An explication of the Decalogue or Ten Commandments, with reference to the catechism of the Church of England to which are premised by way of introduction several general discourses concerning God's both natural and positive laws / by Gabriel Towerson ...

PART II.

The Affirmative part of the Commandment, The contenting our selves with that which is our own; upon occasion whereof enquiry is made into the nature of Contentment, which is defined to be an Acquiescen∣cy of the Mind in that portion of outward things we are possessed of upon a perswasion of its being sufficient for us. This definition al∣lotted both a general and a particular explication, and evidenced to be true in every branch of it. An account of the grounds of our obli∣gation to Contentment, which are shewn to be 1. The Will of the Al∣mighty declared by the disposition of his Providence. 2. Gods both knowing better than we our selves what condition is fittest for us, and his readiness to allot it. 3. The sufficiency of our own portion. The means whereby this excellent vertue may be attained. A sober use of abundance at all times, and sometimes a voluntary abstinence. The consideration of our own Vileness, and particularly of our past Excesses, as in like manner of our own portions being better than many others who are not otherwise inferiour to us. An enumeration of several other means which are alike conducible to it, and particu∣larly of such as are purely Religious. Of which nature are, The as∣surances God hath given us of supporting us under our condition, or delivering us out of it, or making it advantageous to us. The pro∣mises of a better life, and Prayer. The Conclusion.

OF the negative part of the Commandment, what hath been said may suffice;* 1.1 proceed we now to the Affirmative one, said by us (and not without reason) to be no other than what the Authour to the Hebrews adviseth, chap. 13.15. And be content with such things as ye have: This as it is directly opposite to the coveting of our Neighbours Goods, so being manifestly implyed in the prohibition of it; he who is forbidden to covet anothers goods, being eo ipso obliged to be contented with his own, because there is no Medium between them. Taking it therefore for granted, that to be contented with such things as we have, is the thing enjoined in this Commandment, I will make it my business to shew,

• 1. Wherein the nature of Contentment doth consist.
• 2. What the grounds of its obligation are. And
• 3. Lastly, By what means it is to be attained.

1. Now though what Contentment is, be not difficult to define, even from the common acceptation of it in the world; though being so, it might therefore suffice to dispatch our account of it in a few words, as which to men not willing to be deceived would serve to unfold the nature of it: Yet because I have observed that they who seem well enough informed about the nature of it in Thesi, do yet in Hypothesi, and when they come to make application of it to them∣selves, willingly err in the apprehension of it; I purpose to be more particular in the unfolding of its nature, than otherwise I should think my self obliged. In order whereunto I will first give you a short de∣finition of it, and when I have done so, both explain it and draw it down to particulars.

Now Contentment is nothing else than an acquiescency of the Mind in that portion of outward things we are possessed of, upon a perswasion of its being sufficient for us. I call it an acquiescency of the Mind, be∣cause experience shews it so to be, both as to that Mind to which we have attributed it, and that acquiescency thereof, which we have affirmed it to import; Content by whatsoever it be occasioned, yet having its seat in the Mind, and quieting the desires of it. I call it an acquiescency of the Mind in that portion of outward things we are possessed of, partly to intimate that there must be generally some por∣tion of outward things to beget it, and partly to shew that whatso∣ever that portion is, whether high or low, it is equally the object of it. For the proof of the former whereof we shall need to go no far∣ther than that of St. Paul, 1 Tim. 6.8. for exhorting men to content∣ment, though they have no other than Food and Raiment, he giveth us thereby to understand,* 1.2 that those are generally necessary to the procuring of it; that destitution in them is such an evil as, till it be removed, suffereth not the mind of man to be at quiet. Again, though some portion of outward things be absolutely necessary to be∣get it, or at least is generally so; yet whether high or low is not ma∣terial, because both are the object of it: As is evident, both from the former Text which commands us having Food and Raiment there∣with to be content: and another place of the same Apostle, Phil. 4.11, 12. where he not only affirms himself to have learnt in whatsoever state he was therewith to be content; but adds moreover, as a proof and illustration of the former, that he knew both how to be abased, as well as how to abound, to be hungry, as well as to be full, and in fine, to suffer need, as well as to enjoy the contrary affluence. I know not whether I should add, because sufficiently implyed in the former considerations; that Contentment, about whatsoever it is conversant, is still about that which is present; St. Paul's 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 in the place be∣fore quoted, and the Authour to the Hebrews exhorting to be content, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 chap. 13. 5. being an abundant evidence thereof. Though were neither the one nor the other convictive, the necessity of being contented with our own, would infer the being contented also with the present, because nothing can be truly said to be our own but that which is so. Lastly, as Contentment is an acquiescency in that por∣tion of outward things which is present to us; so it doth also include in it as the ground of that acquiescency, a perswasion of its being suf∣ficient for us: this being manifestly implied in those phrases* 1.3 of the New Testament, whereby Contentment is expressed.

