Of the advancement and proficience of learning; or, The partitions of sciences· Nine books. Written in Latin by the most eminent, illustrious, and famous Lord Francis Bacon Baron of Verulam, Vicount St. Alban, Councellor of Estate, and Lord Chancellor of England. Interpreted by Gilbert Watts.

FRANCIS LO: VERVLAM HIS GREAT INSTAƲRATION.

THE PREFACE. Of the STATE OF LEARNING, that it is not PROSPE∣ROUS, nor greatly ADVANCED; and that a farre different way, than hath bin known to former Ages, must be o∣pened, to mans understanding; and other Aides procured; that the Mind may practise her owne power upon the nature of things.

IT seemes to me, that men neither un∣derstand the Estate they possesse, nor their Abilities to purchase; but of the one to presume more; of the other, lesse, than indeed they should. So it comes to passe, that over-prizing the Arts received, they make no far∣ther Inquiry; or undervaluing themselues, more than in equity they ought, they expend their Abilities upon matters of slight consequence, never once making expe∣riment of those things which conduce to the summe of the businesse. Wherefore, Sciences also have, as it were, their Fatall Columnes; being men are not exci∣ted,

either out of Desire, or Hope, to penetrate farther. And seeing the Opinion of Wealth is one of the chief causes of want; and that out of a confidence of what we possesse in present, true assistances are despised for the future, it is expedient, nay altogether necessary, that the excessive Reverence and Admiration con∣ceived of those Sciences, which hetherto have bin found out, should in the Front and Entrance of this work, (and that roundly and undissemblingly) by some wholsome premonition, be taken off, lest their Copie and Vtility be too much Magnified and Celebrated. For he that survaies with diligence all the variety of Books, wherein Arts and Sciences triumph, shall every where finde infinite repetitions of the same matter; for manner of Delivery diverse, but for Invention stale and preoc∣cupate; so as what at first view seem'd numerous, after examination taken, are found much abated. § As for Profit J may confidently avouch it, that the wis∣dome we have extracted, chiefly from the Grecians, seems to be a Child-hood of Knowledge, and to partici∣pate that which is proper to children, namely, that it is apt for talk; but impotent and immature for propa∣gation: for it is of Controversies rank and fertile, but of works barren and fruitlesse. So that the Fable and fiction of Scylla, seemes to be a lively Image of the state of Learning, as now it is, which for the upper parts had the face and countenance of a comely Virgin; but was from the wombe downward circled, and enwrapt with barking Monsters, So the Sciences wherein we are trained up, contain in them certain Generalities

specious and plausible, but when you descend unto par∣ticulars, as to the Parts of Generation, expecting solid effects, and substantiall operations, then Contentions and Barking Altercations arise, wherein they close, and which supply the place of a fruitfull wombe. § Again, if these kinds of Sciences were not altogether a meere livelesse Thing, me thinkes it should not have falne out, which now for many Ages hath continued, that they should thus stand at a stay, in a manner im∣moveable in their first Footings, without any Aug∣mentation worthy the Race of Mankind, in such a dull Jmproficience, that not only Assertion remaines Asserti∣on, but Question rests still Question, which by Disputes is not determined, but fixt and cherisht: and all Tradi∣tion and Succession of Discipline delivered from hand to hand, presents and exhibits the Persons of Teacher and Schollar, not of Inventor or of one should adde something of note to what is invented. § But in Arts Mechanicall we see the contrary hath come to passe, which as if they were inspired by the vitall breath and prolifique influence of a thriving Aire, are daily Propagated and Perfected; and which in their first Autors appeared, for the most part rude and even bur∣thensome and Formelesse, have afterward acquir'd new-refind virtues and a certain apt Propriety and use∣full Accommodation, so infinitely fruitfull, that sooner may mens studies and desires languish, and change, than these Sciences arive at their full height and per∣fection. § Contrariwise Philosophy, and Scien∣ces Intellectuall, like Statues are ador'd and celebra∣ted,

but nothing Advanc't; nay commonly of most vi∣gor in their first Autor, and by Time Degenerate and become embased. For since the time men became de∣voted and, as Pedary Senators, resigned over to the Placits and Definitions of one, they doe not adde any Amplitude to Sciences, but are wholly taken up in a servile duty of Polishing or Protecting certain Au∣tors. § And let no man here alleage, that Sciences growing up by degrees, have at length arrived to a just period or perfect Stature, and so (as having filled up the just spaces of Augmentation) have setled and fixt themselves in the workes of some few Autors; and now that nothing more accomplisht can be found out, there remaines no more to doe, but that the Sciences already extant be improved, and adorned. Jndeed it could be wisht that the state of Learning were thus prospe∣rous; but the very truth is, these mancipations and ser∣vile resignations of Sciences, is nothing else but a pec∣cant humor, bred out of a dareing lust and confidence in some few, and a languishing sloth and Pusillanimity in the rest. For when Sciences (for some parts it may be) have bin tilled and laboured with diligence, then perchance hath there risen up some bold-undertaking wit, for Compendious brevity of Method populare, and plausible, who in shew hath constituted a Science, but indeed depraved the Labours of the Ancients: Yet these Abridgements finde acceptation with Posterity, for the expedite use of such a work, and to avoid the trouble and impatience of a new Inquiry. § And if any stand upon Consent now inveterate, as the Judge∣ment,

and test of Time, let him know he builds upon a very deceivable and infirme Foundation. Nor is it, for most part, so revealed unto us, what in Arts and Scien∣ces hath bin discovered and brought to light in diverse ages, and different Regions of the world; much lesse wbat hath bin experimented, and seriously laboured by particular Persons in priuate; For neither the Birthes, nor the Abortions of Time have bin Registred. § Nor is Consent it self, nor the long continuation thereof, with such reverence be adored, for however there may be many kindes of States in Civile Government; yet the State of Sciences is but one, which alwaies was, and so will continue, Populare; and with the People the Disciplines most in request are either Pugnacious and Polemicall; or Specious and Frivolous; name∣ly such as either illaqueate or allure the Assent. Where∣fore without question, the greatest wits in every age have bin over-borne, & in a sort tyrannized over, whilst men of Capacity and Comprehension about the vulgare, yet consulting their own Credit and Reputation, have sub∣mitted themselves to the over-swaying Judgement of Time and Multitude. Therefore if in any Time or Place, more profound Contemplations have perchance emerged and revealed themselves, they have bin forth∣with tost and extinguisht by the Windes and Tempests of Populare opinions: so that Time like a River car∣ries down to us that which is light and blowen up; but sinks and drownes that which is waighty and so∣lid. § Nay the very same Autors, who bave usurpt a kind of Dictature in Sciences, and with such confi∣dence

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past censure upon matters in doubt, have yet (the heat once over) in the lucide Intervalles, from these peremptory fits of Asseveration, changed their note and betaken themselves to complaints, upon the subtlety of Nature; the secret Recesses of Truth; the Obscu∣rity of Things; the Implication of Causes; the In∣firmity of Mans Discerning Power: Yet nothing the more modest for all this, seeing they chuse rather to charge the Fault upon the common condition of Man and Nature, than to acknowledge any Personall deficience in themselves. Yea it is a thing usuall with them, that what they cannot compasse by Art, their way applied, to conclude the same impossible to be attained by the same Art: and yet for all this, Art must not be condemned, being she is to examine and judge; wherefore the aime and intention of such accusations is only this, That Ig∣norance may be delivered frō Ignominy. § So like∣wise what is already commended unto us and intertained hetherto, is for most part such a kind of Knowledge, as is full of Words and Questions, but barren of Works and reall Improvement; for Augmentation backward and heartlesse; pretending perfection in the whole, but ill-filled up in the Parts; for choice Populare, and of the Autors themselves suspected, and therefore fortified and countenanced by artificious evasions. § And the Persons who have entertained a designe to make triall themselves and to give some Advancement to Scien∣ces, and to Propagate their bounds, even these Au∣tors durst not make an open departure from the Com∣mon received opinions; nor visite the Head-springs of

Nature, but take themselves to have done a great mat∣ter, and to have gained much upon the Age, if they may but interlace, or annex any thing of their own; provi∣dently considering with themselves, that by these middle courses, they may both conserve the modesty of As∣senting; and the liberty of Adding. But whilest they thus cautelously conforme themselves to Opinions and Customes, these Plausible moderations, redound to the great prejudice and detriment of Learning; For at once to Admire and goe beyond Autors, are habits seldome compatible: but it comes to passe here after the manner of Waters, which will not ascend high∣er than the levell of the first spring-head, from whence they descended; wherefore such writers a∣mend many things, but promote litle or nothing, mak∣ing a Proficience in Melioration, not in Augmentati∣on. § Neither hath there bin wanting undertak∣ing Spirits, who with a more resolute confidence, pre∣suming nothing yet done, take themselves to be the men, must rectify All; and imploying the strength of their wits in crying down, and reversing all former judgements, have made passage to themselves and their own Placits; whose busy Clamor, hath not much advan∣ced Knowledge, since their aime and intention hath bin, not to enlarge the bounds of Philosophy and Arts, by a sincere and solid Enquiry; but only to change the Placits, and translate the Empire of Opini∣ons, and settle it upon themselves, with litle advantage to Learning, seeing amongst opposite Errors, the Causes of Erring are commonly the same. § And

if any inconcerned natures, not mancipate to others, or their own opinions, but affecting liberty, have bin so farre animated, as to desire that others together with themselves, would make farther Inquiry; these surely have meant well, but performed litle; for they seem to have proceeded upon probable grounds only, being wheeled about in a vertiginous maze of Arguments, and by a promiscuous licence of Inqury, have indeed loosened the sinewes of severe Inquisition: nor hath any of all these with a just patience, and sufficient expectance attended the Operations of nature, and the successes of Experience. § Some again have embarqu't themselves in the Sea of Experiments, and become al∣most Mechanicall, but in the Experience it selfe, they have practised a roveing manner of Inquiry, which they doe not in a regular course constantly pursue. § Nay many propound to themselves, certain petty Taskes, taking themselves to have accomplisht a great performance, if they can but extract some one Jnvention by a manage as poore as impertitent; for none rightly and successefully search the nature of any thing to the life in the Thing itselfe; but after a painfull and dili∣gent variation of Experiments, not breaking off there, proceeds on, finding still emergent matter of farther Discovery. § And it is an Error of speciall note, that the industry bestowed in Experiments, hath pre∣sently, upon the first accesse into the Businesse, by a too forward and unseasonable Desire, seised upon some design'd operation; I mean sought after, Fructifera non Lucifera, Experiments of use and not Expe∣riments

