Monarchy asserted, or, The state of monarchicall & popular government in vindication of the consideration upon Mr. Harrington's Oceana / by M. Wren.

CHAP. VIII.

Whether a Commonwealth coming up to the Perfection of the Kind, come up to the Perfection of Government, and have no flaw in it.

I Am not ignorant of the Advantage Mr Har∣rington may seem to gaine in this and the two next Chapters, by having inverted the Order of his own Assertions and my Replies; For passing by the first and second, He fals here upon his third Assertion, and in that fixes up∣on the fourth and fift Branches. But I am not willing to contend about a Matter of no

greater Consequence, but will rather embrace his own new Method, and take the Question as He has stated it, first examining the fourth Branch or matter of Fact, concerning Lacedae∣mon and Venice, And then giving my Opinion about the Fift, That a Commonwealth not∣withstanding all its pretensions to equality, is not secure from being infested with Sediti∣on.

Mr Harrington was told by the Considerer, That if there appeares to have been a more then Ordinary Calm in the state of Lacedaemon, this was not so much to be attributed to the Form of their Government, as to their severe Education and affected Poverty, by which all things that served as Baits to Sedition, were driven out of the Country: So that it can not be Rationall to expect the same Effects from the same Government, where the same Edu∣cation and manner of Life is wanting. Since He has been content to spare himself the Pains of taking Notice of this, I shall suppose it does not stand in need of any farther Elucidation, unless perhaps in the Discovery of the Lacedae∣monian Agrarian it prove convenient to insist a little upon it.

To descend then to his Answer to what I had objected about the frequent Insurrecti∣ons of the Helots; He saies that Lacedaemon is * 1.1 either to be considered as not taking in the Helots, and then she was an equall Commonwealth, or taking them in, and so she was unequall. This is just the Man in the Fable who inquired of

the Oracle, Whether the Sparrow in his Fist would come out Dead or alive, when it was in his own Power to make the choise; So Mr Harrington will have the Power, according as it sutes with his Occasions, to make Lace∣daemon an equall or an unequall Commonwealth. But to make short, If she were an equall Com∣monwealth, What has He to say to the Sedi∣tions of the Helots? If she were Unequall, Why did he play the Mountebanck in using her as the Example of an Equall One?

A second sort of Instances alledged by Me to prove Lacedaemon not to have been free from Seditions, were the Contests which have hap∣pened about the Succession to the Crown. These, saies Mr Harrington, being determi∣ned by the Ephori, that is by a Court of Ju∣stice, * 1.2 and not by the Sword, it is most ridicu∣lous to infer from thence that the Government is Seditious. Hold a little; Can those Contro∣versies be said to be determined by a Court of Justice, when the Interessed Parties make their Appeale to their own Sword, And are able to perswade a Foreign Prince to draw his also in their Quarrell? If any Member of a Commonwealth being discontented have In∣terest and Power enough to fill his Countrey with Forreign Armies, I think that Man would not seem very Sober who should at that time go about to applaud that Country for not be∣ing Subject to Seditions.

But this was after Lysander and the Spoiles * 1.3 of Athens had broken the Agrarian and so ruined

Lacedaemon. When I first made use of these Examples, I could not foresee that Mr Har∣rington would be so easy in parting with those Advantages which He pretended to draw from the Agrarian of Lacedaemon: But now that He is willing to allow the Agrarian of Lacedaemon was not sufficient to preserve that Common∣wealth, but was it self overballanced by the ready Mony brought in by Lysander, I have no reason but to be content also, and to remit him for my farther Thoughts in this Particu∣lar to the Chapters of the Ballance and Agra∣rian. Only I must desire Him that when among his Proselytes (whether it be in the Circle or the Ruelle) he Plumes himself over the Com∣monwealth of Lacedaemon, He would be so Inge∣nuous as to strike all the time after Athens was taken, which is a matter of 200 years, out of the Account, And shut up the Glories of that Com∣monwealth with the Actions of Lysander, from which by a Common mistake of Historie, they have hither to been thought to beare Date.

