Of the advancement and proficience of learning; or, The partitions of sciences· Nine books. Written in Latin by the most eminent, illustrious, and famous Lord Francis Bacon Baron of Verulam, Vicount St. Alban, Councellor of Estate, and Lord Chancellor of England. Interpreted by Gilbert Watts.

THE THIRD BOOK OF FRANCIS LO. VERVLAM VICOUNT S^t ALBAN. OF THE DIGNITY AND ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING. To the KING. (Book 3)

CAP. I. I. The Partition of Sciences, into Theology and Philosophy. II. The Partition of Philosophy into three Knowledges. Of God; of Nature; of Man. III. The Constitution of Philosophia Prima, or Summary Philosophy, as the Commune Parent of all.

ALL History (Excellent KING) treads up∣on the Earth, and performes the office of a Guide, rather than of a light; and Poesy is, as it were the Dream of Knowledge; a sweet pleasing thing, full of variations; and would be thought to be somewhat inspi∣red with Divine Rapture; which Dreams likewise pretend: but now it is time for me to awake, and to raise my selfe from the Earth, cutting the liquid Aire of Philosophy, and Sciences.

I Knowledge is like waters; some waters descend from the Heavens, some spring from the Earth; so the Primary Partition of Sciences, is to be derived from their fountaines, some are seated above; some are heere beneath. For all knowledge

proceeds from a two fold information; either from Divine in∣spiration, or from externall Sence; As for that knowledge which is infused by instruction; that is Cumulative, not O∣riginall; as it is in waters, which besides the Head-springs, are encreased by the reception of other Rivers that fall into them. Wherefore we will divide Sciences, into Theology; and Philosophy; by Theology we understand Jnspired or Sacred Divinity; not Naturall, of which we are to speak anon. But this Inspired Theology, we reserve for the last place, that we may close up this work with it; seeing it is the Port and Saboath of all Humane Contemplations.

II. The Obiect of Philosophy is of three sorts; GOD; NA∣TURE; MAN: so likewise there is a Triple Beam of Things; for Nature darts upon the understanding with a direct Beame; God because of the inequality of the mediū, which is the Creature, with a refract beame; and man represented and exhibited to him∣selfe, with a beam reflext. Wherefore Philosophy may fitly be divided into three knowledges; the knowledge of God; the knowledge of Nature; and the knowledge of Man.

III. And because the Partition of Sciences are not like severall lines that meet in one angle; but rather like bran∣ches of trees that meet in one stemme, which stemme for some dimension and space is entire and continued, before it break, and part it selfe into armes and boughes; therefore the nature of the subject requires, before we pursue the parts of the former distribution, to erect and constitute one universall Science, which may be the mother of the rest; and that in the progresse of Sciences, a Portion, as it were, of the common high-way may be kept, before we come where the waies part and divide themselves. This Science we stile Primitive Philosophy or Sapience, which by the Ancients was defin'd to be, The Science of things divine and human. To this Science none of the rest is opposed, being it is differenced from other knowledges, rather in the limits of latitude; than in the things and subject; that is, handleing only the tops of things.* 1.1 Whether I should report this as DEFICIENT, I stand doubtfull, yet I think I very well may. For I find a

certain kind of Rhapsody, and confused masse of know∣ledge, namely of Naturall Theology; of Logique; of particular parts of Naturall Philosophy (as of the Principles of Nature, and of the soule) composited and compiled; and by the height of termes (from men who love to admire them∣selves) advanced, and exalted, as it were, to the verticall point of Sciences. But we, without any such stately lofti∣nesse, would only have thus much, That there might be de∣sign'd a certain Science that should be the receptacle of all such Axioms, as fall not within the compasse of any speciall part of Phi∣losophy; but are more common to them all, or most of them.

§ That there are many of this kind needs not to be doubted. For example, Si inaequalibus aequalia addas;* 1.2 omnia e∣runt inaequalia; is a rule in the Mathematiques: and the same holds in the Ethiques concerning Attributive Iustice; for in Iustice Expletive, the reason of equitie requires, That equall Portion be given to unequall Persons; but in Attributive, unlesse unequall be distributed unto unequall, it is a great injustice.* 1.3 Quae in eodem tertio conveniunt, & inter se conveniunt; is likewise a rule taken from the Mathematiques; but so potent in Lo∣gique also, as all Syllogismes are built upon it.* 1.4 Natura se po∣tissimum prodit in minimis, is a rule in Naturall Philosophy so prevalent, that it hath produced Democritus Atomes; yet hath Aristotle made good use of it in his Politiques,* 1.5 where he raiseth his contemplations of a Citty or State, from the Principles of a Family. Omnia mutantur nil interit; is al∣so a maxime in Naturall Philosophy thus expressed, that the Quantum of Nature is neither diminisht nor augmented: The same is applied to Naturall Theology thus varied; That they are the workes of the same Omnipotence, to make nothing somewhat; and to make somewhat nothing; which the Scriptures likewise testify;* 1.6 J have found by experience that all the works of God doe persevere for ever: nothing can be put unto them, nor any thing taken from them. Jnteritus rei arcetur per reductionem eius ad Principia, is a rule in Naturall Philosophy; the same holds also in the Politiques (as Macchiavell hath wisely ob∣served)* 1.7 because the means which must specially preserve

States from ruine, are commonly nothing else than a refor∣mation, and a reduction of them to their Ancient customes. Putredo serpens magis contagiosa est quam matura;* 1.8 is a ground in Naturall Philosophy; the same is an excellent Maxime in Morall Philosophy; because professedly wicked, and despe∣ratly impious persons, doe not corrupt publique manners so much, as they doe, who seeme to have some soundnesse and goodnesse in them;* 1.9 and are diseased but in part. Quod con∣servativum est formae maioris, id activitate potentius; is a ground in Naturall Philosophy: for it makes for the conservation of the fabrique of the universe; that the chaine and contexture of nature, be not cut asunder or broken; and that there be not vacuum, as they call it, or empty discontinuity in the world; and that heavy bodies should be congregate and as∣sembled to the massy pile of the earth, makes for the con∣servation of the Region of grosse and compacted natures: wherefore the first and universall motion commands, and subdues, the latter and more particular. The same rule holds in the Politiques, for those things which conduce to the conservation of the whole Body Politique in its entire nature and essence, are more potent, than those things are, which make only for the well-fare and existence of Particular members, in a State or Civile Goverment. So the same rule takes place in Theologie; for amongst Theologicall virtues, Charity, a virtue most communicative excells all the rest. Augetur vis agentis per anti-peristasin contrarii:* 1.10 is a rule in Naturall Philosophy; the same works wonders in Civile states, for all faction is vehemently moved, and incensed at the riseing of a contrary faction. Tonus discors in concordem actutùm desinens,* 1.11 concentum commendat: To fall suddenly from a Discord upon a Concord commends the Aire: is a rule in Mu∣sique: the like effect it worketh in Morality, and the Affecti∣ons. That Trope of Musique, to fall or slide softly, from the close or cadence (as they call it) when it seemed even to touch it, is common with the Trope of Rhetorique, of de∣ceiving expectation. The Quavering upon a stop in Musique, gives the same delight to the eare; that the playing of light

upon the water, or the sparkling of a Diamond gives to the eye.

—Splendet tremulo sub lumine Pontus.* 1.12

Organa sensuum cum Organis reflectionum conveniunt:* 1.13 This hath place in Perspective Art; for the eye is like to a Glasse, or to waters: and in Acoustique Art; for the Instrument of hea∣ring is like to the straits and winding within a Cave. These few instances may suffice for examples. And indeed the Persian Magique, so much celebrated, consists chiefly in this; to observe the respondency in the Architectures, and Fabriques of things Natural; & of things Civile. Neither are all these where∣of we have spoken, and others of like nature meere Simili∣tudes only, as men of narrow observation perchance may conceive; but one and the very same footsteps, and seales of Nature, printed upon severall subjects or matters. This kind of Science, hath not bin hither too seriously handled: You may peradventure find in the Writings comming from the pens of the profounder sort of wits, Axiomes of this kind, thinly and sparsedly inserted, for the use and explication of the Argument which they have in hand; but a complete bo∣dy of such Maximes, which have a Primitive and Summary force and efficacy in all Sciences, none yet have composed; being not∣withstanding a matter of such consequence, as doth notably conduce to the unity of Nature; which we conceive to be the office and use of Philosophia Prima.

§ There is also an other Part of this, Primitive Ppiloso∣phy, which, if you respect termes, is Ancient; but, if the mat∣ter which we designe, is new, and of an other kind; and it is an Inquiry concerning the Accessory Conditions of Entities, which we may call Transcendents; as Multitude, Paucity; Si∣militude; Diversity; Possible, and Jmpossible; Entity; Non-Entity; and the like. For being Transcendents doe not properly fall within the compasse of Naturall Philosophy; and that Diale∣cticall dissertation about them is rather accommodated to the Formes of Argumentation; than the Nature of things; it is very convenient that this Contemplation, wherein there is so much dignity and profit, should not be altogither de∣serted; but find at least some roome in the Partitions of Scien∣ces:

but this we understand to be perform'd farre after an o∣ther manner, than usually it hath bin handled. For example no man who hath treated of Paucity or Multitude, hath en∣devour'd to give a reason, Why some things in Nature are and may be so numerous and large; others so few and litle! For cer∣tainly it cannot be, that there should be in nature as great store of Gold, as of Iron; as great plenty of Roses, as of Grasse; as great variety of determin'd and specifique Natures, as of imperfects, and non-specificates. So none in handling Similitude and Diversity, hath sufficiently discovered the Cause, why betwixt diverse species there should, as it were perpetually, be interposed, Participles of Nature, which are of a doubtfull kind and referrence; as Mosse betwixt Putrefacti∣on, and a Plant: Fishes which adhere and move not, betwixt a Plant and a living Creature: Rats, and Mise, and other ver∣mine between living Creatures generated of Putrefaction, and of seed: Bats or Flitter-mise between Birds and Beasts; Flying Fishes, now commonly knowne, between Fowles and Fish. Sea-Calfes between Fishes and four-footed Beasts; and the like. Neither hath any made diligent inquiry of the Reason how it should come to passe, being like delights to u∣nite to like, that Iron drawes not Iron, as the Loadstone doth; nor Gold allures and attracts unto it Gold, as it doth Quick∣silver. Concerning these and the like adjuncts of things, there is, in the common Disceptation about Transcendents a deepe silence: For men have pursued Niceties of Termes, and not subtleties of things. Wherefore we would have this Pri∣mitive Philosophy to containe a substantiall and solid inquiry of these Transcendents, or Adventitious Conditions of Entities, according to the Lawes of Nature, and not according to the Laws of Words. So much touching Primitive Philosophy, or Sapience, which we have justly referr'd to the Catalogue of DEFICIENTS.* 1.14

CAP. II. I Of Naturall Theologie. § Of the Knowledge of Angels, and of Spirits; which are an Appendix thereof.

