good his rash decree; So Herod suffered John Baptist to be beheaded, to make good his rash oath; How much more may the immutable rule of justice in God, and his fidelity in keeping his word, draw from him the punishment of obstinate sin∣ners, though antecedently he willeth their con∣version? He loveth all his Creatures well, but his own Justice better. Again, sometimes a man suffereth that to be done, which he doth not will directly in it self, but indirectly for some other end, or for the producing of some great good; As a man willeth that a putrid member be cut off from his body, to save the life of the whole. Or as a Judge being desi∣rous to save a malefactors life, and having po∣wer to repreive him, doth yet condemn him for example sake, that by the death of one, he may

save the lives of many. Marvell not then if God suffer some creatures to take such courses as tend to their own ruine, so long as their suffe∣rings do make for the greater manifestation of his glory, and for the greater benefit of his faith∣full servants. This is a most certain truth, that God would not suffer evill to be in the world, unless he knew how to draw good out of evill. Yet this ought not to be so understood, as if we made any priority or posteriority of time in the acts of God, but onely of nature. Nor do we make the antecedent and consequent will to be contrary one to another, because the one res∣pects man pure and uncorrupted, the other res∣pects him as he is lapsed. The objects are the same, but considered after a diverse manner. Nor yet do we make these wills to be distinct in God, for they are the same with the divine es∣sence, which is one. But the distinction is in or∣der to the objects or things willed. Nor, lastly, do we make this permission to be a naked or a meer permission, God causeth all good, permitteth all evill, disposeth all things, both good and evill.

T. H. demands how God should be the cause of the action and yet not be the cause of the irregularity of the action. I answer, because he concurres to the doing of evill by a generall, but not by a speciall influence. As the Earth gives nourishment to all kinds of plants, as well to Hemlock as to Wheat, but the reason why the one yields food to our sustenance, the other poison to our destruction, is not from the generall nourishment of the earth, but from the

speciall quality of the root. Even so the gene∣rall power to act is from God, In him we live, and move, and have our being. This is good. But the specification, and determination, of this ge∣nerall power, to the doing of any evill, is from our selves, and proceeds from the free will of man; This is bad. And to speak properly, the free will of man is not the efficient cause of sin, as the root of the Hemlock is of poison, sin ha∣ving no fruentity or being in it, as poison hath. But rather the deficient cause. Now no defect can flow from him who is the highest perfecti∣on. Wherefore T. H. is mightily mistaken, to make the particular and determinate act of kil∣ling Uriah to be from God. The generall po∣wer to act is from God, but the specification of this generall and good power to murther, or to any particular evill, is not from God, but from the free will of man. So T. H. may see clearly if he will, how one may be the cause of the Law, and likewise of the action in some sort, that is, by generall influence; and yet another cause concurring by speciall influence and determi∣ning this generall and good power may make it self the true cause of the anomy or the irregulari∣ty. And therefore he may keep his longer and shorter garments for some other occasion. Cer∣tainly, they will not fit this subject, unless he could make generall and speciall influence to be all one.

But T. H. presseth yet further, that the case is the same, and the objection used by the Jews, ver. 19. Why doth he yet find fault? who hath re∣sisted

his will? is the very same with my argu∣ment; And St. Pauls answer ver. 20. O man who art thou that repliest against God? shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over his clay, &c? is the very same with his an∣swer in this place, drawn from the irresistible power, and absolute dominion of God, which justifieth all his actions. And that the Apostle in his answer doth not deny, that it was Gods will, nor that Gods decree was before Esaus sin. To which I reply.

