Of the advancement and proficience of learning; or, The partitions of sciences· Nine books. Written in Latin by the most eminent, illustrious, and famous Lord Francis Bacon Baron of Verulam, Vicount St. Alban, Councellor of Estate, and Lord Chancellor of England. Interpreted by Gilbert Watts.

CAP. II. 1. The Doctrine touching the Method of Speech is assigned a sub∣stantiall and principall part of Traditive knowledge: It is entitu∣led, The wisedome of Deliverie. 2. The divers kindes of Me∣thods are enumerated: their Profits and Disprofits are annexed. 3. The parts of Method two.

I. LEt us now come to the doctrine concerning the Method of Speech: This hath bin handled as a part of Logick, so it hath found a place in Rhetoricke by the name of Disposition. But the placeing of it as a part of the Traine of other Arts, hath bin the cause that many things which referre unto it, and are usefull to be knowne, are pretermiss'd: wherefore we thought good, to constitute a substantiall and principall Doctrine touching Method, which by a generall name we call the wisedome of Tradition. The kinds of Method, seeing they are divers, we will rather reckon them up, then divide them. But for one onely Method, and continued Dichotomies we neede not speake much of them; for it was a little Cloude of knowledge which was soon dispersed. Certainly a triviall invention, and an infinite prejudice to Sciences; for these Dichotomists, when they would wrest all things to the Lawes of their Method, and whatsoever doth not aptly fall within those Dichotomies they would either omitt or bow contrarie to their naturall inclination; they bring it so to passe, that the Kernels and Graines of Sciences leape out, and they claspe and

inclose onely the drie and emptie huskes: So this kinde of Method brings forth fruitlesse Compends, destroyes the substance of Sci∣ences.

II. Wherefore let the first difference of Method be set downe, to be either Magistrall or Initiative: neither do wee so understand the word Initiative, as if this should lay the ground-worke, the other raise the perfect building of Scien∣ces; but in a farre different sense, (borrowing the word from sacred Ceremonies) wee call that Initiative Method, which discloseth and unvailes the Mysteries of Knowledges: For Magistrall teacheth, Initiative insinuateth: Magistrall requires our beliefe to what is delivered, but Initiative that it may rather be submitted to examination.✚ 1.1 The one delivers popular Sci∣ences fit for Learners; the other Sciences as to the Sonnes of Science: In summe, the one is referred to the use of Sciences as they now are; the other to their continuation, and further propagation. The latter of these, seemes to bee a deserted and an inclosed path. For Knowledges are now delivered, as if both Teacher and Scholler sought to lay claime to errour, as upon contract. For hee that teacheth, teacheth in such a manner as may best bee beleeved, not as may bee best examined: and hee that learneth, desires rather pre∣sent satisfaction, then to expect a just and stayed enquirie; and rather not to doubt, then not to erre: So as both the Master, out of a desire of glorie, is watchfull, that hee betray not the weake∣nesse of his knowledge; and the Scholler, out of an averse dis∣position to labour, will not try his owne strength. But Know∣ledge, which is delivered as a thread to bee spunne on, ought to bee intimated (if it were possible) into the minde of another, in the same method wherein it was at first invented. And surely this may bee done in knowledge acquired by Induction: But in this same anticipated and prevented knowledge, which wee use, a man cannot easily say by what course of study hee came to the knowledge hee hath obtained. But yet certainly more or lesse a man may revisite his owne Knowledge, and measure over againe the

footsteps of his Knowledge, and of his consent; and by this meanes so transplant Science into the mind of another, as it grew in his owne. For it is in Arts, as it is in Plants; if you meane to use the Plant, it is no matter for the Roots; but if you would remove into another soyle, than it te more assu∣red to rest upon roots than slips. So the Delivery of Know∣ledge, as it is now used, doth present unto us faire Bodies indeed of Sciences, but without the Roots; good, doubtlesse for the Car∣penter, but not for the Planter. But if you will have Sciences grow, you need not be so sollicitous for the Bodies; apply all your care that the Roots may be taken up sound, and entire, with some litle earth cleaving to them. Of which kind of Delivery, the Method of the Mathematiques in that subject, hath some shadow, but generally I see it neither put in ure, nor put in Inquisition; and therefore number it amongst DE∣FICIENTS; and we will call it Traditionem Lampadis, the De∣livery of the Lampe, or the Method bequeathed to the sonnes of Sapience.

