An explication of the Decalogue or Ten Commandments, with reference to the catechism of the Church of England to which are premised by way of introduction several general discourses concerning God's both natural and positive laws / by Gabriel Towerson ...

PART IV.

That there are other Sins included in this of Murther; together with an Account of what are so included: Whether they be such as are more near of kin to it, or are farther removed from it. Of the for∣mer sort are, the commanding or instigating Men to Murther, or as∣sisting the Murtherer in it; the using such Means as are likely enough to produce it, or entertaining any murtherous Intention or Desire. Of the latter, the procuring of Abortions, even where the Child is not Quick; wounding or maiming; and, in fine, all Violences whatso∣ever, unless in the case of a Man's own necessary Defence. All Vio∣lences that are vindictive, perfectly unlawful, whether accomplished by our own Hands, or sought at those of the Magistrate. The Passi∣on of Hatred considered, as to its lawfulness or unlawfulness; and shewn to become unlawful onely when it is plac'd upon a wrong Ob∣ject; such as is that Hatred which hath Good Men for its Object, or Evil Men any otherwise than as they are such. The same Hatred considered with reference to this Commandment; where is shewn, both its opposition to that Love which the Commandment enjoyns, and its cognation to that Murther which it forbids. The like unlawful∣ness and murtherous cognation evinc'd in the envying the Prosperity of another, in wishing ill to him, or rejoycing at it; in fine, in causeless and immoderate Anger, and contumelious or reproachful Speeches.

II. THAT the killing of another is the thing expresly forbidden in this Commandment, you need not be told, because the place this Commandment hath in the Decalogue, sufficiently informs you; as neither, after my last Discourse, that the killing of our selves hath a place in it indirectly and by consequence. It remains, that we inquire whether any other Sins are included in them, and what those Sins are.

For the former of these, much need not be said, after what hath been alledg'd in the general, to shew the Comprehensiveness of the Ten Commandments: Onely, that it may more clearly appear, that this particular Prohibition includes others also, I will alledge a Saying of our Saviour, and another of his Beloved Disciple St. John. From the former whereof we learn, that, however the Letter of the Prohi∣bition, or at least* 1.1 the Notion of it in the Jews Courts of Judica∣ture, extended onely to the killing of a Man; yet in the Spirit and Evangelical Sense, it reach'd to the forbidding of Anger and Re∣proach, Mat. 5.21, 22. From the latter, that Hatred is not onely included in it, but a part of it; and that he who harbours it in his Heart, is as truly a Murtherer, as he who unjustly takes away a Mans Life, 1 Joh. 3.15. Taking it therefore for granted, that the Prohi∣bition now before us includes that of other Sins, we will inquire, what those Sins are; and first of all (because that is principally in∣tended in the Prohibition) what Sins are included in the Murther of another.

1. And here, in the first place, I shall not doubt to reckon, as for∣bidden, the commanding or instigating other Men to do it: Because, as he who sets another upon the doing of any thing, is to be look'd upon as the principal Cause of it; so, it is but reasonable to suppose, that he who forbids the doing of any thing toward the taking away a Mans Life, which hath onely the nature of an Instrumental Cause, doth much more forbid the Efficacy of the Principal. Whence it is, that we do not onely find David praying to be delivered from blood∣guiltiness, though he onely put another upon the setting Ʋriah so, that he might die by a third Person or Persons; but the Prophet Nathan, in the Name of God, charging him with the Murther, and affirming him to have slain Ʋriah with the sword of the children of Ammon, 2 Sam. 12.9.

2. As little doubt is to be made, secondly, that it is alike unlaw∣ful by this Commandment to assist the Murtherer, either by our Coun∣sel or Actions; he who doth so, contributing in part to that which it forbids, and consequently so far chargeable with the violation of it.

3. I observe, thirdly, That though Killing be the onely thing ex∣presly forbidden; yet inasmuch as he who forbids any Effect, is in reason to be suppos'd to forbid the Means whereby it is apt to be procur'd; he that makes use of destructive Means, whether they take effect or no, is chargeable with the violation of this Commandment. By which way of reasoning, he shall be concluded to be a Murtherer in the sight of God, who should, after the corrupt Custom of the Heathen, expose a helpless Infant in a Desart place, where it may be in danger of perishing either by Wild Beasts or Famine.