The Considerer brought Instances of a third sort of Seditions in Lacedaemon, which it seems prove not for Mr Harrington's Con∣venience to remember; There is no scarsity in Historie of such Instances, and it will not be unseasonable to commend a few more of them to his Forgetfulness. First the Sedition of those young Men who (Because their Mo∣thers were unmarried Women, such as the state had for greater Population injoyned to make use of a Promiscuous Propagation) were

called Partheniae, and after they were supprest * 1.4 were sent to inhabit Tarentum in Italie. Then the Sedition of them who during the Masseniac War demanded a new Division of the Lands. After that the Attempt of King Pausanias to make himself absolute Master of the Common∣wealth. And then the two dangerous Conspi∣racies in the Neck of one another during the Theban Invasion, in the first of which about 200 discontented Persons had seized upon the Tem∣ple of Diana, one of the strongest and most de∣fensible Quarters of the City, from whence it * 1.5 would have been very difficult to drive them out, had not Agesilaus by a sudden Fetch of Wit cheated them out of their Post and Resolution; The second consisted of a Caball of Spartans of good Quality who had their secret Assemblies for the Innovating Publique Affaires, And when they were detected, the Senate durst not bring them to an open Triall, but they were privately executed by the Authority of Agesilaus and the Ephores, whereas before that time no Spartan had ever been put to Death without the due form of Justice. These Instances being all either older then Lysander, or immediately upon his time, are not liable to any of Mr Harrington's exceptions, but serve abundantly to evince, that Lacedaemon has not been exempted from the Fate of all other Commonwealths, but has had her Portion of seditions.

As for the City of Venice, though she be possest of severall Advantages by her situation, yet she is not at all beholden to that, if we be∣lieve

Mr Harrington, for her tranquillity with∣in Doores; For saies he, she is like a man in a * 1.6 Citadel who thereby may be the safer from his Ene∣mies, but nere a whit the safer from Diseases. But before we can allow of this similitude, We must desire him to remember, That as in the Body of man, so in a Commonwealth, some Diseases are like Feavors caused by a Disorder in the Blood or Humors, others like Plagues are communicated by an Externall Contagion; From the first indeed the situation of Venice gives her not any security, but against the last it is a sovereign Antidote, And of this Familie are the Diseases most frequently incident to a State. Of old the Lacedaemonian & Cretan Re∣publiques scarse differed in their Constitution, the Lacedaemonian being but a Copy wrought by Lycurgus after the Cretan Originall; yet the Cretans were never molested with any insurre∣ctions of their slaves, from which the Lacedae∣monians, in any the least Publique Adversity, were rarely free; And the cause of this Diversi∣ty assigned by Aristotle is, That the Argives, Messenians and Arcadians, all neighbouring States, did continually foment the Discontents of the Lacedaemonian slaves, But Crete being an Island, no Enemy was neare enough to tempt their slaves to a Defection. In like manner the Venetian Republique being comprehended within her Islands, she by that situation is secu∣red from those Practises by which her Enemies might indeavour to excite seditions among her subjects.

Though the City of Venice it self is seated out of the reach of all Enemies, her Frontire extends to two very dangerous Ones, the great Turk, and the House of Austria, whose known Rapacity obliges her to a great deale of Mode∣sty and Reservedness at home; And though the Frontires of all states are bounded by the Territo∣ries of other Princes, Yet all have not such Po∣tent Neighbours, against whom their whole Care and Power is alwaies necessary: Those who have, will in all Probability think them∣selves concerned not to weaken their Force by any Domestick Tumults, there being nothing more Naturall then That the Feare of a Com∣mon Enemy should preserve Union and Agree∣ment between Friends. This Truth is observed to have been very Operative with the Romans, who were not overrun with the Seditions of the Nobility and People, before that by the De∣struction of the emulous Power of Carthage, They were freed from the Feare and Danger of any Common Enemy.

