An explication of the Decalogue or Ten Commandments, with reference to the catechism of the Church of England to which are premised by way of introduction several general discourses concerning God's both natural and positive laws / by Gabriel Towerson ...

PART V.

Concerning Officious Falsities, and that meerly as such they are not al∣lowable; because, however they may be profitable to those persons for whose advantage they are told, yet they may be pernicious to Humane Society, by rendring those external marks uncertain, whereby we are to communicate our Thoughts each to other. An enquiry thereupon, whether there be any case in which they do not render those external marks uncertain. This resolved, by pointing at some particular ca∣ses; such as are, 1. Where Officious Falshood is allowed of by the same general consent, by which words are agreed upon as the decla∣rers of Men's Minds. Of which number are those Falsities that are told to Children, Mad-men, and sick Persons. 2. Where the Falshood is both made use of to insinuate an useful Truth, and detected by the Ʋtterer, as soon as he finds it hath made way for the other. Evi∣dences of the lawfulness of this out of Ecclesiastical Story, and from more authentick Examples in the Scripture. 3. Where the Officious Falshood is made use of to save the life of an innocent Person. All other cases condemned as utterly unlawful; and particularly where the Falsity that is told is prejudicial to any Man: as those that are allowed, allowed only where a kind of necessity doth prompt Men to it. An objection out of Job 13.7. against Officious Falsities answer∣ed; together with a brief censure of Equivocations and mental Reser∣vations. Those Falsities which have the name of Jesting ones more universally condemned. A Conclusion of the whole; with a short ac∣count of the Affirmative part of the Commandment.

BEING now to give an account of the nature of Officious Falsities, the second sort of those, which I have termed Extrajudicial ones; I must desire you to call to mind, what hath been heretofore said con∣cerning our Obligation to that Truth, which consists in the agreement of our Words, and other such like notes, with those Thoughts of ours which they were intended to express. Now that Obligation (as you may remember) I founded in that more known one, which is incum∣bent upon all Men, to profit each other in those several ways, where∣by they are capacitated to contribute to it. For as from thence it may be easily inferred, that they are to communicate of their Conceptions each to other; because both a remedy of Solitude, which is extreme∣ly prejudicial to Humane Society, and of necessary use to direct those they have to do with in their Lives and Actions: so it will also fol∣low, that they are both to agree of certain external marks to make known their Conceptions by; and, having so agreed of them, that they should abide by them, as without which what they speak would be uncertain to the Hearers, and consequently, neither delight nor profit them. Which one thing, if diligently heeded, will void all that difficulty, which does or may occur in the nature of Officious Falsities. For from hence it will appear, First, That the bare officiousness of a Lye can be no just pretence for the deeming of it to be lawful: Because though Officious Lyes are not only not pernicious but profitable, if

considered with respect to those Persons for whose advantage they are told; yet they may be pernicious to Humane Society, by rendring those external marks uncertain, by which we are to communicate our Thoughts unto each other. If therefore such Falsities, or Lyes, as have the name of Officious, be in any case allowable, it must be where they do not render those external marks uncertain: which in what cases it may happen, I come now to declare. And here,