THE Commune Parent of Sciences being first placed in its proper throne like unto Berecynthia which had so much heavenly Issue.

Omnes Coelicolae, omnes supera alta tenentes.* 1.15

We may returne to the former Division of the three Philo∣sophies, Divine; Naturall; and Humane.

I For Naturall Theology, is truly called Divine Philosophy. And this is defined to be a Knowledge, or rather a spark and rudiment of that Knowledge concerning God; such as may be had by the light of Nature; and the Contemplation of the Creature: which Knowledge may be truly termed Di∣vine in respect of the Object; and Naturall in respect of the Light. The Bounds of this Knowledge are truly set forth, that they may extend to the Confutation and Conviction of Atheisme; the Information of the Law of Nature; but may not be drawne out to the Confirmation of Religion. Therefore there was never Miracle wrought by God to con∣vert an Atheist, because the light of Nature might have led him to confesse a God; but Miracles are designed to convert Idolaters, and the Superstitious, who have acknowledged a Deity, but erred in his Adoration; because no light of Na∣ture extends to declare the will and true Worship of God. For as workes doe shew forth the power and skill of the workman, but not his Image: So the workes of God, doe shew the Omnipotency and Wisdome of the Maker; but no way expresse his Jmage. And in this the Heathen opini∣on differs from the sacred Truth. For they defined the world to be the Image of God; man the Image of the World; but Sa∣cred Scriptures never vouchsafed the world that honour, as any where to be stiled the Jmage of God, but only,* 1.16 the workes of his hands: but they substitute man, the immediate J∣mage

of God. Wherefore, that there is a God; that hee raines and rules the world; that he is most potent, wise, and pro∣vident: that he is a Rewarder, a Revenger; that he is to be a∣dored; may be demonstrated and evinced even from his workes: and many wonderfull secrets touching his attri∣butes, and much more touching his Regiment and dispen∣sation over the world, may likewise with sobriety be ex∣tracted, and manifested out of the same workes; and is an Argument hath bin profitably handled by diverse. But out of the contemplation of Nature, and out of the Principles of Human Reason, to discourse, or earnestly to urge a point touching the Mysteries of faith; and againe, to be curiously speculative into those secrets, to ventilate them; and to be-inquisitive into the manner of the Mystery, is, in my judge∣ment not safe: Da Fidei quae Fidei sunt. For the Heathens themselves conclude as much, in that excellent and divine Fable of the golden Chaine,* 1.17 That Men and Gods were not able to draw Iupiter down to the Earth; but contrariwise Iupiter was able to draw them up to Heaven. Wherefore he laboureth in vaine, who shall attempt to draw downe heavenly Myste∣ries to our reason; it rather becomes us to raise and advance our reason to the adored Throne of Divine Truth, And in this part of Naturall Theology, I am so farre from noteing any deficience, as I rather finde an excesse; which to observe I have somewhat digressed, because of the extreme prejudice, which both Religion and Philosophy have received there∣by; as that which will fashion and forge a hereticall Religi∣on, and an imaginary and fabulous Philosophy.

§ But as concerning the nature of Angels and Spirits, the matter is otherwise to be conceived; which neither is in∣scrutable, nor interdicted; to which knowledge, from the affinity it hath with mans soule, there is a passage opened. The Scripture indeed commands,* 1.18 let no man deceive you with sublime discourse touching the worship of Angels, pressing into that he knowes not; yet notwithstanding if you observe well that precept, you shall finde there only two things forbid∣den; namely Adorotion of Angels, such as is due to God; and

Phantasticall Opinions of them, either by extolling them a∣bove the degree of a creature; or to extoll a mans know∣ledge of them farther than he hath warrantable ground. But the sober enquiry touching them, which by the grada∣tions of things corporall, may ascend to the nature of them; or which may be seen in the Soule of Man, as in a Looking glasse, is in no wise restrained. The same may be concluded of impure and revolted spirits; the conversing with them, and the imployment of them, is prohibited; much more any ve∣neration towards them; but the Contemplation or Science of their Nature; their Power; their Illusions; not only from places of sacred Scripture, but from reason or experience; is a principall part of Spirituall wisdome. For so the Apostle saith, we are not ignorant of his stratagems.* 1.19 And it is no more unlawfull to enquire, in naturall Theology, the nature of e∣vill Spirits; than to enquire the nature of Poysons in Phy∣sique, or of vices in the Ethiques. But this part of Science touching Angels and degenerate spirits, I cannot note as De∣ficient; for many have imployed their pens in it. Rather most of the writers in this kind may be argued either of va∣nity, or superstition, or of unprofitable subtlety.

CAP. III. The Partition of Naturall Philosophy into Speculative; and Opera∣tive. § And that these two, both in the intention of the writer; and in the body of the Treatise, should be separated.

LEaving therefore Naturall Theology (to which we have attributed the enquiry of Spirits, as an Appen∣dix) we may proceed to the second Part, namely that of Nature, or Naturall Philosophy.* 1.20 Democritus saith excellently, That the knowledge concerning Nature, lies hid in certain deep Mines and Caves. And it is somewhat to the pur∣pose,

* 1.21 that the Alchimists doe so much inculcate, That vulcan is a second Nature, and perfects that compendiously which Nature useth to effect by ambages and length of time: why then may we not divide Philosophy into two parts; the Mine, and the Fornace; and make two professions, or occupations of Na∣turall Philosophers; Pyoners or workers in the mine; and Smythes; or refiners? Certainly however we may seem to be conceited, and to speak in jest; yet we doe bestallow of a di∣vision in that kind, if it be proposed in more familiar and Scholasticall termes; namely, that the knowledge of Nature, be divided into the Inquisition of Causes; and the Production of Effects; Speculative, and Operative; the one searcheth the bowels of Nature; the other fashions Nature, as it were, up∣on the Anvile.

§ Now although I know very well with what a strict band, causes and effects are united; so as the explication of them, must in a sort be coupled and conjoyned: yet because all solid and fruitfull Naturall knowledge hath a double, and that distinct, scale or ladder; Ascendent and Descendent; From Experiments to Axioms, and from Axioms to new Experi∣ments. I judge it most requisite, that these two parts, Specu∣lative and Operative, be separate, both in the intention of the writer, and the Body of the Treatise.

CAP. IV. I. The Partition of the Speculative knowledge of Nature into Phy∣sique speciall, and Metaphysique: Whereof Physique enquires the Efficient Cause, and the Matter: Metaphysique the finall Cause and the Forme. II. The Partition of Physique, into the know∣ledges of the Principles of Things; of the Fabrique of Things, or of the World; And of the variety of Things. III. The Parti∣on, of Physique, touching the variety of things, into the Doctrine of Concretes; and into the Doctrine of Abstracts. The Partition of the knowledge of Concretes, is referred over to the same Partiti∣on which Naturall History Comprehends. IV. The Partition of the knowledge of Abstracts, into the knowledge of the Schemes of Matter; and into the knowledge of Motions. V. Two Ap∣pendices of Speculative Physique; Naturall Problems: And the Placits of Ancient Philosophers. VI. The Partition of Meta∣physique, into the Doctrine of Formes; And into the Doctrine of Finall Causes.

I. THat part of Naturall Philosophy which is Specula∣tive and Theoricall, we think convenient to di∣vide into Physique speciall; and Metaphysique. And in this Partition I desire it may be conceiv'd, that we use the word Metaphysique in a differing sense from that, that is re∣ceived. And here it seemes to fall out not unfitly to adver∣tise in generall of our purpose and meaning touching the use of words, and Termes of Art. And it is this, that as well in this word Metaphysique now delivered, as in other termes of Art, wheresoever our conceptions and notions are new, and differ from the received; yet with much reverence, we retaine the Ancient termes. For being we hope, that the me∣thod it selfe, and a perspicuous explication of the Matter which we labour to annexe, may redime us from an in∣congruous conception of the words we use, we are other∣wise zealous (so farre as we can without prejudice of Truth and Sciences) to depart as litle as may be, from the opini∣ons and expressions of Antiquity. And herein I cannot but marvaile at the confidence of Aristotle, who possest with a

spirit of contradiction; and denouncing warre against all Antiquity, not only usurpt a licence to coine new termes of Arts at pleasure; but hath endeavoured to deface and extin∣guish all ancient wisdome. In so much as he never names any ancient Auctors; or makes any mention of their opini∣ons, but to reprehend their Persons; or to redargue their Placits, and opinions. Certainly if he affected glory, and drawing disciples after him, he took the right course: For the same comes to passe in the asserting and receiving a Philosophicall Truth, that doth in a Divine Truth; veni in nomine Patris,* 1.22 nec recipitis me; si quis venerit in nomine suo eum recipietis. But from this divine Aphorisme, if we consider whom specially it hath designed (namely Antichrist the greatest Impostor of all times) we may collect, that the com∣ming in a mans own name, without any regard of Antiquity, or (if I may so speak) of Paternity, is no good Augurie of Truth, however it be joyned with the fortune and successe of an eum recipietis. But for Aristotle, certainly an excellent man, and of an admirable profound wit, I should easily be induced to believe; that he learned this ambition of his Scholler, whom per∣haps he did aemulate: that if one conquered all Nations; the other would conquer all Opinions, and raise to himselfe a kind of Monar∣chy in contemplations. Although it may so fall out, that he may at some mens hands that are of a bitter disposition, and bite∣ing language, get a like title, as his Scholler did;

* 1.23Foelix terrarum Praedo, non utile Mundo Editus exemplum. — So

Foelix Doctrinae Praedo &c. But to us on the other side that doe desire so much as lies in the power of our penne, to con∣tract a league and commerce between Ancient & Moderne knowledges; our judgement stands firme, to keep way with Antiquity, us{que} ad Aras; and to retaine the Ancient termes, though sometimes we alter their Sence, and Definitions: according to the moderate and approved manner of Inno∣vation, in Civile Goverment; where the state of things be∣ing changed, yet the solennity of words, and stiles is obser∣ved which Tacitus notes;* 1.24 Eadem Magistratuum vocabula.

