Moderation recommended in a sermon preached before the lord mayor and court of aldermen at Guild-Hall Chappel, May 12th, 1689 by George Tullie ...

A SERMON OF MODERATION.

PHIL. IV. 5.

Let your moderation be known unto all Men.

TIS one of the great Excellencies of the Christian Institution, that the Virtues and Graces it recommends to our Practice, do not only render us good and holy in our individual capacities in order to our everlasting welfare hereaster, but modest, prudent, and wife in our political Relations, in order to our well being here, as we are form'd into Bodies or Communities of

men; that they all of them tend mightily to the sweetning of Societies, and to the preventing, or healing those differences which are apt to imbroil us. And upon this prospect, partly, no doubt it is that we find those homiletic, or, if I may so speak, conversable Graces of meekness, gentleness, for∣giveness, forbearance, &c. so frequently press'd up∣on us in the Sacred Writings, and are particularly required in the Text, to let our Moderation be known unto all men.

In speaking to which words I shall do these three things.

First, I shall explain what I here understand by moderation in the Text.

Secondly, I shall lay down some Rules, or In∣stances of moderation so explain'd. And

Thirdly and Lastly, Shall conclude with a Mo∣tive or two to the practice of it,

And first, What is here meant by moderation?

And this the rather, because, that, as some of late, out of design, and others, from mistake, have declaimed against it, so there are really several Vices, as temporizing, halting betwixt two Opi∣nions, cowardise, and a fear of disobliging, that usurp its name, and fraudulently hang out its Co∣lours.

Now for the more distinct understanding of the the thing it will be necessary to have recourse to the Original word, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, an adjective, according to the Greek idiom, put for the Substantive, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, from the different Translations and Usages where∣of

we may be able to pick out and frame to our∣selves a sufficient notion of the virtue recommend∣ed in the Text.

Some Versions render it in this place by the word Mansuetudo, Meekness: Others by the word Humanitas, Humanity, a just sense of the dignity of humane Nature, and a behaviour suitable there∣to: Others render it Modestia, Modestie, an obliging sort of demeanour towards others proceeding from low apprehensions of a mans self: Our Translation render'd it formerly by the word Patience, and so I find some Interpreters would still have it, impor∣ting thereby an even and equable disposition of mind under all events, at the 24 of the Acts, the 4 ver. 'tis rendred Clemency, which is but another word for Mildness, the one in private Persons, the other in Men of Power and Authority, as Felix was to whom the words are there addressed. In the 2. Epist, of the Corinthians 10. chap. 1. ver. 'tis joyned as Synonimous, with the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Mildness or Meekness, and is there rendred Gentle∣ness. Now I Paul my self beseech you by the meek∣ness, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Gentleness of Christ, &c. by that facile and tractable disposition, which was visible in our Lord and Saviour. Aristotle (to omit se∣veral other places of Scripture, where it is ren∣der'd to the same effect) uses the word in a more narrow and confined sense than any we have yet mention'd; for that, to wit, which we call Equity, a readiness to judge of things, not according to the strict rigour and letter of the Law, but rather as

occasion shall require, and prudence suggest, ac∣cording to the circumstances and exigences of par∣ticular cases, as it may reasonably be supposed the Law giver himself would have judg'd and acted had such emergent cases come before him. Now tho this acceptation of the word is more particular, and furnishes us with a more distinct notion than any of the other, yet, as Grotius observes, the word is not limited to this forinsic sense here, but according to him, it imports, partly, a disposition of mind, whereby a Man is inclined to recede from his own Right upon occasion, and, partly, is studious of all fair opportunities of being useful and advantageous to others; from all which I think, we may collect, that Moderation in gene∣ral will amount to the due observation of a mean betwixt all unjustifiable excesses in matters of diffe∣rence and contest amongst Men, proceeding from a just amplitude and ingenuity of Spirit, and aiming alwaies at the advancement of the most publick and extensive good; and then Moderation, as it relates to religi∣ous differences (in which sense I shall principal∣ly consider it here) will be that gentle and equa∣ble disposition of mind, whereby a Christian, upon a clear sense of the main design of his Religion, and a due consideration of the passions, preposessions, and other infirmities of Humane Nature, is inclined to the most amicable and gentle methods of healing and ac∣commodating lesser differences about matters of Re∣ligion, in order to the more general advancement of more important Truths, and the substantial Interests of the Gospel,

We will take this general definition a peices, and that will give further light to what I mean.