4. In fine, Forasmuch as the Consent of the Will is the principal thing in all Actions, and so estimated by God himself, both in the Old and New Testament; he is in reason to be look'd upon as a Violator of this Commandment, who shall entertain any murtherous Intention or Desire; after the same manner that he who onely looketh upon a woman to lust after her, is affirmed by our Saviour to commit Adultery with her in his heart.

Of such Sins as are more neer of kin to that which is expresly for∣bidden, I have spoken hitherto, and shewn them to be included in it: Proceed we to inquire the same of those which, though of the same cognation, yet are farther remov'd from it. Where,

1. First of all, I shall reckon the procuring of Abortions: I do not mean, where the Child is perfectly form'd, and quick, (for then, if Death follow to the Child, it is Murther properly so call'd) but be∣fore the Child is animated. Concerning which, before I deliver my own Opinion, give me leave to give you that of the Ancients, as it is set down by Tertullian. After the forbidding of Mur∣ther (saith he* 1.2) it is not lawful to us Christians to dis∣solve that Off-spring which is conceiv'd in the Womb, even while Nature is onely in consultation to make a Man of it. It is a committing of Murther before-hand, to hinder any thing from being born: neither matters it whether a Man take away a Soul that is already born, or disturb it in its Birth. He is a Man, which is in a disposition to be so; and the Fruit is already in the Seed which produceth it. Now though, to speak mine own Opinion freely,

I cannot but look upon this of Tertullian as somewhat hyperbolically express'd; there being no place for Murther there, where there is not a Life to take away: yet, as what he saith, is proof enough of the Ancient Christians believing it to be included in this Prohibition, be∣cause here, and all along, pretending not so much to deliver his own Sense, as theirs; so the Reason by him insinuated, is a sufficient Ar∣gument, that they were not out in their Belief. For, though that be not a Man, which is onely in a disposition to become so; yet it is the Rudiments of one, and consequently also of the Image of God: To which therefore, whilst Violence is offer'd, a Violence must be sup∣pos'd to be so far offer'd to the Image of God, which is the Funda∣mental Reason of the Prohibition. Now, forasmuch as the Funda∣mental Reason of the Prohibition hath place in Abortions, as well as in perfect Murthers; it is to be suppos'd, though not express'd, yet to be understood in it; especially being one of those Preceps which were intended as General Heads of Moral Duties. In like manner, because one great Reason of the Prohibition of Murther, is the great Injury it doth to Humane Society, by robbing it of one of its Mem∣bers; it is but just to think it to have been the same God's intention to forbid those Abortions, by which Humane Society is, though in another way, depriv'd of those which should help to maintain and propagate it.

2. But because, beside Murther, or what approacheth very near to it, there are other things pernicious to the Lives of Men, such as wounding, maiming, and the like, which are commonly reduc'd to this Commandment; therefore inquire we, in the second place, what ground there is to believe that these also are forbidden by it. In order whereunto, I shall alledge, first, That those do oftentimes pro∣cure that very Murther which is here forbidden: In consideration whereof, as they are to be look'd upon as no other than Murther, where they have that effect upon whom they fall; so, it is but reaso∣nable to believe, that God, who professeth to hold Murther in such detestation himself, and forbids it so severely to others, intended the Prohibition of such Violences by which they do often ensue.

2. And though the same cannot be said of all Violences that are offer'd, which will oblige us to look out for some other Reason of the Prohibition of them; yet inasmuch as all Violences whatsoever are contrary to that Love which I have before shewn we ought to have for the Persons of Men, even by the force of this Commandment, it will follow, that those also are to be thought to be forbidden by it, and consequently, that it is our Duty to avoid them. Which In∣ference is to be look'd upon as of so much the more force, because he who in this Commandment forbids onely to kill, if we understand it strictly and literally, doth in the very next Chapter forbid the doing of lesser Mischiefs, such as Burning, Wounding, Stripes, and Mutila∣ting, and gives command, that they who are guilty of them, should suffer the like in their own Persons, Exod. 21.24. and so on.