§ To returne therefore to the acception of the word Metaphysique, in our sence. It appears by that which hath bin already said, that we distinguish Primitive Philosophy, from Metaphysique, which heretofore hath bin confounded and taken for the same thing. The one we have set downe as a commune Parent of all Sciences; the other, as a portion of Naturall Philosophy. We have assign'd Common and Pro∣miscuous Axioms of Sciences, to Primitive Philosophy. Like∣wise all Relative and Adventive condicions and Characters of Essences, which we have named Transcendents; as Multitude, Paucity, Jdentity, Diversity, Possible Jmpossible, and such like; we have attributed to the same, only with this Proviso, that they be handled as they have efficacy in nature; and not Lo∣gically. But we have referred the inquiry concerning God; Ʋnity, Bonity, Angels, Spirits, to Naturall Theology. Where∣fore now it may rightly be demanded, what after all this is remaining to Metaphysique! certainly beyond nature, no∣thing; but of nature it selfe the most excellent part. And in∣deed without prejudice to Truth, we may thus farre con∣curre with the opinion and conceipt of Antiquity; that Phy∣sique only handleth that which is inherent in matter, and is moveable; Metaphysique things more abstracted and fixt. A∣gaine that Physique supposeth existence only and Motion; and naturall Necessity: but Metaphysique the Mind also; the Idea or platforme. For to this point perchance the matter comes, whereof we shall discourse. But we will propound this difference, (leaving aside the sublimity of speech) perspi∣cuously and familiarly. We have divided Naturall Philoso∣phy into the Inquisition of causes; and the production of ef∣fects. The inquiry of causes we have referred to the Theo∣ricall part of Philosophy; which we have divided into Phy∣sique and Metaphysique: wherefore by necessary consequence the true difference of these two Theoryes, must be taken from the nature of the Causes which they enquire; so with∣out all obscurity or circuit, Physique is that which enquires of the efficient cause; and of the Matter; Metaphysique, that which enquires of the Forme and end.

II Physique therefore comprehends Causes variable and incertaine, and according to the nature of the subject moveable and changing, and attaines not a fixt constancy of Causes.

* 1.25Limus ut hic durescit, & haec ut caera liquescit Vno eodemque igni—

Fire is cause of induration, but respective to clay; Fire is cause of colliquation, but respective to waxe. We will divide Phisique into three Knowledges: For Nature is either uni∣ted and collected into one; or diffused and distributed: Na∣ture is collected into one either in respect of the common Seeds and Principles of all things; or in respect of the entire, to∣tall Fabrique of the universe. This union of Nature hath brought forth two Parts of Physique, one of the Principles of Things; the other of the Fabrique of the Ʋniverse, or of the World; which we use to call the Doctrines of Summes or Totalls. The third Knowledge which handles Nature diffused, or scattered, exhibites all the variety of things, & the lesser Summes or Totalls. Wherefore from these contemplations it is plain∣ly manifest, that there are three Knowledges touching Na∣turall Philosophy, of the Principles of things; of the world; or of the Fabrique of thing. Of Nature multiplicious or sparsed; which last Part, (as we have said) containes all the variety of things; and is, as it were; the first Glosse, or Paraphase tou∣ching the INTERPRETATION OF NATVRE Of these three Parts, none is wholly DEFICIENT; but in what truth and Perfection they are handled, I make not now my judgment.

III But we will again divide Physique distinctively sorted, or of the variety of things, into two Parts; into Physique of con∣crets; and into Physique of Abstracts: or into Physique of Crea∣tures; and into Physique of Natures. The one (to use the termes of Logique) inquires of Substances with all the va∣riety of their Adjuncts; the other of Accidents, or Adjuncts through all the variety of substances. For example, if the in∣quiry be of a Lion, or of an Oak, these are supported by many and diverse Accidents: Contrariwise if the inquiry be made of Heate, or Heavinesse, these are in many distinct substances.

And seeing all Physique or Naturall Philosophy is situate in a midle terme, betweene Naturall History and Metaphysique; the first part (if you observe it well) comes neerer to Natu∣rall History; the later part neerer to Metaphysique; Concret Phy∣sique hath the same division which Naturall History hath; so that it is a knowledge either concerning the Heavens; or concerning Meteors; or concerning the Globe of the earth and Sea; or concerning the greater Collegiates, which they call the Elements; or concerning the lesser Collegiates, or natures specifique; so likewise concerning Pretergenerations; and con∣cerning Mechaniques. For in all these Naturall History in∣quires and reports the fact it selfe; but Physique, the Causes likewise; but you must conceive this of fluid, not fixt Causes, that is, of matter and of the efficient.

§ Amongst these Portions of Physique, that Part is alto∣gether maimed and imperfect which enquires of Coelestiall bodies; which notwithstanding, for the excellency of the Subject, ought to be taken into speciall consideration: For Astronomy it is indeed not without some probability and use grounded upon the Phoenomena, but it is vulgar; base, and no way solid: But Astrology in many Circumstances hath no ground at all. Jn truth Astronomy presents such a sacrifice to Mans under∣standing, as once Prometheus did, when he went about to co∣zen Jupiter; for instead of a true, substantiall Oxe, he presen∣ted the hide of a great and faire Oxe stuft, and set out with straw, leaves, and Osier twigs; so in like manner Astrono∣my exhibiteth the extrinsique Parts of Celestiall Bodies, (namely the Number, Situation, Motion, and Periods of the starres) as the Hide of Heaven; faire and artificially contrived into Systemes, and Schemes: but the Entrals are wanting, that is, Physicall reasons, out of which (adjoyning Astronomi∣call Hypotheses) the Theory should be extracted, not such grounds and suppositions as should only save the Phaenome∣na (of which kind a number may be wittily devised) but such as propound the substance, motion and influxe of the Heavens, as they they truly are in nature. For those Dog∣maes and Paradoxes are almost vanisht, & long agoe explo∣ded,

* 1.26 namely, the Rapture of the First Mover: and the Solidity of Heaven (starres being there fixt as nailes in the Arched Roofe of a Parlour). And other opinions, not much better, as, that there are diverse Poles of the Zodiack; and of the world; that there is a second moveable of Renitency, contrary to the rapture of the first Moveable;* 1.27 that all parts of the firmament are turned about by perfect circles; that there are Eccentriques and Epicycles, to save the constancy of Motion by perfect circles;* 1.28 that the Moone hath no force or influence upon a body superior to it, and the like. And the absurdity of these suppositions, hath cast men upon that opinions of the Diurnall Motion of the Earth; an opinion which we can demonstrate to be most false. But scarce any man can be found, who hath made enquiry of the Naturall Causes of the substance of the heavens, as well Stellare, as Jnter-stellare; so of the swiftnesse and slownesse of heavenly bodies, refer'd one to ano∣ther; also of the various incitation of Motion in the same Planet; likewise of the perpetuated course of Motion from East to West, and the contrary: Lastly of Progressions, stations and Retrogra∣dations, of the Elevation and Declination of Motions, by the Apo∣gée, or middle point; and Perigée or lowest point of heauen; so of the oblique windings of Motions, either by flexuous Spires, weaving and unweaving themselves, as they make their approach or recesse from the Tropiques; or by serpentine sinuations, which they call Dragons, so of the fixt Poles of Rotations or wheeling motions, why they should be placed in such a point of the heavens, rather than in any other; so of the alligation of some Planets at a certain di∣stance from the Sunne: I say an inquiry of this kind, hath scarce bin attempted, save that some labour hath bin taken therein, only in Mathematicall observations and Demon∣strations. But these observations only shew how wittily all these motions may be contrived, and cleered from oppositi∣on; not how they may truly subsist in Nature; and represent only seeming Motions, and their fictitious Fabrique, and framed at pleasure, not their causes, and the reall truth of Things▪ wherefore Astronomie, such as now it is made, may well be counted in the number of Mathematicall Arts, not without great diminution of the Dignity thereof; seeing it

ought rather (if it would maintaine its own right) be con∣stitute a branch, & that most principall of Naturall Philoso∣phy. For who ever shall reject the fained Divorces of superlu∣nary and sublunary bodies; and shall intentively observe the ap∣petencies of Matter, and the most universall Passions, (which in either Globe are exceeding Potent, and transverberate the uni∣versall nature of things) he shall receive cleere information con∣cerning celestiall matters from the things seen here with us: and contrariwise from those motions which are practised in heaven; he shall learne many observations which now are latent, touching the motions of bodies here below: not only so farre as these inferiour motions are moderated by superiour, but in regard they have a mutuall intercourse by passions common to them both. Wherefore this part of Astronomie which is naturall we set downe as DEFICIENT. And this we will call Liveing Astronomy,* 1.29 to distinguish it from Prometheus Oxe stuft with straw, which was an Oxe in outward shape only.

§ But Astrologie is corrupted with much superstition, so as there is hardly to be found any sound part therein. Yet in our judgement it should rather be purged, than clean cast away. But if any contend that this science is not grounded upon reason, and Physicall contemplations; but in blind ex∣perience, and the observation of many Ages; and therefore reject a triall by naturall Arguments (which the Chaldee A∣strologers boasted) he may by the same reason revoke Au∣guries, Divination, and Predictions from beasts entralls, and swallow downe all kind of Fables; for all these super∣stitious vanities were avoucht, as the Dictates of long expe∣rience, and of Discipline delivered over by tradition. But we doe both accept Astrologie, as a Portion of Naturall Phi∣losophy; and yet attribute unto it no more credit, than rea∣son and the evidence of Particulars doe evince; setting aside superstitions and fictions. And that we may a litle more se∣riously consider the matter.

§ First what a vaine fancy is this, that every Planet should raigne for certain houres by turne, so as in the space of twentyfoure howers, they should resume their Dominions thrice over, three su∣pernumerary

howers reserved? Yet this conceit brought forth unto us the Division of the week; a computation very anci∣ent, and generally received, as from the interchangeable course of daies most manifestly it appears; when in the be∣gining of the day immediatly succeeding, the fourth Planet from the Planet of the first day, enters upon his Goverment; by reason of the three supernumerary howres, whereof we have spoken.

§ Again we are confident to reject, as an idle fiction, the do∣ctrine of Genethliacall Positures of the heavens, to precise points of time; with the Distribution of the Howses; those same darlings in Astrologie, which have made such madde work in the Heavens; nor can I sufficiently wonder that many excellent men, and for Astrology of Principall note, should ground themselves upon so slight reasons, to avouch such opinions. For they say, seeing that experience it selfe discovers as much, that Solstices, Aequinoctialls, new Moone, full Moones, and the like greater revolutions of starres, doe manifestly and notably work upon naturall Bodies; it must needs be, that the more exact, and subtile aspect and posture of the starres, should produce effects more exquisite and occult. But they should first except the Sunnes operations by manifest heat; and likewise, the magnetique influence of the Moone, upon the increase of Tides every halfe Moone (for the daily Fluxe and Refluxe of the Sea, is another thing.) But these set aside; the other powers of the Planets upon naturall bodies (so farre as they are confirmed by experience) is slender and weak; and, which they shall finde, latent in the greater Re∣volutions. Wherefore they should rather argue the other way, namely, that seeing those greater Revolutions, have so small influence, those exact and minute differences of Positures have no force at all.

