Of the advancement and proficience of learning; or, The partitions of sciences· Nine books. Written in Latin by the most eminent, illustrious, and famous Lord Francis Bacon Baron of Verulam, Vicount St. Alban, Councellor of Estate, and Lord Chancellor of England. Interpreted by Gilbert Watts.

THE ARGUMENT OF THE SEƲERALL PARTS.

IT is one point of the Designe we have in hand, that every thing be delivered with all possible Plainesse and Perspicuity: for the nakednesse of the Mind, as once of the Body, is

the companion of Innocence and Simplicity. First therefore, the order and Distribution of the work, with the reason thereof, must be made manifest. The Parts of the work are, by us, assigned Six.

[P. I] ¶The First Part exhibits the summe or univer∣sall description of that Learning and Knowledges in the possession whereof, men have hetherto bin estated. For we thought good to make some stay even upon Sciences received, and that, for this considerati∣on; that we might give more advantage to the Parfecti∣on of ancient knowledges, and to the introduction of new: For we are carried, in some degree, with an e∣quall temper of Desire, both to improve the labours of the Ancients, and to make farther progresse. And this makes for the faith and sincerity of our meaning, according to that of the wise,* 1.1 The unlearned Man re∣ceives not the words of knowledge, unlesse you first interpret unto him the conceptions of his heart: Wherefore we will not neglect to side along (as it were in passage) the Coasts of accepted Sciences and Arts; and to import thether, somethings usefull and profitable. § Neverthelesse we adjoyne such Partitions of Sci∣ences, as comprehend, not only such things that are found out and observed already, but such also as are thereto pertaining & have bin hetherto preter∣miss'd. For there are found in the Intellectuall Globe, as in the Terrestriall, soyles improved and Deserts. Wherefore let it not seem strange, if now and then we make a departure from the usuall Divisions, and for∣sake the beaten path of some Partitions: for Addition

whilest it varies the whole, of necessity varies the parts and the Sections thereof: and the accepted Di∣visions, are accommodated only to the accepted summe of Sciences, as it is now cast up. § Concerning those Parts, which we shall note as Pretermitted, we will so regulate our selves, as to set down more than the naked Titles, or brief Arguments of DEFICIENTS. For where we deliver up any thing as a DESIDERATE, so it be a matter of merit; and the reason thereof may seem some∣what obscure; so as, upon good consideration, we may doubt, that we shall not be so easily conceived what we intend, or what the contemplation is we comprehend in our mind, and in our meditation; there it shall ever be our precise care, to annex either precepts, for the per∣forming of such a work; or a Part of the Work it self, performed by us already, for Example to the whole; that so we may in every Particular, either by Operati∣on or Information, promote the businesse. For in my judgement, it is a matter which concernes not only the Benefit of others; but our own Reputation also; that no man imagine that we have projected in our minds some slight superficiall notion of these Designes; and that they are of the nature of those things, which we could Desire, and which we accept only as good wishes. For they are such as without question, are within the power and possibility of men to compasse, unlesse they be want∣ing to themselves; and hereof, we for our parts, have certain and evident demonstration; for we come not hether, as Augures, to measure Countries in our mind, for Divination; but as Captaines, to invade

them, for a conquest. And this is the First part of our works.

[P. II] ¶Thus having passed over Ancient Sciences, in the next place, we enable human Jntellect to saile through. Wherefore to the Second Part is designed the Do∣ctrine touching a more sound, and perfect use of Reason, in the inquiry of Things, and the true assi∣stances of the understanding; that hereby (so farre as the condition of humanity and mortality will suffer) the Jntellect, may be elevated; and amplified with a fa∣culty, capable to conquer the dark, and deeper secrets of Nature. And the Art, we here set downe, which we are wont to call, The INTERPRETATION OF NATVRE, is a kind of Logique, though very much, and exceed∣ing different. That vulgare Logique professes the Preparation and Contrivance of aides and forces for the understanding, herein they conspire, but it cleerely differs from the Populare, specially in three things, namely, in the end, in the order of Demonstrating, and, in the first disclosures to Inquiry. § For the End propounded in this our Science is, that there may be found out not Arguments, but Arts; not things Con∣sentaneous to Principles, but even Principles them∣selves; not probable reasons, but designations and indi∣cations of works; wherefore from a different intention followes a different effect: for there, an Adversary is di∣stressed and vanquisht by Disputation, here by nature, the thing done. § And with this End accords the nature and order of their Demonstrations: For in vulgare Logique, almost all the paines is imployed a∣bout

