Monarchy asserted, or, The state of monarchicall & popular government in vindication of the consideration upon Mr. Harrington's Oceana / by M. Wren.

CHAP. IX.

Whether Monarchy coming up to the Perfecti∣on of the Kind, come short of the Perfecti∣on of Government, and have some Flaw in it?

IT can not be with Reason expected that I should assert Monarchie to be so far Privileg∣ed as not to have a Flaw in it; For having in the preceding Discourse laid it down for a Max∣ime, That Men will eternally mistake the Point of Government, and think it their Interest to Sub∣vert the Supream Power, I should now contra∣dict my self by affirming that of Monarchicall Government in particular, which I before deni∣ed of all Government in Generall. Yet does not Mr Harrington gaine any Advantage by this, For though I confess that Monarchie comes not up to the imaginary Perfection of Government which He dreams of, but is indeed neither in a Monarchie nor a Commonwealth, nor yet in Na∣ture, I am not at all diffident of making Good, That a Supream Hereditary Monarchie attaines to a greater Degree of Perfection, and has fewer Flaws in it then a Commonwealth or any other kind of Government.

I do not think it needfull to repeat either the Principles or Conclusions of the last Chapter, Only it will be usefull to examine somewhat more at large the Causes or Reasons why Men are not content with the Government they live

under, but do by a continuall Indeavour to subvert the Sovereign Power, disturb it with Se∣dition. Of which in Generall three Reasons may be assigned.

The first is a Desire of Immunity from Pu∣nishment in such Persons as have by their Crimes render'd themselves obnoxious to the Lawes; For it being impossible as long as Men are subject to Passions, but that such Faults will be committed as the Sovereign Power has thought fit to punish with Death or the loss of Estate, The Persons who have commited those Faults will indubitably seek to avoid the Pu∣nishment, which can not be done but by raising a Party able to resist the Sovereign Power. And as Criminall Persons seek to avoid Punishment for Crimes already committed, So Persons ex∣treamly in Debt or Indigent, who being desti∣tute of that Industrie which might procure them a Subsistence in a Regular Way, know not how to live but by Rapine and Invading other Men's Propriety desire to disturb the Government that they may find Security in those Crimes which for the Future they resolve to Commit.

The second is a Want of Judgment to discern the Miseries which attend War; For when a Peo∣ple have so long injoyed Peace that the Memory of the wretched Effects of a Civill War is defa∣ced, They are very Frequently deafe to the Ad∣monitions of Wiser Men, to the Histories of for∣mer times, and to the Example of other Nati∣ons, And so out of meer Wantoness throw away their own Happiness, by suffering themselves to

be ingaged in a War against the Sovereign, the Consequences of which they had never taken the least pains to Consider. And to this they are very easily brought, whensoever those Men who are by some other Motive ingaged to seek the subversion of the Government, have Credit enough with the People to impose a Cheat upon them, by making Use of the Names of Religion or Liberty, or some other like specious Pretence.

The third is that Desire of Power which Men commonly understand by the Name of Ambiti∣on; This seems so twisted with the being of Man that it is thought naturall to him, and no more separable then his Affections or Passions. Yet if any Ambitious Man should take himself to a strict Account, and demand a Reason of his own Thoughts and Actions, If He should contemplate Power with all the Dangers, Cares, and Inquie∣tudes intayled upon it, And strip it of that gaw∣dy Dress with which the Deluded World has adorned it, He would find his Pursuit of Pow∣er extreamly Irrationall, unless so far as it did necessarily conduce to his own Preservation. The Desire of self Preservation was (as I said formerly) the first step to Government, and the Institution of Sovereign Power was the Caution that every Man had of every other Man for his Preservation; Yet this did not satisfy, because it quickly appeared that though good Laws were ordained for every Man's Protection, yet they could not alwaies come in time enough to pre∣vent particular Mischiefs, So that Men judged it Rationall, besides the generall Protection they

injoyed from the Sovereign, to arme them∣selves with a particular Power against particu∣lar Dangers. Nor did Men stop here, but out of their incurable Suspition of all other Men, They became as much afraid of the Sovereign Power as they were before of one another, And so continually endeavoured to acquire such Power as might even defend them from the Sovereign, which Design could never be thought fully attained by them untill the Sovereign Pow∣er it self was in their Possession.