§ Thirdly, Those Fatalities, that the hower of Nativity or conception governs the Birth; The hower of inception, the fortune of the thing begunne; the hower of Question, the fortune of the thing enquired; and, in a word, the science of Nativities, Electi∣ons, Questions, and such like levities; in our judgement, have no

certainty or solidity in them; and may by naturall reasons be plainly redargued and evinced. The point to be spoken of ra∣ther, is, what that is which we retaine and allow of in A∣strologie; and in that which we doe allow, what is defici∣ent? for, for this end, that is, for the observation of Defici∣ents, we undertook this work; not intending (as we have often said) matter of censure. And indeed amongst the re∣ceiv'd parts of Astrologie, the Doctrines of Revolutions wee judge to have more soundnesse in them, than the rest. But it may be to good purpose, to set downe and prescribe certain Rules, by the scale and square whereof, Astrologicall Obser∣vations may be examined; that what is fruitfull may be re∣tain'd; what is frivolous rejected.

§ The first Precept may be that whereof we have ad∣monisht already; let the greater Revolutions be retained; the lesser Horoscopes and Howses casseer'd. Those like Great Ordi∣nance may discharge their influences, at a spacious remote∣nesse; these like small Bowes, are for a short distance, and carry not their forces farre. The second rule is; That the operati∣on of the Heavens workes not on all bodies) but only upon the more tender and penetrable; such as are Humors, Aer, Spirits: but here we except the Operations of the heate of the Sun, and of the Heavens, which without question pierce even to Met∣tals, and many subterraneous Bodies. The third rule is, that the Operation of the Heavens extends rather to the Masse of things and Nature in grosse; than unto individuall essences, and parti∣cularities; yet obliquely it reacheth to many Individualls, namely, those Individuates which of the same species are most Passible, and are like soft waxe: even as when a Pesti∣lentiall aire seizeth on bodies more open and lesse resistent; and passeth by Bodies more compact and strong. The fourth rule is, somewhat like the precedent; That the Operation of the Heavens hath its influxe and dominion not in points and nar∣row minutes of times; but in greater spaces. Therefore Progno∣stications of the temperatures of the yeare may be true; but upon particular daies, are worthily accounted vaine and i∣dle. The last rule, (which by the more wise Astrologers hath

bin ever imbraced) is, That there is no fatall necessity in the starres, but that they doe incline rather, than enforce. Wee adde this moreover (wherein we plainly take part with Astrolo∣gy, if it were rectified) and which we know to be most cer∣taine: That Celestiall bodies have other influences besides heate and light: which influences are of force according to the Rules we have prescribed, and no otherwise: But these lie hidde in the profound Parts of Naturall Philosophy, and re∣quire a larger dissertation. Wherefore we think good (that which we have said being rightly conceived) to set downe, Astrologie agreeable to our Principles,* 1.30 amongst DEFICI∣ENTS, and as we have named Astronomie grounded upon naturall reasons, Living Astronomie, so we think fit to call Astrologie ascertain'd upon the same reasons, Sound Astrolo∣gie. As for the right way how to frame and make this Art, although what we have said, doth not a litle conduce there∣to, yet according to our manner, we will adde a few more observations which shall cleerly propound, out of what materialls it should be collected, and to what end it should be referred.

§ First, let the knowledge touching the Commixtures of Beames be receiv'd into sound Astrologie, that is of Conjuncti∣ons, and of Opositions, and the rest of the constellations, or Aspects of Planets, one on an other. Also we assigne to this part concerning the Commixtures of Beams, the passing of the Planets through the signes of the Zodiaque, and Posi∣tion under the same signes: For the location of a Planet un∣der any signe, is a kind of Conjunction of the same Planet with the Starres of the signes: Moreover as Conjunctions, so likewise Oppositions and other Constellations of Pla∣nets towards the Starres of the signes, are to be noted, which hitherto hath not perfectly bin accomplisht. But the inter∣changeable Commixtures of the Rayes of the sixt starres, are indeed profitable to the Contemplation of the Fabrique of the world; and of the Nature of the Regions lying under them; but not unto Predictions, because these Aspects are e∣ver the same.

§ Secondly, let there be taken into Astrologie the accessions of every particular Planet neerer to the Perpendicular, and Re∣cessions from it according to the Climates of Regions. For all the Planets as well as the Sun, have their summers, their win∣ters; wherein they dart downe more forcible, or more fee∣ble rayes, according to their posture in respect of the Perpen∣dicular. For without question, the Moone in Leo works more forcibly upon naturall bodies here below, than when she is in Pisces: Not because the Moone placed in Leo, hath refe∣rence to the Heart, and under Pisces respects the Feet, (as the vulgar Fable goes); for their Elevation towards the Per∣pendicular and Approximation towards the greater starres, just after the same manner as the Sun.

§ Thirdly, let the Apogaea, and Perigaea of the Planets be received with due inquiry, to what the vigor of a Planet apper∣taines in respect of himselfe; and to what in his vicinity to us. For a Planet in his Apogaea, or exaltation is more cheerfull, and active; but in his Perigaea or declension more cōmunicative.

So the Sun in his Elevation when hee enters the Tropick of Cancer is in heate more recollected and vigorous;* 1.31 but when he falls off from the Meridian, as in Capricorne, hee is more faint, yet more dispersed in his influence. For in his Ascension, he is not only neerer to the fixed starres; but his beams then falling at more equall and right angles; become more united; and by a direct resultance from the earth in∣termixe, and so reduplicate their force; whereas in his de∣clension, they are oblique, & therefore feeble and errant in reflection. Wherefore with the Inhabitants under the Equa∣tor, the heat is more intense; than it is with Northern Con∣finers, where the Sun daily keeps his circuit neer about the Horizon: But yet in this Perigean motion, the Suns beams are more communicative, though lesse active; because de∣parting from the point of their incidence in the rebound, their reflection is oblique and dispersed. This enquiry tou∣ching the projection of beames in a right or oblique line, would be made with diligence, for it concernes all the in∣fluences of the heavens upon terrene bodies; the generall

constitution of the yeare; the diverse temperatures of the aire in the five Zones; the complexion of different Climates and the like.

§ Fourthly to be briefe, let there be taken in all the remain∣ing Accidents of the motion of Planets; as what are the Accelera∣tions, Retardations, Progresses, Stations, Retrogradations, of eve∣ry one of them in their course, what their distance from the Sunne, their Combustions, Encrease, and Diminutions of Light, Ecclipses, and whatsoever else of this nature? For all these cause, that the Beames of the Planets doe work more strong∣ly, or more weakly, and after diverse waies and distinct virtues; And these foure observations, belong to the Radia∣tions of starres.

§ Fiftly, let there be received in, whatsoever may any way, open and disclose the natures of starres Errant or Fixt, in their proper essence and activity; as what is their Magni∣tude; of what collour and aspect; what Scintillation and Ʋi∣bration of light; what Situation towards the Poles or Aequi∣noctiall; what Asterismes; which are more mingled with o∣ther starres; which are more solitarie; which are superior, which inferior; which of the fixt starres are within the lines and course of the Sunne and Planets (namely within the Zodiaque) which without; which of the Planets is more swift; which more slow; which may move in the Eccliptique line; which may expatiate in latitude from it; what Planet may be retrograde, which not; what Planet may be at any distance from the Sunne, which is tied to attend the Sunne; which moves swifter in Apogéo, which in Perigéo; to conclude the Irregularities of Mars; the expatiations of Ʋenus; the won∣derfull Labours or Passions, which are often found in the Sunne, and in Venus, and the like?

§ Last of all, let there be taken into Astrologie, even from tradition the Particular Natures, and Inclination of Planets, as also of fixt starres; which seeing they are delive∣red over with such an universall consent; they are not light∣ly to be rejected; but where they crosse the grounds and rea∣sons of naturall Principles. And of such observations as

these, sound Astrologie is compiled; and according to these only, should the Schemes and configurations of Heaven, be composed and interpreted. Sound Astrologie is likewise ap∣plied and referred with more confidence to Predictions; to Elections; with more Caution, within due limits to both, Predictions may be made of future Comets, which as we conjecture may be foretold; and of all sorts of Meteors; of Deluges, Draughts; Heates; Conglaciations; Earth-quakes; ore flowing of waters; breaking out of Fires; Windes; great Raines; divers Tempests; and strange seasons of the Yeare; Pestilences, Epidemicall diseases; Plenty, and dearth of Graine; Warres, Seditions, Sects, Plantations of new Colo∣nies; lastly of all commotions and greater Innovations, ei∣ther in Nature, or in State-Goverment: so these predictions may be drawn downe (though not with like certainty) to more speciall occurrences, and perchance to singularities; if the generall inclinations of such times and seasons, being first discovered and found out, these be applied by a sharpe pier∣cing judgement Philosophicall or Politicall, to speciall or more particular events, which may be most subject to such Accidents. As for example, a man shall find out from a fore∣sight of the seasons of the yeare, such temperatures of wea∣ther, as are propitious or pernitious rather to Olives, than to Vines; rather to Phthisiques, and ulcerations of the Longues, than to Hepatiques and obstructions of the liver; more to the inhabitants of high and montainous; than low and cham∣pane Countries; more to Monkes, than Courtiers, by reason of their different kind of diet. Or if one from the know∣ledge he hath of the influence, the Heavens have over the spirits of men, should find out a man to be of such a com∣plexion and disposition; to affect or distast rather the peo∣ple then Princes; rather learned and curious, than couragi∣ous and warlike dispositions; rather sensuall and voluptu∣ous, than active and politique natures. Such instances as these are infinite, but (as we have said) they require not on∣ly that generall knowledge, taken from the starres, which are Active; but also a particular knowledge of Subjects which

are Passive. Nor are Elections altogether to be rejected but more sparingly to be credited, than Predictions. For we see in Planting and in Sowing and in Grafting, that the obser∣vation of the age of the Moone is a matter, not altogether vaine and frivolous. But these Elections, are by our rules more restrained than Predictions: and this must ever be ob∣served, that Elections are of force, in such cases alone, where both the Jnfluxe of the Heavens is such, as doth not sodainly passe over; and likewise the Action of Jnferiour Bodies such, as is not presently perfected: for neither the Encreases of the Moone, nor of the Planets are accomplisht in an instant: but Punctuality of time, is by all means to be rejected. There are found many of the like precise observations (which a man would hardly believe) in Elections about Civile af∣faires. But if any man in this case shall except against us, saying, that we have indeed made some remonstrance out of what this reformed Astrologie should be deduced; and like∣wise to what it may with profit be referred: but the man∣ner how it is to be deduced, we have given no precept at all; he should not deale equally with us, to exact at our hands the Art it selfe, which we never promised, nor pur∣posed to handle. Yet notwithstanding touching such a point of Demand, thus much we will admonish; that there are only foure means, which may prepare the way to this knowledge. First by Experiments future; then by Experiments past; againe by Tradition; last of all by naturall Reasons. Now for future Experiments, to what end should we speak much of them? seeing to make up a competent number of Jnstan∣ces, so many ages are requisite, as it were, but lost labour, to think to comprehend it? As for Experiments past, they indeed are within the compasse and reach of men, although it is a matter will require much labour, and much leasure to ac∣complish. For Astrologians (if they be not wanting to their Profession) may make a collection from the faithfull re∣ports of History, of all greater contingences; as Inundations, Pestilences, Warres; Seditions; and (if the state so require) the deaths of Kings: and may contemplate the situation of the