But because, even thus we cannot satisfie our selves perfectly con∣cerning the nature of Contentment, there being place for enquiry how far that acquiescency we speak of is to be extended, and where∣in limited; I will once more run over the definition of Contentment, and draw it down to more particular considerations. For be it that Contentment is an acquiescency of the Mind, according as was before defined; yet is it such an acquiescency as excludes all desires or endea∣vours of mending that mean condition we are in? If so, farewel to all Industry and Providence, which yet no man hath ever esteemed unlawful; yea farewel to those Divine Promises, which, to encou∣rage men to be content with the present, give them hopes of Gods bringing them out of their streights: He who gives hopes of amend∣ing

our Condition, forbidding us not to desire it, but on the contrary rather encouraging us both to desire and endeavour it. And yet if there be place for such desires and endeavours, how can the content∣ed man of whom we speak, be said to acquiesce or rest in his present portion? for how can he be said to quiet his desires in the present, who is ever extending them beyond it? Both which Horns of this Dilem∣ma are thus excellently expressed by Horace* 1.4 in the person of the Cynick Philosopher,

Si pranderet olus patienter, regibus uti Nollet Aristippus. Si sciret regibus uti, Fastidiret olus—

If (saith he) Aristippus could content himself with a dinner of Herbs, he would not certainly endeavour to ingratiate himself with Princes, and thereby to amend his fortune: And if he could compass his ends upon them, no doubt he would despise his former fare, which shews he was not before very well satisfied with it. For the reconciling of which two together, and thereby the discovering yet more fully the nature of Contentment, I shall desire it may be considered, first, that inasmuch as Contentedness is nothing else than an Acquiescency in the present; nothing hinders but a man may be at the same time contented with the present, and yet desire an enlargement for the future, be∣cause that Acquiescency and Desire have respect to different times, which takes away all contradiction between them. The contented man of whom we speak, doth indeed desire an enlargement of his condition for the future; he prays to God for it, and is not wanting in his endeavours to procure it; but in the mean time he quiets him∣self with what he hath, and repines not in the least at the smalness of it. But because the present time in strictness of Speech reacherh no farther than the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 or present moment, within which to confine the duty of Contentment were to pen it up in a narrower room than I con∣ceive Christianity and Nature intended it; and because the same Will of God which obligeth us to be content with the portion of the pre∣sent minute, will equally oblige us to continue our Contentment to the next, if God be pleased to continue the other: for these Reasons, I say, as I deem it but just to understand by the present time, all that time, of what continuance soever, to which God shall be pleased to annex the same humble Fortune; so I conceive it alike necessary to shew, that those Desires and Endeavours, which we spake of, are no way inconsistent with that acquiescency which is commensurate to it. Now that so they are not, or at least need not to be, will appear, if these two Conditions be admitted, which no contented Man either did or can refuse. 1. That whilst the Will of God is yet unknown, he submit his Desires to it, and resolve to abide by the determination of it. And 2. That he lay aside all Desires of an enlargement, after it shall appear to him that it is the Will of God he should abide in that mean condition wherein he is. For acquiescency not so much import∣ing an exclusion of our Desires, as the quieting of them, and bring∣ing them into subjection to the Will of the Divine Majesty, which, as I shall afterwards shew, is the principal ground of Contentment; he may very well be said to acquiesce in his present Fortune, who sub∣mits