The Desire then of such a Power as may pre∣serve a Man, in such Cases where the Laws are not sufficient to do it, from other private Men, implying a Submission to the Sovereign, and a∣cting in a Method not prohibited by him, can never bring danger to Government. But the Desire of a Power able to defend them from the Sovereign, is properly that Ambition which is the Fountaine from whence flow the chiefest Dangers that threaten Government, And is al∣waies unjust though more or less condemnable according to the Temper of those who injoy the Sovereign Power; For if They are just and Vertuous Persons, and use not to make any In∣vasions on the Lives and Fortunes of their Sub∣jects, this Ambition is the more Criminall be∣cause the first Motive to it was false and Irratio∣nall; But if they are known Oppressors of the People, and such who consider not that They injure themselves by trampling upon the Lives and Fortunes of their Subjects, It is a little more excusable, being an indeavour (though

by an unjust Method) of preserving such Things as deserve not to be wilfully thrown away.

I have studiously abstained from reckoning the Desire of Riches among the Causes of Sedi∣tion; For if it be a Desire of Moderate Riches such as are subservient to the Necessities or Conveniences of Man's Life, or to the attaining Innocent and Honest Pleasures, They may with far greater ease and Probability be acquired by private and Legall Industrie then by disturbing the Government; And it is in Experience that those Men who are most taken up with this De∣sign, are of all People the least turbulent, and do most abominate Commotions. But if it be a Desire of excessive Riches, such Riches can not be desirable in themselves but only as They are the Instruments of Power; And so this Desire is to be reduced to the Desire of Power.

If Revenge, Love, or any other Passion has sometimes given the first Impulse to the Disso∣lution of Government, these Accidents are so Particular and Infrequent, that they can not de∣serve to have Place in a Generall Discourse.

Having thus in generall discovered the first Causes of Sedition in all Government, the next Work must be to show by what Art or Provi∣dence the Sovereign may prevent the Mischief, and suspend the Effects in their Causes. And for obviating the first Cause of Sedition, many particular Cares are necessary; As the diligent Execution of Lawes, that so every Offence may be overtaken by the Punishment; then the En∣couragement

of Manufactures and Traffique which fetching Wealth from abroad, cure the Subject of Want and Necessity at home; After that a Prohibition of Excess in such things (as Gaming, Clothes, and the like) by which Men go in Chace of Poverty; And last of all, When notwithstanding all these Cares, Crimi∣nall and Indigent Persons grow Numerous, A seasonable Dreyning of them away by a Foreign War or Plantations.

The Prevention of the second Cause of Sedi∣tions consists in having the People sufficiently instructed in the Sad and Miserable Conse∣quences of a Civill War, in Comparison of which the greatest Pressures under the worst of Governments are no Evils. But it must be con∣fest that this is a Text upon which the Wise part of the World has used in vaine to Preach to the Fooles, And therefore there is a mix∣ture of Fortune in it, which very much secures those Princes who come in just upon the last Act of a Civill War; For there being no Man then alive in whom there is not a fresh Memo∣rie of the Calamities of War, They have them in such Detestation, as that They are willing to suffer any thing rather then be a second time plunged into that miserable Condition.

Against the third Cause of Seditions, the Virtue and Innocence of the Prince is a Grand Remedy; for if his Subjects find Protection from him against all other Men, and have no just ground to suspect any Prejudice from him in their Lives or Fortunes, It would be despe∣rately

unreasonable to enter into any Diffidence of Him, or out of an Ambitious Desire of Pow∣er, to seek to subvert the Government. Yet be∣cause all Mankind are not Philosophers, And a great part of those over whom Sovereign Power is to be exercised, are not guided by Reason, but misled by Passion and false Consequences, It will be necessary to arm a Sovereign with somewhat more then his own Innocence, and give him a Power sufficient to repress those Brutish and Irrationall Subjects.