Heavens, not according to the subtletie of Figures; but ac∣cording to those generall rules which we have already set downe; to know in what postures the Heavens were, at those times, when such effects came to passe; that so were there is a cleere, and evident consent, and concurrence of e∣vents; there a probable rule of Prediction may be inferred. As for Traditions, they ought to be so examined and sifted, that such as manifestly oppugne Physicall Reasons, should be discarded; but such as well consent, should be valide even of their own authority. Lastly, as for Physicall or Naturall reasons, they are the aptest for this inquiry; which make in∣quiry of the Catholique and more universall inclinations and Passions of Matter; and of the simple and genuine mo∣tions of Bodies; for by these wings we safely soare and mount up to those celestiall materiate substances. Thus much concerning Astrologia sana.

§ There is another Portion of Astrologicall Frenzie (besides those figmēts which we have noted at the begining) which is wont to be seperate from Astrologie, and to be transfer∣red into Celestiall Magique, as they call it. This hath purcha∣sed a strange Glosse, from the working fansie of mans wit; namely That a benevolent situation or Aspect of starres,* 1.32 may be taken in seales and signet-rings (be it of Mettalls or of any Gemme, capable of such impression) which may arrest the felicity of that hower, which otherwise would swiftly passe away, and as it were, fixe it, being volatilous. As the Poet passionately com∣plaines of this so noble Art, among the Ancients, now long agoe buried in oblivion.

Annulus infuso non vivit mirus Olympo,* 1.33 Non magis ingentes humili sub lumine Phoebos Fert Gemma, aut Celso divulsas cardine lunas.

Indeed the Church of Rome hath imbraced the Reliques of Saints, and their virtues, (for in Divine and immateriate things, the fluxe of time hath no power to abate the force and efficacy,) but that the Reliques of Heaven should be so lodged, as that the hower which is past, and, as it were, dead, should revive and be continued; is a meere superstiti∣on,

and imposture. Wherefore let us let goe these idle fancies unlesse the Muses be grown doting old wives.

IV. Abstract Physique in our judgement, may very well be divided into two Parts, into the Doctrine of the Schemes of Mat∣ter; and into the doctrine of Appetites or Motions. We will runne them both over briefly, from whence the delineati∣ons of the true Physique of Abstracts may be drawen. The Schemes of Matter are; Dense, Rare; Grave, Light; Hot, Cold; Tangible, Pneumatique; Volatile, Fixt; Determinate, Fluid; Humid, Drie; Fat, Crude; Hard, Soft; Fragile, Tensile; Porous, Ʋnited; Spirituous, Languid; Simple, Composite; Absolute, im∣perfectly Mixt; Fibrous and full of veines, of a simple Positure or equall; Similare Dissimilare; Specificate Non-specificate; Or∣ganicall Jnorganicall; Animate Jnanimate. Neither doe we extend the figurations of Matter any farther, for Sensible and Insensible; Rationall and Irrationall, we referre to the know∣ledge of Man.

§ Appetites and Motions, are of two sorts; either motions simple, which containe in them the Roots of all naturall Actions; but yet according to the Schemes and habitudes of Matter: or Motions composited and Producted; from which last, the received Philosophy of the Times (which compre∣hends litle of the body of Nature) takes its begining. But such Compound Motions (as Generation Corruption, and the rest) should be taken for the Summes and Products of simple Motions; rather than for Primitive Motions. Motions simple, are motions of Antitypie, commonly called Motion opposing Penetration of Dimensions; Motion of Connexion, or Continui∣ty, which they call, Motion to avoid vacuity; Motion of Li∣berty, least there should be any compression or extension preternaturall; Motion into a new spheare, or to Rarefaction and Condensation; Motion of a second connexion, or a motion least there should be a solution of continuity; Motion of grea∣ter Congregation, or to the Masse of their connaturalls, which is commonly called Naturall Motion; Motion of lesser Con∣gregation, usually stiled, Motion of Sympathy and of Anti∣pathy; Motion Disponent, or that parts may be rightly placed

in the whole, Motion of Assimilation, or of Multiplication of its Nature upon an other; Motion of Excitation, where the more noble and vigorous agent awaketh, and stirres up Motion latent and dormant in an other; Motion of the Seale or of Jmpression, that is, Operation without Communication of Substance; Motion Regall, or a Cohibition of other Moti∣tions from a Motion Predominant; Motion without Termina∣tion, or Spontaneous Rotation; Motion of Trepidation, or of Contraction & Dilatation of Bodies placed betwixt things good for them, and obnoxious to them; lastly Motion of Rest or abhorrency of Motion, which is the Cause of many things. Of this kind are simple Motions which truly issue forth out of the inward bowels of Nature; which complicate, conti∣nuate, interchang'd repress'd, repeated, and many waies ag∣gregated, doe constitute those Composite Motions or Summes of Motions, which are receiv'd, and such other of the same kind. The Summes of Motions are those Celebrated Motions, Generation; Corruption; Augmentation; Diminution; Alteration, and Lation; so Mixtion; Separation; Ʋersion.

§ There remaines only as Appendices of Physique, the Mea∣sures of Motions; of what efficacy the Quantity, or Dose of Nature is? What distance can doe, which is called, not un∣properly, the orbe of Virtue or Activity? What incitation, or Tardity, can effect? What a long or short delay? what the force or rebatement of a thing? What the instigation of Peristasie or cir∣cummambient inclosure? And these are the naturall and ge∣nuine Parts of true naturall Philosophy, touching Abstracts For in the figurations, or Schemes of Matter; in Motions simple; In summes or Agregations of Motions; and in Measure of Mo∣tions, the Physique of Abstracts is accomplisht. As for voluntary Motion in Animals; Motion in the Actions of Senses; Moti∣on of the Imagination; of the Appetite, and of the will; Motion of the mind; of the discerning facultie, or Practique Iudgment; and of the Intellectuals, we referre over to their proper Know∣ledges. Yet thus much againe we advertise, that all these Parti∣culars we have delivered, are no farther to be handled in Physique, than the enquiry of their Matter and Efficient; for

according to their Formes and Ends they are revised and re-examined in Metaphysique.

V We will here annexe two notable Appendices, which have reference not so much to the Matter, as to the Manner of Inquiry; Naturall Problemes; and Placits of Ancient Philo∣sophers. The first is the Appendix of multiplied or sparsed Na∣ture; the second of Nature united or of summes. Both these be∣long to a grave and circumspect moving of doubts, which is no meane Part of Knowledge: For Problemes comprehend Particular Dubitations; Placits, generall; about Principles and the Fabrique. Of Problemes there is an excellent ex∣ample in the writing of Aristotle; which kind of worke certainly deserv'd not only to have bin celebrated by Posterity;* 1.34 but by their labours to have bin continued; see∣ing new doubts arise daily. But in this point Caution is to be taken, and that of great Importance. The recording and pro∣posing of Doubts hath in it a two-fold use: One, that it mu∣nites and fortifies Philosophy against errors; when that which is not altogether so cleere and evident is not defin'd and avouched, (lest error should beget error) but a judgment upon it is suspended, and is not definitive. The other that the entrie of Doubts, and recording of them, are so many Sponges which continually suck and draw in unto them an increase and improvement of Knowledge; whereby it comes to passe that those things, which without the suggestion of Doubts had bin slightly, and without observation passed o∣ver, are by occasion of such Dubitations, more seriously and attentively considered But these two utilities scarce recom∣pence one discommodity, which unlesse it be carefully lookt unto, insinuateth it selfe; namely, That a Doubt once ac∣knowledged as justly made, and become, as it were authentique; presently stirres up defendants both waies; who in like manner commend over the same liberty of doubting to Posteritie; so that men bend and apply their wits, rather to keepe a doubt still on foot, than to determine and solve it. Jnstances of this case we have every where, both in Iurisconsults; and in Students in the Universities; who if they have once entertain'd a Doubt, it

goes ever after authoriz'd for a Doubt, assuming unto them∣selves a Priviledge as well of Dubitation, as of Assertion: Whereas the right use of Reason is, to make things doubtfull cer∣taine; and not to call things certaine, into doubt. Wherefore J re∣port as Deficient a Calendar of Dubitations, or Problemes in Nature, and approve the undertaking of such a worke, as a profitable paines; so care be had, that as knowledge daily grows up, (which certainly will come to passe if men hear∣ken unto us) such Doubts as be cleerly discust, and brought to resolution, be raced out of the Catalogue of Problemes. To this Calendar, I would have another annext no lesse usefull: For seeing that in all Enquiries, there be found these three sorts of things; things manifestly true; Doubtfull; manifestly false; It wOuld be a very profitable course to adjoyne to the Calendar of Doubts, and Non-liquets; a Calendar of Falshoods, and of po∣pular Errors, now passing unargued in Naturall History, and in Opinions; that Sciences be no longer distemperd and em∣based by them.

