Politique Observation.

NOthing gives greater tranquility to a State, then the disposal of Govern∣ments into the hands of such persons whose affection and fidelity are well known unto their Prince. The experience which France hath so often had, hath been too sad to be forgotten, seeing the most part of Civil wars, nay of Forraign too, had not been broached, but by the defect of Governours, more solicitous of their own Interests then of their Masters glory and service. Few are the Gran∣dees who are not discontented, if they have not Governments conferr'd upon them, nay, if they have not some kind of assured settlement in their Commands, that their Authorities may be greater. A King therefore is obliged to be the more inquisitive, whether with their Gandeur they have loyalty and zeal for his service, otherwise it were only to give them the means of combining one with the other to raise Factions, and to diminish the Soveraign, by advancing their own private power. Admit they be discontented, 'tis without cause; for no one hath any right to prescribe a Law to his Prince, how he shall chuse such persons as he is pleased to employ in his service. It is prudence not to regard such discontents, they are inconsiderable, when the publike Peace is in question. A King cannot distri∣bute his Governments with more discretion, then by intrusting them with such per∣sons whose loyalty is impregnable, and who he is assured will never interest them∣selves Page  419with any party but his own, if any Division should arise. Now of whom can he better be assured, then of such a Minister, of whose fidelity he receives daily testimonies, and who, when he sees him, brings with his Person all the Go∣vernments and Charges which have been conferred upon him? As for those rela∣ted to him, seeing they absolutely depend upon him, and that their Power is as his own, dependant upon his Majesties good favour, they are equally obliged to be faithful. For this reason it is, that the greatest Princes have not only not been backward to bestow the chief Governments upon them, but have looked upon it as a thing very necessary for their service. Touching the distribution of Govern∣ments, I add, That a King is obliged, what he may, to displace those persons who have enjoyed their Offices any long time, unless he be very well assured of their fi∣delity; they are so used to hold them, when long continued, that the fear of lo∣sing them, doth oftentimes engage them in some Faction, which gives them hopes of a longer continuance; Besides, when not received by his Majesty, but his Pre∣decessors, they are the sooner ingaged in a Faction, because they think not them∣selves beholden to him for them; Withal, in processe of time they get so absolute a Power, that somtimes it exceeds their Masters; it being usual, that long com∣mand is accompanyed with pride and insolence. Hence it is, that in the most po∣litique States their Governments were never but temporary. Rome lost her Liberty by continuing her Magistrates too long in their Power; and Caesar could never have mastered his own Country, but by acquiring too great a Power over the soul∣diers by his long command.