Here then it will concern Us to inquire what are the Advantages of the Sovereign over his Subjects. It is manifest that these consist not in the personall strength of a Monarch, nor yet of a Sovereign Assembly; For the first is but the strength of one Man, and the other but of a few Men, who beare no Proportion to those who are to be governed by them: Therefore the Advantages of the Sovereign Power proceed from this, That their Subjects have given up their particular strengths to be imployed at the Discretion of the Sovereign, So that in the So∣vereign the diffused strength of a Multitude is united in One Person, which in a Monarchy is a Naturall Person, in a State an Artificiall One procreated by a majority of Votes. The Desire in particular Men of retracting this Gift, or Reassuming the Power they had confer∣red upon the Sovereign, (which proceeds from some of the Causes already mentioned but most particularly from the third) is the begin∣ning of all Sedition; This at first can be the De∣sire

of but One Man, who upon discovery of Symptomes of like Inclinations may impart it to some Few, and they afterward Communicate it to more, so as at length to be able to form a Party sufficient to disturb the Government with Sedition. So that in Effect, the Advantage of the Sovereign over his Mutinous Subjects, is the same that an United strength has over a divided One, or an Army over a greater Multitude of dispersed and Scattered People. In consequence of which it may be inferred, That the Great Art of Governing (next to that of withdrawing the Causes and Matter of Sedition by the Virtue & Innocence of the Sovereign's Actions) con∣sists in being verst in those Methods by which a Number of Discontented Persons may be hin∣derd from becoming a Party, that is framing such a Correspondence among themselves as to be able to Act with one Common Consent and Design.

To discourse of the Vigilance of the Sove∣reign in observing all the Motions of his Sub∣jects, or of the Intelligence He ought to main∣tain for discovering all their Cabals, belongs not to this Place; These things are according to the different Complexions of Times and Af∣faires infinitely various, and depend every where upon the particular Sufficiency of the Ministers. Only I may observe, That where there are con∣stant Assemblies of any considerable part of the People which depend not wholly upon the So∣vereign, both as to the times of their Conven∣tion and Dissolution, and as to the Matter and

Manner of their Consulations, such Assemblies do easily become the Cradles of Sedition, and are therefore very Dangerous, and scarse to be with Prudence permitted by the Sovereign.

Let Us therefore consider a Sedition as ready to go alone, and just fitted to walk abroad and take the Aire. The first Steps of it must neces∣sarily be infirm and staggering, For They who first Discover themselves are sure to be imme∣diately attaqued by the United Force of the So∣vereign, against which They can have little hope to prevaile; For their own Party being unsetled and Raw, And that of the Sovereign formed before hand the Oddes must needs be very Great; And therefore the Broachers of Seditions, are generally Men altogether Despe∣rate, who despise the Certitude of those Dan∣gers by which all Considering Men are deter∣red. This then is the Grand Security of all So∣vereigns, whether single Persons or Assemblies, That the united Force of their Subjects with which They are invested, is sufficient to sup∣press the Beginnings of all Seditions, And be∣yond this No Government has any Amulets that can preserve it; For if some Seditions have been suppressed after they were broke out into actu∣all Civill Wars, That has not been by any Vir∣tue of the Government, but is to be attributed to the same Causes that serve to determine the Successes of Wars between distinct Sovereign Powers. And therefore No Sovereign ought to expect his safety from any Frame or Temper of the Government, or from the settled orders

of the Commonwealth, but from his own Vir∣tue in withdrawing the Matter, his Prudence and Dexterity in preventing the Contrivance, And his Celerity and Resolution in suppressing the Beginnings of Seditions.

What then remaines is only to take a View of the particular Method which a Monarch is capacitated to observe, in order to his Secu∣rity, And to Compare it with the Methods of other Governments. Seeing the first Compact of every Man to part with his private Power, upon which Sovereignty was founded, is by experience found too weak to support the Go∣vernment, All Monarchs have found it necessary to communicate some Part of this Power with which themselves are vested, to some subordi∣nate Ministers who by this have a more pecu∣liar Interest in the safety of the Monarch then the rest of his Subjects, and therefore are more likely in any Danger to stand by him: This Pow∣er according to the severall Intentions of the Monarch, either upon the Death of the Person to whom it was committed reverts again to the Monarch, or is transmitted to his next Heire, as one from whom the Monarch has reason to expect the same Services; This last Case is the Generation of a Nobility, who use to be distin∣guish't from other Men by such Titles with which the Monarch has thought fit to adorn them. And because Riches (whether in Land or other Revenue) are a principall Fountain of all such Power as is subordinate to the Sove∣reign Power, either the Nobility uses to have