§ As for the Placits of Ancient philosophers, as were those of Pythagoras, Philolaus, Xenophon, Anaxagoras, Parmenides,* 1.35 Leucippus, Democritus, & others, (which men use disdainfully to runne over) it will not be amisse to cast our eyes with more reverence upon them.* 1.36 For although Aristotle after the manner of the race of the Ottomans, thought he could not safely raigne, unlesse he made away all his Brethren; yet to those who seriously propound to themselves the inquisition and illu∣stration of Truth, and not Dominion or Magistrality, it can not but seeme a matter of great profit, to see at once before them, the severall opinions of severall Auctors touching the Natures of things. Neither is this for any great hope con∣ceiv'd that a more exact truth can any way be expected from these or from the like Theories. For as the same Phoenomena; the same Calculations are satisfied upon the Astronomicall Principles both of Ptolomy and Copernicus: So the popular experience we imbrace; and the ordinary view and face of things, may apply it selfe to many severall Theories; where∣as a right investigation of truth requires another manner

of severity and speculation.* 1.37 For as Aristotle saith elegantly, That Children at first indeed call all men Fathers, and women Mothers, but afterwards they distinguish them both. So certain∣ly experience in Childhood, will call every Philosophy, Mo∣ther; but when it comes to ripenesse, it will discerne the true Mother. In the meane time it is good to read over diverse Philosophies, as diverse Glosses upon Nature; whereof it may be one in one place; another in another; is more corre∣cted. Therefore I could wish a collection made, but with diligence and judgment,* 1.38 De Antiquis Philosophiis, out of the lives of Ancient Philosophers; out of the Parcels of Plu∣tarch of their Placits; out of the Citations of Plato; out of the Confutations of Aristotle; out of a sparsed mention found in other Bookes as well of Christians, as of Heathens, (as out of Lactantius, Philo, Philostratus, and the rest): For J doe not yet see extant a worke of this Nature. But here I must give warning that this be done distinctly, so as the Philosophies, every one severdly, be composed and continued, and not collected by titles and handfulls, as hath bin done by Plu∣tarch. For every Philosophy while it is entire in the whole peece, supports it selfe; and the opinions maintained therein, give light, strength, and credence mutually yone to the other; whereas if they be simple and broken,* 1.39 it will sound more strange and dissonant. In truth when I read in Tacitus the Actions of, Nero, or of Claudius invested with Circumstances of Times, Persons, and Inducements: I find them not so strange, but that they may be true: but when I read the same Actions in Suetonius Tranquillus,* 1.40 represented by titles and common places, and not in order of Time, they seeme monstrous and altoge∣ther incredible: So is Philosophy when it is propounded entire; & when it is sliced and articled into fragments. Neither doe I ex∣clude out of this Calendar of the Placits, or Sects of Philosophy, the Theories and opinions of later times, as that of Theophra∣stus Paracelsus eloquently reduced into a body & Harmony of Philosophy by Severinus the Dane, or of Telesius of Cosen∣ze, who reviving the Philosophy of Parmenides hath turn'd the weapons of the Peripatetiques upon themselves, or

of Patricius the Ʋenetian; who hath sublimated the fumes of the Platonists; or of Gilbert our Countryman, who hath restored to light the opinions of Philolaus, or of any other whatsoever, if he be of merit. And because the volumes of these Auctors are wholly extant, there may be abridgements made only of them, and so annext, by way of reference to the rest. And thus much of Naturall Philosophy, and the Ap∣pendices thereof.

VI. As for Methaphysique, we have assigned unto it, the in∣quiry of Formall and Finall causes; which application, as to Forms, may seem to be nugatory and void.✿ 1.41 For an opinion hath prevailed, and is grown inveterate, that the essentiall Formes and true Differences of things, can by no diligence of Man be found out. Which opinion in the meane, gives and grants us thus much; that the Invention of Formes, is of all other parts of knowledge the worthiest to be sought; if it be possible they may be found. And as for Possibility of Invention, there are some faint-hearted discoverers, who when they see nothing but Aire and Water, think there is no farther Land. But it is manifest that Plato, a man of an ele∣vated wit, and who beheld all things as from a high cliffe,* 1.42 in his doctrine of Ideas, did discry, that formes were the true object of knowledge, however he lost the reall fruit of this most true opinion, by contemplating and apprehending Formes, as ab∣solutely abstract from matters; and not confined and determined by matter: whereupon it came to passe that he turned himselfe to Theologicall speculations, which infected and distained all his Naturall Philosophy. But if we keep a watchfull, and a se∣vere eye upon Action and Use, it will not be difficult, to trace and find out what are the Formes; the disclosure whereof would wonderfully enrich and make happy the e∣state of man. For the Formes of substances,* 1.43 (man only except of whom it is said, Formavit hominem de limo terrae, & spira∣vit in faciem ejus spiraculum vitae; not as off all other kinds, Producat aqua, producat terra) I say the species of creatures,* 1.44 as they are now multiplied by compounding and trans∣planting, are so perplext and complicate, as it is either alto∣gether

lost labour to make enquiry of them, or the inquisiti∣on thereof, such as may be had, should be suspended for a time, and when the Formes of nature, in hir more simple existence are rightly sought and found out, then to be de∣termin'd and set downe. For, as it were not a thing easie, nor any way usefull, to seeke the Forme of that sound, which makes a word; being that words through composition and transposition of letters are infinite: but to enquire the Forme of sound, which expresseth some simple letter (namely with what collision, with what application of the instruments of voice it is made) is a thing comprehensible and easy; which forme of letters once known, presently leads us to the forme of words. In the same manner to enquire the Forme of a Lyon, of an Oake, of Gold, nay of water, of Ayre is a vaine pursuit; but to enquire the Formes of Dense, Rare; Hot, Cold; Heavy, Light; Tangible Pneumatique; Volatile, Fixt; and the like, both of Figurations and of Motions; whereof the most of them we have enumerated when we handled Physique, and are wont to call them, Formes of the first ranke or order; and which (as the letters of the Alphabet) are not so many in number, & yet build up and support the essences and Formes of all substances and this is that very point which we aime at, and endeavour to compasse; and which constitutes and defines that Part of Metaphysique, whereof we now enquire. Nor doth this so prejudicate or hinder, but that Physique may consider the same Natures also (as hath bin said) but only according to the fluid and mutable causes. For ex∣ample, if the cause of whitenesse in Snow or in Froth be inqui∣red, it is well rendred, that it is the subtile intermixture of Aire with water. But this is farre from being the Forme of white∣nesse; being that aire intermixt with the dust, or powder of Glasse, or Chrystall, doth likewise produce whitenesse, as well as if it were mingled with water; but this is the effici∣ent cause only, which is no other than vehiculum Formae. But if the inquiry be made in Metaphysique, you shall finde some such rule as this, That two diaphanous bodies being intermixt, their optique Portions in a simple order, or equally placed, doe de∣termine

and constitute whitenesse. This part of Metaphysique I finde deficient: and no marvaile because by the course of in∣quiring, which hitherto hath bin practised, the Formes of things, will never appeare while the world endures. The root of this error, as of all other, is this; that men in their contempla∣tions of nature are accustomed to make too timely a departure, and too remote a recesse from experience and particulars; and have yeelded and resigned themselves wholly over to the fumes ef their own fancies, and populare Argumentations. But the use of this part of Metaphysique, which I report as deficient, is of the rest the most excellent in two respects.

§ First, because it is the duty and peculiar virtue of all Sciences, to abridge (as much as the conception of truth will permit) the ambages and long circuits of Experience, and so to apply a remedy to the ancient complaint of vita brevis,* 1.45 ars longa. And this is excellently performed, by collecting and uniting the Axioms of Sciences, into more generall heads and con∣ceptions; which may be agreeable to all Individualls. For Sciences, are the Pyramides supported by History; and experience, as their only and true Basis; and so the Basis of Naturall Philoso∣phy is Naturall History; the stage next the Basis is Physique; the stage next the verticall point is Metaphysique: as for the Cone and verticall point it selfe (opus quod operatur Deus à principio us{que} ad finem;* 1.46 the summary law of Nature) we doe justly doubt whether mans inquiry can attaine unto it. But these three be the true stages of Sciences; and are, to men swelled up with their own knowledge, and a dareing insolence, to invade Heaven, like the three hills of the Giants.

Ter sunt Conati imponere Pelio Ossam,* 1.47 Scilicet at{que} Ossae frondosum involvere Olympum.

But to those that disabling themselves, and discharging their pride, referre all to the glory of God, they are the three accla∣mations Sanste, Sancte, Sancte:* 1.48 for God is holy in the multitude of his works, Holy in the order of them, Holy in the union. And therefore the speculation was excellent in Parmenides and Plato; although but a speculation in them,* 1.49 That all things by scales did ascend to unity. So then, that science is the worthi∣est,

which least chargeth mans understanding with multi∣plicity; and it is evident, that that is Metaphysique, as that which principally speculates those simple Formes of things; (which we have stiled Formes of the first degree or order) which though they be few in number, yet in their com∣mensurations and Co-ordinations, they make all kindes of variety.

§ The Second respect which innobles this part of Meta∣physique touching Formes, is, that of all other sciences, it doth most enfranchise, and set at liberty the Power of Man; and brings it forth into a most ample and open field to exer∣cise in. For Physique directs mans labour and diligence through narrow and restrained wayes, imitating the flexi∣ous courses of ordinary Nature; But latae undi{que} sapientibus viae,* 1.50 to sapience (which was anciently defined to be, Rerum divinarum & humanarum scientia) there is ever copie and va∣riety of means. For Physicall causes give light and occasion to new inventions in simili materia; but whosoever knowes any Forme, knows also the utmost possibility of superinducing that nature upon any variety of matter; and so is lesse restrained and tied in operation, either to the Basis of the matter, or to the condition of the Efficient; which kinde of knowledge, though in a more divine sence, Solomon elegantly describes, Non arctabuntur gressus tui,* 1.51 & Currens non habebis offendicu∣lum; his meaning is, that the waies of sapience, are not liable to streights, nor perplexities.