First, that the case is not at all the same, but quite different, as may appear by these particu∣lars; first, those words, before they had done ei∣ther good or evill, are not, cannot be referred to those other words, Esau have I hated; Second∣ly, If they could, yet it is less than nothing, be∣cause before Esau had actually sinned, his future sins were known to God; Thirdly, by the Pot∣ters clay, here is not to be understood the pure mass, but the corrupted mass of mankind. Fourth∣ly, the hating here mentioned is onely a com∣parative hatred, that is, a less degree of love. Fiftly, the hardening which St. Paul speaks of, is not a positive, but a negative obduration, or a not imparting of grace. Sixtly, St. Paul spea∣keth not of any positive reprobation to eternall punishment, much less doth he speak of the actuall inflicting of punishment without sin, which is the question between us, and wherein T. H. differs from all that I remember to have read, who do all acknowledge that punishment

is never actually inflicted but for sin. If the question be put, why God doth good to one more than to another, or why God imparteth more grace to one than to another, as it is there, the answer is just and fit, because it is his plea∣sure, and it is sawciness in a creature in this case to reply, May not God do what he will with his own, Matth. 20.15. No man doub∣teth but God imparteth grace beyond mans de∣sert; But if the case be put, why God doth pu∣nish one more than another, or why he throws one into hell-fire, and not another, which is the present case agitated between us; To say with T. H. that it is because God is Omnipotent, or because his power is irresistible, or meerly be∣cause it is his pleasure, is not only not warran∣ted, but is plainly condemned by St. Paul in this place. So many differences there are between those two cases. It is not therefore against God, that I reply, but against T. H. I do not call my Creator to the Bar, but my fellow creature; I ask no account of Gods counsails, but of mans presumptions. It is the mode of these times to father their own fancies upon God, and when they cannot justifie them by reason, to plead his Omnipotence, or to cry. O altitudo, that the wayes of God are unsearchable. If they may justifie their drowsy dreams, because Gods po∣wer & dominion is absolute; much more may we reject such phantasticall devises which are in∣consistent with the truth, and goodness &, Justice of God, and make him to be a Tyrant, who is the Father of Mercies, and the God of all consola∣tion.

The unsearchableness of Gods wayes should be a bridle to restrain presumption, and not a sanctuary for spirits of error.

Secondly, this objection conteined ver. 19. to which the Apostle answers ver. 20. is not made in the person of Esau or Pharaoh, as T. H. supposeth, but of the unbelieving Jews, who thought much at that grace and favour which God was plea∣sed to vouchsafe unto the Gentiles, to acknow∣ledge them for his people, which honour they would have appropriated to the posterity of Abraham. And the Apostles answer is not only drawn from the Soveraign Dominion of God, to impart his grace to whom he pleaseth, as hath been shewed already, but also from the obsti∣nacy and proper fault of the Jews, as appeareth ver. 22. What if God willing (that is, by a con∣sequent will) to shew his wrath, and to make his power known, endured with much long suffering the vessells of wrath fitted to destruction. They acted, God endured; They were tolerated by God, but fitted to destruction by themselves, for their much wrong doing, here is Gods much long suffering; And more plainly ver. 31. Israel hath not atteined to the Law of righteousness, wherefore? because they sought it not by faith, but as it were by the works of the Law. This rea∣son is set down yet more emphatically in the next Chapter ver. 3. They (that is, the Israe∣lites) being ignorant of Gods righteousness (that is, by faith in Christ,) and going about to esta∣blish their own righteousness, (that is, by the works of the Law) have not submitted them∣selves

to the righteousness of God. And yet most ex∣presly Chap. 11. v. 20. Because of unbelief they were broken off, but thou standest by faith, Neither was there any precedent binding decree of God, to necessitate them to unbelief, and consequently to punishment, It was in their own power by their concurrence with Gods grace to prevent these judgments, and to recover their former estate, ver. 23. If they (that is, the unbelieving Jews) abide not still in unbelief, they shall be graf∣ted in. The Crown and the Sword are immo∣vable, (to use St. Anselmes comparison) but it is we that move and change places. Sometimes the Jews were under the Crown, and the Gen∣tiles under the Sword, sometimes the Jews under the Sword, and the Gentiles under the Crown.