If I produced Examples of Seditions at Ve∣nice; which are older then the last Reiglement * 1.7 (this Word was thought no bad English by the Lord Bacon) in the time of Piero Gradenigo, I made Use of my just Liberty, Mr Harrington having not any where put in a Bar against such Examples: Yet now that He has restrained the Inquiry within the Compass of that Reforma∣tion, I am willing to omit the Mutiny upon Oc∣casion of the new Impositions in Duke Rinieri Zeno's time, with all other examples which

might be added of Seditions before the Reign of Gradenigo. And if the Matter be thus stated, What hurt if We grant him all that He de∣mands? That in the whole World, through the course of all Ages, there may be found one Commonwealth, which by the help of those concurring causes already mentioned, has for something above 300 yeares been free from Se∣ditions. Is this that Giant Argument which must extirpate Monarchicall Government out of the World, and in spite of Fate reduce Us all to a Commonwealth?

Yet even this Liberality is more then Mr Harrington can with Honesty receive, as long as the Actions of Bocconi, Tiepoli, and Faliero, manifest that Venice has been disturbed with Seditions even since her last Reformation. He indeavours indeed to perswade that those Acti∣ons do not imply any Sedition in the Govern∣ment; For saies He, Bocconi would have killed the Duke and was hanged before he could do it, * 1.8 Felton did kill a Duke and was hanged after∣wards. Under favour the Cases are not at all alike; Felton (though perhaps animated by zeale) killed the Duke upon a private Revenge; Bocconi went about to kill the Duke that he might afterward change the Government; Fel∣ton made use of no other assistance but his own Arm, Bocconi engaged many Complices. If We would find a Parallel in the Venetian storie for Felton's Assassinate, We must not take Bocconi, but Andrea Contarini, who being repulsed in his sute for an Employment, grew into that

Vindicative Passion against Duke Foscaro, that * 1.9 He attempted his Life, and had undoubtedly taken it away, if the blow had not been diver∣ted by the next Person from Foscaro's Breast to his Face. But this being only the Issue of a private Quarrell, He does not find Me making any Advantage of it, Faliero and his Complices, continueth He, would have destroyed the great Councell, but were hanged before they could do it, Vaux and his Accomplices would have blown up the Parliament but were hanged before they could do it; Therefore England was in this Relation a Seditious Government, else why was Venice? I do not know that the Considerer ever under∣took to prove that the Government of Eng∣land was alwaies free from Seditions; If He had, that One Instance of the Powder Treason had been enough to confute Him. Such attempts, as they are of a more dangerous Nature, so they deserve a Name of more Horror, then Seditions: For Seditions, like storms gather∣ed a far of, give some warning before They fall, There is Roome for Prudence to seek some way to divert them, The Interposition of Moderate and Acceptable Persons does of∣ten prevent or soon pacifie them, At worst their Fury may be avoided by a speedy Re∣treat; But these secret Conspiracies, like vio∣lent subterraneous Eruptions, in a Moment destroy all, And if they be not discovered be∣fore the Execution (which no state be it either a Monarchy or Republique can

by it's Orders have any Security to do) the Publique is involved in an inevitable Ru∣ine.

The Conspiracy of Tiepoli Mr Harrington confesses came to blowes, yet can not Venice be called a Seditious Commonwealth. You find no * 1.10 man accusing Rome of Sedition in that she had a Manlius or a Melius who dangerously affected Mo∣narchie, &c. Yet Florus has placed the Account of Manlius his attempt under the Title de Se∣ditionibus, and Livy in relating the same Acti∣on imploies the word Seditio five or fix times: But to let that pass. It would have been faire∣ly done and might have prevented many mi∣stakes, if where He interprets the Words of his Lexicon, He had told Us what He understands * 1.11 by this Word Sedition: In this Place He seems to limit it very odly, allowing it only to signi∣fy, in a Commonwealth the Dissension of the Peo∣ple and Senate, in a Monarchy by a Nobility that of the King and Nobles, in a Monarchy by Arms that of the Prince and Souldiery, because these only can be derived from the Orders of the Government. By this Rule the Contest of the Fregosi and Adorni at Genova, not being be∣tween the People and the Senate, but between two Factions of the Nobility, was no Sedition; Nor by the same Rule are the late Insurrections at Naples and Moscow to be reputed Seditions, For they were not excited by the Nobility or Souldiery, but by the Common People. This is a very poore Evasion, for there was incum∣bent upon Mr Harrington an Obligation to