Syllogisme: as for Induction, the Dialectiques seem scarce ever to have taken it into any serious consi∣deration, slightly passing it over, and hastning to the formes of Disputeing But we reject Demonstration by Syllogisme, for that it proceeds confusedly; and lets nature escape our hands. For though no man call into doubt, but that what are coincident in a midle terme, are in themselves coincident, (which is a kind of Mathematique Certitude) yet here lies the Fallax, that Syllogisme consists of Propositions, Proposi∣tions of words, and words are the tokens and marks of things. Now if these same notions of the the mind, (which are as it were, the soule of words, and the Ba∣sis of this manner of structure, and fabrique) be rudely and rashly divorc'd from things, and roveing; not per∣fectly defin'd and limited, and also many other waies vi∣tious; all falls to ruine. Wherefore we reject Syllo∣gisme, not only in regard of Principles (for which nor doe they make use of it) but in respect also of Midle Propositions, which indeed Syllogisme, however, in∣ferres and brings forth; but barren of operations and remote from practise; and in relation to the Active Part of Sciences, altogether incompetent. Although there∣fore we may leave to Syllogisme, and such celebrated and applauded Demonstrations, a jurisdiction over Arts Populare and Opinable (for in this kind we move nothing) yet for the nature of Things, we every where as well in Minor, as Maior Propositions, make use of Inductions: for we take Induction to be that Forme of Demonstration, which supports sense; presses nature

and is instanced in works, and in a sort mingled there∣with. Wherefore the order also of Demonstration is altogether inverted. For hetherto the businesse used to be thus managed; from sense, and some few Particu∣lars, suddenly to fly up to the highest Generalls, as to fixt Poles, about which Disputations may be turned; from which the rest of intermediate Axioms may be de∣rived. A way compendious indeed, but precipitate; and to nature impervious; but for Disputations ready, and accommodate. But according to our method, Axioms are raised by a sequent continuity & graduat dependancy, so as there is no seising upon the highest Ge∣neralls, but in the last place; and those highest Generals in quality not notionals; but well terminated, and such as nature acknowledges to be truly neere allied unto her; and which cleave to the individuall intrinsiques of things. § But touching the forme it selfe of In∣duction and Iudgement made by it, we undertake a mighty work. For the Forme, whereof Logicians speak, which proceeds by simple enumeration, is a childish thing, and concludes upon admittance; is ex∣posed to perill from a contradictory instance; lookes only upon commune operations; and is in the issue endlesse. But to the knowledges of Induction, such a Forme is required, as may solve and separate experience; and by due exclusion and rejection necessarily conclude. And if that publique and populare Iudgement of Diale∣ctiques, be so laborious and hath exercised so many and so great wits; how much greater paines ought we take in this other; which not only out of the secret closets of the

mind, but out of the very entrailes of nature is extra∣cted? Nor is this all, for we more firmely settle, and so∣lidate the foundation of Sciences, and take the first rise of our inquiry deeper than hetherto hath bin attempted; submitting to examinations those Principles, which vulgare Logick takes up on the credit of another. For the Dialectiques borrow, as it were, from all other Sci∣ences, the Principles of Sciences; again adore the prime Notions of the mind; lastly rest satisfied with the im∣mediat informations of sense rightly disposited. But our judgement is this, that true Logique should visite every particular Province of Sciences, with greater com∣mand than their principles possesse; and that those same putative Principles be enforc'd to give an account, and be liable to examination, untill such time as their validi∣ty and tenure cleerely appeared. And as touching the Prime Notions of the intellect, there is nothing of those, (the understanding left at liberty to it selfe) hath con∣gested, but matter to be suspected; nor any way warrant∣able, unlesse it be summon'd, and submit it selfe to a new Court of Judicature; and that sentence passe according thereto. Moreover we many waies sift and sound the information of sense it selfe; for the Sences deceive, yet withall they indicate their Errors: but Errors are at hand, Indications to be sought for a farre off. § The guilt of Sense is of two sorts; either it destitutes us, or else it deceives us. For first, there are many things which escape the cognizance of sense, even when it is well disposed, and no way impedire: either by reason of the subtility of the entire body, or the minutnesse of the

