The history of the government of France, under the administration of the great Armand du Plessis, Cardinall and Duke of Richlieu, and chief minister of state in that kingdome wherein occur many important negotiations relating to most part of Christendome in his time : with politique observations upon the chapters / translated out of French by J.D. Esq.

Politique Observation.

THough Armies for the most part are raised to fight, yet sometimes they are designed for other ends, wise Princes having oftentimes obtain'd great ad∣vantages by them, without striking a blow. The meer jealousie which their motion may strike into an enemy, obligeth him to stand upon his guard, who otherwise had design'd to assault some place; and in case he have assaulted it, to recall some part of his Forces to prevent any attempts. This effect is not of mean consequence, because it divideth an enemies force, and consequently, rendreth him more easie to be conquered: Whilest the Waters of a great River are all shut up in their own Channel, their torrent is more impetuous, their force the greater; and who so then indeavoureth to waft over them, runneth no small hazard; whereas if dispersed into several Rivulets; their course is more slow, their depth lesse, so that they are both safely and easily to be Forded: Thus an enemies Army may some∣times be so strong, that he is to be feared, and then nothing better then to divide him, and force him to separate himself by some motions which may fill him with suspicions. How oft have Princes been compell'd to stay at home in their own de∣fence by their apprehensions of an Army appearing on their own Frontiers, just when they have been upon the point of invading their Neighbours? Besides, what Armies soever a Prince placeth on his Frontiers in times of War, they alwaies give him this advantage of keeping his own Country in security; either as to Forreign∣ers, who commonly make use of any pretensions about the Borders of a Country to colour their attempts; or as to the discontented persons of a Kingdom, who possibly may stir in their Prince's absence. To preserve Peace without making war, is an effect advantagious enough, and indeed a cause sufficient always to keep an Army on Foot; A thing, in my sense, of the more use, in regard War ought not to be made, but in order to Peace; and withal, it being more useful for to preserve Peace by a shew of War, then by War it self, that common Usher of Fire and Sword. For this reason it is that a Prince ought not then to raise his Army, when a Forreiner is upon the point of invading his Kingdom, or when factious spirits are just ready to revolt: No, He ought to prevent both the one and the other: and the bare sight of an Army is sufficient to deter them from the boldness of any enterprize.