§ The second part of Metaphysique, is the inquiry of Fi∣nall causes; which we note not as omitted, but as misplaced: for the inquiry of them usually is made amongst the Phy∣siques, and not in the Metaphysiques. And yet if this were a fault in order only, I should not much stand upon it; for or∣der is a matter of Illustration, and pertaines not to the sub∣stance of Sciences: but this inversion of order, hath caused a notable deficience, and brought a great decay upon Philoso∣phy. For the handling of Finall Causes in the Physiques, hath intercepted and banisht the inquiry of Physicall Causes; and hath given men occasion to rest satisfied in such specious,

and umbratilous Causes; and not thorowly to urge and presse the inquiry of Reall and truly Physicall Causes. For this I find done not only by Plato,* 1.52 who ever Ancreth upon that Shoare; but also by Aristotle; Galen, and others, who usually likewise fal upon these Flats. For to say, That the eye-lids fur∣nisht with hairs are for a quick-set & fence to fortifie the sight: or that the firmnesse of skinnes, and hides of living Creatures, is to repell the extremities of heate and cold: or that Bones are ordai∣ned by Nature for Columes and Beames whereupon the frame of the Body is to be built: or that Trees shootforth leaves to shadow and protect the fruit from the Sunne and the wind: or that the Clouds are ingendred above, to water the earth below: or that the earth is close-compact and solid, that it may be a Station and Man∣sion for living Creatures, is properly inquired in Metaphysique; but in Physique they are impertinent. Nay, (to pursue this point) such discoursing Causes as these, like the Remoraes (as the fiction goes) adhering to shippes, stay and slugge the sayling, and the Progresse of Sciences, that they could not hold on their Course, and advance forward to further Discoveries: And now long agoe it is so brought to passe that the search of Physicall Causes, thus neglected, are decaied and passed over in silence. And therefore the Naturall Philosophy of Democritus, and some others, who removed God and a Mind from the frame of things; and at∣tributed the structure of the world to infinite Preludiums, and Essayes (which by one name they term'd Fate or For∣tune; and have assigned the Causes of Particulars to the ne∣cessity of Matter, without intermixture of Finall Causes) see∣meth to us (so farre as we can conjecture from the Frag∣ments and Remaines of their Philosophy) in respect of Physicall Causes, to have bin farre more solid, and to have penetrated more profoundly into Nature; than that of A∣ristotle and Plato: for this reason alone that those Ancient Philo∣sophers never wassted time in finall Causes; but these perpetually presse and inculcate them. And in this point Aristotle is more to blame than Plato, seeing he hath omitted the fountaine of all finall Causes, God; and in the place of God substituted Nature; and hath imbraced finall Causes rather as a lover of

Logique, than an adorer of Divinity. Nor doe we therefore speake thus much, because those finall Causes are not true and very worthy the enquiry in Metaphysique Speculations; but because while they sallie out, and breake in upon the Possessions of Physicall Causes, they doe unhappily depopu∣late and wast that Province: For otherwise if they keepe themselves within their precincts and borders, they are ex∣tremely deceiv'd who ever think that there is an enmitie or repugnancy between them and Physicall Causes. For the cause render'd, That the hairs about the eye-lids are for the safe∣gard of the sight, doth not indeed impugne that other Cause; That pilositie is incident to Orifices of Moisture,

* 1.53Muscosi Fontes &c.—

Nor the Cause render'd, that the firmnesse of Hides in Beasts is for armor against the injuries of extreme weather, doth impugn that other Cause; That that firmnesse is caused by the contracti∣on of Pores in the outward parts of the body through cold, and de∣predation of Ayre; and so of the rest: both causes excellently conspiring, save that, the one declares an intention, the other a consequence only. Neither doth this call in question, or derogate from divine Providence; but rather wonderfully confirmes and exalts it. For as in Civile Actions that Poli∣tique wisdome will be more deep, and admired, if a man can use the service of other men to his owne ends and de∣sires; and yet never acquaint them with his purpose (so as they shall doe what he would they should doe, and yet not understand what they doe); then if he should impart his Counsils to those he imployes: So the wisdome of God shines more wonderfully, when Nature intends one thing, and Providence draws forth another; then if the Characters of Divine Providence were imprest upon every particular habitude and motion of Nature. Surely Aristotle after he had swelled up Nature with Finall Causes; Naturam nihil frustra facere;* 1.54 suique voti semper esse compotem (si impedimenta abessent); and had set downe many such tending to that pur∣pose; had no further need of God: but Democritus and Epicurus, when they publisht and celebrated their Atomes; were thus

farre by the more subtile wits listened unto with Patience: but when they would avouch that the Fabrique and Con∣texture of all things in Nature, knit and united it selfe with∣out a Mind, from a fortuitous Concourse of those Atomes, they were entertain'd with Laughter by all. So that Physi∣call Causes are so farre from withdrawing mens minds from God and Providence; as rather contrariwise those Philoso∣phers which were most exercised in contriving those A∣tomes, found no end and issue of their travaile, untill they had resolved all at last into God, and Providence. Thus much of Metaphysique, a part whereof touching Finall Causes I de∣ny not to have bin handled both in the Physiques, and Me∣taphysiques; in these truly, in those improperly; for the in∣convenience hath ensued thereupon.

CAP. V. 1 The Partion of the Operative Knowledge of Nature into Me∣chanique and Magique: Respondent to the Parts of Speculative Knowledge; Mechanique to Physique; Magique to Metaphysique. § A purging of the word Magia. II. Two Appendices to O∣perative Knowledge, An Inventory of the Estate of man. § A Cata∣logue of Polychrests, or things of multifarious use.

I THE Operative Knowledge of Nature wee will likewise divide into two Parts; and that from a kind of Necessitie. For this Division is subordi∣nate to the former Division of Speculative Knowledge; for Physique, and the Enquiry of Efficient and Materiall Causes; produces Mechanique: but Metaphysique, and the enquiry of Formes produces Magique: As for Finall Causes the enquiry is barren, and as a Ʋirgin consecrate to God brings forth nothing. Nor are we ignorant that there is a Mechanicall Knowledge which is meerly empericall, and operarie, not depending on Physique; but this we have referr'd to Naturall History, and separate it from Naturall Philosophy: Speaking here only

of that Mechanicall Knowledge which is connext with Causes Physicall. But yet there falls out a certaine Mechani∣call, or Experimentall Knowledge which neither is altoge∣ther Operative, nor yet properly reaches so high as specula∣tive Philosophy. For all the Inventions of Operations which have come to mens Knowledge, either have fallen out by casuall insidence; and afterwards deliver'd from hand to hand; or were sought out by a purposed experiment. Those which have bin found out by intentionall experiment; they have bin disclosed either by the light of Causes, and Axiomes; or found out by extending, or transferring, or compounding former inventions; which is a matter more sagacious and witty, than Philosophicall. And this part which by no means we despise we shall briefly touch hereafter, when we shall treate of Literate Experience amongst the Parts of Logique. As for the Mechanique now in hand, Aristotle hath handled it promiscuously; Hero in spiritalibus; as likewise Georgius Agricola a moderne Writer very diligently in his Mineralls; and many others in particular Treatises on that subject; so as I have nothing to say of Deficients in this kind; but that the Promiscuous Mechanicalls of Aristotle, ought to have bin with more diligence continued, by the pens of re∣cent Writers; especially with choice of such experimentals, of which either the Causes are more obscure, or the Effects more noble. But they who insist upon these doe as it were only coast along the shoare, Premendo littus iniquum. For in my judgment there can hardly be any radicall alteration, or novation in Nature; either by any fortuitous adventures; or by essayes of Experiments; or from the light of Physicall Causes; but only through the invention of Formes. There∣fore if we have set downe that part of Metaphysique as Defi∣cient, which entreateth of Forms; it follows that Natural Ma∣gique also,* 1.55 which is a Relative unto it, is likewise Defective.

§ But it seemes requisite in this place that the word Magia, accepted for a long time in the worse part, be resto∣red to the ancient and honourable sence. Magia, amongst the Persians, was taken for a sublime sapience, and a Science of

the Harmony and concents of universalls in Nature; so those three Easterne Kings which came to adore Christ, are stiled by the name of Magi: and we understand it in that sense, as to be, a Science which deduceth the knowledge of hidden formes to strange and wonderfull effects & operations; and as it is commonly said, by joyning Actives with Passives, which discloseth the great wonders of Nature. As for the Naturall Magique, (which flies abroad in many mens bookes) containing certain credu∣lous and superstitious traditions, and observations of Sym∣pathies, and Antipathies, and of hidden and specifique pro∣prieties, with some experiments commonly frivolous; strange, rather for the art of convayance and disguisement, than the thing it selfe; surely he shall not much erre, who shall say, that this kind of magique, is as farre differing in truth of Nature, from such a knowledge as we require; as the Bookes of the Gests of Arthur of Brittaine, or of Hugh of Burdeaux, differs from Caesars Commentaries, in truth of story. For it is manifest, that Caesar did greater things de ve∣ro, then they durst faine of their Heroes; but he did them not in that fabulous manner. Of this kind of Learning, the Fable of Ixion was a figure; who projecting with himselfe to en∣joy Juno the Goddesse of Power, had copulation with a cloude, of which he begot Centaures and Chimeraes. So who∣ever are carried away with a frantique and impotent passi∣on, and vaporous conceit to those things which only, through the fumes and clouds of Imagination, they fancy to themselves to see, in stead of substantiall operations; they are delivered of nothing but ayrie hopes, and certain defor∣med and monstrous apparitions. The operation and effect of this superficiary, and degenerous Naturall Magique upon Men, is like some soporiferous drugges, which procure sleep; and withall exhale into the fancy, merry and pleasant dreams in sleepe. First it casts mans understanding into a sleep, still chanting and suggesting specificique proprieties, and secret virtues; and sent downe, as it were, from hea∣ven, to be delivered, and to be learned only by auricular tra∣ditions; whence it comes to passe, that men are no more

stirred up and awaked to search with diligence, and to force out the true causes; but sit downe satisfied with these frivo∣lous and credulous opinions: and then it instilles an infinite number of pleasing fictions, in the manner of dreams, and such as one would most wish to be true. And it is worth the paines to note, that in these sciences which hold so much of imagination (as are that adulterate Magique, whereof we now speak, Alchymie, Astronomie and the like) the meanes and Theorie are ever more monstrous, than the end and pre∣tences. The turning of Silver or Quick-silver or any other met∣tall into Gold, is a hard thing to believe: yet it is a thing farre more probable, to a man well skilled, and experimented in the natures of waight; yellow Colour, malleable and exten∣sible; as also fixt and volatile: and likewise to one who hath exactly searcht into the first seeds and menstruous Purgings of Mineralls; that Gold by an industrious and curious wit, may, at last, be produced; than that a few graines of Elixir, or of the powder of Production, should be of force, in a few Minutes, to turne Metalls into Gold, by the activity of the same Elixir; which is able to perfect nature, and to deliver it from all impediments. So the retarding of Age, or the re∣storeing of some degree of youth, doth not easily purchase a beliefe: yet it is farre more likely to a man that knowes per∣fectly the nature of Arefaction, and the depredations of the spirits, upon the solide parts of the body; and hath through∣ly observed the nature of Assimilation, and of Alimentation; either more perfect or more peccant; also the nature of the spirits and of the Flame (as it were) of the body, assigned sometimes to consume, sometimes to repaire; may by diets, Bathings, Anointings, proper Medicines, and accommo∣date motions, and the like, prolong life, or renew some de∣grees of youth, or vivacity: then that this should be effected, by a few drops or scruples of some precious Liquor or Quin∣tescence. Againe that Fates may be drawne from the starres, men will not sodainly, and easily assent unto; but these, that the houre of Nativity (which oftentimes through many na∣turall accidents, is either accelerated or differed) should go∣verne

the fortune of the whole life; or that the houre of Question is co-fatall with the thing it selfe which is sought, you will say are meere impostures. But such a rash impo∣tency and intemperance, doth possesse and infatuate the whole race of man; that they doe not only presume upon, and promise to themselves what is repugnant in nature to be performed; but also, are confident that they are able to con∣quer even at their pleasure, and that by way of recreation, the most difficult passages of nature, without trouble or tra∣vaile. And of Magique thus much; the name whereof we have vindicated from reproach, and separated the true and noble kind from the base and counterfeit.

