Of the advancement and proficience of learning; or, The partitions of sciences· Nine books. Written in Latin by the most eminent, illustrious, and famous Lord Francis Bacon Baron of Verulam, Vicount St. Alban, Councellor of Estate, and Lord Chancellor of England. Interpreted by Gilbert Watts.

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Title
Of the advancement and proficience of learning; or, The partitions of sciences· Nine books. Written in Latin by the most eminent, illustrious, and famous Lord Francis Bacon Baron of Verulam, Vicount St. Alban, Councellor of Estate, and Lord Chancellor of England. Interpreted by Gilbert Watts.
Author
Bacon, Francis, 1561-1626.
Publication
Oxford :: printed by Leon Lichfield printer to the University, for Robert Young and Edward Forrest,
1640.
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Subject terms
Science -- Methodology -- Early works to 1800.
Logic -- Early works to 1800.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A72146.0001.001
Cite this Item
"Of the advancement and proficience of learning; or, The partitions of sciences· Nine books. Written in Latin by the most eminent, illustrious, and famous Lord Francis Bacon Baron of Verulam, Vicount St. Alban, Councellor of Estate, and Lord Chancellor of England. Interpreted by Gilbert Watts." In the digital collection Early English Books Online 2. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A72146.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 2, 2024.

Pages

THE REPREHENSION.

THe Fallax of this Colour is. First when a man doth over-conceive, or prejudicate of the greatnesse of any thing, com∣prehending it beyond the true limits of Magnitude; for then the breaking of it will make it seem lesse, and rectify that false opinion, and present the object in its native verity, and not with amplifica∣tion. Wherefore if a man be in sicknesse or in paine, the time will seem longer to him without a Clock or an

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Hower-glasse, then if it were measured with them: for if the wearisomenesse, and vexation of a disease, make the time seeme longer then in truth it is; yet the computation of time reformes that mistake, and makes it shorter than that erroneous opinion conceived it to be. So in a dead Plaine (whereof even now we gave a contrary instance) it some∣times falls out, for though at first the eye preconceiv'd the way shorter, because it was undivided, yet if upon this sup∣position, an opinion possesse the imagination of a farre shorter space of ground then it proves to be, the frustrating of that vaine conceit, makes it seem longer than the truth. Therefore if any man desire to humor and second the false opinion of another, touching the greatnesse of any thing, let him beware of distributions, and breaking it in severall considerations, but let him out of hand extoll the matter en∣tire, and in the grosse. Secondly this Colour deceives when the Distribution is distracted or scattered, or is not presented intire, or doth not at once object it selfe to the sight. Therefore if flow∣ers in a Garden be divided into severall bedds, they will shew more than if they were all growing in one bed; so the Beds be within a plot that they be the object of view at once; otherwise, union is of more force in this case than scattered distribution. Therefore their Revenues seem greater, whose Lands and Livings lye together in one shire; for if they were dispersed, they would not fall so easily within notice and comprehension. Thirdly this Colour de∣ceives in respect of the dignity of unity above multitude; for all composition is a sure mark of deficiency, in particularities several∣ly considered, which thus pieces out one thing with the addition of another. Et quae non prosunt singula multa juvant. And therefore Mary had chosen the better part; Martha, Martha,* 1.1 attendis ad plurima, unum sufficit. Hereupon Aesop, framed the fable of the Fox and the Cat. The Fox bragged what a number of shifts and devices he had to get from the Hounds; the Cat said she had but one only way to trust to, which was this; she had a poore slender faculty in climbing up a Tree. which yet in proof was a surer guard then all Vulpones policies & strata∣gems,

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whereof the proverb grew, multa novit Vulpes,* 1.2 sed Felis unum magnum, the Fox knowes many practises, but the Cat one speciall; one that will help at a dead lift. And in the Morall of this Fable it comes likewise to passe, that a potent and faithfull friend, is a surer card at a pinch, then all the Plots and Policies of a mans own wit.

And these shall suffice for example: we have an infinite number more of Colours, of this nature, which we collected in our youth; but without their Jllustrations and Reprehensi∣ons, which at this time we have no leasure to perfect and di∣gest; wherefore we thought it incongruous to expose those Colours naked, without their Illustrations, seeing these other come abroad attired. Yet thus much in the mean we admo∣nish, that this branch of knowledge, in our judgement, whatsoever it may seem, is of no contemptible consequence, but a matter of high price and use, as that which partici∣pates both of Primitive, Philosophy, of Policy, and of Rhetho∣rique. Thus much of Popular markes, or of the Colours of Good and Evill in apparance, as well simple as comparative.

III. A second collection which appertaines to a ready Provision, or Preparatory store,✿ 1.3 is that which Cicero intimates (as we have noted before in Logique) where he gives it in precept, that we have Common-places in ready preparation argued and handled Pro and Contra; such as are For the words and letters of Law, for the sence and mind of Law, and the like. And we extend this Precept to other things also; as that it may be applied, not only to Judiciall Formes; but to Delibe∣rative and Demonstrative also. Generally this is it we would have done; namely, that we have all Places, whereof there is more frequent use (whether we respect Probations and Confutations; or Perswasions and Disswasions; or Praises and Vituperations;) studied and meditated before-hand, and the same extoll'd and depressed by the highest straines of wit and invention; and perversely wrested, as it were, of purpose utterly beyond Truth. And in our opinion the manner of this Collection, as well for use as for brevity, would be the best of such common-places, and seeds of severall

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Arguments were abridg'd and cast up into some briefe and acute sentences, as into skaines or bottomes of Thread to be drawn out, and unwinded into larger Discourses as occasion should be presented.* 1.4 A collection of this nature we find in Se∣neca, but in suppositions only or Cases. Of this sort (in re∣gard we have many ready prepared) we thought good to set down some of them for example; These we call Anti∣theta Rerum.

Notes

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