§ Another diversity of Method followeth, in the intention like the former, but for most part contrary in the issue. In this both these Methods agree, that they separate the vulgar Auditors from the select; here they differ, that the former in∣troduceth a more open way of Delivery than is usuall; the other (of which we shall now speake) a more reserved & se∣cret. Let therefore the distinction of them be this, that the one is an Exotericall or revealed; the other an Acroamaticall, or con∣cealed Method. For the same difference the Ancients special∣ly observed in publishing Books, the same we will trans∣ferre to the manner it selfe of Delivery. So the Acroamatique Method was in use with the Writers of former Ages, and wisely, and with judgment applied; but that Acroamatique and Aenigmatique kind of expression is disgraced in these later times, by many who have made it as a dubious and false light, for the vent of their counterfeit merchandice. But the pretence thereof seemeth to be this, that by the in∣tricate envelopings of Delivery, the Prophane Vulgar may be removed from the secrets of Sciences; and they only ad∣mitted,

which had either acquired the interpretation of Pa∣rables by Tradition from their Teachers; or by the sharp∣nesse and subtlety of their own wit, could pierce the veile.

§ Another diversity of Method followes, of great conse∣quence to Sciences, which is when Sciences are delivered by way of Aphorisme; or Methods. For it is a thing worthy to be precisely noted, that it hath bin often taken into Custome, that men out of a few Axiomes and Observations upon a∣ny Subject, have made a compleat and solemne Art, filling it with some discourses of wit, illustrating it with examples, and knitting it togither by some Method. But that other way of Delivery by Aphorismes, brings with it many advantages, whereto Delivery by Method doth not approach. For first it tries the Writer whether he be superficial or solid in know∣ledge. For Aphorismes except they should be altogither ridi∣culous, cannot be made but out of the pyth and heart of Sci∣ences: For Illustration and Excussion are cut off; variety of examples is cut off; Deduction and Connexion are cut off; Description of Practice is cut off; so there remaineth no∣thing to fill the Aphorismes, but a good quantity of observa∣tions. And therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will attempt to write Aphorismes, who is not copiously furnish't, and solidly grounded. But in Methods,

* 1.2—Tantum series, junctura{que} pollet: Tantum de medio sumptis accedit Honoris.

As oftentimes they make a great shew of (I know not what) singular Art, which if they were disjoynted, separa∣ted, and laid open, would come to litle or nothing. Secondly Methodicall Delivery is more fit to win consent or beliefe; but lesse fit to point to Action; for they carry a shew of De∣monstration in or be or Circle, one part illuminating another; and therefore doe more satisfie the understanding; but be∣ing that Actions in common course of life are disperst, and not orderly digested, they doe best agree with dispersed Di∣rections. Lastly Aphorismes representing certaine Portions only, and as it were fragments of Sciences, invite others to contribute, and adde something; whereas Methodicall Deli∣very

carrying shew of a totall & perfect Knowledge forth∣with secureth men as if they were at the furthest.

§ An other diversity of Method followes, which is likewise of great waight, which is when Sciences are deli∣vered either by Assertions with their Proofes annext; or by Questions togither with their Determinations. The later kind whereof if it be immoderately followed, is as prejudicious to the progression of Sciences, as it is to the fortunes and proceedings of an Army, to goe about to besiege every title Fort or Hold. For if the field be kept, and the summe of the enterprize with diligence pursued, those smaller places will come in of themselves. Yet this I cannot deny, that it is not alway safe to leave any great, and fortified towne at his back. In like manner the use of Confutations in the Delivery of Sciences ought to be very sparing, and to serve only to re∣move and breake strong Preoccupations and Prejudgments of mens minds, and not to excite and provoke smaller Doubts.

§ Another diversity of Method followeth which is that the Method be accommodated to the purposed matter which is to be handled. For there is a great difference in Delivery of the Mathematiques, which are of knowledges the most abstra∣cted and most simple; and the Politiques which are the most immersed and compounded: Neither can an uniformi∣ty of Method (as we have observ'd already) be fitly sorted with multi-formity of Matter; and therefore as we have al∣lowed Particular Topiques for Invention; so we would like∣wise in some measure have Particular Methods for Tradition.

§ Another diversity of Method followeth, with judgment to be practis'd in the Delivery of Sciences; and it is directed according to the light of Informations, and anticipations, of the Knowledge to be delivered, infused, and impressed in the minds of the Learners. For that Knowledge which is new and forraine to mens minds, is to be delivered in an other forme than that which by long-receiv'd, and imbibed opi∣nions is naturalized and made familiar: And therefore Ari∣stotle when he thinks to taxe Democritus doth in truth com∣mend