parts thereof, or the distance of place, or the slownesse, and likewise swiftnesse of motion; or the familiar con∣verse with the object, or some other causes. Again, nor where sense truly apprehends its object, are her precepts so very firme: for the testimony and information of sense, is ever from the Analogy of Man, and not from the Analogy of the World; and it is an error of dangerous consequence to assert, that sence is the mea∣sure of things. Wherefore to encounter these inconve∣niences, we have with painfull and faithfull service e∣very where sought out, and collected assistances, that Supplements to Deficients; to Variations, Rectifi∣cations, may be ministred. Nor doe we undertake this so much by instruments, as by experiments; for the subtlety of Experiments, is farre greater than of sense it selfe, though assisted with exact instruments; we mean such experiments, which to the intention of the thing inquired, are skilfully according to Art in∣vented and accommodated. Wherefore we doe not at∣tribute much to the immediat and particular perception of sense; but we bring the matter to this issue, that sense may judge only of the experiment; the experiment of the thing. We conceive therefore, that of sense, (from which all knowledge in things naturall must be derived, unlesse we mean wilfully to goe a witlesse way to worke) we are become the religious Pontifes; and the not inex∣pert interpreters of her Oracles; so as others may seem in outward profession; but we in deed and action, to pro∣tect and honor sense. And of this kind are they which we prepare, for the light of Nature, the accension, and

immission thereof; which of themselves were sufficient, were human Intellect equall, and a smooth inanticipa∣ted Table. But when the minds of men are after such, strange waies besieged, that for to admit the true beams of things, a sincere and polisht Area is wanting; it con∣cernes us, of necessity to bethink our selves, of seeking out some remedy for this distemperature. The IDOLAES, wherewith the mind is preoccupate are ei∣ther Attracted, or Innate; Attracted have slid into mens minds, either by the Placits and Sects of Philo∣sophers; or by depraved lawes of Demonstrations. But the Innate inhere in the nature of the Intellect, which is found to be farre more liable to error, than sense. For however men may please themselves, and be ravish't into admiration, and almost adoration of the mind of man; this is most certain: as an inequall look∣ing-glasse, changes the raies of objects, according to its own figure, and cutting; even so the mind, when it suffers impression from things by sense, in encogitating and discharging her notions, doth not so faithfully insi∣nuate and incorporate her nature, with the nature of things. And those two first kinds of IDOLAES can ve∣ry hardly; but those latter, by no means be extirpate. It remains only that they be disclosed; and that same trea∣cherous faculty of the mind be noted and convinced; lest from the unsound complection of the mind, upon the ex∣termination of ancient, perchance new shootes of Er∣rors spring up in their place; and the businesse be brought only to this issue; that errors be not extinguisht, but changed: but that on the contrary, now at last, it be

for ever decreed and ratified, that the intellect cannot make a judgement but by Induction, and by a legitti∣mate forme thereof. Wherefore the Doctrine of pu∣rifying the understanding, that it may become recep∣tive of truth, is perfected by three Reprehensions: Reprehension of Philosophy; Reprehension of De∣monstrations; and Reprehension of Native hu∣mane Reason. These explicated, and then the case cleered, what the nature of things, what the nature of the mind is capable off; we presume (the Divine good∣nesse being President at the Rites) that we have pre∣pared and adorned, the Bride-chamber of the Mind and of the universe. Now may the vote of the Mar∣riage-song be, that from this coniunction, Human Aides, and a Race of Inventions may be procreated, as may in some part vanquish and subdue mans mi∣series and necessities. And this is the second Part of the Work.