1. In the first place, I shall no way doubt to represent as one, the telling of an Officious Falshood, where it is allowed of by the same general consent, by which Words have been agreed upon as the declarers of Mens minds; partly because an exception so founded must be look∣ed upon as a just abatement to that of which it is so; and partly, be∣cause if any Officious Falsities be so allowed of, no Man can thence take any just occasion to call in question the meaning of those who utter them, when they speak upon other perfectly unlike occasions (which is one way of rendring those external marks uncertain) or think it any just Warrant to himself to confound those external marks, when he is called to deliver his own mind in other matters. By which ac∣count we must first separate from the number of Criminal Falsities, those that are told to Children and Mad-men, to bring them to that peace and quiet, which is not for the most part otherwise to be attained. For it being allowed of by a general consent, thus to impose upon Children and Mad-men for their good, I see not how it can derogate ought from the credit of those that do so, where they speak of other matters, or encourage other persons to falsifie in them, which alone can render those external marks uncertain. The same is to be said of Physicians, and other Persons, who have to do with sick and peevish people, and whom therefore they must beguile into their own good, whether it be by alleviating of the Distemper they lye under, or representing the Me∣dicament they give under some other notion than appertains to it; or lastly, (than which nothing is more common among Physicians) when they have to do with Hypochondriacal persons, by complying with their Patients Fancies, and pretending a belief of those very Whimsies, wherewith they find their Patients over-run; for the telling of such kind of Falsities, and to such persons, being indulged by the same com∣mon consent, by which Words, and other such like notes, have been agreed upon for the declarers of Mens minds, neither can the use of such Falsities be thought to invalidate their Authority in other mat∣ters, and where there is no such consent for the use of any collusion in them. Not unlike I should also think (for I will not be positive in things of this nature) is the case of those false Stories, that are com∣monly given out in War, to incourage our own Party, and discou∣rage the adverse one; such as is, for Example, that a Wing of the Ene∣mies Army flyes; or that a part of our own, on this or that side of the main Body, hath had that success which they really have not: Because as such Stories may be of use to those Parties for whose advantage they are told; so they may seem to have been allowed of by the same ge∣neral consent, by which Words, and other such like external notes, have been appointed declarers of our minds.

2. But beside that an Officious Falsity, or Lye, cannot be thought to render those marks uncertain, by which our Thoughts are to be de∣clared, where the Falsity is allowed of by the same general consent by

which those external marks, and particularly Words, have been agreed upon for the declarers of Mens minds: neither can they be thought to prejudice them, secondly, where the Falsity is both made use of to insi∣nuate an useful Truth, and detected by the Ʋtterer, as soon as he finds it hath made way for the other. An Instance hereof we have in Ec∣clesiastical Story, and one or more in the Sacred Scriptures; and in such Persons moreover, and about such Affairs, as will make the law∣fulness unquestionable. The purport of the former* 1.1 is, That when two Eutychian Bishops, who, believing the two Natures in Christ made but one, did consequently believe, that the Divinity or Godhead did dye as well as his Humane Nature; when these, I say, came to the Court of a Sarazen Prince, he, to undeceive them of their Errour, pretend∣ed great sorrow at the receit of some Letters: Into the contents where∣of when they had with some curiosity enquired, the Prince with a seem∣ing great sorrow told them, that he had received certain intelligence, that the Archangel Gabriel was dead. They to comfort him told him, that certainly it could not be true, and for their parts they did believe it to be impossible. O Fathers, replyed the Prince, can you think it to be impossible for an Archangel to dye, when you affirm the Godhead of Christ did? By that Fiction of his plainly convincing them of that Errour, which they had taken up concerning the Nature of our Savi∣our. But why do we look into Ecclesiastical History, which is less known, and less approved, when the like Instance occurs in the Sacred Scriptures, and that too both in divinely inspired Men, and in the de∣livery of their Message? That I mean, which it acquaints us with, concerning Nathan's address to David; and the address of one of the Sons of the Prophets to King Ahab. For though a Parable, when de∣livered as such, that is to say, as an Emblem of some concealed Truth, have not the nature of a Falsity; because it delivers nothing disagree∣able to the mind of him that useth it, nor yet with the Custom of the World by which such forms of expression are agreed upon as declarers of it, no less than simple and natural ones; yet the like cannot be said of a Parable, when it is represented as a thing really acted, and as such endeavoured to be imposed upon the hearers: He, who so doth, speaking dissonantly both to Truth and his own Thoughts, because convinced that that was not real which he suggests as such. Which notwithstanding we shall find, that even such have been used, and up∣on such occasions also, as will put the lawfulness thereof past all que∣stion. For did not Nathan, when sent to David to make him sensible of his sin in the matter of Ʋriah's Wife; did not he (I say) upon that occasion begin a Story to David of two Men in one City, the one rich and the other poor? The former whereof, when a Traveller came to him, spared to take of his own Flocks, but took the others only Ewe-lamb, which lay in his bosom, and was unto him as a Daughter, and dressed it for the way-faring Man that was come unto him. Nay did he not all along deliver it rather as a thing really acted, than as a Parable, and so that he convinced King David of the truth of it? he immediately subjoining, in agreement with Nathan's Story, that the Person, who had so done, should restore the Lamb fourfold, according to a Provision made in that behalf by the Levitical Law. And indeed otherwise the Prophet Nathan's design might have been frustrated, in making David so sensible of his guilt: For if he had delivered it to him as a Parable,