him, where he saith, If we shall indeed dispute, and not follow after similitudes &c. Charging it as a defect upon De∣mocritus that he was too copious in Comparisons. But those whose conceits are seated in popular opinions, have nothing else to doe but to dispute and prove. Whereas on the contrary those whose conceits are beyond popular opinions, have a double labour; first, that what they produce may be conceiv'd; then, that they be proved. So that it is of necessity with them to have recourse to Similitudes and Translations, whereby they may insinuate themselves into mens capacities. Therefore we see in the infancy of Learning, in rude times, when those Compre∣hensions which are now Vulgar and triviall, were then new and unheard of; the world was full of Parables and Si∣militudes; for otherwise men would have passed over with∣out mark or due attention, or else rejected for Paradoxes, that which was propounded. For it is a rule of Traditive Art, That whatsoever Science is not consonant to Anticipations or Presuppositions, must pray in ayd of Similitudes and Compa∣risons. And thus much of the diverse sorts of Methods, name∣ly such as have not heretofore bin noted by others. As for those other Methods, Analytique; Systatique; Dieritique; Cryp∣tique; Homericall, and the like; they have bin well invented and distributed; nor doe we see any cause why we should dwell upon them.

III But these are the kinds of Method; the Parts are two; the one of the Disposition of a whole worke, or of the Argument of some Book; the other of the Limitation of Propositions. For there belongs to Architecture not only the frame of the whole Building; but likewise the forme and figure of the Columnes; Beames, and the like; and Method is as it were the Architecture of Sciences.* 1.3 And herein Ramus merited better a great deale in reviving those excellent Rules 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; than in obtruding one only Method and Dichotomie. But it falls out, I know not by what fate, that of humane things (according as the Poets often faigne) the most pre∣cious have the most pernicious Keepers. Certainly diligent en∣deavours about the ranke and file of Propositions, cast him

upon those Epitomes and shallowes of Sciences; for he had need set out in a lucky houre, and to goe on by the conduct of a happy Genius, that attempts to make Axiomes of Scien∣ces Convertible; and yet withall not make them Circular, or returning into themselves; notwitstanding we deny not, but that Ramus intention in this kind was profitable. There re∣maines yet two Limitations of Propositions; besides that they may be made Convertible; the one touching the Extension; the other touching the Production of them. Surely Know∣ledges have, if a man marke it well two other dimensions besides Profunditie; namely Latitude and Longitude. For Profunditie is referr'd to the Truth and Reality of them; and these make them solid. As for the other two, Latitude may be taken and reckoned of Science into Science; Longitude may be accepted and understood from the higest generall Proposition, to the lowest particular in the same science. The one comprehends the bounds and true limits of Sciences, that Propositions may be properly, not promiscuously han∣dled; and that all Repetition; Excursion, & Confusion may be avoided: the other gives rule how farre, and to what de∣gree of Particularitie, Propositions of sciences may be dedu∣ced. Certainly there is no doubt but somewhat must be left to use and Practice; for we ought to avoid the precise error of Antoninus Pius, that we be not Cumini sectores in Scientijs,* 1.4 Mincers of Commin in sciences; nor that we multiply divisions to the lowest Particularity. Wherefore how we should mo∣derate our selves in this point, is well worth the inquiry. For we see too remove Generalities unlesse they be drawne downe, doe litle informe, nay rather expose Knowledge to the scorne of Practicall men; and are no more ayding to Practice, than an Ortelius Vniversall Mappe is to direct the way between London and York. Surely the better sort of Rules have not unfitly bin compared to Glasses of steele, wherein you may see the Images of things, but first they must be filed and burnisht: so Rules and Precepts doe then help, after they have bin laboured and polisht by Practice; but if those Rules may be made cleere and Chrystalline a∣fore-hand,

it would be the more excellent, because they would lesse stand in need of diligence, labour, and exercise after. And thus much of the Knowledge of Method, which we have named the Wisdome of Delivery. Nor can we here pre∣termit that many more vain-glorious, than learned have la∣boured about a Method, which is not worthy the name of a lawfull Method, seeing it is rather a Method of Imposture; which yet to some vaporous, and vain-boasting natures, without doubt hath bin most acceptible. This Method doth so sprinkle drops of any Knowledge, that any halfe-learned Clark may with a litle superficiary Knowledge make a glo∣rious shew.* 1.5 Such was the Art of Lullius; such the Typocos∣mie drawne by many; which were nothing else but a heap and masse of words of all Arts, to give men countenance; that those which have the termes of Art, might be thought to understand the Arts themselves. Which kind of Collecti∣ons are like a Frippers or Brokers shop, that hath ends of e∣very thing, but nothing of worth.

Notes

• ✚ 1.1

  TRADITIO LAMPADIS, SIVE ME∣THODUS AD FILIOS.
• * 1.2

  Horat. de Art. P.
• * 1.3

  Ramus.
• * 1.4

  Dion. in Anton. P.
• * 1.5

  Lullius.