is a sign, that (in some sort) he willeth it. But where the Creature needs God's actual help, yea, his special Grace to perform any act, I think his bare Permission is no such sign that he willeth the Event. If it be, sure God willeth the Sanctification, or Re∣pentance of Reprobates, when he doth so much more than permit it; (except we take up Dr. Twisse's poor conceit, that Actus elicitus volendi videtur propriè dici non posse impediri. Quia tum dici solet aliquis impediri, cum non sinitur facere quod vult. Vind. Grat. l. 2. part. 2. Digres. 6. p. 360. As if the not-hindering of an Active Power to move, ac∣cording to the inclination of its Habits, and the drawing of its Object, were not properly Permission.) If you take permittere, either properly for non-im∣pedire, as it respecteth Acts; or improperly, for non-alteration, as it respecteth Qualities: In both senses, Permission is no sign that God willeth the Event. I believe you judg, that Twiss in his Digression hath justly questioned Perkin's saying, Quicquid non im∣pedit Deus, ideo evenit quia Deus non impedit.
All this I speak of Permission-Natural; for as for Moral-Permission, either per Legem, vel in Mori∣bus, it is beyond all doubt, that it is no sign infalli∣ble of God's willing the Event of the thing permit∣ted. And for Austin's saying (cited so commonly) what is it to your purpose? If it be true, that Non fit aliquid nisi omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo, &c. (the [fit] is the signum;) doth it therefore follow, that Non permittitur aliquid nisi quod Deus fieri ve∣lit? But if Permission be a sign of God's Will, what shall we think of that Doctrine, that denieth that there is any such thing as God's Permission of any Action that ever was done in the World? I think