his Desires to the Will of God, whilst it is yet uncertain; and causeth them to cease utterly, where that Will of God is made known. The only difficulty in my opinion, (which though of no concernment as to the present Dispute to resolve, is yet to the understanding of the nature of Contentment) the only difficulty, I say, in my opinion, is how to come to understand whether it be the Will of God we should abide in that condition we are in. Now though nothing herein can certainly be defined without a Revelation from Heaven, partly be∣cause the Scripture (which is one way of knowing Gods Will) is silent in this particular; and partly because his Providence (which is the only one beside) is a mysterious Book, and not very easie to be unriddled: yet I think we may probably conjecture it to be his Will that we should so abide, or at least that we should do so till we have a very fair invitation from his Providence to stir; if, after many and various attempts to amend our condition, we do yet prove unsuc∣cessful in it: It being not lightly to be thought (especially where our Desires are moderate, and Attempts honest) that God, by whose Pro∣vidence they are frustrated, would so often do so, if it were not his Will we should at least for some time abide in the condition we are in. The result of the Premises is this; The contented Man, as such, acqui∣esceth in his present Fortune, and is willing, because it is God's Will, to be what he is: He is moreover as willing to continue so to be, so long as it shall please God to have him so. In conformity whereto, though he do desire, and it may be endeavour an amendment; yet as he doth not do so, even when the Will of God is uncertain, without a sub∣mission of his Will to God's, and a resolvedness to acquiesce in the de∣termination of it; so those Desires and Endeavours of his cease alto∣gether, where it either certainly, or probably, appears to him to be the Will of God, that he should abide in that condition wherein he is. I say nothing at all at present, of the entertaining of immoderate or anxi∣ous Desires, or using any unlawful means to compass them; these be∣ing so apparently inconsistent with that acquiescency of mind where∣of we speak, and that Will of God which I shall afterwards shew to be the ground of it, that it may suffice to have mentioned them, with∣out either Proof or Explication. For how can he be said to acqui∣esce in his present Portion, and much more in the Will of God con∣cerning it; whose mind is not only like the troubled Sea in that it can∣not rest, but is ever casting out mire and dirt, both in its speeches and actions; neither knowing how to express it self without murmuring and complaining, nor to prosecute the Object of its Desires, without violent or fraudulent actions, which that God, in whose Will they ought to acquiesce, hath distinctly and severely forbidden?

From that acquiescency, wherein we have said contentedness to consist, pass we to that in which it obligeth us to acquiesce; which I have said to be that Portion of outward things we are possessed of: Where again, we are to consider it, as it imports the presence of some portion of outward things; and as it imports that portion which we have, as well low as high, to be equally the Object of it. Now though (to begin with the first) it be generally necessary to Contentment, that a Man be furnished with such things as are ordinarily necessary for his support, and particularly with Food and Rayment; upon which account I have shewn it* 1.5 to be lawful, in the case of extreme ne∣cessity,

to withdraw so much from other Men as will serve to supply it; yet I must also add, that we both may and ought to be content, even when we are without those necessary things, where it appears to be Gods Will that so we should be; because though Food and Ray∣ment be generally necessary to Contentment, yet they are not abso∣lutely nor universally such, Man, as our Saviour argues out of the Law, living not by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God. The only difficulty is, how we may discover that Will of God, which I suppose may be these two ways. 1. When he giveth us any assurance of an extraordinary support: and 2. When he placeth us in such a condition as we cannot compass an ordinary one. After either of which to repine or murmur, were as manifest a violation of the Duty of Contentment, as to do so when we have Food and Rayment. For contentedness (as I shall afterwards shew) having for the ground of its Obligation the Will of that God who is the framer of our Fortunes; if it be his Will (as certainly the cases before spoken of are no obscure indications of it) that we should ac∣quiesce in no Fortune as well as in a small one, there is no doubt that alike ought to be the Object of it, and we to acquiesce or rest in it. There is but little difficulty (and therefore I shall not insist on the Ex∣plication of it) as to what I have before said concerning low and high being alike the Object of Contentment; there being no Truth of which we have a greater Experience, than what is said to have fallen from the mouth of Epicurus* 1.6, that to whom little is not enough, nothing how great soever is so; Men's Desires for the most part enlarging with their Fortunes, and creating to them those wants which God and Nature never made.