considerable Riches conferred upon them by the Sovereign, or else such Persons as by their own Industrie have attained considerable Riches are advanced to be of the Nobility. Thus has a Monarch attained the first Degree of his Security, That there are a considerable Num∣ber of Persons who being intrusted with some Portion of Power by him, have by that both an Ability and Interest to defend him against all such as go about to disturb the Government with Sedition; For some of these Persons being present in all Quarters of the Dominion, and injoying by the Monarch's Authority an united Power, can not be supposed to faile in suppres∣sing the Weake and Disjoynted beginnings of all Seditions.

It has been and still is a Question, Whether it be most advantagious for a Monarch to com∣municate this Power only by Commission to such Persons as He finds most capable of doing him Service, and that without any Promissory Obligation upon himself either to continue it to their Posterity, or to themselves longer theu his Good Pleasure, Or whether it be best for Him to transmit it to their Posterity, and by that to constitute a Nobility. But I think it will not be hard to determine the Question in favour of a Nobility out of these Considerati∣ons.

First, That there is more Safety in a Nobi∣lity then in the other way of temporary Com∣missions, against a Forreign Enemy; Seeing it is the Interest of the whole Nobility to defend

to the utmost Extremity that Monarch, from whom They and their Posterity injoy a grea∣ter share of Power then They have Reason to expect from a Conquerour.

Secondly, That even against his own Peo∣ple the Security a Monarch gains by a Nobility is greater then He can have the other Way; For there being a radicated Power in a Nobility, the Impressions of Awe and Reverence upon the People are greater from them, then they can be from any temporary Commander.

Thirdly, It being so naturall to all Men to desire the Welfare of their Posterity, a Nobility has greater Interests to preserve the Monarch by whose Favour both They and their Children are possest of a confiderable Power, then They can have who wanting a Promise from the Mo∣norch for the Continuation of this Power, may justly look upon themselves as Tenants at Will, And so may have a Concernment to endeavour by some Innovation in the Government, to as∣scertain this Power to themselves.

Yet this is not to be taken Absolutely and without Restriction; For seeing a Nobility, is subject to the same Passions with other Men, a Monarch is not to make Account that the Greatness of the Benefits They injoy by Him, should be enough to keep his Nobility within the Bounds of Duty: Nay farther, That Am∣bition which We have Defined to be a Desire of Power sufficient to defend one from the So∣vereign Power, is chiefly incident to the Nobi∣lity, because They possessing Much, are most

apt to think themselves a Prey considerable e∣nough to tempt the Sovereign's Avarice. And therefore as a Nobility is a Monarchs Guard a∣gainst the People, so a Monarch may stand in need of another Guard against the Nobility, to secure him against such Dangers as otherwise He might incur from their Ambition.

These Dangers are of two kinds; For either They proceed from some particular Persons of the Nobility, excelling the rest of their Order in Power or Dignity, Or they arise from the whole Body of the Nobility. If a Monarch has out of the Consideration of neerness of Blood, or his own Affections, or Greatness of Merit, conferred a large share of Power upon one Per∣son or Familie, with leave to transmit it to their Posterity, this Power may easily become Mat∣ter of Danger, if not to Him, at least to his suc∣cessors. Thus the Successors of Charles the Great in Germanie, and this Hugh Capet in France, by conferring upon some of the Nobi∣lity an Hereditary Power over Provinces large enough to raise and maintain an Army, broke those two great Monarchies into a Multitude of little Ones, though the latter of them has had the Fortune to recover, and be again consoli∣dated into one great Empire. At first, no doubt, there were some such Duties reserved by the supream Monarch as served to manifest the De∣pendance of these lesser Ones upon him, But they easily degenerating into Matters of meere Forme and Ceremony, and the People want∣ing Eyes to look beyond the next Object; These

Dependant Monarchs were by their Subjects soone considered as Absolute Ones, and thought to shine by their own Native Light though it were at first derived to them from the great Luminary of the Sovereign Power. Where the Error of former Monarchs has thus deformed the Naturall shape of Empire, and rendered Go∣vernment a Monster with more Heads then One, It is it vaine for the Prince to expect Security, or for the Subjects to hope for Peace and Tran∣quillity: For if the exorbitant Power of these Great On••s among the Nobility can not be re∣trench't, the State can have no Assurance of Safety but that casuall One which is obtained from the Content and Satisfaction of these Great Persons; And that is not like to continue longer then they are taken up with some consi∣derable Imployment abroad, they being in this like tame Lions, whose Keepers are no longer out of Danger of being torne in Pieces, then they maintain them full gorged.