prove, That an equall Commonwealth (of which he produced Venice as an Example) had no flaw in it, and was such as No Man could have the Interest or Power to disturb with Sedition. Of this He has not performed the least part, but indeavours to put Us of with an impertinent Nicety about the Notation of the Word Sedi∣tion. Now for what Purpose serves this Pre∣tension to shut the great Gate of Sedition, if so many back Doores of Disorder be left open by which Miserie and Destruction may enter into a Commonwealth? As if it were not all One, if a Man must necessarily receive a Mortall Wound, Whether it be given him with a Sci∣mitar or a Penknife. Besides all this Mr Har∣rington bestows a large Fallacie upon Us in the Application of this Example: For if the Free∣dome of Venice from Seditions be only to be understood in reference to the Agreement of the Senate and People, the Commonwealth of Oceana is like to gain very little Credit or Se∣curity from it; In Venice the People (as We are often told) are the Grand Counsell, all of them Men of Noble Extraction and Excellent education, not actually armed, constantly re∣siding under the view of the Magistrates, in number not exceeding three thousand, so that the Publique Employments being very many make swift Returns as they circulate through them. In Oceana the People are no lesse then two hundred thousand, having Arms in their hand, made up of Men of all Ranks and Con∣ditions, inhabiting the face of a wide-spread

Countrey, and few of them having Rationall hopes to attain any Considerable Magistracy. Let any Man weigh the Oppositions in the Temper of these Commonwealths, and then judge whether there can be any good Infe∣rence made from the Quietness of the One to the stability of the other. To Me the Conse∣quence lookes like that of the Young Gentle∣man, who because he had never seen a storm upon his Father's Fish-pond, concluded there could not be any upon the Caspian Sea.

But though all what has been said concern∣ing Lacedaemon and Venice should be admitted, Mr Harrington is still secure; At most He can but loose a brace of Examples, and be put to say (as He does of Florence and Genua in a like Case) that if Lacedaemon and Venice have been disturbed with Seditions, then they also must have been unequall Commonwealths: For in * 1.12 generall it is most certain, That a Government which attains to perfect equality hath such a Li∣bration in the Frame of it, that No man in or under it can contract such Interest or Power, as should be able to disturb the Commonwealth with * 1.13 Sedition. And the whole Commonwealth of O∣ceana being the Exemplification of such an equall Government, If Men are still to seek for a Com∣monwealth that has been free from Seditions, the Fault is their own that they make no more hast to come under so happy a Government. This then is a state of the Question which ought to be determin'd by Experiment rather then Argument; But the Ingredients to the Ex∣periment

(the safety of three Nations) be∣ing of two great Expense, We are obliged to better Husbandry, and must be content to make our Judgment of the future Successes of this Government by the Paper Modell of it which has been given Us, And examine Whe∣ther that contains any Security, that this Go∣vernment has no Possibility of being disturbed with Sedition: The Truth or Falsehood of which Proposition will best be discovered, by referring the particular Frame of the Com∣monwealth of Oceana, to the Generall Idea of Government.

The Apprehension of a Disability in every particular Man (or at least in every particular Familie) of preserving by his own single Power either his Life or any thing usefull to life, was the first inducement of Mankind to come under Go∣vernment; Now it was impossible to establish a∣ny Government without a Sovereign Power ve∣sted in some One Man or Assembly of Men, For without that Every particular Man must still have been left to the Protection of his own strength, and must have continued to do all o∣ther Men whatsoever Mischief did any way conduce to his own Profit or Preservation, the avoiding the Inconveniences of which Life was that which Men intended by submitting them∣selves to Government; And therefore every Par∣ticular Man was necessitated to part with his Native Power and intrust it with the Sove∣reign, whose Actions He did thereby Autho∣rise and make his own. The Sovereignty being

thus fixt, The next work was to enact Lawes, or prescribe Rules of behaviour both in Refe∣rence of the Service to himself which the So∣vereign thought fit to require, and the Inter∣course or Commerce between every Particu∣lar Man united under him. But here it soon began to appear how irregular the Passions of Man are, and how infirm and Erroneous his Discourse, For Men presently indeavoured to resume the Liberty which They had so lately parted with, and violated those Lawes which had been newly Authorised by themselves. Yet the Inconvenience was not great, as long as this Irregularity exceeded not a few Persons, such as were apparently too weak to resist the Sovereign Power; For then these Offences, as Murder, Theft, and the like, were presently attended by the Punishments ordained for them by the Sovereign, and the Facinorous Persons being made Examples of Justice; served to con∣tain other Men within the Bounds of their Du∣ty.