Now though what hath been said upon this Argument, may seem to suffice, because shewing lesser Violences to be equally forbidden with Mortal ones; yet because, when we discours'd before concern∣ing Killing, we excepted that from the number of forbidden ones, which is done in a Mans own necessary defence; therefore it may not

be amiss to inquire, whether even in those lesser Violences some exce∣ption be not to be made in the like case,; and whether or no, because such Courses are commonly look'd upon as lawful, it be lawful to re∣taliate those Injuries we have before receiv'd.

Of the former of these much need not be said, I mean as to the Case of a Man's own necessary defence. For, as where such Violences are not resisted, a Man's Life may sometime come to be endanger'd by them; in which case no Man thinks it unlawful to resist: so more en∣couragement would thereby be given to violent Persons, than is con∣sistent with the Peace and Advantage of Humane Society: Because, however the Law have provided Punishments against such Violences, yet they are long before they can be procur'd, and oftentimes are too weak to deter Men from the like Practices. This onely would be ad∣ded, That, when we affirm it to be lawful to use Violence to defend a Mans self from the Violences of others, we are necessarily to under∣stand, where no more is us'd on our part than is necessary to defend our selves; because by this Rule made onely lawful in our own de∣fence, and therefore not to proceed beyond what is necessary to it. For, as for that Exception which may be made from out Saviour's forbidding us to resist evil, it is nothing at all to the present pur∣pose, because, as Grotius* 1.3 hath observ'd, the opposition being made between that, and Moses's his Assertion, of an Eye for an Eye, and a Tooth for a Tooth, we are necessarily to understand by the not resist∣ing of Evil, the not returning of Evil by way of Punishment, because that of Moses was manifestly such.

The Case of a Man's own necessary Defence being thus dispatch'd, proceed we to inquire, whether it be lawful to retaliate by way of Punishment, and return those Evils we have receiv'd. Concerning which, I say, first, That no question can be made of the unlawfulness of retaliating with our own hands; partly, because Vengeance is by God claim'd to himself, and to the Magistrate; and partly, because a private retaliating was not permitted even to the Jews; the Law of an Eye for an Eye, and a Tooth for a Tooth, being left to the Exe∣cution of the Judges, upon complaint made to them thereof, as you may see Exod. 21.22. and so on, and Deut. 19.16. and the following Verses. The onely thing of difficulty is, whether a Man may seek a retaliation from the Magistrate; because our Saviour opposes his Do∣ctrine to that of the Law, which gave such a permission to the in∣jur'd Party. And indeed, if we speak of a Retaliation properly so call'd, that is to say, of seeking the avenging of our selves of the in∣jurious Party, by procuring to him the like Evils he hath inflicted; so, no doubt can remain, but that it is absolutely unlawful to a Chri∣stian; and that not onely because of the former Prohibition of our Saviour, but because the Scripture hath forbid us the returning Evil for Evil, and enjoyn'd us to be patient under it, and ready to for∣give; which that Man can in no sense be said to do, who shall seek to avenge himself, either by himself, or the Magistrate. The onely thing that can be lawful to a Christian in this Affair, is, 1. To seek a Reparation of the Damage he hath sustain'd; which yet must be in greater Instances, and such as cannot well be born: of which nature are those Injuries which either disable the Body, or bring any consi∣derable Pain to it. For, what place can there be for Patience, where

they who suffer Violence will have Satisfaction made them for every the least that is offered? or how can he be said to endure an Injury or Affront, who will not be content unless he have amends made him for every one? But because it may sometime happen, that the Vio∣lence which is offer'd may be such as may, to deter others from the like, require the delating it to the Magistrate, and imploring the drawing of the Sword of Justice against the Offender; therefore it must be added farther, That where the Case is such, it is not onely lawful, but necessary for the injur'd Party to do it; provided, that Zeal of Justice and the Publick Weal be the thing that prompts him to it, and not either in whole or in part the gratifying of his own Re∣venge; that being, in the highest sense, rendring evil for evil, because not onely returning Mischief for Mischief, but with the same malici∣ous purpose and intent: Which, as Seneca* 1.4 well observes, differs onely from an Injury in the order of its commission; and is onely a more excusable Sin, because provoked by, and following after the other.

To go on now to shew what other Sins are included in that of Murther, beside those before rehears'd: Where,

1. First, I shall present you with that of Hatred, because it is the Parent of all that follow. Now there are two things which will be necessary to be inquir'd into, for the better explication of this Pas∣sion.