the guilty conscience of David might have been more shye in condemn∣ing the action of the rich Person, whom Nathan spoke of, lest, as it after hapned, he should be forced to condemn himself. But of all the instances, which either Sacred or Profane Story suggest, concerning the telling of Falsities, to insinuate thereby some useful Truth, there is certainly none more plain, than that Story which was told by a young Prophet to Ahab, upon occasion of letting go Benhadad King of Syria; the sum of which, in short, is this: One of the Sons of the Prophets, be∣ing so instructed by God, puts on the person and guise of a Man that had been ingaged in the Battel, and that he might the better appear so (for that in my opinion is the best account of that action) commands first one, and then another, by the word of the Lord to smite him, which accordingly that second did, and wounded him, as you may see 1 King. 20.35. That done (as the Story doth farther instruct us) the Prophet departeth, and having disguised himself farther, with ashes upon his face, waits for the King by the way. At length the King comes, and this concealed Prophet cryes out to him, and tells him that when he went into the midst of the Battel, behold a man turned aside, and brought a Prisoner to him, and said, keep this man: if by any means he be missing, then shall thy life be for his life, or else thou shalt pay a Talent of Silver. But it happened afterwards (saith he) that whilst I was busie here and there, the man was gone, and I thereby lyable to the Penalty. Than which what more apparent instance can we desire of the telling of a Falsity, thereby to insinuate some useful Truth? It ap∣pearing both from the Antecedents and Consequents, that this whole Story was not only a Fiction of the Prophets, which all Parables are; but, which makes it a perfect Falsity, represented not as the cover of some concealed Truth, but as a Truth in it self, and all the art ima∣ginable used to make it appear so to be. Neither will it avail to say, as I find it is by some Learned Men, that it ought not to be looked up∣on as such, or at least not as a Lye; because the intention thereof was not to deceive, but to teach with the more elegancy and effectualness. For beside that it is to me pretty apparent from a former Discourse of the nature of Truth and Falshood, that to deceive is no essential part of the definition of a Lye, though it be an inseparable accident of it; even this Fiction of the Prophets can no more be acquitted from the design of deceiving, than any other Officious Falsities: For though the ultimate design of it was to bring the King to the sense of his sin, in letting Benhadad go, contrary to the Command of God; yet the in∣termediate design of it was to deceive the King, and make him believe what he told him to be a real Truth; as without which he could not so easily have brought him to condemn his own action, in that supposed action of the Prophet. But what shall we then say, to acquit this and the like actions from being to be looked upon as a sin? Even that which was before said to acquit some others, to wit, That it was nei∣ther pernicious to the party to whom it was told, which is one ground of the Prohibition of Falsities, nor any way destructive of the signifi∣cancy of those external marks, which are agreed upon as the decla∣rers of Mens minds. All pretence of that being taken away, by the Prophets immediately discovering it to be a Story, and that he had no other end in it, than to convince the King of his miscarriage: He, who not only detects the falseness of his own Story, but gives an ac∣count

of the Reason he made use of it, leaving no pretence to Men to doubt of his sincere speaking in matters of another nature, nor gi∣ving any countenance to the insincerity of theirs.