But if the Number of those who were Desi∣rous to resume the Power they had parted with, or who otherwise by reason of their Crimes were concerned that the Course of Ju∣stice should be intercepted, did at any time prove great enough to beare up against the So∣vereign Power, Then were Matters reduced again to a Condition of War, and Government with all the Pacts on which it had been found∣ed trampled under Foot. It may seem contra∣ry to Reason that the Motives which were at

first strong enough to make Men submit to Go∣vernment and Lawes, should afterward prove too weake to inforce their Obedience to them; And without doubt if Men did in all their A∣ctions govern themselves by Calm and solid Reason, They would never hearken so far ei∣ther to the stimulations of their own Passions, or to the Incitements of other Men, as to be in∣gaged in a Design of reversing the Sovereign Power, For the greatest Mischiefs that can be suffered by any Government, are not compara∣ble to those Occasioned by the Absence of Go∣vernment when Men live in the Wild and Law∣less condition of War, Nor can it be any thing but Madness voluntarily to expose ones self to Miserie for the taking away a Power, in room of which another equall Power must of Neces∣sity be substituted. Yet Experience teaches Us that this is too little to make the World Wise, at which We ought no more to wonder, then that the Certainty of Punishment should not be enough to make men abstain from violating Lawes, Nor the Feare of Hell Torments (even to those who are sufficiently perswaded of the Certitude of them) to keep Men from sinning. So that the Wisedome of those Men is a little to be suspected, who think any Governours can be secured, by the unreasonableness that would be in their Subjects Disobedience; For there ever were and will eternally be some Men who will mistake in this Point, and think it their In∣terest to subvert the Sovereign Power.

This False Opinion has been very much helpt

forward by the Sense of those Pressures which are sometimes sustain'd under Government; For whilst Men considering only their private Uti∣lity expect to live free from all Incommodity, They usually charge the Government with those Grievances which are inseperable from the in∣firm Condition of Humanity, or perhaps are Consequences of their own Inconformity to the true and Necessary temper of Subjection; There being nothing which Men more Naturally for∣get, Then that the Exercise of Sovereign Pow∣er requires a large Expence, toward which it is necessary for every particular Man to contri∣bute a Part, thereby to secure the Rest to Him∣self.

Yet it can not be denied That sometimes there has been much of Iniquity in the Manage of Sovereign Power; At first, it is likely, the Person or Assembly trusted with it were known to be of just and Generous Principles, but by Succession the Power being devolved upon Men Weak or Vitious, They have frequently trifled away the Lives, Honours, and Fortunes of their Subjects, which They ought not to have im∣ployed but upon just and Probable Occasi∣ons. The Desire to prevent this Inconvenience brought forth an Expedient into the World, commonly known under the Name of mixt Government, in which, Though there seem to be a Sovereign Instituted, the People do not part with their whole Power to him, but re∣tain some Part of it in their own Hands; So as to some Actions in which the Lives and

Fortunes of every particular Man seem most concerned (such are the making Lawes and rai∣sing Mony, and the like) the Sovereign in ap∣pearance can do nothing by himself, but the Consent of the People by their Collective or Representative Body is still necessary. But this Expedient (though in some Places it might be for a while by reason of some externall Acci∣dents not unprosperous) fell short of effecting the thing desired, And had besides this irrepa∣rable Breach in it, That while the Persons to whom the severall Parts of Sovereign Power were thus committed, fell into little Jealousies and Contests about their severall Respective Rights and Privileges, the Government was weakened, and left as it were without Legs or Arms; And when these little Jealousies came to be improved into open Dissensions, the severall Parties assuming to themselves the Exercise of the whole Sovereign Power, and the Advantages remaining with either not being conspicuous e∣nough to determine the Matter otherwaies, the Nation which happened to be the Seat of so un∣fortunate a Controversie was necessarily redu∣ced into a State of War; From which it has sel∣dome been known to have been redeemed, but by destroying that Mixture which was preten∣ded to, and rendring one of the Parties abso∣lute in their Power.