II. Of this operative part of Nature there are two Appendi∣ces, both of much importance. The first is,✿ 1.56 that there be made an Jnventary of the estate of Man; in which there should be taken and compendiously cast up, the summe of all the wealth and fortunes of men (whether they arise from the fruits and revenewes of nature, or of Art) which are now ex∣tant, and whereof men are already possest; adding such in∣ventions, as is manifest have bin in times past celebrated, but are now perisht. To this end and purpose, that he who addresseth himselfe to the search of new Inventions, may not be arrested in his inquest; nor wast time and study in those things which are already invented, and are now ex∣tant. And this Inventary will be more artificiall, and more serviceable, if you adde those things which in populare con∣ceit are reputed impossible; and together with them couple such inventions, as are neerest in degree to impossibles, and yet are extant; that the one may set an edge on mans en∣quiry; the other may in a sort direct it: and that from these Optatives, and Potentialls, mans Actives may be more readily conducted.

§ The second is,✿ 1.57 that there be made a Calendare of those expe∣riments, which are Polychrests things of a multifarious use, & most universall consequence; & which conduce and direct to the Invention of other experiments. For example; the artifi∣ciall experiment of conglaciation of water by Jce with black salt,

pertaines to infinite purposes and essaies; for this discloseth the secret and abstruse manner of condensation, than which nothing is more commodious for man. As for Fire, that is a ready and known Agent for Rarefaction; but the mystery of Condensation, is not yet fully discovered: and it makes much for the abridgement of invention, if Polychrests of this nature were collected into a particular Catalogue.

CAP. VI. Of the Great Appendix of Naturall Philosophy, Speculative, as O∣perative; Mathematique knowledge, and that it ought rather to be Placed amongst Appendices, than amongst substantiall Sciences. § The Partition of Mathematiques into Pure and Mixt.

* 1.58ARistotle saith well, Physique and Mathematique, in∣gender Practicall or Mechanicall knowledge: Where∣fore now we have handled, both the speculative and operative part of the knowledge of Nature; order requires that we speak of Mathematique, which is an auxiliary sci∣ence to them both. For in the received Philosophy, Mathe∣matique is annext, as a third part to Physique and Metaphysique; but it seems to us, who have undertaken to reexamine, and Till over againe these things, (if we had designed this as a substantive and principall science) more agreeable both in respect of the nature of the thing, and the light of order, to place it as a branch of Metaphysique. For Quantity, which is the subject of Mathematique Science, applied to Matter, is the Dose, as it were, of Nature, and productive of a number of effects in things Naturall; and therefore is to be reckoned in the number of essentiall Formes.* 1.59 For the Power of Figure, and Number, seemed to be of such force amongst the Ancient Philosophers, that Democritus placed the seeds of the varie∣ty of things,* 1.60 principally, in the Figures of Atomes; and Pytha∣goras asserted, the Natures of things, to be constituted of

Numbers. In the meane, this is true, that of Naturall Formes, (as we understand Formes) Quantity is of all most abstra∣cted and separable from Matter: which was the reason why it hath bin more painefully laboured, and more exact∣ly inquired by men, then any other Forme whatsoever, which are all more immersed in Matter. For being it is the nature of Man (certainly to the great prejudice of know∣ledge) to delight in the open Fields of Generalls; rather than in the Woods and Jnclosures of Particulars; there was nothing found more acceptable and delightfull, than the Mathema∣tiques; wherein that appetite of expatiating and meditateing might be satisfied. And though all this be true, yet to us, who provide not only for truth and order, but likewise for the use and profit of men; it seemed at last better, to designe Mathematiques; being they are of such efficacy, both in Phy∣siques and in Metaphysiques, and in Mechaniques, and in Ma∣gique; as the Appendices and auxiliary forces of them all: which in a sort we are compelled to doe, for the wanton∣nesse and arrogancy of Mathematicians, who could be con∣tent that this science, might even command and over-rule Physique. For it is come to passe, by what fate I know not, that Mathematique and Logique, which should carry them∣selves as hand-maides to Physique; boasting their certainty above it, take upon them a command and Dominion. But we doe not so much stand upon the ranke, & dignity of this science; let us consider the thing it selfe.

§ Mathematiques are either Pure, or Mixt. to Pure Mathe∣matiques, those sciences are referred, which handle Quanti∣ty altogether abstracted from Matter, and Physicall Axioms. They are two, Geometry, and Arithmetique; the one handling Quantity continued; the other dissevered. Which two Arts have indeed bin inquired into, with subtiltie and industry; but neither to the labours of Euclide in Geometry, hath there bin any thing of any worth added by Posterity, in so many centuries of years since he florisht; nor hath the Doctrine of Solides, for the use and excellency of the knowledge, bin la∣boured

and advanced by writers Ancient or Moderne. And in Arithmetique there hath not bin found out apt and suffi∣cient variety of compendious waies for supputations, especi∣ally about Progressions; whereof there is great use in the Physiques. Nor is the Algebra, or Art of Equation well perfe∣cted; but that Pythagoricall and Mysticall Arithmetique, which is begunne to be revived out of Proclus, and some Remaines of Euclide, is a spacious field of speculation: For such is the nature of Man, that if it be not able to comprehend solids, it wasts it selfe in unprofitable niceties.

§ Mixt Mathematique, hath for subject Axioms, and Portions of Physique; and considers Quantity, as it is auxiliary to enlighten, demonstrate, and actuate them. For many Parts of Nature can never be with sufficient subtlety com∣prehended, nor demonstrated with sufficient perspicuity; nor accommodated to use with sufficient dexterity and cer∣tainty, without the Aide, and intervening of the Mathema∣tiques. Of which sort are Perspective, Musique, Astronomie, Cosmographie, Architecture, Jngenarie, and divers others. But in Mixt Mathematiques, J can now report no entire por∣tions Deficient; I rather make this prediction, that there will be more kindes of them invented by Posterity, if men be not wanting to themselves. For as Physicall knowledge daily growes up, and new Actioms of nature are disclosed; there will be a necessity of new Mathematique inventions; and so at last more Mixt Mathematiques will be contrived. And now we have passed through the knowledge of Nature, and have noted the Deficients therein. Wherein if we have departed from the Ancient and received opinions, and thereby have moved contradiction; for our part, as we affect not to dissent, so we purpose not to contend. If it be truth,

* 1.61Non Canimus surdis, respondent omnia sylvae;

The voice of nature will crie it up, though the voice of man should crie it downe. And as Alexander Borgia was wont to say,* 1.62 of the Expedition of the French for Naples, that they came with chaulke in their hands to marke up their Lodgings, and

not with weapons to fight; so we like better, that entry of truth, which comes peaceably, where the Mindes of men, capable to lodge so great a guest, are signed, as it were, with chalke; than that which comes with Pugnacity, and forceth it selfe away by contentions and controversies. Wherefore having finisht two parts of Philosophy, concerning God, and concerning Na∣ture; the third remaines concerning Man.

Notes

• * 1.1

  ✿
• * 1.2

  Euclid. El. lib. 1.
• * 1.3

  Eclid. El. Arist.
• * 1.4

  Arist. de Part. Ani∣mal 1.
• * 1.5

  Polit. 1.
• * 1.6

  Eccles 3.
• * 1.7

  Disc. sopra la. 1. Dec. di liu. lib. 3.
• * 1.8

  Avicenna Hippoc. E∣pid.
• * 1.9

  Arist. ali∣cubi.
• * 1.10

  Arist. Me∣teor. 1. Problem §. 11.
• * 1.11

  V. Boet. de Musica. &c.
• * 1.12

  Virg. Aen. 7
• * 1.13

  Alhaz. Opt. 4. Vitello Passim.
• * 1.14

  ✿
• * 1.15

  Virg. Aen. 6
• * 1.16

  Psal. 8. Gen. 1.
• * 1.17

  Homer Iliad. 9.
• * 1.18

  Coloss. 2.
• * 1.19

  2. Cor. 2.
• * 1.20

  Laert. Senec.
• * 1.21

  Paracel. de Philos. sagaci.
• * 1.22

  Ioan. 5.
• * 1.23

  Lucan l. 10.
• * 1.24

  Annal. 1.
• * 1.25

  Virg. Aen. 8.
• * 1.26

  Raptus 1. mo∣bilis. So liditas caeli. Motus rē∣mitentiae. Poli adversi. Epy∣cli. Excent. Motus Terrae diurn: &c.
• * 1.27

  Hypothises i∣maginariae.
• * 1.28

  vide digress.
• * 1.29

  ✿
• * 1.30

  ✿
• * 1.31

  Interpret. additamt.
• * 1.32

  C. Agrip. de Occult. Ph. 1.
• * 1.33

  N. L.
• * 1.34

  Aristot. Probl.
• * 1.35

  ✿
• * 1.36

  Aristot.
• * 1.37

  Phys. 1.
• * 1.38

  De Anti∣quis Philo∣sophiis.
• * 1.39

  Tacit.
• * 1.40

  Sueton.
• ✿ 1.41

  FORMAE RERVM.
• * 1.42

  In Timeo alibi.
• * 1.43

  Gen. 2.
• * 1.44

  Gen. 1.
• * 1.45

  Hipp. Aphor.
• * 1.46

  Eccles. 3.
• * 1.47

  Virg. Geor. 1.
• * 1.48

  Apoc. 4.
• * 1.49

  In Parm.
• * 1.50

  Plat. in Phaed. Cic. de Fin. 2. Tusc. 4.
• * 1.51

  Prov. IV.
• * 1.52

  Aristot. Probl.
• * 1.53

  Virg. Bue.
• * 1.54

  De Coelo. lib. 1 & lib. de part. a∣nimal.
• * 1.55

  ✿
• ✿ 1.56

  INVEN∣TARIVM OPVM HVMA∣NARVM.
• ✿ 1.57

  CATALO∣GVS PO∣LYCHRE∣STORVM.
• * 1.58

  Metaph. I. & IX.
• * 1.59

  Laert. in Dem.
• * 1.60

  Iambl. de vita Pyth. l. 1.
• * 1.61

  Virg. Bu∣col.
• * 1.62

  Vid. Hist. Gal.