of Light and Discovery: not imitating the divine method which created the first day Light only, and allowed it one entire Day, produceing no Materi∣ate work the same day, but descended to their Creation the daies following. § As for those who have given the preeminence unto Logique, and are of opinion that the surest Guards for Sciences must be procur'd from thence; they have truly and wisely discerned, that the mind of man, and Intellective Faculty left unto it self, may deservedly be suspected. But the remedy is too weak for the disease, and is it self not exempt from Distemperature; for the Logique in force, though it may be rightly accommodated unto matters Civile and Populare Sciences, which consist in Discourse and Opinion, yet it comes farre short of penetrating the subtlety of Nature; and undertaking more than it can master, seemes rather to stablish and fixe Errors than to open a way to Truth. § Wherefore to recollect what hath bin said, it seemes that neither In∣formation from others, nor mens own Inquiries touching Sciences, hath hetherto successefully shined forth, especially seeing there is so litle certainty in De∣monstration and Infallibility of Experiments thus farre discovered. And the Fabrique of the Ʋniverse to the contemplative eye of the Mind, for the frame thereof is like some Labyrinth or intricate Maze, where so many doubtfull passages; such deceivable re∣semblances, of Things and Signes; such oblique and serpentine windings and implicite knots of Nature every where present themselves, as confounds the un∣derstanding.

And withall, we must continually make our way, through the woods of Experiences, and parti∣cular Natures, by the incertain Light of Sense, some∣times shining sometimes shadowed: yea and the guides, which (as hath bin toucht) offer their assistance, they likewise are entangled, and help to make up the number of Errors and of those that Erre. In matters of such perplext difficulty, there is no relying upon the Iudge∣ment of men from their own abilities; or upon the Ca∣suall Felicity of Particular events; for neither the ca∣pacity of Man, how excellent soever; nor the chance of Experience, never so often iterated and essayed, is of force to conquer these mysteries: we must march by line and levell, and all the way, even from the first percepti∣on of Senses, must be secured, and fortified by a certain Rule, and constant Method of proceeding. § Yet are not these things so to be understood, as if, in so many Ages, and so much Industry, nothing at all hath bin performed to purpose; nor is there any cause why it should repent us of the Discoveries already made; for certainly the Ancients, in those speculations which con∣sist in strength of wit, and abstract meditation, have ap∣proved themselves men of admirable comprehensions: But as in the Art of Navigation, the men of former Ages, directing their course by obseruation of starres only, could edge along the coast of the known Continent, and it may be, crosse some narrow Seas or the Mediter∣ranean; but before the Ocean could be thus commanded, and the Regions of the new world discovered, it was requisite that the use of the Mariners needle, as a more

sure and certain guide should be first found out; even so what discoveries soever have bin hetherto made in Arts and Sciences, they are of that quality, as might have bin brought to light by Practice, Meditation, Obser∣vation and Discourse, as things neerer the senses, and for most part, under the command of common Noti∣ons; but before we can make our approaches, to the re∣mote and hidden secrets of Nature, it is necessarily re∣quisite, that a better and more perfect use, and pra∣ctique-operation of the Mind and understanding Faculty be introduc't. § As for us, surely we, (vanquisht with an immortall love of Truth) have expos'd our selves to doubtfull, difficult, and desert Pathes; and by the protection and assistance of the Di∣vine power, have borne up and encouraged our selves, against the violent Assaults and prepared Armies, as it were, of Opinions, and against our own private and in∣ward hesitations and scruples, and against the cloudes and darknesse of Nature, and euery where flying fan∣cies; that so we might procure the present and future Age more safe and sound Jndications and Impressions of Truth. If in this high and arduous attempt, we have made any Proficience, surely by no other means have we cleered our selves a way, than by a sincere and just humiliation of the spirit of Man, to the lawes and operations of Nature. For all they that went before us, who applied themselves to the finding out of Arts, casting a transient eye upon Things, examples, and experience, have presently (as if Jnvention were nothing else but a meere Agitation of Braine) invoked

in a manner their own spirits, to divine and utter Ora∣cles unto them: but we being chastly and perpetually con∣versant with the operations of Nature, divorce not the Jntellect from the Object farther than that the Images and beams of things (as in sense) may meet and con∣centrate; by which manner of proceeding, there is not much left to the strength and excellency of wit. The same submission of spirit we have practised in discovery, we have followed in Delivery: Nor have we endea∣vour'd to set off ourselves with Glory, or draw a Maje∣sty upon our inventions, either by Triumphs of Confu∣tations; or Depositions of Antiquity; or an usurpation of Authority; or the vaile of Obscurity; which are Arts he may easily find out, whose study is not so much the Profit of others, as Applause to himselfe. I say we nei∣ther have practised, nor goe we about, by force or fraud to circumvent mens Judgements, but conduct them to the things themselves, and to the league and confedera∣cy of Things, that they may see what they have, what they reprehend, what they adde and contribute to the Publique. And if we have bin too credulous, or too dormant, and not so intentive upon the matter, or lan∣guisht in the way, or broken off the thread of the Inqui∣ry, yet notwithstanding we present things after such a manner open and naked, that our Errors may be dete∣cted and separated before they can spread themselves, or insinuate their Contagion into the masse of Sciences; and after such a Method as the continuation of our la∣bours, is a matter facile and expedite. By this means we presume we have establisht for ever, a true and le∣gitimate

Marriage, between the Empiricall and Ra∣tionall faculty; whose fastidious and unfortunate Di∣vorce and Separation, hath troubled and disordered the whole Race and Generation of Man-kind. § And seeing these performances are not within the compasse of our meere naturall Power and command, we doe heere, in the Accesse to this work, Powre forth hum∣blest and most ardent supplications to God the Fa∣ther, God the Word, God the Spirit, that they being mindfulll of the Miseries of Mankind, and of the Pilgrimage of this life, wherein we weare out few & evill daies, they would vouchsafe to endow man∣kind, by my hand with new Donatives. And more∣over, we humbly pray, that Humane knowledges, may no way impeach, or prejudice Divine Truths; nor that from the disclosing of the waies of sense, and the letting in of a more plentifull Naturall Light, any mists of Incredulity or clouds of Dark∣nesse arise in our minds, touching Divine Mysteries; but rather that from a purified Intellect, purged from Fancies and Vanity, and yet yeelded and absolutely rendred up to Divine oracles; the tributes of Faith may be rendred to Faith. In the last place, that the venome of knowledge infused by the Serpent, whereby the mind of man is swelled and blown up, being voided; we may not be too aspireingly wise, or above sobriety, but that we may improve and propa∣gate Verity in Charity. § Now we have perfor∣med our vowes to heaven, converting our selves to men, we admonish them somethings that are Profitable, and

request of them some things that are equall. First we admonish (which thing we have also prayed for,) that we keep human Reason within due Limits in matters Divine, and Sense within compasse: For sense like the Sunne,* 1.1 opens and reveales the face of the Terrestriall Globe, but shuts up and conceales the face of the Celestiall. Again, that men beware that in flight from this error, they fall not upon a contrary extreme, of too much abasing Naturall Power; which certainly will come to passe, if they once entertain a conceit, that there are some secrets of nature seperate and exempt, as it were by iniunction, from Humane Inquisition. For it was not that pure and immaculate Naturall knowledge, by the light whereof Adam gave names unto the Creatures, according to the propriety of their natures, which gave the first motion and oc∣casion to the Fall; but it was that proud and Impera∣tive Appetite of Morall knowledge, defineing the lawes and limits of Good and Evill, with an intent in man to revolt from God, and to give lawes unto himselfe, which was indeed the proiect of the Primi∣tive Temptation. For, of the knowledges which con∣template the works of Nature, the holy Philosopher hath said expressely;* 1.2 that the glory of God is to con∣ceale a thing, but the glory of the King is to find it out: as if the Divine Nature, according to the inno∣cent and sweet play of children, which hide themselves to the end they may be found, took delight to hide his works, to the end they might be found out; and of his in∣dulgence and goodnesse to man-kind, had chosen the

Soule of man to be his Play-fellow in this game. § In summe, I would advise all in generall, that they would take into serious consideration the true and Genuine ends of knowledge; that they seek it not either for Plea∣sure; or Contention; or contempt of others; or for Profit; or Fame; or for Honor, and Promotion; or such like adulterate or inferior ends: but for the merit and emo∣lument of Life; and that they regulate and perfect the same in charity: For the desire of Power, was the Fall of Angels, the desire of knowledge, the fall of Man; but in charity there is no excesse, neither men nor Angels ever incurred danger by it. § The Requests we make are these; (To say nothing of our selves touching the matter in hand) we Request thus much, That men would not think of it as an opinion; but as a work, and take it for Truth, that our aime, and end is not to lay the foundation of a Sect or Pla∣cit, but of Humane Profit and Proficience. § A∣gain, that respecting their own Benefit, and putting off Partialities and Prejudices, they would all contribute in one for the publique Good: and that being freed and fortified by our Preparations and Aids, against the Er∣rors and Impediments of the waies, they likewise may come in, and bear a part in the burden, and inherit a portion of the Labours that yet remaine behind. § Moreover that they cheere up themselves, and con∣ceive well of the enterprise; and not figure unto them∣selves a conceit and fancy, that this Our Instauration is a matter infinite, and beyond the power and com∣passe of Mortality; seeing it is in truth the right and

legitimate end and period of Infinite Errors and not un∣mindfull of Mortality, and Humane Condition, being it doth not promise that the Designe may be accom∣plisht within the Revolution of an Age only, but deli∣vers it over to Posterity to Perfect. Jn a word, it seeks not Sciences arrogantly in the cells of mans wit, but submissively in the greater world: And commonly, Empty things are vast and boundlesse, but Solids are contracted and determined within a narrow compasse. § To conclude, we thought good to make it our last suit, (lest peradventure through the difficulty of the Attempt, any should be∣come unequall Iudges of our Labours) that men see to it, how they doe, from that which we must of necessity lay down as a ground (if we will be true to our own ends) assume a liberty to censure, and passe sentence up∣on our labours; seeing we reject all this premature and Anticipated humane Reason, rashly and too sudden∣ly departed from Things, (as touching the Inquisiti∣on of Nature) as a thing various, disordered and ill-built: Neither in equity can it be required of us, to stand to the Iudgement of that Reason, which stands it selfe, at the barre of Iudicature.