3. Lastly, As an Officious Falsity cannot be thought to prejudice the Authority and significancy of words, where it is both made use of to insinuate an useful Truth, and detected almost as soon as delivered; so I should think also, that neither will it, where it is made use of to save the life of an innocent Person: Partly because the weightiness of the occasion may both plead its excuse, and take away all pretence of violating the Truth upon less occasions; and partly, because I find the Egyptian Mid-Wives and Rahab both commended and rewarded for that good which they procured by an untruth. For though much ac∣count be not to be made of one of Egypt or Jericho, if considered meerly as such; yet are they not to be despised where they have the commendation of the Almighty, and particularly where one of them, even Rahab, is magnified both for her Faith and Works.

These three things only seem necessary to be added, to prevent all mis-interpretation of what we have said concerning some Officious Fal∣sities. First, That we are to understand it of such Falsities as are pure∣ly Officious, and no way prejudicial to any Man: For though a Man may be allowed to advantage himself or Relations; yet not with the hurt or injury of another. By which means all those Falsities will ne∣cessarily be condemned, which are committed in Commerce between Man and Man; whether it be that of private Men between one ano∣ther, as in Contracts and Bargains; or of Princes and States in Leagues. He, who useth any Falsity in that, at the same time he advantageth himself, doing an injury to him he dealeth with. Upon which ac∣count, though in that sense, wherein Sir Henry Wotton used it, it was a very allowable definition of an Ambassador, that he was a Person sent abroad to lye for the benefit of his Prince; yet is there certainly no∣thing, which is more unbecoming their Employment, or more scanda∣lous to their respective Princes and Religion. I admonish secondly, That when I say there may be cases wherein an Officious Falshood may be lawful, it will equally follow, and therefore alike to be observed, that out of those cases all Falshoods, how officious soever, must be con∣cluded to be unlawful. And indeed as those cases are not many, where∣in an Officious Falshood can be supposed to be lawful, so neither can they give Men any pretence to falsifie in other matters; the only cases wherein they are lawful, being (as hath been at large declared) where they are allowed of by general consent, where they are made use of to insinuate some useful Truth, and detected as soon as it is; or to save the life of an innocent person. Lastly, I shall desire it may be consi∣dered, That as those, who have spoken the most favourably of Officious Falsities, have represented them as such things as have something of Hellebore in them; so like that, and other things of the same dangerous nature, they ought, even in the most allowed instances, to be used spa∣ringly, and with discretion; and rather where there is a kind of ne∣cessity to prompt men to it, than when they may be avoided; especi∣ally considering the severe and general condemnation of Falsities in the Doctrine of the* 1.2 Scripture, and the prejudice that may thereby accrue unto Religion, and particularly to sincerity and Truth: For though all Falsities are not criminal, yet they look so like those that really

are, that they may tempt unwary Men, either to make a mock of Truth, or run upon any Falsity of what nature soever, which may be of any advantage to themselves.