Lastly, As contentedness is an acquiescency of the Mind, and an ac∣quiescency in that portion of outward things we are possessed of; so such an acquiescency in it, as ariseth from, and includeth in it a firm belief of that portion's being sufficient for us. This as it is the natural importance of those Phrases, whereby we have shewn the New Testa∣ment to express it, so being essential to contentedness; it being impos∣sible for the Will to quiet it self, in that which the Understanding doth not apprehend to be sufficient. The Will may indeed, by the impossi∣bility of attaining more, be beaten off from desiring it; it may be taken off from any perfect and efficacious volitions of it: but as some vellei∣ties will ever remain, and, what naturally flows from them, a repining at our portion; so it may rather be said to be quieted, or to speak more properly, to be mortified by, than to quiet it self in it.

2. Of the nature of Contentment I have discoursed hitherto, pro∣ceed we in the next place to the grounds of its obligation. Amongst which I reckon first, the Will of Almighty God, declared by the dispo∣sition of his Providence. For inasmuch as God, and not we our selves, is the framer of our Fortunes, inasmuch as it is he that maketh poor as well as maketh rich; it is but a just compliance with his Will, by whose disposition the several Conditions of Men are shaped, to acqui∣esce in it whatsoever it is, and bring our Minds to an approbation of it. Excellent to this purpose is that of Epictetus in his Enchiridion, or at least may be easily adapted to it. Remember (saith he* 1.7) that thou

art the Actor of a part in a Play, and such an one as it pleaseth thy great Master to impose upon thee. If it be a short one, that thou art the Actor of a short; if a long one, of a long. If he will have thee to act the part of a poor man, remember that thou do handsomly discharge it: if a Lame Man, a Ruler, or a Private Person, that thou according∣ly behave thy self. To thee it belongs to represent as thou oughtest the person which is given thee to act, to another to make choice of it. It is true indeed, if we were or might be chusers of our own Fortunes; if, as we are willing enough to be, so we were actually exempted from subjection to any superiour Power: so I could not with the same reaso∣nableness press upon you the being contented with that portion of outward things which ye are possessed of. For why should I be con∣tented with a mean and despicable Fortune, when there is no restraint upon me from prosecuting a better? But when we are not our own, but his by whom we were created and redeemed, when our Will is no less his servant, than any of our other Faculties or Powers; how unreasonable must it be not to acquiesce in his, and that portion of outward things which he allots us? Especially, if we add in the second place, which may pass for another ground of our obligation to it, that God doth both know better than we our selves what con∣dition is fittest for us; and,* 1.8 because he is also a merci∣ful Father, will be sure to allot us that which is. Dis∣contentedness in this case being not only undutifulness, but ingratitude, and a resisting of his love, as well as of his Authority. Add hereunto, thirdly, (which may pass for another ground of our obligation) the suffici∣ency of that portion which it hath pleased the Divine Majesty to assign us. For what can be more reasonable, especially when God imposeth it on us, than to be contented with that which is sufficient? The only difficulty is, how to make it appear that all allotments of the Divine Providence are such, especially when many of them are attended with great necessities, and such as press upon the most importunate, as well as most reasonable desires of Nature. But as Mens Fortunes do more often become insufficient by the exorbitancies of their desires, than by the disproportionableness thereof to just and moderate ones; so those which are insufficient in themselves, may become sufficient through the Divine Grace, yea undoubtedly shall to all those that truly love and fear him: For God having distinctly promised, that, together with the temptation, whatsoever it is, he will make a way for us to escape, that we may be able to bear it, he hath thereby obliged himself, where he affords not the ordinary means of support, to furnish out an extraordi∣nary and supernatural one. Less than that in the failure of ordinary means sufficing not to bear the temptation, but being more than suffici∣ent for it where it is afforded; not only the infinity of God and his creating out of nothing the ordinary supports of Humane life so per∣swading, but the assurance he hath given us of an eternal life after this, where Food and Rayment, and other such like means of our support, shall neither be wanted nor desired.