THE DISTRIBVTION OF THE WORK INTO SIX PARTS.

• P. I. PARTITIONES SCIENTIARVM, OR a sum∣mary Survay and partition of Sciences.
• P. II. NOVVM ORGANVM, OR True Directi∣ons for the Interpretation of Nature.
• P. III. PHAENOMENA VNIVERSI, OR History Naturall and Experimentall, for the building up Philosophy.
• P. IV. SCALA INTELLECTVS, OR the Intelle∣ctuall Sphere rectified to the Globe of the World.
• P. V. PRODROMI, OR The Anticipations of se∣cond Philosophy emergent upon Practice.
• P. VI. SECVNDA PHILOSOPHIA, OR Active Philosophy, from intimate Converse with Nature.

THE ARGUMENT OF THE SEƲERALL PARTS.

IT is one point of the Designe we have in hand, that every thing be delivered with all possible Plainesse and Perspicuity: for the nakednesse of the Mind, as once of the Body, is

the companion of Innocence and Simplicity. First therefore, the order and Distribution of the work, with the reason thereof, must be made manifest. The Parts of the work are, by us, assigned Six.

[P. I] ¶The First Part exhibits the summe or univer∣sall description of that Learning and Knowledges in the possession whereof, men have hetherto bin estated. For we thought good to make some stay even upon Sciences received, and that, for this considerati∣on; that we might give more advantage to the Parfecti∣on of ancient knowledges, and to the introduction of new: For we are carried, in some degree, with an e∣quall temper of Desire, both to improve the labours of the Ancients, and to make farther progresse. And this makes for the faith and sincerity of our meaning, according to that of the wise,* 1.3 The unlearned Man re∣ceives not the words of knowledge, unlesse you first interpret unto him the conceptions of his heart: Wherefore we will not neglect to side along (as it were in passage) the Coasts of accepted Sciences and Arts; and to import thether, somethings usefull and profitable. § Neverthelesse we adjoyne such Partitions of Sci∣ences, as comprehend, not only such things that are found out and observed already, but such also as are thereto pertaining & have bin hetherto preter∣miss'd. For there are found in the Intellectuall Globe, as in the Terrestriall, soyles improved and Deserts. Wherefore let it not seem strange, if now and then we make a departure from the usuall Divisions, and for∣sake the beaten path of some Partitions: for Addition

whilest it varies the whole, of necessity varies the parts and the Sections thereof: and the accepted Di∣visions, are accommodated only to the accepted summe of Sciences, as it is now cast up. § Concerning those Parts, which we shall note as Pretermitted, we will so regulate our selves, as to set down more than the naked Titles, or brief Arguments of DEFICIENTS. For where we deliver up any thing as a DESIDERATE, so it be a matter of merit; and the reason thereof may seem some∣what obscure; so as, upon good consideration, we may doubt, that we shall not be so easily conceived what we intend, or what the contemplation is we comprehend in our mind, and in our meditation; there it shall ever be our precise care, to annex either precepts, for the per∣forming of such a work; or a Part of the Work it self, performed by us already, for Example to the whole; that so we may in every Particular, either by Operati∣on or Information, promote the businesse. For in my judgement, it is a matter which concernes not only the Benefit of others; but our own Reputation also; that no man imagine that we have projected in our minds some slight superficiall notion of these Designes; and that they are of the nature of those things, which we could Desire, and which we accept only as good wishes. For they are such as without question, are within the power and possibility of men to compasse, unlesse they be want∣ing to themselves; and hereof, we for our parts, have certain and evident demonstration; for we come not hether, as Augures, to measure Countries in our mind, for Divination; but as Captaines, to invade

them, for a conquest. And this is the First part of our works.

[P. II] ¶Thus having passed over Ancient Sciences, in the next place, we enable human Jntellect to saile through. Wherefore to the Second Part is designed the Do∣ctrine touching a more sound, and perfect use of Reason, in the inquiry of Things, and the true assi∣stances of the understanding; that hereby (so farre as the condition of humanity and mortality will suffer) the Jntellect, may be elevated; and amplified with a fa∣culty, capable to conquer the dark, and deeper secrets of Nature. And the Art, we here set downe, which we are wont to call, The INTERPRETATION OF NATVRE, is a kind of Logique, though very much, and exceed∣ing different. That vulgare Logique professes the Preparation and Contrivance of aides and forces for the understanding, herein they conspire, but it cleerely differs from the Populare, specially in three things, namely, in the end, in the order of Demonstrating, and, in the first disclosures to Inquiry. § For the End propounded in this our Science is, that there may be found out not Arguments, but Arts; not things Con∣sentaneous to Principles, but even Principles them∣selves; not probable reasons, but designations and indi∣cations of works; wherefore from a different intention followes a different effect: for there, an Adversary is di∣stressed and vanquisht by Disputation, here by nature, the thing done. § And with this End accords the nature and order of their Demonstrations: For in vulgare Logique, almost all the paines is imployed a∣bout

Syllogisme: as for Induction, the Dialectiques seem scarce ever to have taken it into any serious consi∣deration, slightly passing it over, and hastning to the formes of Disputeing But we reject Demonstration by Syllogisme, for that it proceeds confusedly; and lets nature escape our hands. For though no man call into doubt, but that what are coincident in a midle terme, are in themselves coincident, (which is a kind of Mathematique Certitude) yet here lies the Fallax, that Syllogisme consists of Propositions, Proposi∣tions of words, and words are the tokens and marks of things. Now if these same notions of the the mind, (which are as it were, the soule of words, and the Ba∣sis of this manner of structure, and fabrique) be rudely and rashly divorc'd from things, and roveing; not per∣fectly defin'd and limited, and also many other waies vi∣tious; all falls to ruine. Wherefore we reject Syllo∣gisme, not only in regard of Principles (for which nor doe they make use of it) but in respect also of Midle Propositions, which indeed Syllogisme, however, in∣ferres and brings forth; but barren of operations and remote from practise; and in relation to the Active Part of Sciences, altogether incompetent. Although there∣fore we may leave to Syllogisme, and such celebrated and applauded Demonstrations, a jurisdiction over Arts Populare and Opinable (for in this kind we move nothing) yet for the nature of Things, we every where as well in Minor, as Maior Propositions, make use of Inductions: for we take Induction to be that Forme of Demonstration, which supports sense; presses nature

and is instanced in works, and in a sort mingled there∣with. Wherefore the order also of Demonstration is altogether inverted. For hetherto the businesse used to be thus managed; from sense, and some few Particu∣lars, suddenly to fly up to the highest Generalls, as to fixt Poles, about which Disputations may be turned; from which the rest of intermediate Axioms may be de∣rived. A way compendious indeed, but precipitate; and to nature impervious; but for Disputations ready, and accommodate. But according to our method, Axioms are raised by a sequent continuity & graduat dependancy, so as there is no seising upon the highest Ge∣neralls, but in the last place; and those highest Generals in quality not notionals; but well terminated, and such as nature acknowledges to be truly neere allied unto her; and which cleave to the individuall intrinsiques of things. § But touching the forme it selfe of In∣duction and Iudgement made by it, we undertake a mighty work. For the Forme, whereof Logicians speak, which proceeds by simple enumeration, is a childish thing, and concludes upon admittance; is ex∣posed to perill from a contradictory instance; lookes only upon commune operations; and is in the issue endlesse. But to the knowledges of Induction, such a Forme is required, as may solve and separate experience; and by due exclusion and rejection necessarily conclude. And if that publique and populare Iudgement of Diale∣ctiques, be so laborious and hath exercised so many and so great wits; how much greater paines ought we take in this other; which not only out of the secret closets of the

mind, but out of the very entrailes of nature is extra∣cted? Nor is this all, for we more firmely settle, and so∣lidate the foundation of Sciences, and take the first rise of our inquiry deeper than hetherto hath bin attempted; submitting to examinations those Principles, which vulgare Logick takes up on the credit of another. For the Dialectiques borrow, as it were, from all other Sci∣ences, the Principles of Sciences; again adore the prime Notions of the mind; lastly rest satisfied with the im∣mediat informations of sense rightly disposited. But our judgement is this, that true Logique should visite every particular Province of Sciences, with greater com∣mand than their principles possesse; and that those same putative Principles be enforc'd to give an account, and be liable to examination, untill such time as their validi∣ty and tenure cleerely appeared. And as touching the Prime Notions of the intellect, there is nothing of those, (the understanding left at liberty to it selfe) hath con∣gested, but matter to be suspected; nor any way warrant∣able, unlesse it be summon'd, and submit it selfe to a new Court of Judicature; and that sentence passe according thereto. Moreover we many waies sift and sound the information of sense it selfe; for the Sences deceive, yet withall they indicate their Errors: but Errors are at hand, Indications to be sought for a farre off. § The guilt of Sense is of two sorts; either it destitutes us, or else it deceives us. For first, there are many things which escape the cognizance of sense, even when it is well disposed, and no way impedire: either by reason of the subtility of the entire body, or the minutnesse of the

parts thereof, or the distance of place, or the slownesse, and likewise swiftnesse of motion; or the familiar con∣verse with the object, or some other causes. Again, nor where sense truly apprehends its object, are her precepts so very firme: for the testimony and information of sense, is ever from the Analogy of Man, and not from the Analogy of the World; and it is an error of dangerous consequence to assert, that sence is the mea∣sure of things. Wherefore to encounter these inconve∣niences, we have with painfull and faithfull service e∣very where sought out, and collected assistances, that Supplements to Deficients; to Variations, Rectifi∣cations, may be ministred. Nor doe we undertake this so much by instruments, as by experiments; for the subtlety of Experiments, is farre greater than of sense it selfe, though assisted with exact instruments; we mean such experiments, which to the intention of the thing inquired, are skilfully according to Art in∣vented and accommodated. Wherefore we doe not at∣tribute much to the immediat and particular perception of sense; but we bring the matter to this issue, that sense may judge only of the experiment; the experiment of the thing. We conceive therefore, that of sense, (from which all knowledge in things naturall must be derived, unlesse we mean wilfully to goe a witlesse way to worke) we are become the religious Pontifes; and the not inex∣pert interpreters of her Oracles; so as others may seem in outward profession; but we in deed and action, to pro∣tect and honor sense. And of this kind are they which we prepare, for the light of Nature, the accension, and