I will conclude this head, when I have returned an answer to that which is objected out of Job chap. 13.7. Will you speak wickedly for God, or talk deceitfully for him? An Exception indeed specious enough, and so much the more, for the Inference that seems natural∣ly to flow from it: For if we may not talk deceitfully for God, and his Glory, as that Question doth manifestly import; then certainly not for any inferiour end, and much less for the saving of a life. But beside that he who shall consider that Speech of Zophar's, to which this is an Answer, will find the deceitful speaking here meant to be no other, than the robbing of Job of his integrity, that so God might be justified in his proceedings against him, which is in the number of those Pernicious Lyes, which I have shewn to be univer∣sally unlawful; though nothing else should be meant thereby than an Officious Falsity, yet will it not thence follow, that because we may not talk deceitfully for God, and for his Glory, therefore nei∣ther may we for the saving of an innocent person: He who talks deceitfully for any thing, tacitely insinuating that it may stand in need of it; which though a Reproach to the Almighty (because arguing something of weakness in him) yet none at all to Man, be∣cause naturally weak, and made much more so by the fall of our first Parents. These things indeed (as Grotius* 1.3 observes) do not please the School of latter Ages, as which hath chosen S. Augustine of all the Ancients to be followed by them in all things. But the same School hath admitted tacite Interpretations and Reservations, so ab∣horring from all common sense, that it may very well be doubted, whether it were not much better to admit of speaking falsly in the cases before mentioned, than so indiscriminately to exempt them from it; as when they say I know not, understanding in their mind, so as to tell you; or I have not such a thing, meaning to give or lend to you; and other such like Reservations, which common sense re∣jects, and which if they be admitted, nothing hinders, but he, who affirms any thing, may be said to deny it, and he who denys, to affirm it. The result of which Discourse is, That by whatever softer name the Masters of that Art may call those their Equivocations, they are no other than Falsities, or Lyes, as expressing that in Words, which is no way agreeable to the Speakers Thoughts, and which therefore they are forced to piece out with interpretations in their minds. Nei∣ther will it avail to say, as it is by the Masters of that Art, That an Ad∣dress to God may be no less true, which is made up in part by the ex∣pressions of the Tongue, and in part with the conceptions of the Mind; as for Example, if a rich Man should say in any private Address of his, Thou knowest, O God, how poor and miserable I am, and understand in his mind, as to the qualifications of his Soul. For though in our Ad∣dresses to God it be all one as to Truth or Falshood, whether we speak out the whole, or a part only, because our Thoughts are no less know∣able to him than our Words; yet among Men, to whom the Thoughts of our hearts cannot be known, but as they are manifested by our Words, or other such like notes, the Truth or Falshood* 1.4 of them is in Reason to be estimated by those things only, which can declare our

conceptions to the Hearers. Which since those Reservations, which are in the Mind, cannot do; in judging of the Truth of any Speech, account is to be made of those things only that are expressed, and not of mental Reservations.

Of Pernicious and Officious Falsities, what hath been said may suf∣fice; proceed we therefore to such as have the name of Jesting ones: By which Title I mean not all Fictions of the brain, which are devi∣sed to delight; for so all Parables of the Scripture are, and though not invented for delight only, yet to delight as well as profit. But I mean such Fictions, as are represented as real Truths, contrary to the mind and knowledge of the Utterer. Now concerning these much need not be said, to shew them to be generally unlawful, and as such to be eschewed and avoided; as because the observation of Truth is of much more concernment, than our delight; so because the Scriptures of the New Testament have not only imposed upon us the simplicity of the Dove* 1.5, that guileless Creature, but moreover forbidden to us the speaking of a vain‖ 1.6 or idle word. If there be any case wherein these kind of Falsities are allowable, it must be where they are in a manner detected as soon as told, and neither our own sincerity made lyable thereby to exception, nor the signification of those external marks, by which we are to communicate our Thoughts to each other, brought in∣to uncertainty with the World. That of S. Paul shall put an end to this Argument, and the Negative part of the Commandment, Ephes. 4.25. Wherefore putting away Lying, speak every man Truth with his Neigh∣bour, for we are members one of another. All Pernicious Lyes being simply and universally unlawful; all Officious ones, unless in those few cases before excepted; and all Jesting ones, unless in the case but now mentioned, if yet that may be excepted out of the number.

And here a fair opportunity is ministred to me,* 1.7 of entring upon the Affirmative part of the Commandment, which I shall gladly embrace, though in the close, as you see, of this Discourse; because I have in a great measure dispatched it already, as knowing not well how to en∣treat of the other without it. Where, first of all, I shall represent, be∣cause Judicial Matters are principally referred to, the doing what in us lyes to advantage a just Cause; which that love, in which our Savi∣our sums up this and other the Precepts of the Second Table, doth ma∣nifestly require. Now this a Witness will do, yea cannot otherwise discharge himself of the tye of love, if he voluntarily present himself to attest his knowledge, where either the matter in debate requires it, or he can think it will be acceptable to the party concerned: If when thus presenting himself, or called to it by others, he shall duly recol∣lect himself, that so he may omit no material part of his Evidence. Lastly, if, having thus recollected himself, he clearly and fully declare it, and speak the truth, and the whole truth, as well as nothing con∣trary to it. The Plaintiff shall do his duty, if he shall prefer only such Enditements as are true and material, and prosecute them with candor and moderation; as the Defendant his, if he shall own justly imputed Crimes (particularly in matter of Estate) and fence only against such as he is falsly aspersed with. The Advocate shall fulfil his part, if he espouse just, or at least probable Causes, and prosecute them with that fairness and civility, which becomes men and Christians, and parti∣cularly that awful Assembly before which he speaks. As the Judge his,