The Dangers that arise from the whole Body of the Nobility, are when the Nobility is pos∣sest of a Right to Assemble themselves for the Electing a Successour to the Monarchy, or for making of War and Peace, or for nominating the great Ministers of State, or for performing any other Act which by the Nature of it is insepa∣rable from the Sovereign Power. This Happens either when the Monarch did at first, out of Co∣vetousness of Reigning, accept of the Kingdome with a less share of Power then was necessary for attaining the Ends of Government, or has

since parted with this power out of an erro∣neous beliefe, That Sovereignty could sub∣sist without it. And if in these Cases the Go∣vernment has been Seditious, this can be no Argument against a Soverign Monarch, be∣cause those Cases suppose the Prince to want that power which was requifite to make him Sovereign. Though even in these Cases, there want not examples of some able Princes who by their Artifice in Ballancing the severall Fa∣ctions of the Nobility, have for a long time preserved themselves and People in safety.

Where neither some few persons of the Nobility are possest of excessive power and Command, nor where the whole body of the Nobility has a Right to assemble for the ends be∣fore mentioned, It is not imaginable how a No∣bility should be dangerous to a Monarch; For though the Nobility are not so great a multitude as the People, yet they are a multitude, and by Consequence exposed, in proportion to the same Difficulties and Dangers in carrying on a Designe for disturbing the Government; & the same remedies are applicable against them, which were by them made use of against the People.

These Remedies are in generall two; First that the Monarch have continually in pay a sufficient Militia to be alwaies ready to march for sup∣pressing the first motions or tendency toward a Sedition; Secondly that seing every Country has some places of strength where a few may be secure against a great number, these Pla∣ces be kept at the Monarch's Devotion

by a convenient proportion of Souldiers, for in this case the Nobility wanting places of Defence to secure themselves at the beginning of their Attempt, And knowing assuredly that they shall be exposed to the danger of being cut in pieces by the Militia entertained by the Monarch, They cannot be supposed so Irratio∣nall as out of vain and uncertain Hopes of grea∣ter power to incur the forfeit of that of which they are already possest.

To assign the number of this Souldiery can never be done, not only because Different Mo∣narchies stand in need of Different Proportions, but the same Monarchy may require Different proportions at different times; Only in gene∣rall, it may pass for a necessary Maxime, That this Militia ought not to amount to a com∣pleat full Army; For besides that the Expence would devonr any Monarch, The experience of the Roman and Turkish Emperours and all other Princes who have kept great Armies as a guard to their Persons and Empire, teach us that this is to walke upon precipices, There be∣ing no possibility of preventing such an Army (especially if they lye still without Imploy∣ment) from acquiring an Interest distinct from that of the Prince. Therefore this Militia must be so instituted as that it can have no Interest besides the Pay it receives from the Monarch, nor any hopes of being safe in their own strength if they should withdraw themselves from the Service and Obedience due to him.

This is that mixture of a Monarchy by a Nobility, and a Monarchy by Armes in which consists the perfection of Monarchicall Govern∣ment. Nor do I enter into despaire of living to enjoy my share of the Felicities which will be∣long to the Subjects of such a Government, though Mr Harrington be positive in asserting, That the wit of man never found, nor shall find this * 1.1 Monarchy, there being no such thing in Nature. And his Reason for this most Tyrannous Con∣fidence, is only this That there is nothing in * 1.2 Nature that hath not had a naturall effect by some example. I believe Mr Harrington would not think himself sincerely dealt with, if he should be told, There is no such thing in nature as an equall Commonwealth, because there is no∣thing in Nature that hath not had a Naturall Effect by some Example; But the Common∣wealth of Oceana is (by his own Confession) * 1.3 the first example of a Commonwealth that is per∣fectly equall. It is his own Argument for a Com∣monwealth, and therefore I doe not understand how he can prohibit me the use of the same Logique in Defence of Monarchy, That it is the * 1.4 Government which if it have been seditious, it hath not been from any Imperfection in the kind, but for want of this mixture in the particular Con∣stitution; which where ever the like hath hap∣pened must have wanted this mixture.