immission thereof; which of themselves were sufficient, were human Intellect equall, and a smooth inanticipa∣ted Table. But when the minds of men are after such, strange waies besieged, that for to admit the true beams of things, a sincere and polisht Area is wanting; it con∣cernes us, of necessity to bethink our selves, of seeking out some remedy for this distemperature. The IDOLAES, wherewith the mind is preoccupate are ei∣ther Attracted, or Innate; Attracted have slid into mens minds, either by the Placits and Sects of Philo∣sophers; or by depraved lawes of Demonstrations. But the Innate inhere in the nature of the Intellect, which is found to be farre more liable to error, than sense. For however men may please themselves, and be ravish't into admiration, and almost adoration of the mind of man; this is most certain: as an inequall look∣ing-glasse, changes the raies of objects, according to its own figure, and cutting; even so the mind, when it suffers impression from things by sense, in encogitating and discharging her notions, doth not so faithfully insi∣nuate and incorporate her nature, with the nature of things. And those two first kinds of IDOLAES can ve∣ry hardly; but those latter, by no means be extirpate. It remains only that they be disclosed; and that same trea∣cherous faculty of the mind be noted and convinced; lest from the unsound complection of the mind, upon the ex∣termination of ancient, perchance new shootes of Er∣rors spring up in their place; and the businesse be brought only to this issue; that errors be not extinguisht, but changed: but that on the contrary, now at last, it be

for ever decreed and ratified, that the intellect cannot make a judgement but by Induction, and by a legitti∣mate forme thereof. Wherefore the Doctrine of pu∣rifying the understanding, that it may become recep∣tive of truth, is perfected by three Reprehensions: Reprehension of Philosophy; Reprehension of De∣monstrations; and Reprehension of Native hu∣mane Reason. These explicated, and then the case cleered, what the nature of things, what the nature of the mind is capable off; we presume (the Divine good∣nesse being President at the Rites) that we have pre∣pared and adorned, the Bride-chamber of the Mind and of the universe. Now may the vote of the Mar∣riage-song be, that from this coniunction, Human Aides, and a Race of Inventions may be procreated, as may in some part vanquish and subdue mans mi∣series and necessities. And this is the second Part of the Work.

[P. III] ¶But our purpose is not only to point out and munite the way; but to enterprise it: Wherefore the third Part of the work compriseth, PHaeNOME∣NA VNIVERSI, as to say, all kind of Experience, and Naturall History, of such kind as may be fundamentall for the building up of Naturall Philosophy. For nei∣ther can any exact way of Demonstration or Forme of interpreting Nature, both guard and support the mind from error and lapse; and withall present and mi∣nister matter for knowledge. But they who proposed to themselves not to proceed by Conjectures and Divina∣tions, but to find out, and to know, whose end and aime

is not to contrive Fictions and Fables, but to search with diligence into the nature of, and, as it were, anatomize, this true world; must derive all from the very things themselves. Nor can the substitution and compensation of wit, or meditation, or Argumentation suffice to this travaile, inquisition, and mundane perambulation; no not if all the wits in the world should meet together. Wherefore we must either take a right course, or desert the businesse for ever: and to this day the matter hath bin so managed, that it is no marvaile, if nature hath not disclosed hir selfe. For first, defective and fallaci∣ous information of sense; negligent, inequall, and as it were, casuall observation; vain Tradition and from idle report; Practise, intent on the work, and servile; experimentall attempt, ignorant, dull, wild, and bro∣ken; lastly slight and poore Naturall History, have to∣wards the raising of Philosophy, congested most depra∣ved matter for the understanding. After this, prepo∣sterous subtlety of arguing, and ventilation, hath essayed a late remedy to things plainly desperate; which doth not any way recover the businesse, or seperate errors. § Wherefore there is no hope of greater advance∣ment and progresse, but in the Restauration of Sci∣ences. And the commencements hereto must, by all means, be derived from Naturall History; and that too, of a new kind and provision: for to no purpose you polish the Glasse, if images be wanting: not only faithfull guards must be procured, but apt matter prepared. And this our History, as our Logick, differs from that in use, in many particulars: in the end or office, in the Masse

and Congeries, than in the subtilty, also in choice, and in constitution in reference to those things that follow. § For first we propound such a Natu∣rall History, as doth not so much either please for the variety of things, or profit for present improvement of Experiments, as it doth disperse a light to the invention of causes; and gives, as it were, the first milke to the nou∣rishing up of Philosophy. For though we principally pursue operation, and the Active part of Sciences; yet we attend the due season of Harvest; nor goe about to reap the green hearb or the blade. For we know well that Axioms rightly invented, draw after them the whole troupe of Operations; and not sparsedly but plen∣tifully exhibit works. But we utterly condemne and renounce, as Atalantaes Apple which retards the Race, that unseasonable and childish humor of accelerating erly pledges of new works. And this is the Duty of our Naturall History. § As for the Masse, we Com∣pile a History, not only of Nature at Liberty, and in Course; I mean, when without compulsion she glides gently along, and accomplishes her own work: (as is the History of the Heavens, Meteors, Earth and Sea; of Minerals, Plants, Animals:) but much rather of Na∣ture straightned and vext; when by the provocations of Art, and the ministry of Man, she is put out of her com∣mune road; distressed and wrought. Wherefore, all the experiments of Arts Mechanicall; all of the Operative part of Liberall; all of many Practicall, not yet conspi∣red into a peculiar Art (so farre as any discovery may be had, and so farre as is conducent to our intention) we

will set down at large. So likewise (not to dissemble the matter) nothing regarding mens pride and bra∣vades, we bestow more paines, and place more assu∣rance in this Part than in that other; being the nature of things, more discloses hirselfe in the vexation of Art; than when it is at its own liberty. § Nor doe we present the History of Substances only, but also we have taken it as a part of our diligence, to prepare a se∣perate history of their virtues; we mean, such as in nature may be accounted Cardinall, and wherein the Primordials of nature are expressely constituted; as matter invested with her Primitive qualities and ap∣petites; as dense, rare, hot, cold, consistent, fluid, ponderous, light, and others not a few. § For in∣deed, to speak of subtility, we search out with choice diligence, a kind of Experiments, farre more subtile and simple than those commonly met with. For we educe and extract many out of darknesse, which had ne∣ver come into any mans mind to investigate, save his who proceeds by a certain and constant path, to the in∣vention of causes: whereas in themselves they are of no great use; that it is cleerely evident, that they were not sought after, for themselves, but that they have directly the same reference to things and works, that the Letters of the Alphabet have to speech and words; which, though single by themselves, they are unprofitable, yet are they the Elements of all Language. § And in the choice of Reports and Experiments, we pre∣sume that we have given in better security, than they who hetherto have bin conversant in Naturall Phi∣losophy

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for we admit nothing but by oculate faith, at least evident proofe; and that after most severe enquiry: so as nothing is reported hightned to the abusive credit of a miracle; but what we relate are chast and immacu∣late from Fables and Vanity. So also all those recei∣ved and ventilated current fictions and lies, which by a strange neglect, have for many ages bin countenanced and are become inveterate; we doe by name proscribe, and precisely note, that they may be no longer prejudi∣ciall to Sciences.* 1.4 For what one wisely observes, that Fables, Superstitions, and idle Stories, which nurses instill into young-children, doe in good earnest de∣prave their minds: so the same reason moved us, to be so religious and carefull, lest at the entrance, where we handle and take the charge of the Infancy, as it were, of Philosophy, under naturall History; she should be initiated in any vanity. § But in every new and somewhat more subtile experiment, in our opinion, certain and tryed, we yet apertly adjoyne the manner of the experiment we have practised; that after it is made apparent what the successe of every particular was with us; men might see the error which might lurke and cleave thereto; and be awaked to proofes, if any such be, more exact and secure. § In briefe, we every where sparsedly insert monitions and scruples and conjectures; ejecting and interdicting, as it were, by a sacred adjura∣tion and exorcisme, all Phantasmes. § Lastly be∣ing it is a thing most liquid unto us, how exceedingly Experience and History disperse the beams of the sight of humane Intellect; and how hard a matter it is, speci∣ally

to minds tender and preoccupate, at first entrance, to become familiar with nature; we therefore many times adde our own observations, as certain first con∣versions and inclinations, and as it were, Aspects of History to Philosophy; to the end that they may be both pledges to men, that they shall not ever be detained in the waves of History; as also that when they are once arrived to the operation of the understanding, all may be in a more preparednesse. And by this kind of Na∣turall History, as here we describe, we suppose that there may be a secure and easy accesse unto Nature; and solid and prepared matter presented unto the Vnder∣standing.

¶ Now we have both fortified and environed [P. IV] the understanding with faithfull Auxiliaries and for∣ces; and by a strict Muster raised a compleat Army of Divine works, there seemes nothing remaining but that we set upon Philosophy it selfe. But in so diffi∣cile and dubious an enterprise, there are some particu∣lars, which seem necessarily to be interposed partly for instruction, partly for present use. § Of these the first is, that the examples of Inquisition and of In∣vention, be propounded according to our rule and me∣thod represented in particular subjects; chiefly making choice of such subjects, which amongst other things to be enquired, are the most noble, and in mutuall relati∣on, most Adverse; that there may not want an example in every kind. Nor doe we speak of those examples, which for illustration sake, are annexed to every parti∣cular precept and rule, (for we have sufficiently quit

our selves hereof in the Second Part of the Work,) but we mean directly the Types and Platformes which may present as it were, to the eye, the whole Procedure of the mind, and the continued Fabrick and order of Invention, in certain selected subjects; and they various and of remarke. For it came into our mind, that in Mathematiques, the frame standing, the Demonstra∣tion inferred is facile and perspicuous; on the contrary, without this accomodation and dependency, all seems involved, and more subtile than indeed they be. Wherefore to examples of this sort we assigne the Fourth Part of our work; which indeed is nothing else, but a particular, and explicite application of the Second Part.