First, then, The Moderation I recommend must proceed from an internal habit or disposition of the mind; for if a man, by the uncertain and ir∣risistable swing of humane affairs, is driven to re∣laxations of the rigour of things, contrary to the bent and bias of his own, otherwise inflexible, inclinations, then his moderation wants the influ∣ence of that internal principle, which gives life to all moral actions, and cheifly, denominates them virtuous.

Secondly, The moderation we speak of must derive from a clear sense of the main design of the Christian Religion, and alwayes act in order to the advancement of it. Now the great end of the Christian Institution being to render every individual Christian good and holy here in order to his everlasting happiness hereafter, and then, secondly, to plant in him those Graces, which, as a Member of Civil Society, may most pro∣mote the general good and quiet of Mankind, and the peace of the particular Community in which he lives, our Man of temper and mode∣ration must alwayes have a special eye and re∣gard to the advancement of these in all his pro∣ceedings, and then howsoever unsuccessful his en∣deavours may be with men that resolve to stand divided into parties, yet the honesty and gene∣rosity of his intentions will justifie him before God, and at the Bar of the severest reason. And

here take notice, that I exclude all secular and narrow considerations from being justifiable mo∣tives to the exercise of that moderation I would perswade to. Is a Man so inclined purely because 'tis perhaps the humour of the Times wherein he lives? the humour may be a virtue in others, but in him 'tis a sordid and ungenerous compli∣ance. Is he, again, so inclined only to purchase the favour and good will of a Party, away with him and his Party together: The Moderation we speak of, as it must be known unto all men, so must it aim, as far as possible, at the general good, peace, and mutual advantage of all men con∣cerned in the Contest: The moderate Man must, with the great Apostle, an illustrious instance of this virtue, endeavour, as far as may be, to give no offence neither to the Jews, nor to the Gen∣tiles, nor to the Church of God: pleasing all men in all things, not seeking his own profit, or interest, the gratification of his own passion or humour, but the profit of many, that they may be saved, 1 Cor. 10. 33.

Thirdly, I said a vertuous modera••ion must proceed from a due consideration of the passions, prepossessions, and other infirmities incident to our common humane Nature. i. e. in short, from this undeniable maxime, that these, and other such like things render an intire harmony and a agreement in opinion an impossibility in morali∣ty, and the object of our wishes rather than of our hopes; whereupon our moderate Man, upon

a principle of the most extensive benificence, and compassion on the score of these unhappily dividing infirmities of our Nature, is inclined to make use of such prudential expedients, as may, in his judgement, most conduce to the conciliating a good understanding amongst men, notwithstanding the variety of their apprehen∣sions.

Fourthly, I said this Moderation must take place in the less and more minute differences a∣bout Religious matters. For as for such as sap the foundations, or doctrines, by direct and ne∣cessary consequence••, tending to the subversion of them, there's room indeed for base servile Spirits to temporize and betray their Religion, but there's no room, that I know of, for any vir∣tuous moderation, unless that of a fair and civi∣liz'd handling the matters in debate, without vi∣rulent and unmannerly reflexions.

And after what has been said, if there be any vice, or unwarrantable artifice, that pre∣tends to the name and mine of this excellent Grace, Rectum est index sui & obloqui, we may easily pull off its vizor, and discriminate it from the vertue in the Text, by the description gi∣ven of it.

And thus much of the first general, the true notion of a virtuous Moderation.

I proceed to the Second, which was to lay be∣before you some R••les, or instances of Modera∣tion thus stated and explain'd.

But before I do this, I must premise,

First, that I would not be understood to pre∣scribe to any one denomination of men, exclu∣sively of all others, but in the extent and lan∣guage of the Text, Ʋnto all men, that stand in need of it.

Secondly, That I intrench not here upon any thing that looks more properly like the task of publick wisedom, as what is by no means rudely to be touch'd by private hands, no, all we have to do, is, if possible, by general argu∣ments to dispose Men to, and by general lines to chalk out the way that Leades to the great end of peace, and a good understanding.

