A treatise of justifying righteousness in two books ... : all published instead of a fuller answer to the assaults in Dr. Tullies Justificatio Paulina ... / by Richard Baxter.

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Title
A treatise of justifying righteousness in two books ... : all published instead of a fuller answer to the assaults in Dr. Tullies Justificatio Paulina ... / by Richard Baxter.
Author
Baxter, Richard, 1615-1691.
Publication
London :: Printed for Nevil Simons and Jonath. Robinson ...,
1676.
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"A treatise of justifying righteousness in two books ... : all published instead of a fuller answer to the assaults in Dr. Tullies Justificatio Paulina ... / by Richard Baxter." In the digital collection Early English Books Online 2. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A69541.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 13, 2024.

Pages

Reply.

1. I never intended when I wrote that, to assert, That Impletion was an uncertain sign of God's Will: But the other four signs are uncertain, as to the Event. But I see I should have so cautelously expressed my self, that my speech might not have been so liable to misinterpretation. Yet if I mi∣stake not the usual meaning of the Schoolmen, that under the Will Beneplaciti & signi, even under each branch, they comprehended God's Will about whatsoever Object; then Impletio Voluntatis Bene∣placiti de Eventu non est signum Voluntatis Benepla∣citi de Jure. The killing of Christ was no sign, that it was God's Pleasure that it should be the Jews duty to kill him. Your yielding the three first to be uncertain signs, shews that the Schoolmens Distincti∣on

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is not the same with mine: For they are not un∣certain signs of God's Immanent Will de Debito.

2. I perceive no proof of your Assertion, That Per∣mission is a certain sign of God's Will de Eventu: [If God permit a thing (say you) to be done, it is a cer∣tain sign it is his Will to have it done.] I believe not this. Indeed, if a thing be done on God's Permission, it is a certain sign he would permit it to be done: But not, if he permit it, therefore would he have it done; that is, the event (that it is done) whether by Permissi∣on, or Efficiency, is a certain sign that he Willed that Event, or to permit that Event. But the Permission is no such sign that he Willed the Event, but only it is a sign that he Willed that Permission. For God per∣mitteth that which never cometh to pass. Doth he not permit the wicked to amend? the Drunkard to be sober? &c. I think he doth per∣mit * 1.1 it, and more than permit it. Indeed, where the Creature hath a natural, or adventitious incli∣nation to the Act (as a stone to fall downward, a sin∣ner to do wicked∣ly, &c.) and there are the mediums at hand which are ne∣cessary thereto, there Gods bare Permissi∣on is certainly con∣nexed to the following Event; and consequently,

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is a sign, that (in some sort) he willeth it. But where the Creature needs God's actual help, yea, his special Grace to perform any act, I think his bare Permission is no such sign that he willeth the Event. If it be, sure God willeth the Sanctification, or Re∣pentance of Reprobates, when he doth so much more than permit it; (except we take up Dr. Twisse's poor conceit, that Actus elicitus volendi videtur propriè dici non posse impediri. Quia tum dici solet aliquis impediri, cum non sinitur facere quod vult. Vind. Grat. l. 2. part. 2. Digres. 6. p. 360. As if the not-hindering of an Active Power to move, ac∣cording to the inclination of its Habits, and the drawing of its Object, were not properly Permission.) If you take permittere, either properly for non-im∣pedire, as it respecteth Acts; or improperly, for non-alteration, as it respecteth Qualities: In both senses, Permission is no sign that God willeth the Event. I believe you judg, that Twiss in his Digression hath justly questioned Perkin's saying, Quicquid non im∣pedit Deus, ideo evenit quia Deus non impedit.

All this I speak of Permission-Natural; for as for Moral-Permission, either per Legem, vel in Mori∣bus, it is beyond all doubt, that it is no sign infalli∣ble of God's willing the Event of the thing permit∣ted. And for Austin's saying (cited so commonly) what is it to your purpose? If it be true, that Non fit aliquid nisi omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo, &c. (the [fit] is the signum;) doth it therefore follow, that Non permittitur aliquid nisi quod Deus fieri ve∣lit? But if Permission be a sign of God's Will, what shall we think of that Doctrine, that denieth that there is any such thing as God's Permission of any Action that ever was done in the World? I think

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the Doctrine of [The Necessity of Physical efficient Predetermination to every act of the Creature,] is guilty of this, as its direct Consequence (if I may so far excur) which yet some Divines, especially Twiss, do lay so great weight on; when it is not from Christ, or Paul, but the Dominicans. For how can God be said to permit that act, which he is the principal determining efficient Cause of.

As for your Allegation out of Aqu. Twiss, and Rutherford, that they mean as I: I answer, 1. Their making Voluntas signi but Metaphorically Voluntas, shews the contrary. 2. You confess that it is but [so far forth as this Signum is Praeceptum:] But then sure the Distinction, 1. Speaking de signo ut signo, & de praecepto ut signo; and 2. Of four more signs, cannot be the same with mine. 3. Twisse's is above half the same as mine; for indeed I re∣ceived it from him: But, 1. He saw further into it than the Schoolmen (or than most of our own) and Rutherford follows him. 2. Yet he seems to take no notice of the Immanent Will de Debito, whereof the Precept is signum: Nor yet doth he extend it to the whole Law, but only to Precept: Nor do I find him speaking, as you friendly inter∣pret him, that [It is properly the sign, or significa∣tion of his Will, &c.] I make God's Will de Debito (which I shall take leave to call, his Legislative, or Ethical Will) to stand at the top in the Series of our Ethicks, indeed the Fountain of all Due: And his Will de Ente, vel Eventu, to stand at the top of our Philosophy de Ente. Lastly, I will not contend any more about this, seeing I am glad if you be in the right: For as it confirmeth me, to have you of my Judgment; so will it do more, to have so many such as those named.

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