[P. V] ¶But the fifth Part is added only for a time, and paid as interest untill the Principall be raised. For we are not so precipitantly bent upon the end, as too slightly to passe over what we casually meet with by the way. Wherefore the Fift Part of the Work, is com∣posed of such things as we have, or found out, or expe∣rimented, or superadded; nor yet doe we performe this, by the reasons and rules of Interpretation, but by the same application of the understanding, which others in enquiry and invention use to practise. For seeing from our perpetuall converse with nature, we hope grea∣ter matters from our meditations, than we can promise to our selves from the strength of our own wit; these ob∣servations may be as tents pitched in the way, into which the mind, in pursuit of more certain Collections, may turne in, and for a while repose hir selfe. Yet in

the mean, we promise not to engage our selves upon the credit of those Observations; because they are not found out, nor tried by the right forme of Interpretation. § And there is no cause why any should distast or in∣tertain a jealousie, at that suspension of Iudgement in knowledge, which asserts not absolutely, that nothing can be known; but that nothing, without a certain order and a certain method, can be known; and yet withall, layes downe for use and ease, cer∣tain degrees of certitude, untill the mind be fixt up∣on the explication of causes.* 1.5 For neither those very Schooles of Philosophers, who downe-right maintained Acatalepsie or Incomprehensibility, have bin inferi∣or to those,* 1.6 who usurp a liberty of pronouncing sen∣tence: but they provided not, assistances to the sense, and understanding, as we have done; but utterly took away all credit and authority, which is a farre different case and almost opposite.

¶Now the sixth Part of our Work, whereto [P. VI] the rest are subservient and ministrant, doth altoge∣ther disclose, and propound that Philosophy, which is educed, and constituted out of such a legitimate sincere and severe enquiry, as we have already taught and prepared. But to consummate and perfect this last Part, is a thing exalted above our strength, and be∣yound our hopes. We have given it, as we trust, not contemptible beginnings; the prosperous successe of man∣kind shall give it issue; and peradventure such, as men, in this present state of mind and imployments, cannot easily conceive and Comprehend. And the case con∣cernes

not contemplative felicity alone, but indeed mens affaires and fortunes, and all the power of works: For Man, Natures minister and interpreter, doeth, and un∣derstands so much, as he hath by Operation or Con∣templation observed of Natures Order; nor can know or doe any more: For neither can any forces unloose and break asunder the chain of Causes; nor is nature otherwise, than by obedience unto it, vanquisht. Wherefore these two main Jntentions, Human Scien∣ces, and Human Potencies, are indeed in the same point coincident: and the frustration of works, for most part, falls out from the ignorance of Causes. § But herein the summe and perfection of all consists, if a man, never taking off the eye of his mind from the things themselves, throughly imprint their images to the life. For God defend, that we should publish the ayery dreams of our own Fancy, for the reall Ideas of the World! But rather may he be so graciously propiti∣ous unto us, that we may write the Apocalyps, and true vision of the impressions and signets of the Creator, up∣on the Creature!

Wherefore thou, O Father, who hast conferred vi∣sible Light as the Primitiae on the Creature; and breathed into the face of Man Intellectuall Light, as the accomplishment of thy works; protect and con∣duct this Work, which issueing from thy Good∣nesse, returnes to thy Glory! Thou, after thou hadst survayed the works thy hands had wrought, saw that all was exceeding Good, and hast rested: but Man survaying the works his hands had

wrought, saw that all was vanity and vexation of Spirit, and found no Rest: Wherefore if we labour with diligence, and vigilance in Thy works; thou wilt make us Participants of thy Vision, and of thy Sabbath. We humbly supplicate, that we may be of this resolution, and inspired with this mind; and that thou wouldest be pleased to endow human Race, with new Donatives by our hands; and the hands of others, in whom thou shalt implant the same SPIRIT.

THE GENERALL ARGVMENT OF THE IX. BOOKS.

• LIB. I. Is Proemiall to the Instauration of Sciences. § Reports the DISCREDITS of LEARN∣ING. § The DIGNITY of LEARNING.
• LIB. II. Declares the ADVANCEMENT of LEARNING. § Instrumentall. § Essentiall, in the Partition of Sciences, into, HISTORY. § POESY. § PHILOS. § Partit. of HIST. § POESY.
• LIB. III. Partitions of PHILOSOPHY, into § SUMMARY. § SPECIALL, into DI∣VINE. § NATURALL. § HUMANE. § Par∣titions of NATURALL PHILOSOPHY.
• LIB. IV. Partitions of HUMANE PHILOSO∣PHY into § PHILOSOPHY of HUMANI∣TY. § CIVILE. § Partitions of the PHILOSO∣PHY of HUMANITY.
• LIB. V. Partitions of SCIENCES, from the Use and Objects of the MIND, into § LOGICK, § ETHICK. § Of LOGICK into INVENTION. § JUDGEMENT. § MEMORY. § TRADITION.

• LIB. VI. Partitions of TRADITION or ELO∣CUTION into the ORGAN of SPEECH. § METHOD of SPEECH. § ILLUSTRATI∣ON of SPEECH.
• LIB. VII. Partitions of ETHICK or MORALE KNOWLEDGE, into the Doctrine of the PLATFORME of GOOD. § Of the CULTVRE of the MIND.
• LIB. VIII. Partitions of CIVILE KNOW∣LEDGE, into the Doctrine of CONVERSATI∣ON. § Of NEGOTIATION. § Of GOVER∣MENT of STATES.
• LIB. IX. Partitions of THEOLOGY omitted, DE∣FICIENTS Three. § I. THE RIGHT USE OF HUMAN REASON in DIVINITY. § II. The DEGREES OF UNITY IN THE CITTY OF GOD. § III. The EMANATIONS OF SS. SCRIPTURE:

THE ARGVMENT OF THE CHAPTERS OF THE First Booke.

CHAP. I.

THE Consecration of this Work unto the most Learned of Princes K. IAMES. § Who in high, but just conceptions is here admired. § The Distribution into the Dignity and Proficiency of Learning. I. Discredits of Learning from the ob∣jections of Divines; That the aspiring unto Know∣ledge was the first Sinne. That Learning is infinite and full of anxiety. That Learning inclines the Mind to Heresy and Atheisme. II. The Solution. Originall Guilt was not in the Quantity, but in the Quality of Knowledge. § The Corrective hereof, Charity. III. Against Jnfinity, Anxiety, and Seduce∣ment of Knowledge, Three preservatives. § That it instruct us our Mortality- § That it give us con∣tent. § That it soare not too high. § And so Phi∣losophy leads the Mind by the Linkes of Second Causes unto the First.

CAP. II.

I. Discredits cast upon Learning from the objections of Politiques; That Learning softens Mens na∣tures and makes them unfit for Exercise of Armes. That Learning perverts mens minds for matter of Goverment. Other particular indispositions pre∣tended. II. The solution; Learning makes not men unapt for Armes. III. Learning inables men for Civile affaires. IV. Particular seduce∣ments imputed to Learning: As curious incer∣tainty. § Pertinacious Regularity. § Mis∣leading Book-Presidents. § Retired slothful∣nesse. § Relaxation of Discipline; are rather cu∣red than caused by Learning.

CAP. III.

I. Discredits of Learning from Learned mens For∣tunes; Manners; Nature of studies. II. Dero∣gations derived from Fortune are these; Scarcity of Means. § Privatenesse of life. § Mean∣nesse of imployment. III. From their Man∣ners these; too Regular for the times. § Too sen∣sible of the good of others; and too neglective of their own. § A defailance in applying themselves to Persons of Quality. § A Failing in some lesser Ceremonies of demeanure. § Grosse Flattery practised by some Learned men. § Instanced, in

CAP. IV.

I. Distempers of Learning from Learned mens stu∣dies, are of three sorts; Phantasticall Learning; Contentious Learning; Delicate Learning. II. De∣licate Learning a curiosity in words, through pro∣fusenesse of speech. § Decent expression com∣mended. § Affected brevity censured. III. Con∣tentious Learning, a curiosity in matter, through Novelty of Termes or strictnesse of Positions. § A vanity either in Matter; or in Method. IV. Phantasticall Learning hath two branches, Imposture; Credulity. § Credulity a Belief of History; or a Beliefe of Art; or Opinion: and that ei∣ther Reall, in the Art it selfe. § Or Personall in the Author of such an Art or Science.

CAP. V.

Peccant Humors in Learning. I. Extreme affection to two extremes; Antiquity: Novelty. II. A distrust that any thing New, should now be found out. III. That of all Sects and Opinions, the best hath still prevailed. IV. An over-early reduction of Knowledge into Arts and Methods. V. A neg∣lect of PRIMITIVE PHILOSOPHY. VI. A Di∣vorce

CPA. VI.

The Dignity of Learning from Divine Arguments and Testimonies. I. From Gods Wisdome. § An∣gels of Illumination. § The first Light. § The first Sabbath. § Mans imployment in the Gar∣den. § Abels contemplation. § The Invention of Musique. § Confusion of Tongues. II. The ex∣cellent Learning of Moses. § Job. § Salomon. § Christ. § S^t Paul. § The Ancient Doctors of the Church. § Learning exalts the Mind to the Celebration of Gods glory; and is a preservative against Error and unbeliefe.

CAP. VII.

The Dignity of Learning from human Arguments and Testimonies. I. Naturall Inventors of new Arts, for the Commodity of Mans life, consecrated as Gods. II. Politicall, Civile Estates and Affaires advanced by Learning. § The best and the hap∣piest

CAP. VIII.

The Merit of Learning, from the influence it hath up∣on Morall virtues. § Learning a Soveraign reme∣dy for all the diseases of the Mind. § The domini∣nion thereof greater than any Temporall Power, be∣ing a Power over Reason and Beliefe. § Learning gives Fortunes, Honours and Delights, excelling all other as the soule the sense. § Durable monu∣ments of Fame. § A prospect of the Immortality of a future world.

THE SECOND BOOK.

THE PROEM.