The first Rule of moderation then in gene∣ral, shall be this, to attemperate our concern for or against things with charity and discretion. For if Fury once usurps the name of Zeal, and those drunken Pilots, our Passions, sit at the Helm, (for Passion is a sort of ebriety of the mind) what can men expect but that, like a Fleet of Ships, with spread Sails, no ballast, and in a migh∣ty Storm, we fall foul upon each other, and some suffer shipwrack in the Scuffle. If our Zeal transports us beyond the bounds of civil deco∣rum and discretion, we offend against the Rules of our common humanity, and the fundamen∣tal obligations we have to Mankind, as such, which give the prime and irriversable Laws to all humane Societies, and oblige us to a fair and civiliz'd demeanour towards one another

in all our transactions. If our Zeal push us on to exasperating Language, harsh and severe cen∣sures, malicious misconstructions, &c. beyond the measures that Charity prescribes, we violate the prime and irrepealable Laws of our common Religion, and transgress both as Men and as Chri∣stians. We must therefore in all our debates, especially in those of the Nature we speak of, always appoint two Moderators of our Zeal and Concernment, Prudence in our Political, and Cha∣rity in our Religious Capacity, without both, or either of which, our ardency partakes no longer of the Nature of a regular and vital heat, but of the Flame and burning of a Feaver: Is no longer Health, but Frenzy and Distemper; with∣out which all our doings, how briskly and how bravely soever we may think we lay about us, are most certainly nothing worth, have no intrin∣sic value in them here, nor will ever avail us one jot hereafter. O thou Divine Charity, the very bond of Peace and of Perfectness! we have often heard of Thee by the hearing of the Ear, but when shall our Eyes see Thee! Never? It may be so. Yet, Abba Father, all things are possible unto Thee.

Secondly, And in consequence of the former, another Rule of the Christian Moderation we speak of, is, to refrain, as much as possible, from all scornful and scandalous Reflexions upon the persons of those with whom we differ. For as they are a manifest indication of want of Tem∣per

in the Aggressors, so are they, too fatally. apt to carry their Opponents into the same unju∣stifiable excesses, especially if the Sparks chance to fall upon Men of as combustible matter as those who sent them out; by which means the quarrel is gradually transferr'd from causes to per∣sons, which of all other things, sets men at the most irreconcileable distance. Ill Words being naturally, so far from closing, that they never fail to widen Mens differences, and Fester, and Gangrene those Wounds, which without them, might probably have heal'd of themselves. They alienate Men from entertaining any tollerable o∣pinion of our persons, and then we may bring them over to our perswasions, if we can; for we may endeavour to perswade him to great pur∣pose, who, by the rude treatment we give him, shall have reason to think himself the Object of our Malice, or our Scorn. No, we may be as Hot and Angry as we please, but Men, I tell you, reasonable Creatures, expect other usage, and will not be scolded or rail'd out of their prejudi∣ces. There is a natural sturdiness in all Men, that immediately sets it self to oppose, and con∣front such contemptuous usage, and which there∣fore is so far from informing Mens judgments, or bending their Wills, that it renders them much more inflexible, and therefore it might possibly become our Christian Prudence in such Cases, if we do really and in good earnest aim at an Honourable Peace, and a good Understan∣ding,

(and God forgive them that do not) to be∣take our selves to humane methods of perswasion, the bands of love, and the cords of a man; to endeavour to catch one another, as the Apostle speaks of himself in relation to the Corinthians, craftily and with guile, by all the Christian me∣thods of endearment, kindness, candor, meek∣ness, good words; and if there be any other obliging and conciliateing ways, any other pi∣ous complaisance, which may recommend our persons at least, if not our perswasions, to one an∣other.

3ly. Another Rule of the Moderation we speak of is, carefully to distinguish about the weight and importance of those things wherein we differ, and to proportion our zeal for or a∣gainst them accordingly; for certainly, he were a very ridiculous person who should be equally concern'd about the sitting of his hair upon his head, as about the sitting of his head upon his shoulders. When massie bulkie Errors, of the very first Magnitude, shall come to be cramm'd into our Creeds, and be ready to be cramm'd down our Throats, upon our inability to swallow them, away then with Modalities, Comprehen∣sions, compounding or comprimising the differ∣ence; here the rule is, on the contrary, to con∣tend earnestly for the faith, to be zealously affected, to withstand our Adversaries to the face, to keep our Posts, maintain our ground, and not to flinch or abate one jot of our pretensions, as we value

the interests of Truth, and of the Gospel. But now in less momentous and important differences, as ours confessedly are on all hands, the same mea∣sure of zeal and stiffness is not, I conceive, war∣rantable on either side, tho that of establishment and authority must be own'd to have the stron∣ger plea. Here the Rules are a cautious and pru∣dential behaviour one towards another, a walk∣ing by the same Canon, or Rule, as far as we possibly can, whereunto we have already at∣tain'd, an endeavour of reducing our Brethren from their Errors in the spirit of meekness, and the like. In a word therefore, our zeal ••or or against things should always bear proportion to their just weight and importance, otherwise it becomes both criminal and ridiculous.

