Monarchy asserted, or, The state of monarchicall & popular government in vindication of the consideration upon Mr. Harrington's Oceana / by M. Wren.

CHAP. V.

Whether there be any Common Right or Inte∣rest of Mankind distinct from the Parts ta∣ken severally; And how by the Orders of a Commonwealth it may best be distinguish't from private Interest.

IF I had not been taught by Mr Harrington himself that many Passages of his are to be understood by way of Similitude only, not of * 1.1 Argument or Probation, I should have been very much at a loss how to answer this Chap∣ter: But now by the help of that Instruction I perceive this is intended for a Chapter of Simi∣litudes, And it would be too unkind a Part to oppose a Gentleman in the choise of such Simi∣les as He thinks fit to make use of for the adorn∣ing his stile. I am sensible of my having alrea∣dy erred in this Point, and justly incurred Mr Harrington's Anger, by thinking his Similitudes * 1.2 included somewhat of Reason in them, There∣fore I shall imploy my Care in this Chapter to impart that Caution to the Reader which I my self have received, least He should do these Si∣militudes or their Author so much wrong as to mistake them for Reasons.

The first Place where this Care may be sea∣sonably imploy'd, is about a Similitude which, though it be taken from Beasts, We are not to expect should have foure Feet. Divers of the Beasts (it is Grotius who has observed it) ab∣stain

from their owne Profit, either in regard of * 1.3 those of the same kind, or at least of their Young. Mankind then (infers Mr Harrington) must ei∣ther be less just then the Creature, or acknowledg also his Common Interest to be Common Right. To go about upon this Occasion to discover the Causes of that Affection which Brute Crea∣tures beare to their Foetus, And how a Part separated from an Animal to which it had been long united may by the Perpetuall stream of Ef∣fluviums emitted from it, continue to have an Operation upon that Animall, would be a Dis∣quisition too remote from our present Subject. I will rather make Mr Harrington a Gift of the whole Inference, and allow That Men have the same Affections with the Creatures, And do deny themselves their own Profit for the Ad∣vantage of their Familie: But what will He gaine by this Concession? This will at most serve to prove something of a Common Interest of every Familie within it self, but fals infinite∣ly short of making out a Common Interest of all Mankind; And I do justly suspect He will not be much gratified with any Instances taken from Paternity, or the naturall Administration or Interests of Families, seeing there is not in that whole Oeconomy one Particular, which does not largely disfavour the Pretensions of Popular Government.

And therefore He cals in another Similitude to the Rescue, and tels Us out of Hooker, That even stones or heavy things forsake their ordinary mont or Center, and fly upwards, to relieve the * 1.4

Distress of Nature in Common. If I should now take this Hint to discourse of Vacuum Dissemi∣natum, of Magneticall Motion, of the Gravita∣tion and Impulsion of Aire, of the Protrusion of less heavy Bodies by those that are more Heavy, and of severall other Principles belonging to this Subject, Mr Harrington would think Me very Fond of my Naturall Philosophie, and more then ordinarily Covetous of an Occasion to di∣vulge it. It is enough that this is but a Simili∣tude, and as such did very well become Mr Hooker in a Rhetoricall Exaggeration, Nor shall Mr Harrington be denied the same Liber∣ty while He appeares either as Poet or Orator, but when He acts the Legislator's Part, and pretends to fix the Principles of Government, He must not wonder if We remain unsatisfied with such thin Discourses.

Indeed He himself seems to place no great Confidence in them, but has thought fit to * 1.5 give Us this farther Demonstration: All Civill Lawes acknowledge that there is a Common Inte∣rest of Mankind, and all Civill Lawes proceed from the Nature of Man, therefore it is in the Na∣ture of Man to acknowledge that there is a Com∣mon Interest of Mankind. How? Do all Civill Lawes proceed from the Nature of Man? This New Maxime will make strange Havock among the pore School-men and Authors de Legibus, and quite Ruine all their Divisions and Defini∣tions of Jus Naturale, Jus Gentium, and Jus Civile; But of all Men honest Ʋspian will be in the worst Condition who has had the ill For∣tune