He is willing to suppose that I understand * 1.5 France as an instance of this mixture; But that France cannot be an Instance of it is manifest by this, That the Princes of the Blood do there

possess such an excessive power, as I have de∣clared inconsistent with this mixture, a conse∣quence of which power have been all the con∣siderable seditions of France in this last age. In many other things I allow that France is not far remote from this mixture, much of which also may be discovered in the Castilian Monar∣chy, in the administration of the Duke of Florence's Government, and the Pope's Tempo∣rall Domiuion in Italy. But it must be remem∣bred, That to make good the possibility of this mixture, I am not obliged to produce the Example of a Monarchy that has continued free from Seditions, since I have endeavoured to prove that it is impossible any Government should be altogether free from them: It is abun∣dantly enough if the Reigns of able Monarch; have not been troubled with Seditions, or on∣ly with such as have been immediately supprest, For the art of apprehending and preserving this mixture is not attainable by any universall Rules or Frame of Policy, but is a personall Ef∣fect of the Capacity and Experience of every Monarch: And therefore to expect that a weak Prince can long continue to Govern securely by the maximes and Constitutions of a wise predecessor, is all one as to imagine that the Tools of some excellent Artificer falling into the Hands of an ignorant person should serve to make good worke.

And this seems to be the only considerable objection against us, That this mixture cannot * 1.6 be durable, because the Nobility in this case would

not keep down the People, but fetch them up (as did the Barons) into their scale, that together they might weigh down the Army; which is the infallible Consequence of this mixture. Where the Nobility has already got too great Head, and where the Prince by the unseasonable applica∣tion of an Army goes about to reduce them, I deny not but this may perhaps be the Conse∣quence; But then this Case supposes the Nobi∣lity possest of a power from which They will be excluded by this mixture; And as this mix∣ture takes from them the power so does it the Interest also, it being impossible for the Nobility to League with the People, or fetch them up in∣to their scale, without loosing some part of that power which by the Monarch they injoyed over the People. This Case of the Nobility and People uniting against the Monarch can never happen unless the Monarch is at once become through his own Vices and Cruelty universally odious, and through his Imprudence and Irre∣solution universally contemptible; And I doe with much readinesse confesse, That such Princes are not to look for security, it being not in the Design of God or Nature, or in the power of Art to make those men Happy who will not cooperate toward the attaining their own Happiness.

This Temper of a Monarchy is the High∣water Marke beyond which no Government can rise; That all other Government must needs fall a great deale short of it I am in the last place to make Evident. And that a popular Govern∣ment

or Commonwealth must doe so is apparent by the last Chapter, where it has been proved That this kind of Government is necessarily ex∣posed not only to Sedition but totall Dissoluti∣on. For a Government by a Sovereign Assembly or Aristocracy, As it is exposed to all the same Originall Causes of Sedition with a Monar∣chy, so it wants the Remedies which consist in Secrecie and Celerity, that are the peculiar Advantages of a single person's Administration: Besides, this Inconvenience belongs particu∣larly to a Sovereign Assembly, that one or more persons of it carrying on a secret Design to change the Government may have Cre∣dit enough in the Assembly to corrupt their Consultations, and so make the Assembly an Instrument to their own subversion. Lastly for a Monarchy either by Armes or a Nobility taken singly, This Mixture of both curing the Infirmi∣ties of each must necessarily have the Advantage of them.

If Mr Harrington be of Opinion that I ought to have laid down a particular Modell of this kind of Government, I must in this also ac∣knowledge the Difference of my Judgement from his; For though a Generall Discourse concerning Government may fairly become any Gentleman, the proposing (or imposing rather) a particular Modell seems to relish too much of a Design, and wants that Modestie and submission that ought to be in all Private Men.

Notes

• * 1.1

  H. pag. 72.
• * 1.2

  H. pag. 71.
• * 1.3

  Ocena. p. 23.
• * 1.4

  ibid.
• * 1.5

  H. pag. 70.
• * 1.6

  H. p. 72.