THe Advancement of Learning commended to the Care of Kings. I. The Acts thereof in generall three, Reward, Direction, Assistance. II In speci∣all, about three Objects, Places, Books, Persons. § In Places foure Circumstances, Buildings, Re∣venues, Priviledges, Lawes of Discipline. § In

CAP. I▪

I. An Ʋniversall Partition of Human Learning into, § History. II. Poesy. III. Philosophy. § This Partition is drawn from the three Intellective Fa∣culties; Memory; Imagination; Reason. § The same distribution is agreeable unto Divine Learn∣ing.

CAP. II.

I. The Partition of History, into Naturall, and Ci∣vile. (Ecclesiasticall, and Literary comprehended under Civile.) II. The Partition of Naturall History, into the History of Generations. III. Of Preter-Generations. IV. Of Arts.

CAP. III.

I. A Second Partition of Naturall History from the Ʋse and End thereof, into Narrative; and Jndu∣ctive. And that the most noble end of Naturall History is, that it Minister and Conduce to the building up of Philosophy; which end, Inductive History respecteth. II. The Partition of the Histo∣ry of Generations, into the History of the Heavens; The History of the Meteors; The History of the Earth, and Sea; The History of Massive Bodies, or of the greater Collegiats; The History of Kinds, or of the Lesser Collegiats.

CAP. IV.

I. The Partition of History Civile, into Ecclesiasti∣call and Literary; and (which retaines the generall name) Civile. II. Literary Deficient. § Pre∣cepts how to compile it.

CAP. V.

Of the Dignity and Difficulty of Civile History.

CAP. VI.

The first Partition of Civile History, into § Me∣morials. § Antiquities. § Perfect History.

CAP. VII.

The Partition of Perfect History, into Chronicles of Times; Lives of Persons; Relation of Acts. § The explication of the History of Lives. § Of Re∣lations.

CAP. VIII.

The Partition of the History of Times; into universall and particular History. The advantages and dis∣advantages of both.

CAP. IX.

The Second Partition of the History of Times, into Annals; and Iournals.

CAP. X.

A Second Partition of Speciall-Civile History in History Simple and Mixt.

CAP. XI.

I. The Partition of Ecclesiasticall History, into the Generall History of the Church. II. History of Prophecy. III. History of Providence.

CAP. XII.

The Appendices of History Conversant about the words of Men, as History it selfe about Mens Acts. The partition of them into Speeches; Letters; and Apophthegmes.

CAP. XIII.

The Second Principall part of Human Learning, Poe∣sy. I. The Partition of Poesy into Narrative. II. Drammaticall. III. Parabolicall. § Three Examples of Parabolicall Poesy propounded. IV. Naturall. V. Politicall. VI. Morall.

THE THIRD BOOK.

CAP. I.

I. The Partition of Sciences into Theology and Phi∣losophy. II. The Partition of Philosophy, into three Knowledges; of God; of Nature; of Man,

CAP. II.

Of Naturall Theology. § Of the Knowledge of Angels and Spirits, an Appendix thereof.

CAP. III.

The Partition of Naturall Philosophy into Specula∣tive and Operative. § These two both in the In∣tention of the Writer, and Body of the Treatise, ought to be separate.

CAP. IV.

I. The Partition of speculative Science concerning Nature, into Physique speciall; and Metaphy∣sique; whereof Physique inquires the Efficient Cause and the Matter: Metaphysique the Finall cause of the Forme. II. The Partition of Physique into the knowledges of the Principles of things; of the Fabrique of things or of the World; and of the va∣riety of things. III. The Partition of Physique re∣specting the variety of Things, into the Doctrine of Concretes, and into the Doctrine of Abstracts The Partition of Concretes, is the same with the Distri∣bution of Naturall History. IV. The Partition of

CAP. V.

I. The Partition of Operative Knowledge concerning Nature, into Mechanique; and Magique: respon∣dent to the Parts of Speculative knowledge; Me∣chanique to Physique; Magique to Metaphysique. § A purging of the word Magia. II. Two Appendices to Operative knowledge: An Inventary of the estate of Man. § A Catalogue of Poly∣chrests; or things of multifarious use.

CAP. VI.

Of the great Appendix of Naturall Philosophy, as well Speculative as Operative; Mathematique knowledge: and that it ought to be placed rather a∣mongst Appendices; than amongst substantiall Sci∣ences. § The Partition of Mathematiques in∣to Pure; and Mixt.

THE FOVRTH BOOK.

CHAP. I.

I. THe Partition of the Knowledge of Man, into the Philosophy of Humanity; and Civile. § The partition of the knowledge of Humanity, in∣to the knowledge touching the Body of Man; and into the knowledge touching the Soule of Man. II. The constitution of a generall knowledge, touch∣ing the Nature and Estate of Man. § The par∣tition of the knowledge concerning the Estate of Man, into the knowledge touching the Person of Man; and into the knowledge touching the League of Soule and Body. § The partition of the know∣ledge touching the Person of Man, into the know∣ledge of Mans miseries. § And of Mans preroga∣tives. III. The partition of the knowledge touch∣ing the League, into the knowledge of Jndications, § And of Impressions. § The assignement of Physiognomy. § And of Interpretation of Na∣turall Dreams: unto the Doctrine of Jndications.

CAP. II.

I. The partition of the knowledge respecting the Body of Man, into Art Medicinall. § Cosmetique. § A∣thletique. § And Voluptuary. II. The partiti∣on

CAP. III.

I. The partition of Human Philosophy touching the soule, into the knowledge of the Inspired Essence; and into the knowledge of the sensible, or traduced soule. § The second partition of the same Philosophy, in∣to the knowledge of the Substance and Faculties of the Soule. And into the knowledge of the Ʋse, and Objects of the Faculties. II. Two Appendices of the knowledge, concerning the Faculties of the soule, the knowledge of Naturall Divination. § And the knowledge of Fascination. III. The Distri∣bution of the Faculties of the sensible soule, into Motion; and Sense.

THE FIFTH BOOK.

CAP. I.

I. THE partition of the knowledge which respect∣eth the use and objects of the Faculties of the Mind of Man; into Logique; and Ethique. II. The Division of Logique, into the Arts of Invention, of Iudgement; of Memory; and of Tradition.

CAP. II.

I. The partition of the Art of Jnvention, into the In∣ventive of Arts, and of Arguments. § The for∣mer of these which is the more eminent, is Deficient. II. The partition of the Jnventive Art of Arts, in∣to Literate Experience. § And a New Organ. III. A delineation of Literate Experience.

CAP. III.

I. The partition of the Inventive Art of Arguments, into Promptuary, or Places of Preparation: And Topique, or Places of Suggestion. II. The parti∣tion of Topiques, into Generall, § And Particular Topiques. III. An Example of Particular To∣pique in the Inquiry, De Gravi & Levi.

CAP. IV.

I. The partition of the Art of Iudging, into Iudge∣ment by Induction, § And by Syllogisme. Of the first a Collection is made in the Novum Organum. § The first partition of Iudgement by Syllogisme into Reduction, Direct; and Inverst. § The se∣cond partition thereof, into Analytique Art; and the knowledge of Elenches. II. The division of the knowledge of Elenches, into Elenches of Sophismes, § Into Elenches of Interpretation of Termes, § And into Elenches of Images or Idolaes. III. The di∣vision of Idolaes, § Into Impression from the gene∣rall

CAP. V.

I. The Partition of Art Retentive, or of Memory, into the knowledge of the Helps of Memory. § And the Knowledge of Memory it selfe. II. The Divi∣vision of the Doctrine of Memory, into Prenotion; and Embleme.

THE SIXTH BOOK.

CAP. I.

I. THE Partition of the Art of Tradition, into the Doctrine of the Organ of Speech. The Doctrine of the Method of Speech, and the Doctrine of the Illustration of Speech. § The partition of the Doctrine of the Organ of Speech, into the knowledge of the Notes of things; of Speaking; and of Writing: Of which the two last constitute Grammer, and the Partitions thereof. § The Partition of the know∣ledge of the Notes of Things, into Hieroglyphiques; and into Characters Reall. II. A second Partiti∣on of Grammer into Literary; and Philosophicall.

CAP. II.

I The Doctrine of the Method of speech is assigned a substantiall and Principall Part of Traditive know∣ledge: it is stiled the Wisdome of Delivery. II The divers kinds of Methods are enumerated; their Profits and Disprofits annext. § The Parts of Method.

CAP. III.

I. The Grounds and Office of Rhetorique. II. Three Appendices which appertain only to the preparatory Part. The Colours of Good and Evill, as well simple as compared. III. The Anti-theta of Things. IV. Les∣ser stiles or usuall Formes of Speech.

CAP. IV.

I Two generall Appendices of Traditive knowledge Art Criticall. II. And Pedagogicall.

THE SEVENTH BOOK.

CAP. I.

I. THe Partition of Morall Philosophy, into the knowledge of the Exemplar, or Platforme;

CAP. II.

I. The Partition of Individuall or Private Good, in∣to Good Active; and Good Passive. II. The Par∣tition of Passive Good, into Conservative Good; and Perfective Good. III. The Partition of the Good of Communion, into Generall. § And into Respective Duties.

CAP. III.

I. The Partition of the Doctrine of the Culture of the Mind, into the knowledge of the Characters of the Mind. II. Of the Affections. III. Of the Reme∣dies and Cures thereof. IV. An Appendix to the same Doctrine touching the Congruity between the Good of the Mind, and the Good of the Body.

THE EIGHT BOOK.

CHAP. I.

THe Partition of Civile knowledge, § Into the knowledge of Conversation. § The knowladge of Negociation. § And the knowledge of Empire or State-Goverment.

CAP. II.

I. The Partition of the knowledge of Negociation in∣to the knowledge of dispersed Occasions. II. And into the knowledge of the Advancement of life. § Examples of the knowledge of scattered Occasi∣ons from some of Solomons Parables. § Precepts concerning the Advancement of Fortune.

CAP. III.

The Partition of the Art of Empiry or Goverment is omitted, only accesse is made to two Deficients. I. The knowledge of enlarging the Bounds of Empire. II. And the knowledge of universall Iustice, or of the Fountains of Law.

THE NINTH BOOK.

CAP. I.

The Partitions of inspired Theology are omitted, only way is made unto three Desiderats. I. The know∣ledge of the right Ʋse of Human Reason in matters Divine. II. The knowledge of the degrees of uni∣ty in the Citty of God. III. The Emanations of SS. Scripture.