[P. III] ¶But our purpose is not only to point out and munite the way; but to enterprise it: Wherefore the third Part of the work compriseth, PHaeNOME∣NA VNIVERSI, as to say, all kind of Experience, and Naturall History, of such kind as may be fundamentall for the building up of Naturall Philosophy. For nei∣ther can any exact way of Demonstration or Forme of interpreting Nature, both guard and support the mind from error and lapse; and withall present and mi∣nister matter for knowledge. But they who proposed to themselves not to proceed by Conjectures and Divina∣tions, but to find out, and to know, whose end and aime

is not to contrive Fictions and Fables, but to search with diligence into the nature of, and, as it were, anatomize, this true world; must derive all from the very things themselves. Nor can the substitution and compensation of wit, or meditation, or Argumentation suffice to this travaile, inquisition, and mundane perambulation; no not if all the wits in the world should meet together. Wherefore we must either take a right course, or desert the businesse for ever: and to this day the matter hath bin so managed, that it is no marvaile, if nature hath not disclosed hir selfe. For first, defective and fallaci∣ous information of sense; negligent, inequall, and as it were, casuall observation; vain Tradition and from idle report; Practise, intent on the work, and servile; experimentall attempt, ignorant, dull, wild, and bro∣ken; lastly slight and poore Naturall History, have to∣wards the raising of Philosophy, congested most depra∣ved matter for the understanding. After this, prepo∣sterous subtlety of arguing, and ventilation, hath essayed a late remedy to things plainly desperate; which doth not any way recover the businesse, or seperate errors. § Wherefore there is no hope of greater advance∣ment and progresse, but in the Restauration of Sci∣ences. And the commencements hereto must, by all means, be derived from Naturall History; and that too, of a new kind and provision: for to no purpose you polish the Glasse, if images be wanting: not only faithfull guards must be procured, but apt matter prepared. And this our History, as our Logick, differs from that in use, in many particulars: in the end or office, in the Masse

and Congeries, than in the subtilty, also in choice, and in constitution in reference to those things that follow. § For first we propound such a Natu∣rall History, as doth not so much either please for the variety of things, or profit for present improvement of Experiments, as it doth disperse a light to the invention of causes; and gives, as it were, the first milke to the nou∣rishing up of Philosophy. For though we principally pursue operation, and the Active part of Sciences; yet we attend the due season of Harvest; nor goe about to reap the green hearb or the blade. For we know well that Axioms rightly invented, draw after them the whole troupe of Operations; and not sparsedly but plen∣tifully exhibit works. But we utterly condemne and renounce, as Atalantaes Apple which retards the Race, that unseasonable and childish humor of accelerating erly pledges of new works. And this is the Duty of our Naturall History. § As for the Masse, we Com∣pile a History, not only of Nature at Liberty, and in Course; I mean, when without compulsion she glides gently along, and accomplishes her own work: (as is the History of the Heavens, Meteors, Earth and Sea; of Minerals, Plants, Animals:) but much rather of Na∣ture straightned and vext; when by the provocations of Art, and the ministry of Man, she is put out of her com∣mune road; distressed and wrought. Wherefore, all the experiments of Arts Mechanicall; all of the Operative part of Liberall; all of many Practicall, not yet conspi∣red into a peculiar Art (so farre as any discovery may be had, and so farre as is conducent to our intention) we