3. From the grounds of our obligation to Contentment, pass we to the means whereby it may be acquired, the third thing proposed to be discoursed of. I do not mean to mention all, which were too large a task, and may with more Reason be expected from such as entreat de

industriâ of that Argument, but to select such of them as seem to me to be most efficacious to produce that Contentment which I inculcate. In the number of which I reckon, first, A sober use of abundance at all times, and sometimes a voluntary abstinence. For were Men careful, as they ought, to keep themselves always within the bounds of tempe∣rance, and sometimes also (which yet were no hard task) to ab∣stain wholly from the enjoyment of their plenty; they would not then find it so uneasie to content themselves with a more moderate For∣tune, or repine and murmur at it when it befalls them: he who can be without these external things even when he hath them, being much more likely to bear the want of them when they are not to be had, and bring his mind to acquiesce in it. But when Men will not only not ab∣stain at any time from lawful Delights, but allow themselves in such as are exorbitant; when, instead of denying and mortifying their ap∣petites, they will afford them the utmost satisfaction they are capable of, though with the hazard of their health, and, which is of much more consideration, of their eternal welfare: then no wonder if a meaner Fortune appear strange and irksom, and the inconveniences wherewith it is attended insupportable; the difference between their former enjoyments and their present straits appearing so vastly great, that it may well stagger a resolved Understanding, and make Men sink under their Calamity, though they were otherwise well enough disposed to bear it, and made use of all their Reason to reconcile them∣selves to the undergoing of it. Whence it is, that where such a change hath sometime hapned, they, who have been the unhappy subjects thereof, have needed no other Malady to oblige them to quit the World, and exchange this miserable life, I will not say for a better, but what may reasonably enough be feared, for one that exceeds it as much in sadness, as it doth in the duration of it.

But let us suppose (as God knows that opportunity of learning Con∣tentment doth often pass by us unobserved,) let us suppose, I say, that we have not been careful to use our affluence with sobriety, and much less to abridge our selves in the lawful use of it; yet even so there will not want means to bring us to a contented mind, if we will but be so wise as to make use of them. Such as is in the next place the conside∣ration of our own vileness, and, what our former plenty may well sug∣gest to us, our past riots and intemperances: For how can he think much to stoop to a mean Fortune, who hath made so ill use of a more splendid one? yea who it may be hath been the Author of his own pressures, and brought himself to penury by a prodigal wasting of his former Fortunes? It being but reasonable, that every Man should ac∣quiesce in that, which hath been rather his choice than his misfortune. And though it be true, that all, who have thus fallen, are not consci∣ous to themselves of the like Prodigality, nor it may be of any Crimes which may be looked upon as equal to them; yet is there none who will not find enough in himself to make him acknowledge his Calamity to have been deserved, and accordingly to prompt him, rather to thank God for what he hath, than to repine that it is no greater than it is; especially if he do also consider, that there are many in the world who are more necessitous than himself, and, it may be too, who have in all things more approved themselves to the Divine Majesty, than he himself, if he judge impartially, will think himself to have done. And

though it were but an odd consideration which Diogenes* 1.9 solaced him∣self with in the extremity of his poverty, that the Mice which plaid about him, pleased themselves with those crums, that did either fall from, or were wiped off by him; yet it may suggest to us another which is more likely to be attended to, and, where it is so, to induce Men to Contentment. For certainly, notwithstanding the murmurings of discontented Men, there are some in the world, who do not yet re∣pine, whose Fortunes are as disproportionable to those of the discon∣tented person, as those of the Mice were to the condition of the Cy∣nick.

What should I tell you, what Experience no less than the Scripture assures us, That our life consisteth not in the abundance of the things that we possess? That Contentment is as rarely, yea more rarely, to be found in a splendid Fortune, than in a moderate or humble one? That those gayeties, which we so much desire, and without which it is so hard for us to be contented, are attended with a proportionable number of inconveniences? That more cares, and fears, and dangers wait up∣on the Scepter than upon the Spade? That those pleasures, which are the Concomitants of greater Fortunes, appear more amiable at a distance, than when they come to be enjoyed; which no Man who hath ever tasted any earthly pleasure, but will find himself obliged to confess? That they are of no certain continuance, even when we think our selves most sure of them? That we our selves may be taken from them, as well as they from us? In fine, That we may be taken from them even whilst we continue in and with them? It being no rare thing for Men to lose the sense of them, by stupidity or an exquisite pain, and want them, even when they are possessed of them. All which things, whosoever shall duly ponder in his mind, and allow them that weight which they de∣serve, will, I doubt not, be easily induced to content himself with an humble Fortune, and not only suffer but embrace it.