FRANCISCI DE VERVLAMIO ARCHITECTVRA SCIENTIARƲM.

THE GENERALE IDEA AND PROIECT OF THE LO. VERVLAM'S INSTAVRATIO MAGNA.

Represented in the PLATFORM OF THE DESIGNE OF THE I PART thereof, As it was Conceav'd in the mind of the Author and is expressed in the Modell of the VVork.

DEUS OMNIA IN MENSVRA, ET NVMERO, ET ORDINE, DISPOSVIT.

THE PLATFORME OF THE DESJGNE

LIB. I. THE DIGNITY OF LEARNING.

• Reporting the
  • Dishonors and Dero∣gations of Learning in the
    • Discre∣dites from
      • Divines Cap. 1.
        • Desire of Knowledge the first sinne.
        • Knowledge an Infinite: an Anxious thing.
        • Learning the cause of Eresy and Atheisme.
        • ...Objected Answered.
      • Poli∣tiques C. 2.
        • Learning makes men unapt for Armes.
        • Disables men for Civile affaires.
        • Particular indispositions pretended.
        • ...Objected Answered.
      • Learned Mens Cap. 3.
        • ...Fortunes
          • Scarcity of means.
          • Privatenesse of life.
          • Meannesse of imployment.
        • ...Māners
          • Too incompatible with the times.
          • Too sensible of the common good.
          • Not applying to Persons of quality
          • A failing in points of behaviour.
          • Grosse flattery practised by some.
        • Studies in some impertinents.
    • Distempers in studies Cap, 4.
      • Phantasticall Learning.
      • Contentious Learning.
      • Delicate Learning.
    • Peccant Humors Cap. 5.
      • Affection to two extremes Antiquity, Novelty.
      • A distrust that any thing New should now be found out.
      • A conceit that the best Opinions still prevaile.
      • A too peremptory reduction of Sciences into Methods.
      • A neglect of Primitive Philosophy.
      • A divorce of the Intellect from the Object.
      • A contagion of Knowledge frō particular inclinations.
      • An impatience of suspense: hast to Positive Assertion.
      • A Magistrall manner of Tradition of Knowledge.
      • Aime of Writers, Illustration, not Propagation.
      • End of studies, Curiosity, Pleasure, Profit, Promotiō, &c.
  • Honors, and Prero∣gatives of Learning from Arguments
    • Divine Cap. 6.
      • Wisdome of God. § Angels of Illumination.
      • First light. § Adams. § Abels, Contēplations &c.
      • The learning of Moses, Iob, Solomon, &c.
    • Humane cap. 7. 8.
      • Inventors of Arts consecrate as Gods.
      • Civile Estates advanc'd by learning.
      • The concurrency of Armes and Letters.
      • The Dominion § Donations of Learning.

LIB. II. THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING.

• Personall, in Proem. lib.
  • ...Generall by the
    • Amplitude of Reward.
    • Wisdome of Direction.
    • Conjunction of Labours.
  • ...Speciall
    • Promoted by
      • Places, as
        • Buildings. § Revenewes.
        • Priviledges. § Discipline.
      • Books, as
        • Libraries.
        • Good Editions.
      • Persons as
        • Lectures for Arts extant.
        • Inquirers into Arts non-extant.
    • Preju∣diced for
      • Want of foundations for Arts at large.
      • Want of sufficient Salarie to Lecturers.
      • Want of allowance for Experiments.
      • Want of a right course of proceeding in studies.
      • Want of Intelligence between Vniversities.
      • Want of Inquiries into Arts Deficient.
• Reall, by a right Par∣tition of Learning Jnto Cap. 1.
  • 1 History referr'd to Me∣mory
    • ...Naturall the
      • Subject Cap. 2.
        • ...Genera∣tions
          • Heavens. § Meteors.
          • Earth. § Sea.
          • Elements § Specifiques.
        • ...Preter Gener.
          • Monsters. § Marvels.
          • Magique, &c.
        • ...Arts me∣chanique
          • Agriculture.
          • Alchimy, &c.
      • Vse and end Cap. 3.
        • Narrative.
        • Inductive.
    • ...Civile into
      • Civil in spe∣ciall. C. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
        • 1
          • Memorialls.
          • Antiquities.
          • Perfect History
            • Chronicles.
            • Lives.
            • Relations.
        • 2 Pure. § Mixt.
      • Ecclesiasticall Cap. 11.
        • Generall of the Church.
        • Speciall
          • Prophesy.
          • Providence.
      • Literary cap. 4.
        • Ages. § Climates. § Declinations.
        • Instaurations, &c. of Learning.
    • Append. to History. Orations. § Epistles. § Apophthegmes. Cap. 12.
  • 2 Poesy referred to the Imagination Cap. 13.
    • Narrative or Historicall.
    • Drammaticall or Representative.
    • Parabolicall or Allusive.
  • 3 Philosophy, referring to Reason and the will. Lib. seqq.

LIB. III. THE PARTITION OF KNOW∣LEDGES IN GENERALL INTO

• PHILOSOPHY. Cap. 1.
  • Summary or Primitive
    • Axioms of universality.
    • Transcendents of Entity.
  • Speciall respect∣ing three Objects
    • 1 God hence Divine Philosophy or Cap. 1.
      • Naturall Theology.
      • —
        • Appen.
          • Angels.
          • Spirits.
    • 2 Nature So Naturall Philoso∣phy. Cap. 3.
      • Specu¦lative cap. 4.
        • Phy∣sique into the
          • Principles of Things.
          • Fabrique of things or of the world.
          • varie∣ty of things
            • ...Con∣crets
              • ...Gene∣rati∣ons
                • Heavens.
                • Meteors.
                • Earth. Sea.
                • Elements.
                • Specifiques.
              • ...Preter-Generations.
            • ...Ab∣stracts of
              • ...Mat∣ter.
                • Hot. § Cold.
                • Dense. §
                • Grave. §
                • Light &c.
              • ...Mo∣tions
                • Simple motiōs.
                • Summs of moti.
                • Measurs of mot.
          • ...Append.
            • Problems.
            • Placits.
        • ...Metaphysiques
          • Formes.
          • Finall causes.
      • Operative
        • ...Mechanique.
          • subser∣vient to
            • Metaphysique.
            • Metaphysique▪
        • ...Magique.
        • Apend. Cap. 5.
          • An Inventary of the estate of man.
          • A Catalogue of Polychrestes.
      • Append. Mathematiques Cap. 6.
        • ...Arithmetique.
        • ...Geometry.
    • 3 Man, Hence the Emanations of
      • Humane Philosophy Lib. seq.
      • Civile Philosophy Lib. seq.
• THEOLOGY inspired Lib. ult.

LIB. IV. THE PARTITION OF HUMANE KNOWLEDGE, OR THE KNOWLEDGE OF HƲMANITY.

• Generall of the nature and state of man in re∣spect of Cap. 1.
  • His Person, his
    • ...Miseries.
    • ...Prerogatives
      • Intellectuall.
      • And Morall.
  • The league of soule & Body by
    • ...Indication of the
      • Mind by the Body.
      • Body by the mind.
      • Appendices
        • Physiognomy.
        • Interpret. of dreams.
    • ...Impression of the
      • Body upon the Mind.
      • Mind upon the Body.
• Speciall di∣vided into Philosophy
  • Humane properly so called, which re∣ferr's to mans
    • Body into Art Cap. 2.
      • ...Medicinall
        • Conservation of Health.
        • Cure of Diseases.
        • Prolongation of life.
      • ...Cosmeteque, or of Decoration.
      • ...Athletique, or of Activity.
      • Voluptuary as
        • Pictures.
        • Musique, &c.
    • Soule the Cap. 3.
      • ...Substance
        • Rationall whether
          • Native or advētive
          • Separable or insep.
          • Mortall or immor.
          • Passible or impassi.
        • ...Sensible
          • A corporall, Fiery.
          • Aeriall substance.
      • ...Facul∣ties
        • ...Rationall
          • Intellect. § Reason.
          • Imaginatiō. § Memory
          • Appetite. § Will.
          • Appendices
            • ...Divination.
            • ...Fascination.
        • ...Sensi∣ble
          • Voluntary Motion.
          • Sense. § Perception.
      • Ʋse and Objects of Faculties. Lib. V.
        • Hence the Ema∣nations of
          • Logique.
          • Ethique.
  • Civile. Lib. VIII.

LIB. V. THE PARTITION OF THE VSE AND OBIECTS OF THE FACVLTIES OF THE MIND, INTO

• LOGIQUE hath foure Intellectu∣all Arts.
  • I Inquisitiō or Jnventi∣on of Cap. 2.
    • Arts into
      • ...Literate Ex∣perience by
        • Variation. § Production.
        • Translation. § Inversion.
        • Application. § Copulation.
        • Casualty or Chance.
      • ...Interpretation of Nature Nov. Organ.
    • Arguments into Cap. 3.
      • ...Preparation or Provision.
      • ...Suggestion or Topiques
        • Generall.
        • Particular.
  • II Exami∣nation or Judgement by Cap. 4.
    • Induction, Whereof a collection is in the Nov. Org.
    • Syllo∣gisme into
      • 1 Reduction
        • Direct.
        • Invert.
      • 2
        • Analitique Art.
        • ...Know∣ledge of Elenchs
          • Sophismes Elenches, hand∣led by Arist. in precept, by Plato in example.
          • ...Elenchs of Interpreta∣tion of Terms
            • Majority.
            • Minority.
            • Priority.
            • Posteriority.
            • Power.
            • Act &c.
          • ...Idolaes or im∣pressi∣ons frō the
            • Generall nature of man.
            • Individuall tēper.
            • Imposition of words & names.
    • Append: Analogy of Demonstration from the nature of the subject.
  • III Custody or Memory into Cap. 5.
    • Helps to memory, — Writing.
    • Memory it selfe by
      • Prenotion.
      • Embleme.
  • Elocution or Tradition. LIB. VI.
• ETHIQUES, referr'd to mans will. LIB. VII.