• 1. What Hatred is to be look'd upon as sinful; and,
• 2. How that which is such, is redneible to this Commandment.

That it is not unlawful simply to hate, is evident from hence, that it is a Natural Passion of the Soul: it is no less evident, because evil is the proper Object of it, that when it is employ'd about that, it is not onely not unlawful, but just and commendable. To make it therefore at any time a Sin, it must be employ'd about a wrong Ob∣ject; which how it may be, as to the present Affair, I come now to shew. And here, in the first place, I think no Man will make any difficulty to grant, that it must necessarily be sinful to hate a Good Man, as such: because, as Evil, and not Good, is the proper Object of Hatred; so, much less that which is Good, as such. Now, that such a Hatred as this hath found place in the World, is evident from that of Wisdom, chap. 2. 12. and so on; where he doth not onely re∣present it as the general Character of Evil Men, to hate and persecute those which are better than themselves; but fortifies that his Opinion with such a Reason, as puts it past all contradiction. For, it being usual with Men to hate those which are not onely of a contrary tem∣per, but do, by that temper of theirs, make the others to be the worse thought of; it is easie to suppose, that Evil Men will hate Good, because (as the Wise Man there speaks) they are not onely contrary to Evil Men's doings, but tacitely upbraid† 1.5 them with their Impieties and Transgressions; that Virtue by which they shine, at the same time it shews forth its own Worth, discovering the Deformity of the other. From that first sort of Hatred, pass we to another, which hath the Good Man also for its Object: I do not say simply for his Goodness, and that Reproach which it naturally casts upon the contrary Temper; but because, as the same Wise Man speaks,

he expresly objecteth, to their infamy, the transgressions of their Educa∣tion, and chargeth them with those Impieties they are guilty of. Now, that even this Hatred is not without a Crime, is evident from hence, that as he who tells them of their Faults, doth it out of kindness; so that very Act of theirs is the greatest Kindness in the World: because, by such an Act they may not onely come to know their own Errours, but be thereby provoked to discard them. And indeed, so far is it from an Unkindness, however commonly so interpreted, to reprove Men for their Errours and Extravagances, that God himself reckons the neglect of it as a sign of Hatred, as you may see Levit. 19.17. Forasmuch therefore as to rebuke is not onely not evil, but the great∣est kindness a Man can do to a wicked Person; it must needs be look'd upon as a Sin, to make it the ground of our Hatred: which was the second thing to be demonstrated. Next to the Hatred of Good Men, consider we that of the Evil and Injurious, which may seem to have nothing Criminal in it: And indeed, neither would it, if it had onely their Injuriousness for its Object, or the Persons of wicked Men meer∣ly for it; because every thing that is evil, either in it self, or to us, is a just ground of hatred and aversation. But, as it would be con∣sider'd, that he who hates a Person for his Injuriousness, can be pri∣vileg'd no farther by that hate, than to discountenance him in it; so also, that there may be more in him to excite our Love, than there is to stir our Hatred: in which case, there is no doubt, but that our Hatred is to be bounded by it, and go no farther than is consistent with the other. Now, that this is the Case of all evil and injurious Men, will appear, if we consider, that they are God's Creatures, and adorn'd with his Image; that they are the Subjects of his Providence, yea, for whom he sent his Son to die. For, having all these Relati∣ons to God, who is the Supremest Good, both in himself, and to us, they must needs be look'd upon as a juster Object of our Love, than all their Evil and Injuriousness can be a ground of Hate. Though therefore Evil Men, as such, may and ought to be hated; though, so far as we can separate their Injuriousness from their more lovely Qua∣lities, they may lawfully enough become the ground of our aver∣sation: yet inasmuch as they have more to commend them to our Love than Hatred, as we cannot hate them altogether, so neither any farther than is consistent with those things which are the just Object of our Love. The result of which Consideration will be, that though we may hate them as Sinners, yet we may not hate them as Men, but, on the contrary, love, and pray for their conversion, and prosperity in all their lawful Ʋndertakings.