to give us this Account of Civill Lawes; Jus Civile est quod neque in totum à Naturali * 1.6 vel Gentium recedit, nec per omnia ei servit: Itaque cum aliquid addimus vel detrahimus juri communi, Jus proprium, id est Civile efficimus. Which is beyond Dispute thus far true, That the Obligation of Civill Lawes consists proper∣ly in such Things to which Men were not bound by Nature, nor by any other Argu∣ment but their Subjection to the Power which constitutes those Lawes; For otherwise the same Civill Lawes must obtain through the whole World, seeing all Men are equally bound to what proceeds from Nature: But though Mr Harrington's Assertion were true, the Con∣siderer were not at all concerned in it, For He at first denying there was any Common Inte∣rest of Mankind, only with Reference to Man∣kind before they had voluntarily listed them∣selves into Societies, and so rendred themselves Subject to Civill Lawes, is not now with any Equity to be oppugned by any Observations taken from the Condition of Mankind after it was become Subject to the Power of Civill Lawes. I must alwaies assert, That though O∣riginally in the State of Nature, and Ante∣cedently to all Society, there was no Com∣mon Interest of Mankind distinct from the Parts taken severally; (the Obligation laid upon Families by Paternall Power only excep∣ted) but that every particular Man had Right to prosecute his own Advantage, though to the Ruine of other Men, yet since the Instituti∣on

of Government, Men are obliged besides, nay in many Cases above, their own Private Interest, to advance the Publique or Common One: The reason of which is taken from hence, That unless Every private Man does devest him∣self of his private Interest as well as his private Power, and contribute it to the Publique, the Sovereign Power will be disabled from effecting the Design and Aime of Government; And Par∣ticular Men will in vain expect from that Pow∣er, which has by themselves been so unwisely limited, Protection and the Benefit of Lawes: By this Protection and Benefit of Lawes, Every Man's Power and Interest which He had parted with, comes home to him again with Increase, the Observation of such Lawes as the Sovereign Power finds usefull for the Preservation of So∣ciety being in an Eminent Manner the Interest of every private Man: For Instance, A man that Steales is put to Death; This is not only the Pub∣lique Interest, but the Private Interest of every Particular Man, who by the Terrour of such a Punishment is in some Measure secured from an Invasion on his Propriety. This Assertion is I confesse contradictory to Mr Harrington's, That a Man who steales is not put to Death for * 1.7 any Man's private Interest, in which, as in this whole Thing called Demonstration, I meet with so little Reason, that it pities Me there is nothing in it which might make it pass for a Similitude.

Seeing then the Addresses of Reason have been so unsuccessefull, I do not wonder to find

The other Potent Rivall Passion, has obtained so far upon Mr Harrington's Soule. He pretends That the whole Philosophie of the Soule which con∣cerns Policy is demonstrated throughout the Com∣monwealth of Oceana, And that it consists in de∣posing * 1.8 Passion and advancing Reason unto the Throne of Empire. But it will not be Rationall to believe this of a Commonwealth whose Au∣thor and Legislator is himself a slave of Passion, and not a Subject of Reason; And I make my Appeale to all uninteressed Persons, Whether through his whole Reply Reason or Passion beare the greatest sway with Mr Harrington, And in reference to this particular Chapter, I desire them to Judge, Whether it be not an heap of very Pitifull Petulancies and Calum∣nies. Yet it is not to be thought but that in this Anger He has Wit, of which if any Man be unconvinced, He is to be remitted to that admirable Oration He makes to the two Girles, which being a Treasury of such Rare Conceits, ought in all Prudence to be inserted with the other Speeches into the following Editions of Oceana.

But though his Wit be admirable, his Dis∣cretion still has the upper hand; To repeat 40 or 50 lines out of his Commonwealth of Ocea∣na, was not very troublesome, but to examine the Reasons alledged by the Considerer to prove that the Case of the two Girles dividing and choosing their Cake was not applicable to the Institution of a Commonwealth, was too stubborn a Matter to be wrought to his Pur∣pose,

and is therefore silently past over. It is but Justice that I should have leave to repeat too, and put Mr Harrington in mind that He goes upon a false Supposition; For unless the two Girles lived under some Power grea∣ter then their own, (And if so they were Mem∣bers of some Society, and obliged in Dispo∣sing of their Cake to behave themselves accor∣ding to the establisht Lawes of it) They would never have divided the Cake, but the stron∣ger of the two Girles would have taken the whole, or at least so much of it as She thought usefull to her.