4ly. Another Rule of the Christien Moderati∣on we speak of is for a man to carry always about him a fair and teachable disposition, and not to have his ears servilely bored through to the di∣ctates of any one Master, or party of men, ex∣clusively of all others; for by that means we re∣ally, and in effect, lapse into the stupidity of an implicite faith, and follow such or such a Teacher, as the phrase is, more like an herd of Cattel than a Congregation of Christians. A man must not therefore, I say, be so over-consident and dog∣matical in the truth and rectitude of the things he is inclined to, as resolvedly to bolt out all evi∣dence to the contrary, and leave no room for a fur∣ther enquiry into the grounds and reasons of the

things he is at present perswaded of; for that is not to act in the middle way which alone is suitable to the reasonable nature, that being in it self a sort of medium betwixt the brute and the Divi∣nity, and which, as it may be sway'd and preju∣diced by the sensual appetite of the one, so is it capable still of receiving farther degrees of the illumination of the other; and therefore he who is thus resolvedly partial, and rigidly deaf to all Objections that may shake the certainty of the things he is perswaded of, acts not like the rea∣sonable humane Creature he pretends to be, but either below himself, with the obstinacy and sturdiness of a brute, or a above himself, in a manner fit only for the infinite and inerrable knowledg of God. Our moderate man then is never invincibly stiff and tenacious, but as his ears are always open, to the voice of reason and truth, from whatsoever point of the Compass the sound comes, so is his heart always equally open to entertain and embrace it. He is ready upon occasion of enquiry into things, to divest himself, as far as possible, of his former prejudi∣ces and prepossessions, sets up the Imperial Stan∣dard of Reason instead of them, and will stick by Truth, bare naked Truth, wheresoever he finds it, without regard to Parties, or invidious names fix'd upon them, or the Examples and Authorities of any one whatsoever; as well knowing, that he who shall in the lump, with∣out examination or distinction, maintain for truth

whatsoever one man, or denomination of men, shall advance, and for right and good whatso∣ever they shall do, and deal just the quite contrary measure to all others, must in all humane proba∣bility, often oblige himself to contradict Truth, defend unjustifiable proceedings, and provoke God himself, to whose actions and sentiments alone such unlimited deference of judgment and entire obedience is due, for 'tis God only that can never do amiss, and never be in the wrong. And yet such is the weakness of the generality of men, that they are carried away sometimes by the names of Leaders and Parties, one is for Pa••l, another for Apollo's, and a third for Cep••as, and yet possibly without due examination, how far any of these is for Christ; sometimes again, by the names which the wit or malice of men have fixt upon opinions, or designs, without any farther enquiry into the nature of the things themselves, according to that excellent and just observation, Pauci res ipsas sequuntur, plures nomina rerum, plu∣rimi nomina Magistrorum. And of this we have had late, but deplorable, experience, from the cunning and subtilty of those whose business it was, still is, and ever will be, to divide and in∣flame us. Thus have the great Christian Virtues of the Moderation we are now upon, conde∣scension, forbearance, and the like suffer'd under the imputation of fanaticism, and thus again, on the other hand, has conformity with the best constituted Church upon earth been obstructed,

only because some men were pleas'd, how justly, time since has shewn, to suspect it of Popery; and pray God our foolish passions, animosities, and prejudices do not still give the same com∣mon enemy the same fatal opportunity of practi∣sing upon us. If therefore men would condescend to be Disciples of the virtue in the Text, they must try all things, and hold fast only that which is good, abet that alone in persons of their own perswasions which is just and true, and disprove that alone in others which is blame-worthy; they must have no men in admiration through prejudice, education, or passion, and not hold the Faith of Christ with respect of persons; and by thus doing they will purchase to themselves the applause of their own Consciences, a good report among all honest and understanding men, and it matters not for others.