What Hatred is to be look'd upon as sinful, we have seen already; inquire we in the next place, how that which is so, is reducible to this Commandment. A Task which will not be difficult to perform, if we consider this Sin of Hatred either with relation to that Love which the Commandment enjoyns, or to that Sin of Murther which it forbids. For, if (as we learn from the Apostle) this, and other the Command∣ments that follow, enjoyn the loving of our Neighbour; they must consequently be suppos'd to forbid the hatred of him, as being contra∣ry to, and inconsistent with it. And though it be true, that Hatred is not Murther, or other the like Injuriousness, if we mean thereby those of the Hand; yet it is either the murther and injuriousness of

the Heart (which I have shewn to be equally forbidden) or at least the Producer of it: he who hates any Person in the least, naturally wish∣ing some ill or other to him; but he who perfectly hates him, Death: According to that Saying of Ennius, remembred by Tully† 1.6, Quem quisque odit periisse expetit; He who hates any Person, desires his de∣struction. To all which, if we add, That St. John, in the place be∣fore-quoted, affirms the hater of his Brother to be a Murtherer, and that* 1.7 God absolv'd that Manslayer from the guilt of it, who hated him not in time past; so, no doubt can remain, but that the same Com∣mandment which forbids the murthering of a Man, forbids also the hating of him: That being in reason to be thought to be forbidden, to which the Scripture doth not onely give the Title of Murther, but absolves even that Manslayer in whom it should be found not to be.

2. That great Crime of Hatred being thus dispatch'd, proceed we to that of Envy; which is, in short, nothing else than a Grief of Mind for that Good which happens to another. I do not mean, as that Good may become the Instrument of much Mischief, by the Possessors abuse; for in that case a good Man may be griev'd: but because he whom we envy is like to be advantag'd by it. Now, that this, no less than the former, hath the nature of a Sin, and particularly against the present Prohibition, will require no great pains to prove. For, beside that such a Grief, Spider-like, sucks its Poyson from the choi∣cest Flower, because, contrary to Nature, making that which is the proper Object of Joy, the matter of its own Sadness and Discontent; beside that it is a manifest reluctancy to the Dispensations of the Di∣vine Providence, from whence, as all other Good proceeds, so that particular one which we so much envy; beside, lastly, that it is a na∣tural effect of Hatred, and consequently to be suppos'd to be forbid∣den with that Hatred from which it ariseth; it is oftentimes the cause of Murther, and other injurious Actions; but, to be sure, doth always dispose Men to it; The first Murther that was ever committed, pro∣ceeding from hence, that the Sacrifice of the murther'd Person was more accepted by God, than that of the Murtherer was.

3. The same is to be said of wishing any Evil, and particularly Death, to any Person, or of rejoycing in it when it doth befal him; of being angry with our Brother without a cause, or above measure; of proceeding to contumelious or reproachful Speeches to or of him: these, as they are but the fruits of Hatred, so disposing Men to Mur∣ther, and consequently to be suppos'd to be forbidden with it: He that forbids any Action, or at least with any severity, being in reason to be thought to forbid that which disposeth Men to it; because, where that is not carefully avoided, it will be hard to avoid the other. Onely because Anger, and that reproachful Speaking which proceeds from it, is by our Saviour himself particularly referr'd to this Com∣mandment, I think it but a just respect to him, and to his Authority, to allot them a more distinct Consideration. But of that, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in my next.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not kill, and whosoever shall kill, shall be in danger of the judgment.
• * 1.2

  Nobis vero homicidio semel in∣terdicto, etiam conceptum utero, dum adhuc sanguis in hominem deliberatu, dissolvere non licet. Homicidii festinatio est, prohibere nasci, nec refert natam quis eri∣piat animam, an nasientem di∣sturbet Homo est, & qui est fu∣turus Etiam fructus omnis jam in semine est. Apolog. c. 9.
• * 1.3

  Annot. in Mat. 5.39.
• * 1.4

  Immane ver∣bum est ultio, & ab injuria distans tantum ordine Qui ulciscitur, non nisi excusatius peccat.
• † 1.5

  Sulpitius Severus Sacrae Hist. li. 2. p. 368. Hic primus [nem∣pe Nero] Christianum nomen tol∣lere aggressus est. Quippe semper inimica virtutibus vitia sunt, & optimi quique ab improbis quasi exprobrantes aspiciuntur.
• † 1.6

  Tull. de Of∣fic li 2. Pra. clarè Ennius, Quem metuunt oderunt, quem quisque odit periisse expetit.
• * 1.7

  Deut. 19.4. &c.