Beyond this I know but of One Artefice to which Humane Invention has pretended, and that is to contrive a way how the People may govern themselves without Instituting any So∣vereign,

so that the Ends of Government may be attained and yet no Man devest himself of his Native Power and Liberty. It is confest by those Men who indeavour to introduce this kind of Government, that the People in their diffused condition are incapable of all Govern∣ment; ignorant of such Counsels as are necessa∣ry to their Preservation, and unable to put the least part of them in Execution: Therefore it is of Necessity that the People should be assembled together, that there should be a Senate to consult, and Magistrates to Execute. But the advantage of this Government is pretended to consist in this, That the People not parting with their Power, but reserving to themselves the last Result in all Business, They are secured from all Injurie and Oppression, seeing the People can not be supposed to agree to do themselves Hurt: And as for the Magistrates and Senate they can not be Authors of any Violence, be∣cause they shall have only a very limited Power, the Exercise of which also is terminated within the Compass of a few Months, after which they are againe to be melted down into the Mass of the People, from which They were at first se∣parated. In Fabricating this great Engine, and contriving all the Movements and Ressorts be∣longing to it consists the whole Mysterie of Po∣pular Government; Of which the most perfect Modell, that ever was produced Mr Harrington assures Us is his Commonwealth of Oceana. So that we need only to examine that Common∣wealth by the Notions & Maximes already laid

down, to know Whether Popular Government has that advantage over all other Governments, as to have no Flaw in it, and not to be exposed to a Possibility of being disturbed with Sedition.

In the first Place it is manifest that Popular Government is equally with any other Govern∣ment exposed to this Inconvenience; That Par∣ticular Men will have an Interest to disturb it with Sedition; For it being impossible there should be any Government without Lawes, and all Lawes consisting either in a Prohibition of doing somewhat which before it was free to do, or in a Command of doing somewhat which before might have been omitted, Men must under Popular Government also needs re∣gret the loss of that Liberty which was Naturall to them. If it be objected that under Popular Government Men give their Consent to the en∣acting of all Lawes, and therefore can not be rationally thought averse from what was their own Act, It must be remembred that in all o∣ther Government also, every Man did by that One Generall Act of resigning his Power and Authorising the Actions of the Sovereign, give his Consent to all the establisht Laws, which notwithstanding is known to be insufficient for inforcing a Plenary Obedience to Lawes. And it is little less then ridiculous to think, That when under Popular Government Men have committed such Crimes as by the Lawes of it deserve Death, They should not apprehend it to be their Interest, by disturbing the Govern∣ment with Sedition to secure, if it be possible,

their own Lives. Whensoever therefore under Popular Government, the number of those whose offences have rendered them lyable to the severity of Laws, is considerable enough to qualify them for the Attempt, Popular Govern∣ment has no more security than any other of being free from Seditions. Of this Originall and Extraction as to the main, was Catalines At∣tempt upon the Roman Commonwealth.

Secondly, The Constitution of the Com∣monwealth of Oceana supposing a Senate and a Representative of the People called the Prero∣gative Tribe, consisting of about thirteen hun∣dred Men, I aske Whether that Representative (taking the Senate and present Magistrates with it) be indued with the Sovereign Power, that is such as cannot be resisted by any Man or Men within the Commonwealth of Oceana? If they have such Power, Then it is manifest They may whensoever they think it their Interest, perpe∣tuate this power, and by repealing the Orders of Rotation, render themselves a standing Assem∣bly, which dashes to peeces the whole frame of popular Government, and puts the publique Affaires (which is contrary to the Designe and supposition of a free Commonwealth) into the hands of a Sovereign Assembly. Now that the Representative may come to think this their In∣terest is manifest also; For the Desire of Power being Naturall to man, a far greater share of Power remaines with every particular Man, when the Svereign Power is divided among thirteen hundred, then when the same Power