Thirdly, though I confess, that human Pacts are not the measure of Gods Justice, but his ju∣stice is his own immutable will, whereby he is ready to give every man that which is his own: as rewards to the good, punishments to the bad, so nevertheless God may oblige himself freely to his creature. He made the Covenant of works with mankind in Adam, and therefore he pu∣nisheth not man contrary to his own Covenant, but for the transgression of his duty. And Di∣vine Justice is not measured by Omnipotence, or by irresistible power, but by Gods will; God can do many things according to his absolute power which he doth not; He could raise up children to Abraham of stones, but he never did so. It is a rule in Theology, that God cannot do any thing which argues any wickedness or im∣perfection,

as God cannot deny himself, 2 Tim. 2.13. He cannot lie, Tit. 1.2. These and the like are fruits of impotence, not of power. So God cannot destroy the righteous with the wicked, Gen. 18.25. He could not destroy Sodome whilst Lot was in it, Gen. 19.22. not for want of do∣minion or power, but because it was not agree∣able to his Justice, nor to that Law which him∣self had constituted. The Apostle saith Heb. 6.10. God is not unrighteous to forget your work. As it is a good consequence to say, this is from God, therefore it is righteous, so is this also; This thing is unrighteous, therefore it cannot proceed from God. We see how all Creatures by instinct of nature do love their young, as the Hen her Chickens, how they will expose themselves to death for them; And yet all these are but sha∣dowes of that love which is in God towards his Creatures. How impious is it then to conceive, that God did creat so many millions of souls to be tormented eternally in hell, without any fault of theirs, except such as he himself did ne∣cessitate them unto, meerly to shew his domini∣on, and because his power is irresistible? The same privilege which T. H. appropriates here to power absolutely irresistible, a friend of his in his book de Cive cap. 6. pag. 70. ascribes to power re∣spectively irresistible, or to Soveraign Magi∣strates, whose power he makes to be as absolute as a mans power is over himself, not to be limit∣ted by any thing, but only by their strength. The greatest propugners of Soveraign power think it enough for Princes to challenge an immunity

from coercive power, but acknowledge, that the Law hath a directive power over them. But T. H. will have no limits but their strength. What∣soever they do by power, they do justly.

But, saith he, God objected no sin to Job, but justified his afflicting him by his power. First, this is an Argument from authority negatively, that is to say, worth nothing. Secondly, the af∣flictions of Job were no vindicatory punish∣ments to take vengeance of his sins, (whereof we dispute,) but probatory chastisements to make triall of his graces. Thirdly, Job was not so pure, but that God might justly have laid grea∣ter punishments upon him, then those afflicti∣ons which he suffered. Witness his impatience, even to the cursing of the day of his nativity, Job 3.3. Indeed God said to Job, where wast thou when I laid the foundations of the earth? Job 38.4. that is, how canst thou judge of the things that were done before thou wast born? or comprehend the secret causes of my judgments? And Job 42.9. Hast thou an arm like God? As if he should say, why art thou impatient? doest thou think thy self able to strive with God? But that God should punish Job without desert, here is not a word.

Concerning the blind man, mentioned John 9. his blindness was rather a blessing to him than a punishment, being the means to raise his Soul illuminated, and to bring him to see the face of God in Jesus Christ. The sight of the body is common to us with Ants and Flies, but the sight of the soul with the blessed Angells. We

read of some, who have put out their bodily eyes because they thought they were an impediment to the eye of the Soul. Again, neither he nor his parents were innocent, being conceived and born in sin and iniquity, Psal. 51.5. And in many things we offend all, Jam. 3.2. But our Saviours meaning is evident by the Disciples question, ver. 2. They had not so sinned, that he should be born blind. Or they were not more grievous sinners than other men, to deserve an exemplary judgment more than they; but this corporall blindness befell him principally by the extraordinary providence of God, for the ma∣nifestation of his own glory, in restoring him to his sight. So his instance halts on both sides; neither was this a punishment, nor the blind man free from sin. His third instance of the death and torments of beasts, is of no more weight then the two former. The death of brute beasts is not a punishment of sin, but a debt of nature. And though they be often slaughtered for the use of man, yet there is a vast difference between those light and momentary pangs, and the unsufferable and endless pains of hell; be∣tween the meer depriving of a creature of tem∣porall life, and the subjecting of it to eternall death; I know the Philosophicall speculations of some who affirme, that entity is better than non-entity, that it is better to be miserable, and suffer the torments of the damned, than to be annihilated, and cease to be altogether. This en∣tity which they speak of, is a Metaphysicall en∣tity abstracted from the matter, which is better

than non-entity, in respect of some goodness, not morall nor naturall, but transcendentall, which accompanies every being. But in the concrete it is far otherwise, where that of our Saviour often takes place, Matth. 26.24. Woe unto that man by whom the Son of Man is be∣trayed, It had been good for that man, that he had not been born. I add, that there is an Ana∣logicall Justice and Mercy due, even to the brute beasts. Thou shalt not mussle the mouth of the Oxe that treadeth out the corn. And, a just man is mercifull to his beast.