LIB. VI. THE PARTITION OF THE ART OF ELOCVTION OR OF TRADITION INTO THE

• ORGAN OF SPEECH into
  • ✿ Notes of things
    • Hieroglyphiques.
    • Reall characters.
  • ...Speaking
    • Hence the original of Grammer
      • Popular.
      • ✿ Philosophicall
  • ...Writing
    • Append. to
      • Speech-Poetique measure.
      • Writing-Ciphers.
• METHOD of SPEECH the Cap. 2.
  • Kinds
    • Magistrall § ✿ Of Probation or Initiative.
    • Exoterique. § Acroamatique.
    • ...Delivery
      • By way of Aphorisme.
      • By way of Method.
    • ...Delivery
      • By Assertions, and Proofes.
      • By Questions and Determinations.
    • ...Method
      • Fitted to matter.
      • Vpon presupposition.
    • Method by way of Information § Anticipation.
    • ...Method
      • Analitique. § Systutique.
      • Diaeretique. § Cryptique. § Homericall.
  • Parts
    • ...Disposition of a whole work.
    • Limitation of Propositions, their
      • Extention.
      • Production.
• ILLUSTRATION of SPEECH or RHETORIQUE.
  • The vse and office Application ✿
    • Of the dictates of Reason to Imaginatiō.
    • Of speech respectively to particulars: or the wisdome of private speech.
  • ...Append
    • ✿ Colours of Good and Evill, simple, compar'd.
    • ✿ Anti-theta Rerum, or the coūterpoint of things
    • ✿ Lesser Stiles and Formes of Speech.
  • Two generall Appendices touching the Tradition of Knowledge.
    • ...Criticall
      • Corrected Editions.
      • Interpretation of Authors.
      • A judgement upon Authors.
    • ...Paedan∣ticall
      • Collegiate education of youth.
      • A Caveate against Compends.
      • Application of studies to the quality of wits.

LIB. VII. THE PARTITION OF MORALL KNOWLEDGE, INTO THE

• PLAT∣FOKME of GOOD. Cap. 1.
  • Simple or the kinds of Good Cap. 2.
    • Indivi∣duals, or virtues
      • ...Active from a desire of
        • Perpetuity.
        • Certainty.
        • Variety.
      • ...Passive
        • Conservative Good.
        • Perfective Good.
    • Of Com∣munion, or Duties
      • ...Generall.
      • ...Respe∣ctive
        • Duties of
          • ...Professions, &c.
          • ...Oeconomicall;
          • ...Politicall duties.
        • ✿ Vices
          • ...Impostures, fraudes, cau∣tils &c.
          • ...Of professions.
    • Individ. & common
      • ...Simply and irrespectively taken.
      • ...Comparative∣ly between
        • Man and Man.
        • Case and case.
        • Publike and private▪
        • Time and time.
  • ...Compared, or the De∣grees of Good of
    • Honesty. § Profit. § Pleasure.
    • Body. § Mind. § Fortune.
    • Contemplative. Active Good.
• CULTURE of the MIND in the Cap. 3.
  • ...Characters or tempers.
    • ...Impressed by Nature to
      • Armes. § Leters.
      • Contemplative §
      • Active course of life.
    • ...Impos'd by
      • ...Chance of
        • Sex. § Age. § Region
        • Health. § Beauty &c.
      • ...Fortune
        • Nobility. § Honors.
        • Riches. § Poverty.
  • ...Affections or distem∣pers, their.
    • ...Names
      • Pleasure, paine, fear, hope.
      • Anger, Patience, Love, Hate.
    • ...Nature
      • How stirr'd. How still'd.
      • How secreted? How disclosed?
      • What operations they produce.
      • What turnes they take?
      • How enwrapt? How they encountre?
  • ...Cures, or Remedies
    • Custome, Exercise, Habit, Education.
    • Emulation, Company, Friends, Fame.
    • Reproofe, Exhortation, Lawes, Books.
    • Study, Briefe precepts hereof.
  • Append. The Congruity between the Good of
    • Body
    • and Mind.

LIB. VIII. THE PARTITION OF CIVILE KNOWLEDGE INTO

• CONVERSATION Cap. 1
  • Not Affected; much lesse despised.
  • But Moderated, that is either
    • ...Generall in
      • Speech in the
        • ...Conception.
        • ...Ʋtterance.
      • Gesture of
        • ...Speaker.
        • ...Hearer.
    • ...Respe∣ctive to the
      • Quality of Men.
      • Nature of Matter. §
      • § Of time. § Of Place.
• NEGO∣CIATI∣ON. Cap. 2.
  • Scattered occasions, examples thereof out of Solomōs Proverbs.
  • The Ad∣vancemēt of For∣tune Precepts thereof
    • Summary in the
      • ...Knowledge of
        • Others
          • ...Six waies by
            • Countenance. Works.
            • Actions. Nature.
            • Ends. Reports.
          • ...Three waies
            • Acquaintance with men well seen in the world.
            • A wise temper in liberty of speech and silence.
            • A present dexterity both to observe and act.
        • Him∣selfe
          • ...How his Nature and abilities sort with
          • The estate of the present time: Professiōs that are in prize: His competitors in fortune: The Friends he hath chosen: The examples he would follow.
      • ...Art of
        • Setting forth his Virtues; Fortunes; Merits
        • Concealing his Defects, and Disgraces, by
          • ...Caution.
          • ...Colour.
          • ...Confidence
        • Declaring a Mans mind in particulars by a mediocrity of Revealing, Concealing.
        • Framing the mind to become flexible to occasions; of place; time; & persons, &c.
    • Spars'd
      • That he be well skill'd what instruments to use and how.
      • That he overtaske not his own abilities.
      • That he doe not alwaies stay for, but sometimes provoke occasions.
      • That he never undertake great; or long works.
      • That he never so engage himselfe but that he leave a posterne dore open for retreat.
      • That he so love, as he may hate upon occasion.
• GOVER∣MENT of STATES Cap. 3.
  • Partitions omitted Deficients
    • ✿ The art of enlarging an Estate.
    • ✿ The fountains of Lawes.
      • Certain in the intimation.
      • Iust in the commandment.
      • Fit to be put in execution.
      • Agreeing with the form of the state
      • Begetting virtue in the Subjects.

LIB. IX. INSPIRED THEOLOGY. The Partition of Inspired Divinity is omitted, only an entrance is made unto three DEFICIENTS

• DEFICI∣ENTS
  • I ✿ THE LIMITS AND VSE OF HVMAN REASON IN MATTERS DIVINE.
  • The
    • ...Ʋse it selfe
      • Explication of Divine Mysteries.
      • Inferences thence deduced.
    • ...Excesses in that Vse
      • Mineing into things not revealed by a too Curi∣ous inquiry.
      • Attributing equall Authority to Dirivations, as to Principles themselves.
  • II ✿ THE DEGREES OF VNITY IN THE CITTY OF GOD
    • ...In Points
      • Fundamentall; one Lo. one Faith; &c.
      • Superstructive or of perfection.
    • ¶
      • A dissent in Fundamentell Points, discor∣porates men from the Church of God; not so in superstructive Points.
  • III ✿ EMANATIONS FROM SCRIPTURE Wherein are observed
    • ...Errors in Interpreta∣tion
      • In supposing that all Philosophy is derived from Scripture, as the Schoole of Para∣celsus did, and some others now doe.
      • In interpreting Scripture as one would a humane Author; whereas two things were known to God which are not known to Man The
        • ...Secrets of the Heart.
        • ...Succession of Times.
    • ...A Deside∣rate.
      • A Collection of Positive Divinity upon particular Texts in briefe observations. prejudiced by
        • ...Dilating into common places.
        • ...Chasing after Controversies.
        • ...Reducing to Methods.

The Emanation of SCIENCES, from the Intellectuale Faculties of MEMORY IMAGINATION REASON.

From these — ¶

• ¶
  • I HISTORY
    • Naturale. The Subject; the Vse. LIB. II.
    • Civile
      • Civile, properly so called. LIB. II.
      • Ecclesiasticale. LIB. II.
      • Literary. LIB. II.
  • II POESY
    • Narrative or Historicall. LIB. II.
    • Drammaticall or represent. LIB. II.
    • Parabolicall or Allusive. LIB. II.
  • III PHILO∣SOPHY
    • Primitive Sapience, the receptacle of generale Axioms III.
    • Derivative
      • Divine, or Natur. Theol. III.
      • ...Naturale
        • ...Speculative
          • Physicks. III.
          • Metaph. III.
        • ...Operative
          • Mechanick. III.
          • Magick. III.
      • ...Humane
        • Generale of the nature of man. &c IV.
        • Speciale into Philosophy. A. IV.
  • ...A. Humane so called of
    • Body, into Arts
      • Medicinale against diseases. § Cosmetick or of Decoration. IV.
      • Athletick or of Activity. § Voluptuary or Sensuale. IV.
    • Soule, the
      • ...Substance
        • Spirituale — Native or Adventive, &c. IV.
        • Sensuale—Fiery, Aëriall substance, &c. IV.
      • ...Foculties
        • Rationale — Jntellect; reason; Imagination &c. IV.
        • Sensuale. — Ʋoluntary motion, Sense, &c. IV.
      • ...Ʋse of Fa∣culties
        • LOGICK
          • Invnetion or Inquisition V.
          • Iudgement or Examination. V.
          • Memory or Custody. V.
          • ...Elocution or Tradition
            • Grāmar. VI.
            • Method. VI.
            • Rhetorick VI.
        • ETHICKS
          • ...Platform of good
            • Kinds of Good, VII
            • Degrees of Good. VII
          • ...Culture of the Mind
            • Tempers. VII
            • Distempers; Cures. VII
    • Civile of
      • ...Conversation.
      • ...Negociation.
      • ...Government of States
        • Art of enlarging a State VIII.
        • Fountainee of Laws. VIII.
    • Inspir'd Divinity is here separat from Philosophy: yet Reason receives the signet of Faith DEFICIENTS
      • Ʋse of Reason in Divinity. IX
      • Degrees of unity in Rligion. IX
      • Dirivations frō Scripture. IX

The Preparation to these Books, is populare, not Acroama¦tique: Relates the Prerogatives & Derrgations of Learning. LIB. I.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Philo. Iud.
• * 1.2

  Prov. 25.
• * 1.3

  Prov. 18.
• * 1.4

  Plut. de Ed. P. ex Plat. de Rep.
• * 1.5

  Academ. Vet. Nov.
• * 1.6

  Dogmat.