But of all the means whereby Contentment may be procured, and which therefore it will concern us to make use of, because there can be no happiness without it; there are certainly none more effica∣cious, than such as are purely Religious, and for which we are beholden rather to the Book of God than that of Nature. In the number of which I reckon, first, Those many assurances the Scripture hath given us of Gods supporting us under our humble Fortunes, or delivering us out of them, or making them advantageous to us. Such as are those that inform us, that God will never leave us nor forsake us (for so what was spoken to Joshua in particular, is by the Author to the Hebrews extended unto all) that his eyes are upon them that fear him,* 1.10 to deli∣ver their souls from death, and to feed them in the time of dearth; that though the Lyons do lack and suffer hunger, yet they which seek the Lord shall want no manner of thing that is good; and in fine, that all things shall work together for good to them that love God, to them who are called according to his purpose. For who can well be discon∣tented with his outward condition, which he is assured shall be made supportable, or mended, and (which is more) rendered advantage∣ous to him? The like is to be said, yea with much more reason, of the Promises of a better life, of being satisfied, however we may now hunger, when we awake with Gods likeness, of being advanced to an abiding City, and an incorruptible Crown, to the tasting of, or rather

immersing our selves in Rivers of pleasures, and such Rivers, as, be∣cause they are supplyed out of the Ocean of the Divine Goodness, shall run for evermore. For what peevishness must it be, during the short time of our continuing here, not to content our selves with a mean allotment; when he, by whom we are allotted it, hath assured us of so large a portion in that better and more enduring world? To all which, if we add our Prayers to God, who is the giver of every good and perfect gift, and particularly of that Contentment whereof we speak, it being he and he alone who giveth his beloved rest of body and mind, whilst others rise up early and sit up late, and eat the bread of cares and sorrows; so (I say) we shall want nothing (because he hath styled himself a God hearing Prayer, as well as giving success to our endeavours) which may both oblige and enable us, to content our selves with our allotment, as well as not to extend our Desires to those of others.

Such are the Laws of the Jewish Code, or at least of that part of it, which contains the precepts of a vertuous life; such too, because transcribed, and confirmed, and enlarged, by our Blessed Saviour, are the Laws of the Christian one. I wish I could also add, such are the lives of his Disciples; of those who have been baptized into his Faith and service, and particularly into the obedience of this Royal Law. But the carelesness of the better, and the debauchedness of the wors∣er sort make the contrary too evident to be either disbelieved or de∣nyed. In consideration whereof, as it was not without great reason, that that Church, whose Catechisme I have chosen to explain, hath taught us to subjoin, both to the whole and every precept of it, an acknowledgment of our own Errours, and a Prayer both for mercy and a better mind; so I shall conclude my Explication of it with pray∣ing in like manner, that God would be merciful in the pardoning of our several transgressions of these his most Holy Laws, and for the time to come write them in our minds and in our hearts, and incline us both more diligently and faithfully to keep them.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Affirmative part.
• * 1.2

  Hooker Eccl. Pol. li. 1. sect. 10.
• * 1.3

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Hesy. Idem sensus 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 quod alibi usurpatur.
• * 1.4

  Epist. li. 1.—Epist. 17.
• * 1.5

  See Explic. of the Eighth Com. Part 3.
• * 1.6

  Vid. Aelian. Vari. hist. l. 4. c. 13.
• * 1.7

  c. 23. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.8

  Permittes ipsis expendere numini∣bus, quid Conveniat nobis, rebús{que} sit utile nostris; Nam pro jucundis aptissima quae{que} dabunt dii, Charior est illis homo quàm sibi.— Juv. Sat. 10. v. 347. &c.
• * 1.9

  Aelian. Var. hist. l. 13. c. 26.
• * 1.10

  Psal. 33.18.19,—34.10. Rom. 8.28. Heb. 13.5.