But his greatest errour is that which I touched before, to make Justice to be the proper result of Power. Power doth not measure and regulate Justice, but Justice measures & regulates Power. The will of God, and the Eternall Law which is in God himself, is properly the rule and mea∣sure of Justice. As all goodness whether Natu∣rall or Morall, is a participation of divine good∣ness, and all created Rectitude is but a partici∣pation of divine rectitude, so all Lawes are but participations of the eternall Law, from whence they derive their power. The rule of Justice then is the same both in God and us, but it is in God, as in him that doth regulate and measure; in us, as in those who are regulated and measured. As the will of God is immutable, alwayes wil∣ling what is just and right and good; So his ju∣stice likewise is immutable. And that indivi∣duall action which is justly punished as sin∣full in us, cannot possibly proceed from the spe∣ciall influence and determinative power of a

just cause. See then how grossely T. H. doth understand that old and true principle, that the Will of God is the rule of Justice, as if by willing things in themselves unjust, he did render them just, by reason of his absolute dominion and ir∣resistible power. As fire doth assimilate other things to it self, and convert them into the nature of fire. This were to make the eternall Law a Lesbian rule. Sin is defined to be that which is done, or said, or thought contrary to the eternall Law. But by this doctrine nothing is done, nor said, nor thought contrary to the will of God. St. Anselm said most truly, then the will of man is good and just and right, when he wills that which God would have him to will: but accor∣ding to this doctrine every man alwayes wills that which God would have him to will. If this be true, we need not pray, Thy will be done in earth as it is in heaven, T. H. hath devised a new kind of heaven upon earth. The worst is, it is an heaven without Justice. Justice is a con∣stant and perpetuall act of the will, to give eve∣ry one his own; But to inflict punishment for those things which the Judge himself did deter∣mine and necessitate to be done, is not to give every one his own; right punitive Justice is a re∣lation of equallity and proportion, between the demerit and the punishment; But supposing this opinion of absolute and universall necessity, there is no demerit in the world, we use to say, that right springs from Law and fact, as in this Syllogism, Every thief ought to be punished, there's the Law; But such an one is a thief,

there's the fact, therefore he ought to be pu∣nished, there's the right. But this opinion of T. H. grounds the right to be punished, nei∣ther upon Law, nor upon Fact, but upon the irresistible power of God. Yea, it overturneth as much, as in it lies all Law; First, the eter∣nall Law, which is the ordination of divine Wis∣dom, by which all Creatures are directed to that end which is convenient for them. That is, not to necessitate them to eternall flames. Then, the Law, participated, which is the ordination of right reason, instituted for the common good, to shew unto man, what he ought to do, and what he ought not to do. To what purpose is it to shew the right way to him who is drawn and haled a contrary way by Adamantine bonds of inevitable necessity?

Lastly, howsoever T. H. cries out, that God cannot sin, yet in truth he makes him to be the principall and most proper cause of all sin. For, he makes him to be the cause not onely of the Law, and of the action, but even of the irregu∣larity it self, and the difference between the action and the Law, wherein the very essence of sin doth consist. He makes God to determin Da∣vids will, and necessitate him to kill Uriah. In causes physically, and essentially subordinate, the cause of the cause is evermore the cause of the effect. These are those deadly fruits which spring from the poisonous root of the absolute necessity of all things, which T. H. seeing, and that neither the sins of Esau, nor Pharaoh, nor any wicked person do proceed from the opera∣tive,

but from the permissive will of God; And that punishment is an act of justice, not of do∣minion onely, I hope that according to his pro∣mise he will change his opinion.