is divided among two hundred thousand men. It is very true, as Mr Harrington has observed That the Power or Effect of a greater People is * 1.14 proportionably greater then the Power or Effect of a lesser people; But that is not to be brought to account under this Head, For it is not now inquired, Whether the Power of thirteen hun∣dred or two hundred thousand Men be greater, but Whether if the same Power belong to thir∣teen hundred or two hundred thousand men, Every particular person of the thirteen hun∣dred will not have more Power than every par∣ticular person of the two hundred thousand men. And what has been said of Power the same is to be understood of Riches. So that in the Commonwealth of Oceana, the Magistrates, Senate, and Prerogative Tribe for the time be∣ing, have both power and Interest to dissolve the Frame of the Goverment. And that a Re∣presentative is not incapable of making such an attempt as this, will, (it is not improbable) ea∣sily find Belief with those who are acquainted with the Actions of these last eighteen yeares.

But now let us resume the other member of the Disjunction, and suppose that the Magi∣strate, Senate and Prerogative Tribe, have not the Sovereign power, but that it remaines still with the Body of the People in Oceana. Hence it must follow that in the Commonwealth of Oceana there is no Sovereign power at all, And that the People of it are either in a Condition of Warr, or ready to fall into it. For the people of Oceana being too numerous and too much

dispersed to Assemble Personally in one place, They cannot concur to any Act but by their Representative; But that Representative not ha∣ving the Sovereign power, there is not any such Power constituted, and consequently every Par∣ticular Man is left to the Protection of his own Power and strength, which is the Condition of War, and implies the Absence of all Government.

It will, perhaps, be replied that the Sovereign Power resides in the lesser Assemblies, as the Parish, Hundred, or Tribe, where the People personally concur to the Election of their De∣puties: But this is not to make One but a great many Sovereign Powers, and to shatter One great Commonwealth, into as many little Ones as there are Parishes in Oceana. Nor is the Difficulty removed by it, For these lesser So∣vereign Assemblies being not put into any Me∣thod of concurring in any Common Opinion, but by the Deputies they send to the Represen∣tative or Prerogative Tribe, If those Deputies be sent with Sovereign Power, the Common∣wealth relapses into the Danger before insisted on of being supplanted by that Representative.

But if these Deputies be not sent to the Pre∣rogative Tribe with Sovereign Power, then the Prerogative Tribe has no such Power and by Consequence can not make Lawes, or impose any other Resolution upon the Common∣wealth; If notwithstanding this the Preragative Tribe does de facto make Lawes, the Authority with which they are armed, is not that of the Representative it self, but of the lesser Sovereign

Assemblies, who in that They do not declare their Dissent, are presumed to allow of such things as have been resolved on by their De∣puties. So that upon the Matter, Oceana, is not a Single Commonwealth, but a Compund∣ed One made up by a tacite League of so many Commonwealths as there are lesser Sovereign Assemblies in Oceana. Now the Leagues between Sovereigns are of no longer Duration then their Common Interest, which whensoever it hap∣pens to be divided, such Leagues Vanish; And therefore whensoever the lesser Sovereign As∣semblies in Oceana come to be divided in their Interest, the Commonwealth must fall in Pieces. But that They may come to be so divided is probable, if not necessary; Antiently They were divided both in respect of the Saxon Heptar∣chie, and the Welch Princes under the Norman Kings; The difference of Language (One of the greatest separators of Men's Affections) is not quite worn out; The inhabiting the same Island is not a sufficient Argument of Union, for then Scotland and We should make but One Nation; In fine, there can be no cause assigned of the Union of this Nation under One Govern∣ment but the Power of former Princes, which by the Institution of this new Commonwealth is quite obliterated. More then all this, The Concernments of the Severall Parts of this Na∣tion are very different in Reference to Proprie∣ty and Riches; some Parts subsist upon Mines and Cole, Others upon Manufacture, Some up∣on Corne, Others upon the Profits of Cattle,

London and the Sea Ports upon Exportation and Importation; And it is not possible but that when those severall things come to be regulated by Lawes, the Different Parts of the Nation must necessarily espouse very Different Interests.