if he lend a patient ear to the Evidence that is given, help out and en∣courage weak but honest Witnesses, and narrowly sift crafty and reser∣ved ones: if, having so done, he shall duly weigh all circumstances, and, if that be all he hath to do (as in our Common-Law Courts it is) re∣capitulate the whole, and deliver his own sense clearly and impartially. The Jury shall do their part, if, after a like serious consideration of the matter in debate, they shall guide themselves in their Verdict by the opi∣nion of the Judge in matter of Law, and by the Evidence that is given as to matter of Fact. In fine, those, to whom the power of Registring is committed, theirs, if they shall faithfully record the Sentence, that is passed upon the whole by the Judge; as they, and all others to whom the power of the execution of it belongs, if they set their helping hand to a speedy, and faithful, and full execution of it. All which Duties I have thus shortly laid together, without the addition of their respe∣ctive Proofs; partly because they carry their own conviction in their foreheads; and partly because those that seem to stand in need of any, have already had them in the foregoing Discourses; to which there∣fore it is but reasonable to refer you.

From Judicial Matters pass we to Extrajudicial ones, where agree∣ably to those several Falsities, which I have shewn to be forbidden in the Negative, our Duty, as well as the Affirmative part of the Com∣mandment, must be to prosecute those Truths that are contrary to them; particularly, that whereas Pernicious Lyes strike at our Neighbours Re∣putation or Estate, we, on the contrary, in compliance with that Truth which is opposite to them, should endeavour to advantage him in both, as the Precept of Love doth manifestly enjoin. To advantage him in his Reputation, by giving him his due commendation, by ascribing to him those Parts, or Vertues, or Endowments, which he is really posses∣sed of; and remembring them, where ere we come, with all the expres∣sions of respect and honour. To advantage him again in his Reputati∣on, by taking off those Calumnies wherewith he is aspersed, and shew∣ing the either falsness or improbability thereof. To advantage him in his Estate, by a religious observation of our own Promises or Compacts; or, by causing those of others to be strictly and faithfully observed. To have a regard to Truth in our Discourses with our Neighbour, even when the contrary thereof may be advantageous to our selves and others, unless it be in such cases, where the common consent of mankind, the saving of an innocent persons life, or a speedy detection of the falshood licenseth a departure from it. But above all, that we intend the prose∣cution of Truth above our own meer delight, and against the temptation of those baits, which the pleasure of imposing upon others gives. Truth, as it is a Duty which is owing to our Neighbours Ʋnderstanding, no less than Good-will is to his Will from ours; so being the foundation of all pleasurable and useful Commerce, the band of Societies, and of those several Compacts by which they are confederated, and in fine, the fulfil∣ling of this Commandment.

Notes

• * 1.1

  See Jer Tay∣lor's Ductor Dubit. Book 3. Chapt. 2. Rule 5.
• * 1.2

  See Prov. 13.5. — 30.8. Psal. 5.6. Col. 3.9.
• * 1.3

  De jure belli ac pacis. l. 3. c. 1.
• * 1.4

  Sanderson De Juramenti Obligatione. Praelect. 6. Sect. 6.
• * 1.5

  Matt. 10.16.
• ‖ 1.6

  Matt. 12.36.
• * 1.7

  Affirmative part of the Command∣ment.