will set down at large. So likewise (not to dissemble the matter) nothing regarding mens pride and bra∣vades, we bestow more paines, and place more assu∣rance in this Part than in that other; being the nature of things, more discloses hirselfe in the vexation of Art; than when it is at its own liberty. § Nor doe we present the History of Substances only, but also we have taken it as a part of our diligence, to prepare a se∣perate history of their virtues; we mean, such as in nature may be accounted Cardinall, and wherein the Primordials of nature are expressely constituted; as matter invested with her Primitive qualities and ap∣petites; as dense, rare, hot, cold, consistent, fluid, ponderous, light, and others not a few. § For in∣deed, to speak of subtility, we search out with choice diligence, a kind of Experiments, farre more subtile and simple than those commonly met with. For we educe and extract many out of darknesse, which had ne∣ver come into any mans mind to investigate, save his who proceeds by a certain and constant path, to the in∣vention of causes: whereas in themselves they are of no great use; that it is cleerely evident, that they were not sought after, for themselves, but that they have directly the same reference to things and works, that the Letters of the Alphabet have to speech and words; which, though single by themselves, they are unprofitable, yet are they the Elements of all Language. § And in the choice of Reports and Experiments, we pre∣sume that we have given in better security, than they who hetherto have bin conversant in Naturall Phi∣losophy

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

for we admit nothing but by oculate faith, at least evident proofe; and that after most severe enquiry: so as nothing is reported hightned to the abusive credit of a miracle; but what we relate are chast and immacu∣late from Fables and Vanity. So also all those recei∣ved and ventilated current fictions and lies, which by a strange neglect, have for many ages bin countenanced and are become inveterate; we doe by name proscribe, and precisely note, that they may be no longer prejudi∣ciall to Sciences.* 1.2 For what one wisely observes, that Fables, Superstitions, and idle Stories, which nurses instill into young-children, doe in good earnest de∣prave their minds: so the same reason moved us, to be so religious and carefull, lest at the entrance, where we handle and take the charge of the Infancy, as it were, of Philosophy, under naturall History; she should be initiated in any vanity. § But in every new and somewhat more subtile experiment, in our opinion, certain and tryed, we yet apertly adjoyne the manner of the experiment we have practised; that after it is made apparent what the successe of every particular was with us; men might see the error which might lurke and cleave thereto; and be awaked to proofes, if any such be, more exact and secure. § In briefe, we every where sparsedly insert monitions and scruples and conjectures; ejecting and interdicting, as it were, by a sacred adjura∣tion and exorcisme, all Phantasmes. § Lastly be∣ing it is a thing most liquid unto us, how exceedingly Experience and History disperse the beams of the sight of humane Intellect; and how hard a matter it is, speci∣ally

to minds tender and preoccupate, at first entrance, to become familiar with nature; we therefore many times adde our own observations, as certain first con∣versions and inclinations, and as it were, Aspects of History to Philosophy; to the end that they may be both pledges to men, that they shall not ever be detained in the waves of History; as also that when they are once arrived to the operation of the understanding, all may be in a more preparednesse. And by this kind of Na∣turall History, as here we describe, we suppose that there may be a secure and easy accesse unto Nature; and solid and prepared matter presented unto the Vnder∣standing.

¶ Now we have both fortified and environed [P. IV] the understanding with faithfull Auxiliaries and for∣ces; and by a strict Muster raised a compleat Army of Divine works, there seemes nothing remaining but that we set upon Philosophy it selfe. But in so diffi∣cile and dubious an enterprise, there are some particu∣lars, which seem necessarily to be interposed partly for instruction, partly for present use. § Of these the first is, that the examples of Inquisition and of In∣vention, be propounded according to our rule and me∣thod represented in particular subjects; chiefly making choice of such subjects, which amongst other things to be enquired, are the most noble, and in mutuall relati∣on, most Adverse; that there may not want an example in every kind. Nor doe we speak of those examples, which for illustration sake, are annexed to every parti∣cular precept and rule, (for we have sufficiently quit

our selves hereof in the Second Part of the Work,) but we mean directly the Types and Platformes which may present as it were, to the eye, the whole Procedure of the mind, and the continued Fabrick and order of Invention, in certain selected subjects; and they various and of remarke. For it came into our mind, that in Mathematiques, the frame standing, the Demonstra∣tion inferred is facile and perspicuous; on the contrary, without this accomodation and dependency, all seems involved, and more subtile than indeed they be. Wherefore to examples of this sort we assigne the Fourth Part of our work; which indeed is nothing else, but a particular, and explicite application of the Second Part.