This is also very conformable to Experience; Greece was a Country much less then England, The People of it (with an inconsiderable varie∣ty of Dialect) spoke the same Language, They had the same Common Enemy the Persian, and were united in many other particular Interests: Yet all this was not enough to reduce them in∣to one great Commonwealth, but We find a∣mong them almost as many Republiques, as Ci∣ties. The Condition of Sicilie, Magna Graecia, and the Coasts of Asia serve also to make good the same Observation. Nay in Israel (which Mr Harrington will have pass for a Common∣wealth) though the Countrey was so Narrow, the People all descended of one Familie, and cemented together by a Million of common Concernments and Obligations, this Thing is very apparent also; For though it did not pro∣duce a totall Dissolution of the Government, yet It for some time suspended it, and threw the People into a Civill War, as in the Case of Jeph∣thah between the Men of Ephraim and Gilead, * 1.15 and in that of the Levites Concubine, between the Tribe of Benjamin and the rest of Israel.

There is but One imaginable case more to be put concerning the Sovereign Power in the Com∣monwealth of Oceana, Which is, That though the People have parted with their Power, They

have not intrusted it all in One hand, but have so equally divided it among the Magistrates, Senate, and Prerogative Tribe, that No publique Action can be performed without the Concur∣rence of all; Now there is nothing more impro∣bable then that all these should concur to the Oppressing the People, changing the Government, or disturbing it with Sedition; Then which greater Security is not attainable in Matter of Government. But all this rises no higher then the Case of mixt Government. For the Power being wholly past from the People, and divided equally among these severall Persons, This equality of Power must upon their Disagreement reduce the Commonwealth to a Civill War, seeing it is not otherwaies to be judged which of them has the Sovereign Power, and by that a Right to the Obedience of the Rest. Now that they can∣not long Agree, is a Consequence of that Desire of Power which is confest to dwell with Man, and will not permit him to rest satisfied with Part of that Sovereign Power, which He may fairely hope to possess Intire. And if there are any Examples of Persons thus Possest of equall Power, who have for a while maintained a good Correspondence with one another, and so preserved the Commonwealth in Peace, This must not be attributed to the Frame or Tem∣per of the Government, but to some externall Cause, such as the Apprehension of some Com∣mon Impending danger, Or an over high Esti∣mation of one another's strength, by which there is generated in them a mutuall Fear of one

another: As two Armies when neither of them has any Visible Advantage of strength, do very often forbeare engaging out of a mutuall doubt of the Success, which notwithstanding is not a state of Peace, seeing both are intent upon the Opportunities of procuring one anothers Ruine.

It having been thus Proved, That the Com∣monwealth of Oceana, which was given us as the Example of a most equall Commonwealth, is which way soever the Case be stated, liable not only to Sedition, but which is more, to a totall Dissolution, It is at the same time evin∣ced, That a Commonwealth coming up to the Per∣fection of the kind, comes not up to the Perfection of Government, but has a Flaw in it. I do not sus∣pect that after this Mr Harrington will any lon∣ger think fit to accuse Me of hudling things to∣gether * 1.16 or neglecting of Principles; It is true I can not admit of his Principles, because, as I have often told him, They are meerly Effects & Consequences of Government, that is no Prin∣ciples at all. And while He thus goes astray in the Principles, His Labour must needs be un∣profitable, both in examining the Models of For∣mer Commonwealth's, and in proposing New Ones of his own; For at this Rate New Models of Government may be contrived with as much ease, as a French Tayler invents new Fashions. It is the Foundation of Government upon un∣deniable Principles, and the Diductions from them, which render Politiques a Compleat Sci∣ence, without which the greatest Conversati∣on with particular Commonwealths can but at most make Men Empiricks in Policy.

Notes

• * 1.1

  H. p. 40.
• * 1.2

  H. p. 41.
• * 1.3

  Ibid.
• * 1.4

  Arist. Polit. lib. 5. c. 7.
• * 1.5

  Plut. in Ages.
• * 1.6

  H. p. 41.
• * 1.7

  H. p. 40.
• * 1.8

  H. p. 42.
• * 1.9

  Sabell. Dec. 3. lib. 1.
• * 1.10

  H. p. 43.
• * 1.11

  H. p. 84.
• * 1.12

  H. p. 46.
• * 1.13

  H. p. 36.
• * 1.14

  H. pag. 39.
• * 1.15

  Jud. cap. 12. & 20.
• * 1.16

  H. p. 40.