5ly. Another Rule, or instance, of the Mode∣ration I perswade to, when men stand divided in opinion, is what the Apostle prescribes, and that upon occasion too, of such differences in the Church of Corinth, That no man seek his own, but 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, every one the things of another, (1 Cor. 10. 21.) the common publick good of the whole Community concern'd in the contect, not the private separate advantage of any one single party; for whatsoever leads men to an intempe∣rate love of themselves, and their own ends, di∣vides the unity that ought to be amongst them. And certainly, says a late great Prelate of

our own, A. B. Laud himself, there's no keeping of unity either in Church or State, unless men will be so tem∣perate, (when it comes to a push at least) as to lay down the private for the publicks sake, and perswade others to do the like. And indeed 'tis too obvious to imagin what peril to the publick good must derive from an immoderate love of the private, to need a Comment; for how only, in a word, should that body, whether Natural or Political, be preserv'd safe and entire, if the hands, for instance, would assist no other part but themselves, if the head would not direct the feet, nor the feet con∣tribute to support the head: Let us therefore, I say, (and I am sure 'tis high time so to do) divest our selves of that littleness of spirit, and narrow selfish principle which reigns so visibly amongst us, and is so unworthy the dignity of a man, and the p••ety of a Christian, and so directly opposite to the peace and preservation of all humane So∣cieties; and reassume we, on the contrary, that just amplitude and generosity of temper, that like charity seeketh not its own, but the publick and most universal good.

6ly. Another Rule, or instance, of a virtuous Moderation is for men to put the most chari∣table constructions they can upon one another's actions and perswasions, ascribing them to the best causes, assigning them the best ends, and deriving them from the best principles they fair∣ly may. For, for men immediately to fall foul upon one another's integrity, to charge the dif∣ference

of perswasions and practises observable amongst us, upon the corruption of our minds, and the depravity of our hearts, is to assail one another in the most quick and sensible parts, and to set us at an irreconcileable distance; the heart and intention being that grand leading principle by which as the great searcher of hearts will judg all men hereafter, so likewise that too, by which they ought principally to stand or fall in the esti∣mate of their fellow-servants here; and therefore not rudely to be assaulted without the keenest resentments. Let us not therefore, if we have any sense of moderation and temper, persist to dress up things in shapes, that for ought we know belong not to them, in hideous and portentous forms to frighten and exasperate one another, but let us rather ascribe the differences amongst us to error of judgment, the prejudices of Education, infelicity of Constitution, or to any other of those either innocent or excusable causes, which render an entire unity of opinion an impossible thing: but do'nt we by any means set up for searchers of hearts, and peremptorily judg of men in refe∣rence to their future states; we know whose great attribute that is, and to him, their own master, as to that particular, must every man stand or fall. Who art thou that invadest this mighty Prerogative, and that thus arrogantly judgest another mans servant?

7ly. Another Rule of the Christian moderati∣on I speak of, I take to be this; not to charge

the faults or failures of particular persons, either upon whole parties, or their perswasions. For as to to the first of these, 'tis an open breach of Justice, Charity, and Logick, all at once, it being against the known rules of reasoning to argue from a lame induction of particulars to universals, for in that case there is more in the conclusion than was in the premises, which is a fallacy, and not to be admitted. St. Jude's Rule therefore of making a difference, must take place here, and that will set us right. Nor is it, secondly, any more justifiable to load the several causes men may chance to maintain with the exorbitancies or irregularities of their particular abetters, in as much as there is no necessary connexion betwixt truth and error in the understanding, and rectitude and obliquity in the will; we must not then argue from persons to causes; for as (to in∣stance) we read of several Hereticks of old whose lives were as pure and unblameable, as their errors were gross and pernicious, so, what is but a melancholly consideration, we need not go far for instances of those, whose lives are as scandalous, as their communion is orthodox.

8ly. Another rule of the Moderation I would perswade to, is, not to engage in any needless contests and disputes about these lesser matters: according to the advice of the great Apostle in his fourteenth Chapter to the Romans, at the first vers. Him that is weak in the faith, (who is still scrupulous about his Mosaick Rites, Meats, Days,

&c.) receive ye, but not to doubtful disputations. In as much as experience shews such conflicts are seldom attended with better success than with heating both our selves and opponents in∣to passion; and then for ought I know the gi∣ving way to anger and resentment on both sides may be of worse consequence than the error on either. And therefore possibly 'twere most ad∣visable for men in such cases, fairly and modest∣ly to propound their reasons, without endea∣vouring forcibly to bear down their Adversaries with the strength of them, for the seeming in∣sult and triumph of such a procedure does but more impregnably steel men against that convi∣ction, which the truth of our cause, and the weight of our arguments might otherwise create: better therefore, I say, leave men to the cool of their thoughts, and suffer private reflexion to work what bearing hard upon them would ne∣ver produce, if God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth we shall have fairly propounded.