In like Manner, If some One Person or Per∣sons who have acquired the Supream Pow∣er (by what Method or Artifice is not as to this purpose Materiall) shall think fit to frame a Government where the whole People shall be divided into two Assemblies, with one of which shall be the right of dividing or Deba∣ting, and with the other that of choosing or Resolving, there is no great Reason to doubt but that this Temper may be effectuall to the attaining the Ends of Government: Yet even in this Case, it will be a Necessary Caution, That by mixing the Function of the severall Members of the Government, it be not ren∣dered disputable in which of them the Sove∣reign Power resides, For this destroyes the Design of Government, and must frequently reduce things to the State of War. But all this while this is nothing to Mr Harrington's Purpose, and serves not at all to make out

the Naturall Right of a Commonwealth, see∣ing this Frame of a Commonwealth depen∣ded upon some former Sovereign Power; And to imagine that without the Influence of such a Power, Men unreduced or broken to the Rules of Society, should of themselves con∣trive themselves into two Assemblies, One of which should divide and the other choose, And that the strongest would not rather en∣gross the whole Right both of dividing and choosing, Is to suppose that which can ne∣ver be granted, And for which I do not be∣lieve there can ever be any stronger Reason produced then Mr Harrington's bare Affirma∣tion.

For as for that Notion of a Naturall Demo∣cracy and a Naturall Aristocracy, Or that among * 1.9 twenty Men there will be some few (perhaps Six) excelling the Fourteen in greatness of Parts, It is altogether Arbitrary and destitute of any good ground in Experience; Among the twenty per∣haps there will be but One, perhaps Sixteen, who excell the Rest in Parts: Or if this Pro∣portion of about a third be allowed him, it will not be enough to help him over the stile; For though among twenty Men (not related to one another, nor as yet united in any Society) Six be apparently Wiser then the Fourteen, Must the Fourteen therefore necessarily intrust the Six with the Debate of such things as concern their Interest? Is it not much more Naturall to every Man to think him∣self Wise enough to advise about his own

Affaires, and to suspect all Persons of a greater Reach then himself? Indeed upon a Supposi∣tion that there were any known Common In∣terest of these twenty Men, it were not impro∣bable that such of them as by Experience were known to be the Wisest, might be intrusted by the Rest with their Common Affaires; But it has been already demonstrated that there can be no such Common Interest ( I adde now also, Nor no such Experience of one another's Abilities) unless those twenty Men had been before united in some Society, that is, reduced under some Government. Wherefore Mr Har∣rington stands Convict of Obstinacy in this Pa∣ralogisme, That He by Supposition puts the twenty Men into a Condition that of Necessity infers them to be already reduced to some Go∣vernment, And yet at the same time Imagines them free to dispose of themselves as if They lived under no Government, and did but then begin to think of Constituting One.

To go yet a little farther with him, Admit that at first by some strange Accident a People should happen thus to distribute themselves into two Assemblies, a dividing One, or Senate, and a choosing One or Popular Assembly: Is this Foundation firm enough to sustain the whole Weight of a Commonwealth? May not either of these Assemblies repent of the Bargain, and indeavour to draw the whole Power both of the Debate and Result to themselves? That the Senate may do it by deluding the People, and confounding their Judgments in the Choice or

Result seems not improbable; Nor is it Anti∣dote enough to say that The People in a Com∣monwealth are their own Army, unless it were also Certain that a more subtle Party never had nor could dispossess a simple and ignorant One of the Power of the Sword. But that on the other side the People should not invade the Fun∣ction of the Senate and take upon themselves the Right of Debate as well as of the Result, can not without some shame be denied by him who has complained of the Athenian, Cartha∣ginian, and Roman People for this very thing. It is true None of these People did go about to take away the Senate wholly, but the diffe∣rence is not great between dissolving an Assem∣bly, and rendring it altogether Insignificant by robbing it of that Employment for which it was at first Instituted. When the Lion is to choose, the Fox knows his Division must be such as gives all to One side and leaves nothing to the other; If a People be once inraged, the Senate will find themselves concerned to please them in the Division as well as in the Choice. And this was the Condition of the Senate of Capua after the Fright they were put into by Pacuvius, I am verò nihil in Senatu actum aliter, quàm si Plebis ibi esset Consilium. That whole * 1.10 Scene was laid by Pacuvius with a Design to preserve the Senators and satisfie the People, and by that at once bring them both into a Depen∣dance upon himself; His surprize of the People was indeed very Ingenious, but had He given them time to consider, They would without

doubt have found out some among themselves whom They would have thought Wise enough to make a Senate: If not, It must have been for want of Instruction in Mr Harrington's new Do∣ctrine, That the pretended Depth and Difficulty * 1.11 in Matter of State is a meere Cheat. From the be∣ginning of the World unto this day, you never found a Commonwealth, where the Leaders having Ho∣nesty enough, wanted skill enough to lead her unto her true Interest at home or abroad.