[P. V] ¶But the fifth Part is added only for a time, and paid as interest untill the Principall be raised. For we are not so precipitantly bent upon the end, as too slightly to passe over what we casually meet with by the way. Wherefore the Fift Part of the Work, is com∣posed of such things as we have, or found out, or expe∣rimented, or superadded; nor yet doe we performe this, by the reasons and rules of Interpretation, but by the same application of the understanding, which others in enquiry and invention use to practise. For seeing from our perpetuall converse with nature, we hope grea∣ter matters from our meditations, than we can promise to our selves from the strength of our own wit; these ob∣servations may be as tents pitched in the way, into which the mind, in pursuit of more certain Collections, may turne in, and for a while repose hir selfe. Yet in

the mean, we promise not to engage our selves upon the credit of those Observations; because they are not found out, nor tried by the right forme of Interpretation. § And there is no cause why any should distast or in∣tertain a jealousie, at that suspension of Iudgement in knowledge, which asserts not absolutely, that nothing can be known; but that nothing, without a certain order and a certain method, can be known; and yet withall, layes downe for use and ease, cer∣tain degrees of certitude, untill the mind be fixt up∣on the explication of causes.* 1.3 For neither those very Schooles of Philosophers, who downe-right maintained Acatalepsie or Incomprehensibility, have bin inferi∣or to those,* 1.4 who usurp a liberty of pronouncing sen∣tence: but they provided not, assistances to the sense, and understanding, as we have done; but utterly took away all credit and authority, which is a farre different case and almost opposite.

¶Now the sixth Part of our Work, whereto [P. VI] the rest are subservient and ministrant, doth altoge∣ther disclose, and propound that Philosophy, which is educed, and constituted out of such a legitimate sincere and severe enquiry, as we have already taught and prepared. But to consummate and perfect this last Part, is a thing exalted above our strength, and be∣yound our hopes. We have given it, as we trust, not contemptible beginnings; the prosperous successe of man∣kind shall give it issue; and peradventure such, as men, in this present state of mind and imployments, cannot easily conceive and Comprehend. And the case con∣cernes

not contemplative felicity alone, but indeed mens affaires and fortunes, and all the power of works: For Man, Natures minister and interpreter, doeth, and un∣derstands so much, as he hath by Operation or Con∣templation observed of Natures Order; nor can know or doe any more: For neither can any forces unloose and break asunder the chain of Causes; nor is nature otherwise, than by obedience unto it, vanquisht. Wherefore these two main Jntentions, Human Scien∣ces, and Human Potencies, are indeed in the same point coincident: and the frustration of works, for most part, falls out from the ignorance of Causes. § But herein the summe and perfection of all consists, if a man, never taking off the eye of his mind from the things themselves, throughly imprint their images to the life. For God defend, that we should publish the ayery dreams of our own Fancy, for the reall Ideas of the World! But rather may he be so graciously propiti∣ous unto us, that we may write the Apocalyps, and true vision of the impressions and signets of the Creator, up∣on the Creature!

Wherefore thou, O Father, who hast conferred vi∣sible Light as the Primitiae on the Creature; and breathed into the face of Man Intellectuall Light, as the accomplishment of thy works; protect and con∣duct this Work, which issueing from thy Good∣nesse, returnes to thy Glory! Thou, after thou hadst survayed the works thy hands had wrought, saw that all was exceeding Good, and hast rested: but Man survaying the works his hands had

wrought, saw that all was vanity and vexation of Spirit, and found no Rest: Wherefore if we labour with diligence, and vigilance in Thy works; thou wilt make us Participants of thy Vision, and of thy Sabbath. We humbly supplicate, that we may be of this resolution, and inspired with this mind; and that thou wouldest be pleased to endow human Race, with new Donatives by our hands; and the hands of others, in whom thou shalt implant the same SPIRIT.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Prov. 18.
• * 1.2

  Plut. de Ed. P. ex Plat. de Rep.
• * 1.3

  Academ. Vet. Nov.
• * 1.4

  Dogmat.