9ly. and lastly, Another Rule of the Modera∣tion I perswade to, is what the same Apostle ad∣vises in the same Chapter to the Romans; above mention'd, at the third vers. Let not him that eateth (him, who, upon the abolition of the Cere∣monial dispensation by our Lord is satisfied, he may lawfully eat of such meats as in the Leviti∣cal Law were reputed unclean) despise him that eateth not; (him, who on the other hand, through

his former prejudices thinks himself still obliged to abstain from them) and let not him which eateth not, judge (or condemn) him that eateth. Where 'tis manifest each party rallied and reflected on the o∣ther. The Eaters 'tis likely look'd upon the non∣eaters as silly, weak, and superstitious people, laugh'd at and ridiculed their childish scrupulosi∣ty; and these he advises to abate of their intel∣lectual pride, and supercilious scornful humour; the non-eaters on the other side were sullen, sowre, and morose, full of censure, and ill na∣ture, and probably condemn'd the Eaters as per∣sons irreligious, that made no conscience of their actions, and who were ready, upon occasion, to comply with any thing; and these he perswades to modesty and sobriety in passing their verdicts upon those who were otherwise perswaded; and indeed the reasonableness and wisdom of the A∣postle's advice is demonstrable from the nature of the two extremes of which these parties were guilty; contemning and undervaluing on the one hand, and judging and censuring on the other. For as to the first of these, contempt, nothing in the world is more exasperating and provoking than it. Men had rather be the objects of your malice than your scorn; the former supposes them considerable, and every man is willing to be thought so for something or other, but the latter speaks them below your notice, and strikes directly at that value which every man is apt to set upon himself. Nay indeed, all other pro∣vocations

borrow a great part of their sting from the contempt they imply, for no man injures or abuses another, but who at the same time, tacite∣ly, at least, dispises and contemns him. And then again, for the excess on the other hand, the sowre, censorious, judging humour, that too ex∣tremely irritates and provokes, as what, in these lesser matters especially, looks more like the pro∣duct of peevishness and malice, than of ignorance or mistake; and how far the continuance of our unhappy divisions has been owing to these faults, and the want of putting this Apostolick Rule in practise, is perhaps a fitter subject for our sorrow than our discussion. I might detain you longer upon this head, but whilst I treat of Moderation, I must remember that I am then more especially obliged to keep within bounds my self, and pro∣ceed therefore, briefly, in the last place, to some motives, or inducements to the practice of it.

And need there indeed any other motives be∣sides the simple reasonableness of the thing, to induce men to the practice of any one particular I have perswaded to? need I yet advise men to be sober, modest, prudent, and temperate, when heats, animosities, and excesses, have almost un∣done us? and do not the dangers we have es∣caped, and the circumstances we are in, call lou∣der upon us than a thousand other Arguments, to lay aside faction in Religion, and to glorifie God with one heart and one mouth? Surely they

do. And if you need any farther motives con∣sider,

1. That the moderation I recommend is the peculiar virtue and ornament of that excellent Church you own your selves members of, the Church of England; I say again, of the Church of England, which in her very fundamental Con∣stitution, is a mean betwixt the two extremities, Superstition on the one hand, and Enthusiasm on the other; and as for those excesses her adversa∣ries have been pleas'd to charge her with, she is no way in her self, responsible for them, unless they could, at the same time, prove that the personal failures, indiscretions, passions, &c. of every particular member of her Communion are adopted into her Constitution, which were no less an absurd than an uncharitable Position.