By this it appeares, That there is no Com∣mon Right or Interest of Mankind (except that of Families arising from Paternall Power) an∣tecedent to the Reduction of Mankind under Government; As also, That the Office of Di∣viding, or debating, and Choosing or Resolv∣ing, Or the different Functions of the Senate and People in a Commonwealth, are not founded upon any Naturall Right, but meerly upon an Artificiall One proceeding from the Designati∣on of some preceding Sovereign Power. And this being the true Case of a Commonwealth, the two distinct Assemblies of the Senate and People have not as to this any more advantage then is between any Parties who give and take Coun∣sell; Counsell is nothing but Ratiocination a∣bout the Affaires of another Man, and Ratio∣cination is the Addition or Subtraction of Pro∣positions; The Operation belongs to the Per∣son who gives Counsell, and the Proof or Exa∣men of it remains in his hand who receives the Counsell: This Mr Harrington is pleased to call dividing and choosing, which in this Sence be∣longs

to a Monarchy as much as to a Common∣wealth; For when a Prince askes any Man his Ad∣vise (and I think there never was Prince who advised not with some Body) that Man divides, and the Prince makes the Choise; Only here is the Difference, an able Prince if his Counsell has committed an Error in the Operation knows both how to detect and Rectifie it, but a Popular Assembly being of themselves unfit for a Debate, are forced to acquiesce in the Division or Debate of the Senate.

And what if after all the Popular Assembly, fixes upon the wrong Member of the Division? To judge of the Utility or Disutility of a Pro∣position in matter of State, is I hope another thing from discerning which is the biggest or least Piece of a Cake, And a Discourse about which much of understanding and Experience must be imployed, is not of so easy and certain Dispatch, as a Matter which is submitted to the Determination of sense. In one respect, the Choise or Result is an Action of greater Difficulty then the Division or Debate, For an Active Fancie which suddenly Ranges over a great deale of ground, may easily find out the various Methods of which any Business is Capable, but to discern which of them is the most conducing, is the Work of an exact and well-poised Judgment. To affirm That because every Man hath an Inte∣rest * 1.12 what to choose, therefore that which sutes with every Man's Interest, cometh up to the Publique In∣terest, Is in the first Place not true; For it most fre∣quently fals out that Particular Men have a Private

Interest of their own differing from if not con∣trary to the Publique One, by which they are more potently inclined then by their Affection to the Publique; But secondly if it were alwaies true the Difficulty is left still remaining; For to suppose that every Man in a Popular Assembly should in a matter of State be able to discern his true Interest, is to suppose the Meanest and most unqualified of the People infallible in those things, where the most Consummate Politici∣ans do often mistake, And is besides repugnant to the Experience of all Commonwealths, whose Histories are full of Examples of pernitious Councels which have been embraced by the People.

Notwithstanding all that has been said, it must be confessed that a Commonwealth gaines one great Advantage by the Debate of the Se∣nate; For the People being composed of Igno∣rance, Obstinacy, and Tumult would certain∣ly in a Moment teare to pieces any Business that should be thrown among them; Whereas by reserving the Debate to the Senate, the People have no other imployment but to let fall a little piece of Linnen at all Adventures into one of two Boxes, So that being thus brought within a Disjunction of the Matter, It can be but an even lay against them that they do Miscarry.

Notes

• * 1.1

  H. p. 9.
• * 1.2

  Chap. 2.
• * 1.3

  Oceana p. 5.
• * 1.4

  H. p. 24.
• * 1.5

  H. p. 25.
• * 1.6

  Digest. de Just. & Jur. leg. 6.
• * 1.7

  H. p. 25.
• * 1.8

  Ibid.
• * 1.9

  H. p. 27.
• * 1.10

  Liv.
• * 1.11

  H. p. 133.
• * 1.12

  H. p. 27.