2ly. Let me perswade you to the practice of this virtue, because 'tis the truly Evangelical temper, and the practice of the Apostles them∣selves. The great Doctor of the Gentiles has left us an undeniable precedent of this matter in his own person; for though he tells us, He was Free from all men, yet he made himself a servant unto all, that he might gain the more; He made himself all things to all men, that by all means he might have some. And how was he to all, as a Learned * 1.1 Prelate of our own asks the question, if he did not sometimes remit of his right to some, & indeed had the Saint solicited the Christian cause with the same

zeal and stiffness, the Persecutor had pursued it with not long before, he might have saved himself the labour of preaching the Gospel from Jeru∣salem round about to Illiricum, his Gospel had been hid to all intents and purposes: And in his own language, he had spoke all the while unto the air; in as much as experience attests, that fierce∣ness and violence are the most improper engines imaginable to move the great weights of so strong prepossession, and such long prescription. Nay, 'tis farther evident that the transactions of the whole Apostolick Synod recorded in the 15th. of the Acts, are an eminent instance of the temperate proceeding I at present recom∣mend. For tho they might justly have insisted upon their Apostolick authority, the extent and plenitude of their Commission, and the unque∣stionable infallibility of their decisions, and there∣upon have peremptorily condemned the scrupu∣lous Judaizing Converts by some Canon, or Decree, to which they should be obliged to submit, without farther debate, upon pain of Anathema, yet I say, notwithstanding all these indisputable advantages on their side, it seem'd good to the Holy Ghost, and to the Apostles, to come rather to a Temperament; for they proceed∣ed neither to an absolute prohibition of the Mo∣saique Rites after conversion, wisely considering that they might thereby have exasperated the Judaizing Zealots into an absolute Apostasie from the faith; nor were they so regardless

on the other hand, of the liberty of the Gen∣tile Converts, as to require any other observan∣ces of them than such as they presumed were requisite, in that exigency of affairs, in order to a perfect union and agreement amongst them, that they might thereby prudentially remove such occasions of difference as might obstruct the growth and progress of the common Christia∣nity in the world.

3ly. Be perswaded to the practise of this virtue, because you thereby make the nearest approaches that the infirmities of Men, and the circumstances of human affairs will admit to the Divine O••cono∣my it self; for what, I beseech you, is God's whole Government of the world, but a moderation of the rigour of his justice, with a temperament of mercy? For if he should be extreme to mark what is done amiss, as we are, should pursue things to their utmost rigour and extent, take advantage of all the forfeitures we make him, and not recede one jot from his just pretensions against us, Who could live if God should do this? and it appears to me a very hard case, that we cannot be induced to treat one another with the same temper that our common God treats us all with. And this naturally leads me to shut up all with the sequel of the Text.

Let your Moderation be known unto all men, the Lord is at hand. He is not far off in his final judgment of all flesh, and then I am sure the best of us all will stand in need of that temper

and moderation in him, which we deny to one another. He is at hand, again, not far off, pos∣sibly, in the execution of some temp••••ary and heavy judgments upon this sinful Land of our Nativity. Sure I am that if an unnatural ingra∣titude, unchristian animosities, ill grounded jealou∣sies, unreasonable dissatisfactions, sinful murmurings, if, I say, in a word, one of the worst abuses that ever was of one of the greatest of mercies in possession, be a fatal fore-runner of the forest of Judgments in reversion, we of all Mankind bid the fairest for them. For if, after God has unex∣pectedly dropt his mercies in our mouths, we shall u••gratefully throw them up again, will not the Divine indignation have just reason to use the same passionate expostulation with us that he did with the dull murmuring Israelites of old, What could I ha••e done more for my Vineyard that I have not done for it? and to inflict likewise the same judgment upon us; Behold, your house is left unto you desolate. If we will still persist to sa∣crifice our Holy Religion, the interests of Truth and of the Gospel, all in a word, that is dear to us as m••n or Christians, to our passions, animo∣siti••s, s••lf-will, private interests, notions; or to speak more properly, to we know not what; why then we fall as ridiculous as unpitied vi∣ctims, God our deliverer, with all the Nations round about us, will justly laugh at our calami∣ty; mo••k when our fear cometh, and give us up to that destruction wherein we seem to delight.

In a word, the Lord is at hand, I hope in the midst of this present Assembly, and when thou, Lord, shalt come to judg the World, 'twil•• not then, surely, be enquired, who has most stiftly and vehemently asserted the little inferior opinions, perswasions, and interests of his own particular party, but who in his life and conversation has most promoted the true Spirit and Genius of thy holy Religion for its own sake, and most labour∣ed the advancement of one of those great and glorious ends thou camest into the world for, of Peace on earth, and good will a mongst men.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Bishop Hall of Exeter.